Complex interdependence and China’s engagement with Australia: navigating between power and vulnerability by Zheng, Yixiao
1 
 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Complex Interdependence and China’s Engagement with 
Australia 
--- Navigating between Power and Vulnerability 
 
 
 
 
 
Yixiao Zheng 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of 
the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy, London, October 2014 
 
2 
 
Declaration 
 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School 
of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it 
is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person 
is clearly identified in it). 
 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full 
acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. 
 
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. 
 
I declare that my thesis consists of 99,616 words. 
  
3 
 
Abstract 
China has become heavily dependent on Australia for resource supply as a result of her rapid economic 
growth over the 2000s. Stable and reliable resource supply from Australia has become a matter of 
national economic security. Yet, China’s resource relationship with Australia is grown out of a delicate 
geopolitical framework, because Australia is not only a resource superpower but also a staunch U.S. ally 
in the Asia-Pacific region. Despite extensive economic interdependence between the two countries, 
China faces a huge challenge to build a genuinely reliable and close resource partnership with Australia. 
This study discusses how China has proactively sought to shape or adapt to the evolving power 
dynamics behind the bilateral resource politics over the 2000s. It provides a relevant case study on the 
resource politics between a rising great power and a resource superpower under the condition of 
complex interdependence. 
 
China’s search for resource security has become the primary goal of her policy towards Australia in the 
2000s. However, China’s engagement with Australia has led to an uneasy resource partnership with 
growing competitive dynamics and constant power struggle. The political context of the resource ties 
between China and Australia has changed dramatically towards the end of the 2000s, as the systemic 
impact of China’s rise has resulted in a deterioration in the strategic dimension of China-Australia 
relatoions. This has in turn created considerable constraints and uncertainties in China’s resource 
cooperation with Australia. Both the difficult resource investment ties and the inequitable iron ore trade 
relationship show the limits of this resource partnership. Australia’s approach to this critical resource 
relationship with China remains ad hoc, transactional and oriented to short-term interest maximisation. 
Despite her growing power, China remains the more vulnerable party in the uneven resource 
interdependence with Australia. The Chinese have sought to improve their power position vis-à-vis the 
Australians; but domestic economic constraints and internal fragmentation have considerably 
undermined Chinese efforts to gain the upper hand in the bilateral resource politics. China has to 
navigate cautiously between power and vulnerability in her engagement with Australia. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background: China’s Rise and Relations with Australia 
1.1.1 Predominance of Extensive Economic Interdependence 
China’s phenomenal economic rise has taken place during an era of economic globalisation, and its' 
entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 has ushered in a new era of economic 
development and rapid economic growth. China has emerged as the world’s second largest economy 
measured by gross domestic product (GDP), leading the shift in global power and the collective rise of 
the emerging economies across the globe. The country's rising economic salience is further accentuated 
by the relative decline of the West following the 2008-2009 global financial and economic crises. The rise 
of Chinese economic power has also been accompanied by the perceived growth of its' military 
capabilities. China has come to be regarded as a formidable strategic force with the potential and 
ambitions to challenge the United States' strategic primacy. The rise of the Chinese economy and military 
is transforming the structure of the international system and the U.S.-led world order. Accordingly, 
China’s rise is also reshaping the underlying power structure of Chinese-Australian relations. By the early 
2010s, the growing power disparities between these two countries – a middle power and a near, if not 
realised, superpower – is increasingly resulting in an unequal power relationship.  
 
In the bilateral context, China’s rise vis-à-vis Australia is first and foremost a result of the development of 
robust resource ties between the two countries during the 2000s. China’s strong economic growth and 
the pattern of her economic development have fuelled an insatiable demand for resources and raw 
materials. As China has become the world’s largest consumer of resources, Australia, as a ‘resource 
superpower’, has emerged as an increasingly vital resource partner for China.  
 
Bilateral relations between China and Australia, in terms of trade and investment, are dominated by 
resource ties.
1
 This growing resource partnership has led to a continuous surge in bilateral (merchandise) 
trade since the 1990s. Thanks to surging demand in China for Australian minerals (most notably iron ore, 
which constitutes the bulk of the bilateral resource trade) and energy resources (such as coal and natural 
gas), China overtook Japan in 2007 to become Australia’s largest resource buyer and merchandise 
                                                        
1
 Interview: 24 
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export market. Australia has also emerged as the top destination for China’s outbound direct foreign 
investment and become home to some of China’s largest overseas foreign direct investment (FDI) 
projects and proposals. Indeed, China is now the largest emerging FDI investor in Australia. As a result of 
an ambitious strategy to acquire Australia’s resource assets, a rapid surge in Chinese direct investments, 
mostly undertaken by government-related investment entities, was registered in the second half of the 
2000s. 
 
The resource business has formed the backbone of the bilateral relations and underpinned the extensive 
economic interdependence between China and Australia. Australia has become a major overseas 
resource supplier for China, and in turn China has become the key to Australia’s future economic 
prosperity as it embraces what has been termed the Asian century. The development of this resource 
partnership has fuelled the rapid expansion of the Australian resources sector, and the mining boom has 
become the key driver of the Australian economy and a major reason behind the country’s continued 
economic success despite the recent global financial and economic crises. 
 
Beyond the vital resource ties, the bilateral relations also encompass a security dimension, which reflects 
the strategic dynamics between China and Australia. Although the bilateral economic relationship centred 
on resource cooperation has dominated the agenda, this security relationship has never been far from 
strategic significance. In fact, the security dimension has always remained an important area of policy 
deliberation for both the Chinese and Australians, even when the bilateral relations seemed to have been 
overwhelmed by the resource engagement. This is not, however, simply because the strategic dynamics 
have already started to complicate the economic dealings between the two countries. If anything, the 
state of this security relationship always carries a great influence over the overall political direction of 
Chinese-Australian relations, in terms of the basic pattern of amity and enmity between them. This was 
the case during the decade of the 1990s following the end of the Cold War and has also been true during 
the 2000s, when the overall bilateral relationship has been increasingly shaped by the economic 
imperative of resource cooperation. The security dimension will gain increasing salience in the bilateral 
context when the strategic implications of China’s rise further complicate the security dynamics between 
China and Australia, with global repercussions.  
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Sino-Australian security ties have undergone several stages of transformation from the 1990s through 
the post-9/11 period and into the post-crisis era. These changing patterns are part of a broader strategic 
transformation that continues to unfold as a result of China’s rise to global power. Insofar as the 2000s 
are concerned, the 9/11 incident as well as the global financial and economic crises at the end of the 
decade, resulted in a series of systemic changes in the global and regional strategic circumstances 
under which China’s security relationship with Australia evolved. The shifting power balance between 
China and the United States, evolving Chinese strategic behaviour and U.S. security priorities, have had 
a huge impact on U.S.-China relations and the Asia-Pacific regional security environment. Changes in 
these systemic factors contributed to a delicate security relationship between China and Australia. As an 
integral part of the strategic triangle between Beijing, Canberra and Washington, the Chinese-Australian 
security relationship remains inherently uncertain and precarious, not least because of irreconcilable 
ideological differences, deep-seated mutual distrust, opposing outlooks on American hegemony, and 
conflicting long-term strategic preferences. 
 
It is true that as a middle power, the only Western power in the Western Pacific, and a significant security 
actor in the region with a robust alliance relationship with the United States, Australia has occupied a 
special place in China’s foreign policy considerations. From the Chinese perspective, the fact that 
Australia is geographically the most proximate Western country and America’s closest ally in the region, 
has added significance to China’s relationship with Australia. The Chinese have come to regard the 
political relationship with Australia as having a special meaning following post-9/11 strategic 
rapprochement. Indeed, the Chinese leaders began to view China’s relationship with Australia as an 
exemplary model for relations between China and the West.
2
 The resultant Chinese enthusiasm for a 
strategic partnership with Australia provides an insight into the importance Beijing attached to China’s 
political ties with Canberra. The deterioration in the security relationship after 2008 caused some anxiety 
for the Chinese. Arguably, the changing alliance dynamics between Australia and the United States in the 
post-crisis era and Australia’s place in America’s Asian pivot strategy, reinforced China’s strategic anxiety 
and further accentuated Australia’s strategic significance for the Chinese amidst a deteriorating regional 
security environment. 
                                                        
2
 Interview: 27 
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Having said that, Australia nonetheless remains a distant power in China’s strategic thinking. It is close 
enough to be generally considered as part of the region, but too far away (both geographically and 
culturally) to be considered an East Asian regional country by the Chinese.
3
 Despite her location in the 
Western Pacific, Australia at best belongs to the ‘greater/outer peripheral region’ (dazhoubian). Although 
Australia is a significant security actor in the Asia-Pacific region, Australia, unlike countries such as 
Japan and even South Korea, is not a strategically or politically important regional power that 
necessitates China’s constant attention, insofar as the Chinese strategic policy is concerned. Hence, the 
security dimension of the bilateral relationship no longer consistently dominates the agenda of the 
bilateral politics. Rather, the traditional military security agenda has had to constantly compete with 
resource-focused economic affairs for policy attention, both in Beijing and Canberra.  
 
Although both resource ties and security relationships still constitute two very important dimensions of 
Chinese-Australian relations, it is the resource relationship that has become the primary concern of both 
countries. The security relationship remains important in its own right, but China’s economic rise in the 
new century has demoted the security dimension to second place, whether in comparison with its relative 
significance in the 1990s (and early 2000s), or as compared with the economic dimension. If anything, 
the bilateral resource engagement has acquired overriding importance. After all, Chinese-Australian 
relations have been built on the back of the resource partnership.  
 
Arguably, if the post-2008 security relationship is said to have taken on a new meaning, it is the vital 
resource partnership that has given additional weight to it, especially from the Chinese perspective. If 
economic statecraft is defined in terms of the use of economic inducements or coercion to achieve 
political and security goals,
4
 China’s policy towards Southeast Asian countries more or less reflect an 
                                                        
3
 Interviews: 6, 37 
4
 According to The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, economic statecraft is defined by David Baldwin as 
‘influence attempts relying primarily on resources which have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of 
money’. In other words, economic statecraft ‘is any political act which utilises economic instruments to achieve 
compliant behaviour from a Target actor… Economic statecraft may appropriately be regarded as an umbrella term 
covering all instances where international actors use economic instruments for political ends’ (Evans & Newnham, 
1998: 145-146). 
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overriding geopolitical imperative of strategic reassurance and inducement through the use of economic 
statecraft. By contrast, nowadays China’s approach to Australia is not dominated (or primarily driven) by 
the same geo-strategic logic of economic statecraft. Despite the fact that the growing economic 
interdependence that flows from the robust resource partnership has had a stabilising effect on the 
bilateral security relationship since the late 1990s, the Chinese motivation behind the growing resource 
partnership with Australia has increasingly taken on a momentum of its own, and is primarily 
developmental in nature. There has always been a growing incentive to tap into the burgeoning 
economic relationship given its huge strategic dividend.
5
 Nonetheless, China’s economic engagement 
with Australia has first and foremost been driven by the developmental imperative of resource security; 
and Chinese foreign policy towards Australia during the 2000s has increasingly been characterised by a 
geo-economic agenda, with the aim of making Australia a reliable major resource supplier for China. 
 
As Chinese-Australian relations were transformed by China’s rise during the 2000s, it is interesting to 
observe how China’s rise has shaped the dynamics of power politics between the two countries. In light 
of the central role resource cooperation has played in advancing the bilateral relations, it is necessary to 
explore the implications of China’s growth in power for the resource power politics between the two 
countries. As the 2000s was characterised by economic globalisation and the initiation of a global shift in 
power, it is all the more important to explore resource power politics between China and Australia in the 
context of growing economic interdependence and the evolving security dynamics during the course of 
the decade. In short, this thesis’s analysis of China’s resource power politics vis-à-vis Australia is 
undertaken against the background of China’s rise, extensive economic interdependence and changing 
strategic dynamics in the bilateral security relationship with Australia. 
 
1.1.2 Paradox between Growing Power and Vulnerability 
To some extent, China’s rise has become almost a testament to the success of economic globalisation 
and is leading the global power shift. Despite her rising power, China remains vulnerable to a series of 
structural constraints at home and within the international system. Whilst the nation’s rising power is often 
taken for granted, her vulnerability has so far remained less discernible, often overshadowed and 
                                                        
5
 Interview 16 
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eclipsed by the confusion and thrills produced by the former. Yet, rising power and entrenched 
vulnerability do constitute a real paradox of China’s rise. An ascendant China has to face the dual 
challenge of adapting to her increasing power and coping with her vulnerability. The interplay between 
power and vulnerability has created considerable uncertainty about the way in which China would use 
her power, respond to her vulnerability and handle her foreign relations. This thesis attempts to engage 
this paradoxical dimension of China’s rise. 
 
This paradoxical nature of China’s rise sets the theme for this study in the context of China’s bilateral 
relations with Australia. As this thesis will show, the challenge of navigating herself through this paradox 
is a real and hard test of Chinese foreign policy. The processes and outcomes of China’s resource power 
politics vis-à-vis Australia demonstrate that China has to make painstaking efforts to strike a fine balance 
between strength and vulnerability, seeking to maximise the gains with the growing power at her disposal 
whilst avoiding the pitfalls of misjudging the constraints imposed by its vulnerability. Failures to 
understand the limits of her power and the logic of her vulnerability can be costly in policy terms for the 
Chinese. Unless China can come to grips with the implications of the growing tensions between her rising 
power and vulnerability, it is unlikely that the country will be able to implement a policy with sufficient 
depth and coherence in her quest for resource security with Australia. 
 
It is important to emphasise here the distinction between the different possible meanings of the word 
‘vulnerability’. The word ‘vulnerability’ is not used in the context of this study to mean ‘fragility’, though the 
two words could have some overlapping connotations. This study uses the concept of vulnerability as 
construed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in their seminal text of neoliberalism – Power and 
Interdependence. The theoretical definition of this concept is however relatively abstract, so it will be 
discussed in the subsequent section on the thesis’ theoretical framework in this chapter. To put it simply, 
at least insofar as this study is concerned, ‘vulnerability’ basically refers to a situation where one is faced 
by an unfavourable position but lacks sufficient options or autonomy to change that unfavourable position; 
this is because such options are either unavailable or too costly and the constraints are too immense to 
overcome. Indeed, this notion of vulnerability captures the essence of the Chinese word ‘beidong’ (被动), 
which in fact is often used to refer to China’s relatively unfavourable position vis-à-vis the United States, 
which, more often than not, dominates the bilateral relations over a variety of issues areas. Given the 
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existing power disparities between China and the United States, the United States’ advantageous power 
position vis-à-vis China has allowed the former to enjoy a favourable power position in the bilateral 
dealings vis-à-vis China.
6
 The sense of vulnerability (or beidong) therefore used to characterise the 
Chinese foreign policy thinking on China’s relations with America as the Chinese endeavour to maintain 
their room for manoeuvre under U.S. predominance; to get rid of the vulnerable position has always been 
an important foreign policy imperative for Beijing in the power politics vis-à-vis Washington.
7
 In this 
regard, zhudong (主动) is the very antithesis of beidong (被动) in the Chinese strategic thinking. In plain 
English, the word ‘zhudong’ entails a great amount of room for manoeuvre in whatever situations; to 
some extent, the meaning of ‘zhudong’ echoes the idea of ‘the initiative’, which basically means (one has) 
‘the power or opportunity to act and gain an advantage before other people do’.
8
 In this regard, the idea 
of getting rid of vulnerability (baituo beidong) and the notion of seizing the initiative (zhengqu zhudong) 
are basically two sides of the same coin.  
 
From the Chinese perspective, the situations of beidong (vulnerability) and zhudong essentially reflect 
states’ relative power position vis-à-vis other states.
9
 Accordingly, as China’s power continues to grow, 
the strategic goal of seeking greater foreign policy autonomy and striving for greater freedom of 
manoeuvre is thought to have somehow become relative easier to attain. Indeed, this new thinking 
reflects growing Chinese confidence in foreign affairs and would arguably push back the boundaries of 
Chinese ambitions. Arguably, China’s growing power is also likely to diminish her tolerance for her 
vulnerability;
10
 for a rising potential superpower, the need to overcome her vulnerability and seek greater 
strategic initiatives would only become ever more pressing for Chinese foreign security and economic 
                                                        
6
 See interview with Wang Jisi: http://www.nfcmag.com/article/2139.html 
7
 See various discussions of this strategic thinking by Chinese military and foreign policy strategists: 
http://dangshi.people.com.cn/GB/18003056.html; http://www.globalview.cn/ReadNews.asp?NewsID=516; 
http://www.nfcmag.com/article/2139.html; 
http://www.ciss.pku.edu.cn/ueditor/net/upload/file/20140813/6354348760247173005423273.pdf; 
http://www.dfdaily.com/html/8762/2012/9/18/863587_2.shtml; http://opinion.china.com.cn/opinion_37_83437.html; 
http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2014-10/5160549.html 
8
 See Oxford Dictionary: http://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/initiative 
9
 See interview with Wang Jisi: http://www.nfcmag.com/article/2139.html 
10
 See relevant discussions of China’s diminishing tolerance by Zhang Yunling and Wang Jisi: 
http://www.dfdaily.com/html/8762/2012/9/18/863587.shtml; 
http://www.ciss.pku.edu.cn/ueditor/net/upload/file/20140813/6354348760247173005423273.pdf 
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policies alike.  
 
China’s resource power politics vis-à-vis Australia has already demonstrated such dynamics in Chinese 
strategic thinking. In essence, this thesis is telling a story about the Chinese response to the interplay 
between China’s vulnerability and growing power in the search for resource security with Australia. From 
the Chinese perspective, this is a story about China’s struggle to get rid of her vulnerable position (baituo 
beidong jumian 摆脱被动局面) and seek the upper hand (zhangwo zhudong 掌握主动) in the resource 
power politics vis-à-vis Australia.  
 
In the light of the central role of the resource ties in the bilateral relations, it is interesting to see how the 
paradox between growing power and vulnerability is played out in the resource power politics between 
the two countries. Indeed, as the empirical analysis will demonstrate, this study is very much focused on 
the Chinese vulnerability in the resource power politics against a background of a rising great power 
seeking to maximise her resource security interest. Moreover, given the nature of the China-Australia 
relations as outlined previously in this section, it is all the more important to explore the resource power 
politics by taking account of both the extensive economic interdependence and the evolving security 
dynamics between China and Australia over the 2000s; in other words, the interplay of forces of 
economic globalisation and power shift also constitutes a crucial analytical background in this study. 
 
From the Chinese perspective, the bilateral resource politics basically focuses on two issue areas: the 
transnational battle between the Chinese steel industry and Australian iron mining oligarchs for iron ore 
pricing power, and the political struggle over Chinese government investment in Australia’s resources 
sector. Whilst the former represents the politics of resource trade, the latter illustrates the politics of 
resource investment. The reason for this focus is that the bilateral resource power politics is most 
intensely played out in these two issues areas as both sides have immense interests at stake in the 
outcomes of the power struggles. Moreover, these two issues areas are most reflective of the underlying 
patterns of the relative power relationship between China and Australia.  
 
As this study will show, Australia has enjoyed considerable advantages in terms of resource power, and 
the Chinese seek to change this unfavourable status quo. The Chinese actors have been striving for 
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increased Chinese ownership of resource assets in Australia and control of resource prices. By 
leveraging China’s enhanced market status and new-found financial power in the power politics vis-à-vis 
the Australians, the Chinese aim to beef up China’s market influence and secure reliable supply of 
Australian resources at reasonable prices. For the Australians, the challenge is how to sustain and 
expand the lucrative resource business with China and maximise the gains and benefits from China’s 
economic rise through the resource ties, while at the same time preserve and protect the country’s 
dominance as a resource superpower in terms of Australian control of quality resources and their pricing. 
By looking at the Chinese experience in these struggles for resource power, this thesis hopes to shed 
light on how China tackles the contradiction between rising power and vulnerability in her relations with 
Australia. 
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1.2 Research Topic and Purpose 
The aim of this research is to analyse China’s engagement with Australia in the context of China’s rise 
during the 2000s. More specifically, it investigates China’s resource interaction with Australia. 
 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the power politics of economic interdependence. It looks at how 
the power dynamics behind the bilateral resource politics evolve in the context of China’s rise, and how 
China responds to the dynamic pattern of resource politics. 
 
The study draws on neoliberal International Relations (IR) theory of complex interdependence in 
conjunction with the neoliberal perspective on the power politics of asymmetrical interdependence, to 
explain China’s resource politics vis-à-vis Australia. 
 
1.2.1 Research Question  
How has China sought to shape and adapt to the evolving power dynamics behind the bilateral resource 
politics with Australia in the 2000s? 
 
1.2.2 Research Objectives 
In order to address the core research question, the study will seek to accomplish the following objectives: 
1 To examine the geopolitical context of Chinese-Australian resource politics and to understand the 
strategic constraints faced by China; 
2 To assess the basic pattern of China’s power position vis-à-vis Australia in the struggle over 
Chinese investment in Australia’s resources sector and the battle for iron ore pricing; 
3 To analyse the roles and interests of various Chinese actors involved in Sino-Australian resource 
politics; 
4 To explain the Chinese and Australian responses and how they have shaped the power dynamics of 
the bilateral resource politics; 
5 To discuss the broader implications of Sino-Australian resource politics for complex 
interdependence theory and China’s foreign policy. 
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1.2.3 Overarching Argument  
This thesis argues that China does not enjoy a superior power position vis-à-vis Australia in bilateral 
resource politics under complex interdependence theory. Despite her perceived rising economic power, 
China has failed to gain the upper hand in the issue-specific power politics versus Australia in the iron ore 
pricing war and in the controversy over Chinese resource investment in Australia. The Chinese have 
sought to redress the unfavourable patterns of asymmetrical vulnerability interdependence in the bilateral 
resource power politics vis-à-vis the Australians. However, these efforts have been seriously undermined 
due to domestic constraints, which have significantly contributed to Chinese vulnerability. 
 
Realist dynamics in the strategic dimension of the bilateral relations have also imposed significant 
geopolitical constraints on the development of the resource ties. As China’s strategic relations with 
Australia continue to be strained by the revived adversarial dynamics in response to China’s rising power, 
the development of resource ties with Australia faces growing strategic risks.  
 
Hence, despite the perception of China’s rise and the country’s favourable power position in terms of the 
overall power asymmetries between China and Australia, China nonetheless faces significant 
international political and domestic constraints in her search for resource security. In order to protect her 
resource security interests, China has to cautiously navigate between rising power and vulnerability in 
her relations with Australia. 
 
1.2.4 Chapter Outline 
Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 discusses the changing patterns of China’s security relationship with Australia over the 2000s. 
This strategic dimension of the bilateral relations defines the political framework under which the 
economic partnership between China and Australia develops. In no small measure, China’s increasingly 
vital resource partnership with Australia was grown out of a highly dynamic and difficult geopolitical 
context. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the geopolitical context in which the bilateral resource 
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politics was played out. It discusses the strategic dimension of the bilateral relations by investigating the 
evolving trajectory of the changing strategic dynamics between the two countries in the post-9/11 and 
post-2008 eras respectively.  
 
The chapter argues that China’s delicate strategic relations with Australia underwent some major 
changes in the first decade of the new century. The bilateral relations improved significantly during the 
post-9/11 era that featured a steady warming-up of the bilateral relations; but since 2008 there was a 
serious deterioration in the strategic dimension of the bilateral relations. China’s growing power and 
expansionist behaviour following the global financial crisis brought about a chain of systemic changes 
that had led to a deteriorating regional strategic environment, characterised by intensified tensions in 
China-U.S. relations, changing U.S. regional strategic posture, and heightened strategic rivalry in East 
Asia. The deterioration in China-Australia strategic ties since 2008 was part of this wider geopolitical 
change.  
 
The geo-strategic context set out in this chapter underlines the geopolitical constraints faced by China in 
her bilateral resource power politics vis-à-vis Australia. By illustrating the ups and downs in the bilateral 
relations during the post-9/11 and post-2008 eras respectively, the strategic analysis in this chapter set 
out the wider geopolitical context for the issue-specific analysis of bilateral resource politics in the 
subsequent chapters. It helps readers better appreciate the delicate strategic context of the bilateral 
resource ties and its ensuing implications for the development of this resource partnership. As the 
subsequent chapters will illustrate, the precarious nature of this bilateral political relationship had 
seriously limited the potential for economic cooperation and precluded China and Australia from 
establishing a reliable and intimate resource partnership. 
 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 is concerned with the investment aspect of the bilateral resource politics. More specifically, it 
discusses the power politics over Chinese investment in Australia’s resources sector. The Chinese 
government investors flocked to Australia in search of greater control of resource assets over recent 
years. The rapid surge in China’s government-related foreign direct investment in the Australian 
resources sector since 2008 caused a huge controversy and Australia sought to restrict Chinese 
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government investment in order to protect her national interests. The controversy over Chinese 
government investment in Australia highlights one of the most important and thorny aspects of the 
evolving resource ties between China and Australia. This is therefore an arena in which the power 
dynamics behind the politics of resource relationship is most intensely played out. The purpose of this 
chapter is to illustrate the power dynamics behind this investment politics. By examining the Chinese 
efforts to shape and adapt to the power politics of China’s dynamic resource investment relations with 
Australia, it seeks to answer the research question and throw light on the limits of the bilateral resource 
investment ties and the nature of the resource partnership.  
 
This chapter argues that China’s resource investors were vulnerable to Australian restrictions on foreign 
government investment. Despite their great financial power and mercantilist ambitions, the Chinese 
investors had no choice but to adapt to Australia’s rather stringent and restrictive foreign government 
investment regime because the favourable underlying patterns of asymmetrical vulnerability 
interdependence. China carried out a mercantilist strategy of resource acquisition in Australia via her 
government investment vehicles in an attempt to enhance Chinese control of Australian resource assets. 
The Australian authorities were determined to protect Australia’s resource domination by blocking and 
restricting China’s government investment in the country’s resources sector to protect Australian 
dominance in the resource relationship. China’s apparent vulnerability in the resource investment politics 
was in stark contrast to the general perception of growing Chinese power that was derived from the 
phenomenal surge of Chinese investment in Australia’s resources sector. When it comes to assessing 
the real power relationship between China and Australia in the specific area of resource investment, the 
reality of Chinese vulnerability is a more accurate indicator than the overwhelming yet misleading sense 
of rising Chinese purchasing power that had engulfed Australia. The findings of this chapter reinforce the 
conclusion of the thesis, which argues that China has to cope with her vulnerability in her resource 
politics vis-à-vis Australia despite her perceived growing power.  
 
Having demonstrated Chinese vulnerability in the face of the Australian policy restrictions on Chinese 
government investment, this chapter also illustrates the limits of the resource partnership by highlighting 
the limited scope of the resource investment ties. The intense power struggle and complex political 
manoeuvres on both sides have clearly showed the lack of trust and depth in the resource cooperation 
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that had seriously impinged the development of a genuinely reliable resource partnership between China 
and Australia. 
 
Chapter 4 
Whilst the politics of resource investment is an important dimension of the resource politics, the politics of 
resource trade constitutes another crucial aspect of the bilateral resource power politics, especially 
pertaining to the distribution of gains from the bilateral resource cooperation. China’s gigantic demand for 
iron ores resulted in growing prices of imported iron ores from Australia and elsewhere. Inspired by the 
growing salience of the Chinese market in the global iron ore trade, the Chinese steel industry 
endeavoured to fight a ‘war’ against the dominant Australian miners over the iron ore import prices in 
response to the miners’ attempts to raise ore prices. The battle for iron ore pricing power was another 
most important aspect of China’s resource politics with Australia because the iron ore trade constituted 
the bulk of the bilateral resource trade and both sides had immense interests at stake.  
 
In fact, there is an inherent causal relationship between the battle for iron ore pricing and the struggle 
over Chinese resource investment in Australia, not least because China’s aggressive investment spree in 
Australia was in no small measure a direct response to the Chinese predicament in the iron ore trade with 
the Australian miners. China’s entrenched vulnerability in the power struggle over iron ore pricing was 
costly and taught the Chinese a most painful lesson about the importance of gaining control of the 
upstream resources for the survival of downstream resource-dependent industries. After all, China’s 
experience in the iron ore pricing debacle had led the Chinese to believe that increased ownership and 
control of upstream iron ore resources in Australia could significantly enhance the Chinese market 
influence over iron ore pricing and increase downstream steel makers’ ability to absorb the costs of 
surging raw material costs. This market logic was apparent behind many of the huge Chinese investment 
adventures into Australia’s iron ore assets. Arguably, the Chinese experience in the transnational 
struggle over iron ore pricing had greatly influenced the Chinese geo-economic thinking about the 
mineral resource strategy at both the national and corporate levels. In other words, if the Chinese 
resource investment in Australia was ultimately aimed at acquiring a dominant market influence centred 
on the control over resource pricing, then the iron ore pricing issue could be regarded as the ‘fuse’ for the 
great controversy over Chinese investment. In this regard, the power politics over Chinese resource 
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investment was essentially a continuation of the power politics over iron ore pricing between China and 
Australia. To fully appreciate the geo-economic and market rationales behind China’s thirst for market 
power in Australia’s resources sector, one has to look at the trade dimension of this resource partnership; 
and the iron ore pricing war is the most relevant starting point in this regard.  
 
Chapter 4 will discusses this important dimension of the resource politics by looking into the power 
politics of the transnational struggle over iron ore pricing power between China’s steel makers and the 
Australian mining oligarchs. Its purpose is to answer the thesis’ research question by analysing how the 
various Chinese industry actors endeavoured to shape and adapt to the evolving power dynamics behind 
the transnational battle over iron ore pricing power against the dominant Australian miners. 
 
This chapter argues that the Chinese steel makers remained completely vulnerable to the Australian 
pricing initiatives to raise the ore price. Rising iron ore import costs had depressed the profit margins of 
steelmakers; the deterioration in the Chinese steel industry’s earnings performance since the global 
financial crisis rendered the surging raw material costs increasingly intolerable towards the end of the 
2000s. As a result, the iron ore price issue was politicised and became a matter of national economic 
security in China; it emerged as an important policy agenda for China in her bilateral relations with 
Australia. However, In the face of the miners’ dominant pricing power, China’s steelmakers failed to exert 
any effective influence over the iron ore prices and pricing mechanism. In this regard, both the underlying 
patterns of sensitivity and vulnerability were working against the Chinese side. Despite the fact that 
China had emerged as the world’s largest iron ore importing country and the biggest export market for 
Australian iron ores, the Chinese had failed to translate the country’s overall market position into real 
market power over commodity pricing in the iron ore pricing war, and were forced to adapt to the 
Australian dominance over the iron ore trade, even when the surging raw material costs and a 
deteriorating Chinese economic environment had almost brought the entire Chinese steel industry to its 
knees. China still lacked and failed to acquire the market influence over iron ore price and pricing regime 
that was commensurable with the country’s overall market size in the global iron ore trading business. 
The main argument of this chapter is consistent with the thesis’ central argument that China has to 
navigate between vulnerability and power in her resource politics vis-à-vis Australia.  
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If anything, the iron ore pricing war illustrated the subjugation of the Chinese steel industry by the 
Australian mining oligarchs in the political economy of iron ore trade. The vast power disparities between 
the Chinese ore buyers and the Australian ore suppliers allowed the latter to profit immensely from the 
lucrative ore business by taking advantage of the Chinese vulnerability. Such inequitable terms of 
resource trade were consistent with the changing nature of the geopolitical ties between the two 
countries. Like the resource investment ties, the trade relationship was also grown out of a delicate and 
precarious geopolitical framework. The revived strategic tensions and even growing adversarial 
dynamics observed over recent years in the bilateral strategic relationship had rendered the broader 
political context increasingly difficult for the development of a truly equitable and harmonious resource 
trade partnership. 
 
Chapter 5 
The previous chapter has also briefly discussed the ways in which the Chinese endeavoured to reduce 
the country’s dependence on the three dominant miners. Efforts such as increasing China’s indigenous 
iron ore supplies and Chinese-owned iron ore assets abroad were all supply-side strategies that aimed at 
undermining the three mining oligarchs’ monopoly control of iron ore supply and strengthening Chinese 
market power. Those measures were essentially supply-side strategies to reduce Chinese dependence 
on the major iron ore suppliers. However, such efforts could hardly undermine the dominant market 
power of the three mining oligarchs or help significantly reduce Chinese dependence on them in the short 
term.  
 
This chapter will look into the demand-side Chinese deliberations to tackle China’s vulnerability in the 
iron ore pricing war. It will examine in detail how the various domestic economic constraints significantly 
contributed to Chinese vulnerability in the battle for pricing power and explain why it was so difficult for 
the Chinese to get rid of those domestic constraints under complex interdependence.  
 
The Chinese side encountered enormous domestic obstacles to improving the Chinese power position in 
the transnational iron ore price struggle. In no small measure, the Chinese predicament in the iron ore 
pricing war was the spillover created by those domestic obstacles. In order to have a deeper 
understanding of the sources of the Chinese vulnerability in the iron ore pricing war, this chapter 
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considers those domestic constraints on the Chinese actors by mainly looking into two major issues: the 
rampant speculative trading in China’s iron ore import market, and the steel industry’s structural 
problems.  
 
These two situations had considerably aggravated the Chinese predicament in the iron ore struggle by 
popping up Chinese demand for imported iron ores and depressing steelmakers’ profit margins. By 
tracing the various internal constraints behind these two situations, Chapter 5 seeks to shed light on the 
internal sources of Chinese predicament in the transnational struggle for resource pricing power. 
 
The analysis of the domestic sources of Chinese vulnerability is a very important step to answer the 
thesis’ research question and some of the research objectives. It is not only necessary for understanding 
the roles and interests of the various Chinese actors involved in the struggle for pricing power, but also 
extremely crucial for understanding China’s disadvantageous power position vis-à-vis Australia and why 
the various Chinese endeavours in the transnational power politics of resource trade always failed to 
enhance China’s bargaining power. Hence, though the analytical focus of this chapter is 
domestic-oriented, it nonetheless constitutes an integral part of the empirical analysis of China’s resource 
power politics vis-à-vis Australia. 
 
The chapter argues that the internal fragmentation among the Chinese market actors in China’s iron ore 
import sector and the problems of overcapacity and excessive investment in the Chinese steel industry 
constituted the two major domestic sources of Chinese vulnerability in the transnational resource politics 
vis-à-vis Australia.  
 
China’s enhanced market status in the iron ore trade failed to bring about an improvement in the Chinese 
power position vis-à-vis the Australian mining oligarchs. Because of the interest fragmentation and lack 
of internal coherence among the Chinese market actors in China’s iron ore import sector, the Chinese 
steel industry tried in vain to crackdown on the rampant speculative trading in the iron ore spot market, 
which contributed significantly to the surging iron ore prices. Given the pluralistic patterns of actors 
involved and the divergent interests at stake, the Chinese market actors remained rather incapable of 
maintaining their coherence in the collective struggle against the Australian miners. Notably, the 
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divergent interests among the various state-owned and private market actors of the Chinese steel 
industry as well as the infighting between the steel industry actors and the minerals trading community 
clearly demonstrated how internal fragmentation could jeopardise the Chinese efforts to curb the 
rampant speculative trading and undermine some of the collective bargaining strategies against the 
Australian mining oligarchs in the price negotiations. 
 
The persistent problems of overcapacity and excess investment in steel capacity considerably increased 
Chinese demand for iron ore, thereby contributing to the high prices of imported iron ore. Moreover, 
overcapacity led to over-supply of steel, which was a major cause for the steel industry’s persistently 
bleak outlook over recent years as the Chinese economy slowed down and demand for steel fell. Hence, 
the problem of overcapacity had simultaneously aggravated Chinese vulnerability to iron ore price hikes 
and sensitivity to increased raw material costs. The analysis also suggests that the problem of steel 
overcapacity was reinforced by a series of structural factors pertaining to China’s economic growth model 
and development patterns; problems such as local protectionism and the Chinese economy’s heavy 
reliance on property market and (infrastructure) investment, had all made it extremely difficult to combat 
overcapacity and eradicate its root causes without paying a huge price. 
 
This chapter finds that the above-mentioned domestic economic constraints had seriously undermined 
the Chinese efforts to manipulate asymmetrical interdependence and eradicate vulnerability in the iron 
ore pricing war against the Australian mining oligarchs. By considering the domestic dimension of China’s 
transnational battle with the Australia for iron ore pricing power, the analysis reinforces the thesis’ core 
argument that China has to cope with her vulnerability despite her growing power in the bilateral resource 
politics vis-à-vis Australia. 
 
Chapter 6 
This concluding chapter summarises the empirical findings in relation to the theory of complex 
interdependence, which provides the overarching analytical framework for this study. It seeks to answer 
the research question by addressing the more specific research objectives that are set out in the 
introduction chapter. 
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The chapter argues that China does not enjoy a superior power position vis-à-vis Australia in bilateral 
resource politics under complex interdependence. Despite the perception of China’s rise and the 
country’s favourable power position in terms of the overall power disparities between China and Australia, 
China nonetheless faces significant international political and domestic constraints in her search for 
resource security with Australia. In order to protect her resource security interest, China has to navigate 
cautiously between rising power and vulnerability in her relations with Australia. 
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1.3 Theoretical Framework 
1.3.1 Neoliberal Theory of Power Politics of Interdependence 
The analysis of Chinese-Australian resource politics requires a theoretical understanding of the power 
politics of interdependence. By combining liberal emphasis on (economic) interdependence and realist 
focus on power (politics), neoliberal IR theory of asymmetrical interdependence provides a relevant 
starting point for the analysis of power politics of economic interdependence. Since China’s relations with 
Australia has been characterised by power politics of resource interdependence, it is helpful to begin the 
analysis by taking a neoliberal perspective on the Sino-Australian resource politics. 
 
The neoliberal theory of interdependence politics is laid out by Keohane and Nye in their seminal work 
Power and Interdependence. It offers a power-oriented analysis of the politics of interdependence, and 
can be applied to relations between transnational actors (such as multinational corporations) and 
governments, as well as interstate relations. By and large, the theory itself consists of the following 
propositions. 
 
First, asymmetrical interdependence can be a source of power. Keohane and Nye suggest that ‘a less 
dependent actor in a relationship often has a significant political resource, because changes in the 
relationship (which the actor may be able to initiate or threaten) will be less costly to that actor than to its 
partners’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 10). 
 
Second, the authors identify two important dimensions of power deriving from asymmetrical 
interdependence, which are namely ‘sensitivity interdependence’ and ‘vulnerability interdependence’. In 
terms of the cost of dependence, ‘sensitivity means liability to costly effects imposed from outside before 
policies are altered to try to change the situation’, whereas ‘vulnerability can be defined as an actor’s 
liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered’ (Keohane & Nye, 
2011: 11). 
 
Sensitivity ‘involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework – how quickly do changes in 
one country bring costly changes in another, and how great are the costly effects?’ (Keohane & Nye, 
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2011: 10). It is ‘measured not merely by the volume of flows across borders but also by the costly effects 
of changes in transactions on the societies or governments’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 10). The vulnerability 
dimension of interdependence ‘rests on the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that 
various actors face’ (Keohane & Nye 2011: 11). It ‘can be measured only by the costliness of making 
effective adjustments to a changed environment over a period of time’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 11). 
 
Third, Power and Interdependence sets out a hierarchy of power resources derived from different types 
of asymmetrical interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 13-16). According to Keohane and Nye, power 
deriving from asymmetrical vulnerability interdependence dominates power deriving from asymmetrical 
sensitivity interdependence, i.e., ‘sensitivity interdependence will be less important than vulnerability 
interdependence in providing power resources to actors’; ‘if one actor can reduce its costs by altering its 
policy, either domestically or internationally, the sensitivity patterns will not be a good guide to power 
resources’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 13). In this regard, ‘vulnerability interdependence includes the 
strategic dimension that sensitivity interdependence omits’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 14). Keohane and 
Nye suggest that policymakers and policy analysts ‘must examine underlying patterns of vulnerability 
interdependence when they decide on strategies’ since ‘coherent policy must be based on an analysis of 
actual and potential vulnerabilities’; and ‘an attempt to manipulate asymmetrical sensitivity 
interdependence without regard for underlying patterns of vulnerability is likely to fail’ (Keohane & Nye, 
2011: 14). 
 
Forth, the theory outlines how actors are likely to play the political game between the different levels of 
power hierarchy. As Keohane and Nye observe, ‘a movement from one power resource to a more 
effective but more costly resource, will be more likely where there is a substantial incongruity between 
the distribution of power resources on one dimension and those on another’. They suggest that ‘in such a 
situation, the disadvantaged actor’s power position would be improved by raising the level at which the 
controversy is conducted’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 14).
 11
 
                                                        
11
 The authors use the example of the power relationship between a multinational resource company and the foreign 
host government to illustrate this dynamic. In a concession agreement, a multinational oil company may seem to have 
a better bargaining position than the host government. The agreement may allow the company to set the level of 
output, and the price, of the petroleum produced, thus making government revenues a company decision. Yet such a 
situation is inherently unstable, since the government may be stronger on the vulnerability dimension. Once the 
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To summarise, ‘influence deriving from favourable asymmetries in sensitivity is very limited when the 
underlying asymmetries in vulnerability are unfavourable’. This is because ‘if one set of rules puts an 
actor in a disadvantageous position, that actor will probably try to change those rules if it can do so at a 
reasonable cost’. Likewise, if a country ‘chafes at its economic vulnerabilities, it may use military force to 
attempt to redress that situation as Japan did in 1941; or, it may subtly threaten to use force, as did the 
United States in 1975, when facing the possibility of future oil boycotts’. However, in many contemporary 
situations, ‘the use of force is so costly, and its threat so difficult to make credible, that a military strategy 
is an act of desperation’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 15). 
 
1.3.2 Complex Interdependence Theory 
The other major theme in Power and Interdependence is the theory of complex interdependence. 
Keohane and Nye conceive a scenario of world politics that is the opposite of realism. They call it 
‘complex interdependence’, which ‘sometimes comes closer to reality than realism does’. Under complex 
interdependence, world politics would be very different than under realist conditions (Keohane & Nye, 
2011: 19). 
 
Defining Characteristics of Complex Interdependence 
According to Keohane and Nye, there are three defining characteristics of complex interdependence. 
First, there are multiple channels of contact, which can be summarised as interstate, trans-governmental 
and transnational relations. Interstate relations are the normal channels assumed by realists; 
trans-governmental allies emerge when we relax the realist assumption that states act coherently as 
units; and transnational applies when we relax the assumption that states are the only units. Second, the 
agenda of interstate relationships consists of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or consistent 
                                                                                                                                                              
country has determined that it can afford to alter the agreement unilaterally, it may have the upper hand. Any attempt 
by the company to take advantage of its superior position on the sensitivity dimension, without recognising its 
weakness at the vulnerability level (much less at the level of military force), is then likely to end in disaster (Keohane & 
Nye, 2011: 14-15). 
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hierarchy. This absence of hierarchy amongst issues means, amongst other things, that military security 
concerns do not consistently dominate the agenda. Many issues arise from what used to be considered 
domestic policy, and the distinction between domestic and foreign issues becomes blurred. The third 
characteristic is the minor role of military force as state’s policy instrument. Military force is not used by 
governments toward other governments within the region, or on the issues, when complex 
interdependence prevails (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 20-24). 
 
‘Spectrum Theory’ of World Politics: Between the Realist and Complex Interdependence Ideal Types 
Keohane and Nye state that they are not arguing that ‘complex interdependence faithfully reflects world 
political reality’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 20). Rather, they emphasise that complex interdependence ‘can 
be seen as defining an extreme set of conditions or ideal type’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 19). What they are 
suggesting is a ‘spectrum theory’ of world politics, in which both complex interdependence and ‘realist 
portrait are ideal types’, and ‘most situations will fall somewhere between these two extremes’ (Keohane 
& Nye, 2011: 20). They argue that ‘sometimes, realist assumptions will be accurate, or largely accurate, 
but frequently complex interdependence will provide a better portrayal of reality’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 
20). They caution their readers that ‘before one decides what explanatory model to apply to a situation or 
problem, one will need to understand the degree to which realist or complex interdependence 
assumptions correspond to the situation’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 20). 
 
Linkage Process under Complex Interdependence: Distinction between Structure Model and Issue 
Structure Model  
From the perspective of traditional (realist) analysis, military security will be the dominant goal of states’ 
in the realist world; military security will even affect issues that are not directly involved with military 
power or territorial defence; and non-military problems will not only be subordinated to military ones, but 
also be studied for their politico-military implications. As a result, militarily and economically strong states 
will dominate a variety of organisations and on a variety of issues, by linking their own policies on some 
issues to other states’ policies on other issues; by using their overall dominance to prevail on their weak 
issues, the strongest states will, in the realist world, ensure a congruence between the overall structure of 
military and economic power and the pattern of outcomes on any one issue area. Hence, under realist 
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conditions, the overall power relationship matters because it determines the outcome of the specific issue 
through the linkage process; and Keohane and Nye call this the ‘overall power structure’ model for the 
analysis of power politics of interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 35-39). 
 
Keohane and Nye argue that such congruence is less likely to occur under complex interdependence. 
This is because as military force is devalued, militarily strong states will find it more difficult to use their 
overall dominance to control outcomes on issues in which they are weak. As a result of this, ‘strong 
states will find that linkage is less effective’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 25). Hence, under complex 
interdependence, the issue-specific power relationship matters more than the overall power relationship 
in determining the outcome of the specific issue. Keohane and Nye call this the ‘issue structure’ model for 
the analysis of power politics of interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 42-44). 
 
In short, under realist conditions, linkages will reduce differences in outcomes amongst issue areas; and 
the overall power structure model is more applicable for the analysis of power politics. Under complex 
interdependence, linkages by strong states will be more difficult to make; and the issue-specific power 
structure model becomes a more powerful and relevant model to explain the outcome of power politics 
on a particular issue area. As Keohane and Nye observe, ‘as the utility of force declines, and as issues 
become more equal in importance, the distribution of power within each issue will become more 
important’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 25-26). 
 
Agenda Politics under Complex Interdependence 
Under complex interdependence, the so-called ‘high politics’ no longer dominate, and agenda politic 
becomes more important and complicated with respect to agenda formation and control. Keohane and 
Nye observe that under complex interdependence, state agenda is no longer primarily influenced by 
shifts in the overall balance of power between states or perceived military security threats; instead, it is 
expected to be heavily influenced by a wide range of sources. For instance, agendas can be affected by 
politicisation of international and domestic problems created by economic growth. Pressure for agenda 
change can come from the parties impatient with an ineffective international regime that no longer 
delivers outcomes consistent with underlying power structure. Change of agenda can be a result of rising 
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sensitivity interdependence, or due to discontented domestic groups seeking politicisation of issues and 
state intervention. It can also be a product of shifts in the distribution of power resources within issue 
areas, or a consequence of policy shift by a dissatisfied government with growing strength. 
 
Given the growing salience of non-military affairs and the increasing complexity of actors and links 
between countries under complex interdependence, states no longer act as monolithic entities with a 
unified and coherent view of their own national interests. This pluralisation process, characterised by 
growing ambiguity and competing interpretations of the national interest, will complicate agenda politics 
as suggested above, and renders the goals of the state increasingly difficult to define. Under complex 
interdependence, different state actors are expected to pursue different interests. For instance, various 
government agencies will pursue their own organisational interests under the guise of national interests. 
Transnational actors such as multinational corporations will also pursue their own goals. As the 
conditions of complex interdependence are more closely approximated, the processes of agenda 
formation and goal setting will become more subtle and differentiated (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 26-28). 
 
Power Politics of Asymmetrical Interdependence under Pluralisation and Fragmentation 
Given the negligible role of force and the military security agenda, states will rely more on other 
instruments in order to wield power; and less vulnerable states will try to use asymmetrical 
interdependence in particular groups of issues as a source of power. Power resources derived from 
asymmetrical (sensitivity or vulnerability) interdependence specific to issue areas will be the most 
relevant and effective instrument. Hence, manipulation of asymmetrical interdependence becomes major 
instruments of state policy. 
 
According to Keohane and Nye, the more closely a situation resembles complex interdependence, the 
more we can expect the outcomes of political bargaining to be affected by fragmentation. Internal 
fragmentation in terms of pluralisation of interests and actors will undermine the state’s ability to 
manipulate asymmetrical interdependence. Power and Interdependence suggests that ‘states that are 
better placed to maintain their coherence will be better able to manipulate uneven interdependence than 
fragmented states that at first glance seem to have more resources in an issue area’ (Keohane & Nye, 
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2011: 29). 
 
Under complex interdependence, transnational actors pursue their own goals as independent actors 
whilst being used as policy instruments manipulated by governments; and there is ‘less assurance that 
fragmented state will be united when dealing with foreign governments or its components will interpret 
national interests similarly when negotiating with foreigners’. The fragmented state may therefore ‘prove 
multi-faceted, even schizophrenic’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 29). 
 
Moreover, internal incoherence and fragmentation make it more difficult for the economically dominant 
power to follow a consistent strategy of economic linkage. This is because domestic, transnational and 
trans-governmental actors might resist having their interests traded off and different issues may involve 
different actors, and the international organisations in which negotiations take place are often quite 
separate; as a result, these factors might all make a trade-off or concessions linkage difficult to achieve in 
practice (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 28-29). 
 
1.3.3 Theoretical Relevance 
China’s relations with Australia primarily reflect the condition of extensive economic interdependence. 
The situation characteristically represents complex interdependence as seen from the vital importance of 
resource agendas, the multiple channels of contact between the two countries, and the minor role of 
military force as policy instrument. The inherent strategic tensions in the bilateral relations as outlined in 
the introductory section represents the existence of realist dynamics; but the realist dynamics do not 
dominate China’s relations with Australia. Insofar as the position on the continuum between the ideal 
types of complex interdependence and realism is concerned, this predominance of complex 
interdependence suggests a position siutated closer to complex interdependence. 
 
The position on the spectrum suggests that China’s resource power politics with Australia has to be 
understood largely in the context of complex interdependence. The implication is that analysis of power 
politics over the specific issues of iron ore pricing and Chinese resource investment has to be considered 
with respect to the issue-specific power structure model rather than the overall power structure between 
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the two countries. This is because under complex interdependence, military force is devalued and 
traditional military security agenda no longer dominates policy agenda; as a result, the linkage 
mechanism is likely to breaks down; thus, the issue-specific outcomes depend on the issue-specific 
power structure. 
 
Since power deriving from asymmetrical sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence is more relevant 
under complex interdependence, the analysis of power politics of iron ore pricing and Chinese resource 
investment has to look at the issue-specific patterns of asymmetrical interdependence in relation to 
sensitivity and vulnerability. Given the hierarchy of the power resources deriving from asymmetrical 
interdependence, it is all the more important to examine the underlying patterns of asymmetrical 
vulnerability interdependence, which is likely to determine the outcomes of the power struggle in those 
two issue areas. As this thesis will show, the Chinese side is faced with unfavourable patterns of 
asymmetrical interdependence in each of the two issue areas; the Chinese market actors from the steel 
industry fail to gain the upper hand in the battle for iron ore pricing power against the dominant Australian 
mining oligarchs, and Chinese government investors have little leeway in the face of the Australian 
government’s efforts to block and restrict Chinese government investment in Australia’s resources sector. 
 
From the perspective of agenda politics, the iron ore pricing issue has become a matter of national 
economic security because the Chinese steel industry’s growing sensitivity to rising iron ore costs has led 
to politicisation of the iron ore pricing issue in China; as China’s market size continues to increase in the 
global iron ore trade, the Chinese have become increasingly intolerant to their lack of pricing influence 
and the unfavourable terms of trade in the iron ore business. To a large extent, China’s aggressive 
investment and acquisition spree into Australia’s resources sector represents an attempt to reduce 
over-dependence on the Australian mining oligarchs for ore supplies, which is said to have considerably 
contributed to Chinese vulnerability in the iron ore pricing war. In short, agenda formation is no longer 
dominated by traditional state-centric military security concerns; insofar as China’s resource power 
politics with Australia is concerned, agenda is primarily shaped by economic processes and the evolving 
interests of multiple actors involved in resource politics. Nonetheless, behind the transnational face of 
those power struggles, the interests of those sub-state actors to a large extent still represent the interests 
of the state. 
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Under complex interdependence, internal fragmentation among actors can undermine the coherence of 
state strategy. This has been observed in the collective Chinese efforts to boycott iron ore imports from 
the Australian mining oligarchs and to crack down on the rampant speculative trading on China’s iron ore 
spot market. As the subsequent analysis in Chapter 5 will demonstrate, the multiplicity of actors involved 
and the divergent interests between the various market actors in China’s iron ore import sector have 
rendered any unified Chinese actions led by industry leaders extremely difficult to sustain in practice. 
Domestic incoherence has essentially neutralised the major Chinese manoeuvres during the iron ore 
price negotiations and undermined efforts to tackle the entrenched vulnerability in the iron ore pricing 
struggle. 
 
As stated in the introductory section of this chapter, the analysis of the bilateral resource power politics 
has to take account of the dynamic security relationship between China and Australia. Indeed, from the 
‘spectrum’ perspective, this is a sensible approach because the specific position of any situation of world 
politics along that continuum has analytical and real-world implications. In the context of this study, 
though realist dynamics do not dominate the bilateral relations, the resource ties nonetheless are grown 
out of such a delicate geopolitical framework. As the subsequent chapters will show, the inherent 
tensions in the strategic dimension of the bilateral relations have a constraining effect on the 
development of the resource partnership. In other words, China can hardly expect to forge a genuinely 
reliable, deep and equitable resource partnership with Australia, which in many respects is a potential 
strategic adversary in the light of the deteriorating regional strategic environment. Indeed, as the analysis 
of the controversies over iron ore pricing and Chinese government investment will demonstrate, the 
resource partnership is by no means an easy pair. The uncertainties of the bilateral geopolitical ties 
arguably have posed huge strategic constraints and risks for China’s resource security interest. 
 
1.3.4 Complex Interdependence Theory: A Critique 
Inadequate Theorisation of the ‘Spectrum’ Perspective 
Keohane and Nye conceive a ‘spectrum’ of world politics between the two ideal types of complex 
interdependence and realism. They suggest that the location of a particular situation on the spectrum 
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determines the applicability of the theoretical model for analysis. However, despite the significance they 
give to a particular position on the spectrum, their theoretical approach fails to specify the exact analytical 
and real world implications of what the position entails; much is left unexplained as to how positions 
‘in-between’ the ideal types along the continuum might manifest in real world political situations under 
analysis. This can be problematic for analysis because, as Keohane and Nye suggest, most real world 
situations will fall somewhere in between the two extremes along the continuum of complex 
interdependence and realism. Indeed, this particular theoretical inadequacy could, to some extent, 
undermine the validity of complex interdependence theory. As Keohane and Nye themselves admit, ‘… 
precisely because we insisted that complex interdependence is an ideal type rather than an accurate 
description of world politics or a forecast of trends, its relevance to contemporary world politics is 
ambiguous’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 269) Although they emphasise that the ‘position of a given situation 
along this continuum constitutes the independent variable…’, they go on to say that the relationship 
between this independent variable and what complex interdependence theory seeks to explain ‘was 
somewhat muddle[d]’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 269). 
 
This limitation of the ‘spectrum’ perspective is evident in the analysis of China’s resource politics with 
Australia. First of foremost, the broader geopolitical environment dictates that there will always be 
inherent strategic tensions in the bilateral relations; the growing adversarial dynamics observed in recent 
years reflect increasing salience of realist agenda; and to some extent transnational resource politics is 
carried out in the context of inter-state rivalry for resource power, not least because most of the 
transnational market actors involved were agents of the state, particularly on the Chinese side. Despite 
the seeming predominance of complex interdependence, this theory does not provide analysts with a 
clear explanation insofar as the mutual interactions between complex interdependence and realist 
dynamics, as well as their implications, are concerned. Whilst this thesis does identify one the 
constraining influence of the adversarial realist dynamics on the scope and nature of the bilateral 
resource investment and trade relationships, the exact patterns of interactions between those geopolitical 
elements and economic affairs, requires a more sophisticated and elaborate theoretical discussion on 
the analytical and practical implications of the location along the spectrum. Arguably, the same can be 
said about the relationship between the ongoing prolonged Free Trade Agreement process and the 
evolving geopolitical orientation of the bilateral relations between China and Australia. 
40 
 
 
The potential theoretical implications of the spectrum position are highly relevant to understanding 
China’s international relations, whereby forces of economic globalisation have increasingly come to 
mingle with the realist dynamics triggered off by shifts in power. Indeed, a coexistence of the realist and 
complex interdependence dynamics, whereby manifestations of realism and complex interdependence 
emerge simultaneously and intermingle, would suggest an ‘in-between’ position on the theoretical 
spectrum. Although, the exact position along the continuum depends on the relative significance of realist 
and complex interdependence dynamics in reality during a specific period of time. This complexity of 
realities is somewhat at odds with the theoretical emphasis on the ideal-type assumptions and makes 
analysis of real world politics difficult. Yet complex interdependence theory fails to significantly elaborate 
on how world politics looks like under such circumstances. This might raise questions about the theory’s 
actual applicability to the study of contemporary Chinese foreign relations. 
 
Arguably, the inherent inadequacy of the ‘spectrum’ perspective has its roots in the Cold World era, when 
world politics was much more polarised between two opposing camps. When the theory was first 
conceived and developed during the Cold War, the condition of complex interdependence was more 
frequently observed in the international relations between the Western allied industrialised democracies, 
whereas the traditionalist visions of typical realist dynamics were more applicable to the international 
relations between countries in opposing ideological camps between the East and the West. In that 
scenario, trade, investment and finance did not flow freely between the opposing camps. The distinction 
between the condition of complex interdependence and realism were much more clear-cut; and the 
position of any particular political situation on the spectrum appeared to be relatively easier to locate and 
pinpoint.  
 
Today, a mixture of liberal and realist dynamics in international relations is a much more common 
phenomenon. Whilst forces of economic globalisation still prevail, the competitive dynamics of realism 
have increasingly appeared in situations where liberal logic once dominated. In particular, China’s rise, 
which is essentially a phenomenon facilitated through economic globalisation, has begun to intensify 
realist dynamics by bringing about systemic changes in the global power structure. The power transition 
driven by China’s continued rise has increasingly destabilised the strategic status quo and encouraged 
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adversarial strategic dynamics to occur, in which realist dynamics necessarily interact with and 
complicate the elements of complex interdependence under the condition of extensive economic 
interdependence. Insofar as China’s foreign relations are concerned, complex interdependence theory 
needs to address this complexity by developing a more explicit exposition and argument about the 
theoretical implications of the ‘in-between’ position along the continuum. Some such pertinent questions 
that should be addressed include: How exactly does occupying a different position on the spectrum 
shape the manifestation of international politics? How can one determine the exact position on the 
spectrum? Moreover, how can one assess the relative extent of liberal and realist dynamics in a 
particular political situation? How quickly can a country’s position along the spectrum shift and what will 
such a shift mean in policy terms? In essence, these questions concern the relative importance and 
interplay of realist and liberal forces, and how they would shape international relations. 
 
Incompleteness of the Economic Linkage Argument 
The theory of linkage is inadequately developed in Power and Interdependence. In this book, Keohane 
and Nye argue that under complex interdependence, the linkage process is likely to break down: since 
military force is too costly and a traditional military security agenda no longer dominates the foreign policy 
agenda, the militarily powerful state will find it more difficult to use their overall (military) dominance to 
control outcomes on issues in which they are weak (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 25-26). Given the collapse of 
the linkage mechanism, the issue-specific power structure is more relevant than the overall power 
structure to political analysis of a particular issue area under complex interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 
2011: 42-44).  
 
However, this narrow emphasis on ‘issue compartmentalisation’ approach to the linkage process under 
complex interdependence can be problematic. As Arthur Stein points out, ‘linkage is the central analytic 
problem with an issue approach to international politics. Issue compartmentalisation only goes so far… 
Because there are situations amenable to linkage politics, the viability of an issue-area approach to the 
study of international politics is itself context-dependent’ (Stein, 1980). Even Keohane and Nye admit that 
they ‘failed to develop any theory of linkage that could specify under what conditions linkages would 
occur’ despite the importance of the subject. They acknowledge that ‘the lack of extensive analysis of 
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issue linkage in Power and Interdependence must have struck some observant readers as one of the 
oddest aspects’ of their work (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 268). 
 
In particular, Keohane and Nye fail to develop a coherent argument about the linkage process under 
complex interdependence with respect to how economically powerful states can use their overall 
economic predominance to secure favourable outcomes in a particular economic issue area. After all, 
many issue linkages take place between different economic affairs in international relations; in other 
words, linkage is a phenomenon between different economic issue areas as much as between economic 
and security issue areas. At the core of the issue is the ‘fungibility’ of economic power - whether states 
can translate their overall economic power dominance into issue-specific power advantage by 
transferring economic power across different economic issues (since linkages amongst issues invariably 
involve making concessions on one issue for securing gains on another issue). However, the theoretical 
discussion of the ‘fungibility’ of economic power is somewhat muddled, particularly under complex 
interdependence.  
 
When discussing the linkage process, Keohane and Nye suggest that ‘dominant states may try to secure 
much the same result by using overall economic power to affect results on other issues’… since ‘money, 
after all, is fungible’. Although they do not specify under what condition (whether realism or complex 
interdependence) money is fungible, they do emphasise that ‘if only economic objectives are at stake, 
they may succeed’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 25-26). Yet, they also seem to suggest that under complex 
interdependence money is not after all that fungible, because ‘economic linkage by the strong is limited 
by domestic, transnational, and trans-governmental actors who resist having their interests traded off’, 
and ‘economic objectives’ can ‘have political implications’ that might forestall economic linkage. They 
also suggest that the different international actors involved in different issues could also work against 
linkage across economic issues (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 26, 28-29).  
 
When discussing the issue structure model ‘in which force is usable only at high cost, and military 
security is not at the top of a clear hierarchy of issues for governments’, Keohane and Nye state that 
‘economic capabilities relevant to one area may not be relevant to another’ when the issue structure 
model is more applicable. However, their explanation (devalued military force and absence of a hierarchy 
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of issues) seems to be more relevant to the conclusion that ‘military capabilities will not be effective in 
economic issues’ under such a model (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 42). In short, Keohane’s and Nye’s 
explanation of the ‘fungibility’ (or ‘infungibility’) of economic power is ambiguous, as is their discussion on 
how powerful states might exploit their overall economic predominance (as opposed to military 
dominance) vis-à-vis weaker states to secure favourable outcomes in a specific economic issue. 
 
The incompleteness of their treatment of transferability of economic power resources (especially under 
complex interdependence) is not helpful when analysing certain aspects of the Sino-Australian resource 
politics, where economic linkages are thought to be actively pursued by the Chinese and Australian 
actors involved. The prolonged free trade agreement (FTA) negotiation has been a case in point. The 
Chinese government has reportedly pushed for greater investment access for Chinese capital (private 
and government-related investment) and the loosening of labour restrictions on foreign workers; whereas 
the Australian side has demanded greater access to the Chinese domestic market for Australian 
agricultural exports and service-sector businesses.
12
 In essence, this process of FTA negotiation 
represents a grand bargain between China and Australia whereby economic linkages take place across 
multiple economic issue areas. Arguably, the Chinese government is trying to use her overall economic 
power advantage in terms of China’s market size to induce Australian concessions on the specific issues 
pertaining to access for Chinese government investment. In this regard, a more sophisticated theoretical 
treatment of economic linkage would be extremely useful for analysing the Chinese policy deliberations, 
which are essentially part of the ongoing Chinese efforts to tackle their vulnerability in the controversy 
around Chinese government investment in Australia’s resources sector. In this context, it does not make 
much sense to rule out the viability of economic linkage under complex interdependence altogether. 
 
Theoretical Neglect of the Domestic Perspective 
The third major weakness of complex interdependence theory is its lack of thorough treatment of the 
domestic factors. Keohane and Nye state that they have deliberately limited their analysis to the level of 
international systems in the interest of theoretical parsimony, which ‘is so highly valued by students of 
                                                        
12
 Source: ‘20
th
 Round of China-Australia FTA Negotiation to Be Held in Canberra in May’ (April 3, 2014) 
http://jingji.21cbh.com/2014/4-3/zNMDA2NTNfMTEyMDIzNA.html 
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international relations’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 271-272). Although they recognise the importance of 
processes at the domestic level, the priority of theorisation is ‘first to sort out the systemic forces at work’ 
(Keohane & Nye, 2011: 271). However, this systemic approach neglects the crucial domestic sources of 
international politics. As Keohane and Nye themselves admit, analysts ‘had to view interests as formed 
largely exogenously’, and ‘domestic politics and the impact of international relations on domestic 
politics…were ignored’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 271). Indeed, the result of such an approach is a 
self-imposed analytical barrier that tends to discourage a more in-depth analysis of the important 
domestic political and economic processes under complex interdependence; and this exclusive focus on 
systemic perspective weakens the prospects for a deeper understanding of important dynamics under 
complex interdependence, such as agenda politics and linkage politics.  
 
As the study of Chinese-Australian resource politics demonstrates, the analysis of domestic economic 
and political processes is critical for understanding the sources of Chinese sensitivity and vulnerability in 
the struggle over iron ore pricing power and the controversy around Chinese investment in Australia. In 
particular, the domestic perspective is essential for understanding how the relevant resource security 
agenda took shape within China in response to the country’s growing sensitivity and vulnerability; and it 
would be impossible to understand Chinese vulnerability in the iron ore pricing war without looking into 
how internal interest fragmentation amongst the Chinese market actors, as well as economic constraints 
facing the Chinese steel industry, contributed to China’s predicament. Although complex 
interdependence theory provides a number of insights into some of the domestic-related considerations – 
such as fragmentation amongst actors, incoherence of national interests and the pluralist face of states 
under complex interdependence – the discussion is nonetheless limited and constrained to an analysis of 
the implications of transnational and trans-governmental relations. It does not facilitate a serious 
theorisation of the relationship between domestic factors and international politics under complex 
interdependence. In fact, as the multiple channels of contact have further blurred the boundary between 
what is domestic and what is systemic, the domestic dimension indeed deserves more serious treatment 
in complex interdependence theory. 
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1.4 Literature Review 
This section mainly surveys the existing academic literature on China-Australia relations. 
 
1.4.1 Chinese Language Sources 
To trace the sources of Chinese foreign policy towards Australia, a survey of relevant works in the 
Chinese language is a necessary first step. For Chinese scholars, whether in the field of foreign policy or 
from other academic fields, the South Pacific region is a relatively neglected area compared with China’s 
immediate neighbouring regions. Despite being the largest country in the South Pacific, Australia has not 
historically received strong research attention from Chinese scholars (Jia & Hou, 1999). 
 
Australian studies is a relatively underdeveloped academic field at Chinese universities; research on 
Australia lags far behind the United States and Britain, despite being China’s nearest English speaking 
country (Cai et al., 2002). Book-length Chinese writing on Australian foreign affairs and related subjects 
are rare in the literature on Australia, the majority of which being studies of Australian culture, literature 
and language. Given the poor state of Australian studies in China, it comes as no surprise that Chinese 
academic research on Sino-Australian relations has been rather weak (Wang, 2003). 
 
Nevertheless, a few book-length works on the bilateral relations have appeared since the early 1990s. 
The first book was an edited volume on Sino-Australian economic cooperation by Wang & Duan (1991), 
which was followed by a translation of E.M. Andrews’ Australia and China: the Ambiguous Relationship 
(Gao et al. trans., 1992; Andrews, 1986). Hou Minyue’s History of Chinese-Australian Relations (1999), 
Hu Zhuanglin’s A Bright Prospect of Sino-Australian Cooperation (2000), and Wei Songshou’s Australian 
Economy and Foreign Trade in Transition: the Progress of Australia’s Relations with China (2001), were 
three welcome contributions to the literature at the turn of the century. Hou Minyue’s The Impact of 
China’s Modernisation on Relations with Australia (2005a) is a more recent addition to the list. Indeed, it 
is the most up-to-date (at least at the time of its publication), comprehensive and in-depth study of the 
development of the bilateral relations between the two nations since China’s reform period began. Hou 
examines the economic, political, security/strategic, and multilateral (both regional and global) aspects of 
the bilateral relations, and China’s policy in each of the four domains. In light of the fact that it is all too 
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common for scholars to write how Australia perceives and treats China, what is perhaps the most 
valuable feature that distinguishes this work from the rest is that Hou has made a special effort to 
systematically look into China’s policy towards Australia, as opposed to the other way round. One edited 
volumes of research articles on Chinese-Australian ties was published in 2012 to mark the 40
th
 
anniversary of the establishment of the diplomatic relationship between the People’s Republic of China 
(P.R.C.) and Australia. It is co-edited by Chinese scholars Chang Chenguang and Yu Changsen (Chang 
& Yu 2012). 
 
Although most of the Chinese academic research articles on Sino-Australian relations have appeared 
fairly recently over the last ten years, they have not adequately covered the more recent developments in 
the bilateral relations. One notable exception is Gao Cheng’s works, which survey the recent 
developments in Chinese-Australian relations in 2011 and 2012 by looking at the basic trends in the 
bilateral ties, and the impact of enhanced allied cooperation between Australia and the United States on 
Chinese-Australian relations. (Gao, 2012; Gao, 2013) Many of them have been exclusively concerned 
with issues in the pre-1980s period, such as the establishment of Chinese consulates in Australia in the 
late Qing Dynasty (Zhang, 1994), Australia’s China policy from the late 1940s to the early 1970s (Wu, 
2006) and during the Vietnam War (Hou, 2002), as well as the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between the P.R.C. and Australia (Wu, 2006; Wang, 2003a; Zhang, 2002a; Zhang & Wang, 1999). The 
1990s has been lightly touched on in some works (Chen, 1993; Jia & Hou, 1999; Wang, 2004; Nie, 2003a, 
2003b), while exclusive treatment of the bilateral ties during the Howard years was undertaken in only 
four articles (Yang, 2005; Zhang & Huang, 2007; Zhang & Zhou, 2007; Hou, 2007). 
 
It is fairly evident that more substantial analysis of Chinese policy towards Australia is lacking in these 
works. Zhang (1994) addresses the Qing Dynasty’s decision to set up its consulates in Australia. Zhang 
and Huang (2007) discuss contemporary Chinese perceptions of Australia’s strategic importance. These 
are the two exceptions that approach the bilateral relations entirely from the Chinese perspective. Many 
other works are exclusively analyses of Australia’s policy towards China (Hou, 2002; Zhang, 2002a; Nie, 
2003a; Yang, 2005; Wu, 2006; Zhang & Zhou, 2007) The rest contain only passing reference to China’s 
policy (Jia & Hou, 1999; Zhang & Wang, 1999; Wang, 2003a, 2004; Hou, 2005b, 2007). For example, 
Wang (2003a) briefly mentions China’s use of ‘wheat trade diplomacy’ in an attempt to influence 
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Australia’s recognition policy as well as Chinese positions on the issues of Taiwan and China’s 
representation in the United Nations (U.N.) before the establishment of diplomatic relations. There is also 
a short mention in Zhang and Wang’s (1999) and Jia and Hou’ (1999) works on Australia as a country of 
the Second World to be united in the struggle against superpower hegemony in Mao’s ‘Three Worlds’ 
theory. Hou (2005d) talks briefly about China’s policy towards Australia on the Cambodia issue. Chinese 
attitudes towards Australia’s American alliance, especially in relation to Australia’s role in the Taiwan 
issue, is touched upon by Jia and Hou (1999), Hou (2007) and Zhang and Huang (2007). China’s 
economic diplomacy is mentioned in only a few sentences by Hou (2007). 
 
Writings on the economic relationship have appeared since the mid-1980s. Amongst these works, only 
three books have been written on the subject (Wang & Duan, 1991; Yu, 1998; Duan, 2000), while the rest 
have been journal articles, many of which have been professional accounts of trade business. More 
academic analyses of the bilateral economic relations have emerged over the last ten years. However, 
they have generally focused on analyses economic technicalities, and have neglected to bring foreign 
policy considerations into the discussion. No efforts have been made to specifically discuss the political 
context or strategic implications of the economic ties. 
 
A great majority of the academic works focus on the merchandise trade, and recent studies have looked 
at the question of bilateral Free Trade Agreement (Zhu, 2005; Yang et al., 2005; Qin & Wang, 2006; Sun, 
2007; Zhang, 2007). Resource trade has received some attention in more recent years, yet only one 
article has exclusively addressed trade in mineral resources (Huang & Li, 2006). While many writers 
acknowledge that Australia is one of the few popular destinations for China’s overseas investment, no 
specific research has been carried out to investigate the influx of Chinese capital into Australia’s 
resources sector. 
 
The bilateral resources ties have received some research attention in more recent years especially after 
2008. Gao Cheng’s structural analysis of the asymmetrical interdependence in Sino-Australian trade 
relations also explores the sensitivity and vulnerability dimensions of the economic ties, especially in 
relation to the bilateral iron ore trade. Gao concludes that, while both countries are highly sensitive to the 
mutual interdependence in the iron ore business, China is the relatively more vulnerable party in her iron 
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ore trade with Australia (Gao, 2008). In an overview of the Chinese-Australian iron ore trade and 
investment relations, Hou Minyue offers a brief review of the history of the bilateral iron ore ties, and 
highlights the pattern of Chinese sensitivity and vulnerability in the bilateral iron ore trade. Hou’s study 
not only examines the asymmetrical interdependence in the iron ore trade, but also accounts for the 
growing Chinese investment interest in Australia by linking the iron ore trade issue with the Chinese 
investment issue. His analysis of the strategic significance of the Chinalco-Rio Tinto deal and the 
important lessons drawn from its failure is informative (Hou, 2010).  
 
1.4.2 English Language Sources 
English sources on P.R.C.-Australia relations have mostly been written by Australian scholars. Ten 
volumes have appeared since the 1960s on the subject (Albinski, 1964a; Albinski, 1965; FitzGerald, 
1972; Dunn & Fung, 1985; Fung & Mackerras, 1985; Andrews, 1986; Mackerras, 1996a; Fung & Chen, 
1996; Strahan, 1996; Thomas, 2004). Amongst them, three are multi-authored edited volumes. One 
edited volume on China-Australia ties has also appeared in 2012 to mark the 40
th
 anniversary of the 
establishment of the diplomatic relationship between the P.R.C. and Australia. (Reilly & Yuan 2012) 
Another notable recent addition to this literature has been David Uren’s work. As economics editor of The 
Australian, Uren’s gives an interesting and informative account of Australia-China relations interspersed 
with entertaining stories from a journalistic perspective. 
 
Books that appeared prior to the 1990s are most useful for understanding the historical evolution of 
Australia-P.R.C. relations before the end of the Cold War. Albinski offers the first historical account of the 
early relationship between Communist China and Australia during the Korean War (1964b). He also 
surveys the security, trade and immigration issues between the two countries in the 1950s and the first 
half of the 1960s (1965). FitzGerald recalls the Australian Labour Party’s historic visit to China in 1972 
and offers his sober analysis of China’s foreign policy in the early 1970s (1972). The detailed historical 
analysis contained in the work of Fung and Mackerras (1985) is the best source for understanding how 
the relationship was transformed from fear and xenophobic hostility into a stable friendship. 
 
Strahan (1996) offers a systematic full-length study of Australia’s changing perceptions of China over an 
49 
 
extended period from the Sino-Japanese War to the early 1990s, rejecting the ‘pendulum model’ in 
explaining Western perceptions of China. Each of the two edited volumes (Mackerras, 1996a; Thomas, 
2004) provide comprehensive coverage of every aspect of the partnership between China and Australia 
in the early 1990s and the early 2000s, respectively. Thomas’ work is the latest entry, and remains the 
only book published since the mid-1990s on the subject. 
 
In addition to book-length works, studies of the bilateral relations have also appeared in academic journal 
articles. Most of them have been published in the Australian Journal of International Affairs, the 
Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs and the Australian Journal of Politics and History. Journal articles 
on P.R.C.-Australia relations were rare before the 1980s, but have steadily increased since the 1980s as 
the bilateral relations developed and matured. In the last two decades up until 2007, there have been at 
least 14 such journal articles, a sign of burgeoning research interest in the field.  
 
During that same period a large number of edited volumes appeared that offered comprehensive surveys 
of Australian foreign policy or Australia-Asia relations. China was an indispensable component in those 
discussions, and always warranted separate treatment covering a single chapter in those volumes. 
Hence, the 1990s witnessed a surge in book chapters on Chinese-Australian relations. Since the 1990s, 
at least 17 such book chapters on Australia’s ties with China have been produced. 
 
These articles and book chapters on Sino-Australian relations are an abundant source of information for 
writing a literature review. Given the limited scope available here, it is not feasible to engage in a 
comprehensive survey of the entire literature in great depth. Indeed, I can state with reasonable 
confidence, that it is not necessary for the purpose of this thesis. Nevertheless, some deficiencies in this 
body of scholarship are worth commenting in order to help shed light on the areas that deserve more 
research attention. 
 
One obvious weakness is the lack of thorough investigations into China’s foreign policy approach 
towards Australia. As the first Australian ambassador to China, FitzGerald was one of the few writers who 
displayed a serious interest in China’s foreign policy. His personal impressions of Chinese diplomacy in 
the early 1970s constitute the earliest account of China’s Australia policy (1971; 1972; 1973). Shi Chunlai 
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(2002) offers a valuable source for understanding China’s basic attitudes towards Australia. In his 
contribution to the Australian Journal of International Affairs’ special edition marking the 30
th
 anniversary 
of the establishment of diplomatic relations, the former Chinese ambassador to Australia expresses 
China’s wish for an independent and pragmatic Australian foreign policy free of U.S. influence and 
ideological bias. He goes on to highlight the Taiwan issue and American containment of China as the two 
major strategic issues that affect Sino-Australian relations. In another article penned by a learned student 
of Chinese-Australian relations, Hou Minyue (2005) explains why the so-called Howard Doctrine has 
been an irritant to China. Despite these exceptions, the body of literature mostly focuses on Australia’s 
foreign policy towards China or how Australians perceive the bilateral ties. 
 
Scholars (Fung & Mackerras, 1985; Fung, 1986; Mackerras, 2004) have suggested that the 
Sino-Australian partnership is an unequal relationship: the vast disparities in power, international 
influence and status between China and Australia mean that China is always more important to Australia 
than Australia is to China. In the eyes of the Australians, China will always be one of the most important 
countries for Australia’s prosperity and security, whether in a positive or negative way. By contrast, as a 
regional middle power at best, Australia has traditionally occupied only a peripheral place in China’s 
worldview and foreign affairs. This disparity reflects critical differences in the two countries’ centre of 
strategic gravity and orientation. 
 
A corollary of this conventional wisdom is the common perception that China is in some senses 
indifferent to Australia, and China can afford not to have a proactive and strategic approach to its 
Australia policy. China’s many policy responses towards Australia have, at best, been ad hoc and 
reactive. To put it plainly, China’s approach prompts the question: does China have an Australia policy? 
This question of how China treats Australia is exactly what has been described in those works that have 
occasionally touched upon China’s Australia policy. 
 
For instance, according to some writers (FitzGerald, 1971; Fung & Mackerras, 1985), Australia’s formal 
recognition of the People’s Republic was highly desired by the Chinese because it would serve China’s 
interest in raising the country’s international status and breaking out of international isolation in the 
precarious years of the early 1970s; but it was never a great prize that China would have desperately 
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pursued or actively sought, a policy which was manifest in Chinese diplomacy throughout the game of 
political manoeuvres over the establishment of diplomatic relations before 1972. 
 
The fact that Australia was once a second-rate strategic partner of China against Soviet expansionism 
did not help change Australia’s marginal position in Chinese strategic thinking during the 1970s and 
1980s. It merely helped the two countries to maintain a reasonably amicable relationship, which in reality 
lacked substantive content and was dwarfed by China’s preoccupation with great power relations. The 
Kampuchea/Cambodia problem was the only substantive political issue over which China occasionally 
consulted Australia during this period. As the bilateral relationship was often a function of a third-party 
factor, Australia’s importance to China was more auxiliary than independent until bilateral trade grew to 
the level where it became the real binding force that could pull the two countries together on a firm basis. 
 
The literature on current Sino-Australian relations gives the impression that China does not seem to have 
a proactive Australia policy except for the general objective to increase trade. However, this is a policy 
objective that applies to China’s relations with every other country and tells little concerning what China 
actually wants from Australia, apart from a general desire to further economic cooperation. This literature 
does seek to address a range of bilateral issues that have emerged since the 1990s, such as those 
concerning Taiwan, human rights, Tibet, Australia’s American alliance, and its strategic relationship with 
Japan, etc. However, the passing mentions made to China’s sporadic responses to Australia’s policy on 
these issues, in no measure amounts to a systematic account of Chinese strategic intentions towards 
Australia and the specific policies that China has pursued to achieve these objectives. 
 
A growing research interest in Chinese-Australian relations emerged towards the end of the 2000s 
against the background of China’s rise. These works are mainly concerned with the analysis of 
Australia’s strategic and diplomatic responses to a rising China. Interestingly, the politics of 
accommodation in the face of China’s rise is a major theme that underlies much of this discussion. 
  
James Manicom and Andrew O’Neil examine the extent to which Australia’ has accommodated China’s 
policy preferences across the three issue areas pertaining to bilateral economic relations, war and peace, 
and soft power during the 2000s (Manicom & O’Neil, 2010). The two authors also compare Australia’s 
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response to China’s rise with that of Canada and explain some of the notable differences in their 
respective policy approaches as two resource-rich Western middle powers of the Asia-Pacific (Manicom 
& O’Neil, 2012). He Baogang’s work uses the Australian case to illustrate the politics of accommodation 
in the context of changing power relationships and to explain the regional secondary states’ 
accommodation policy towards a rising China (He, 2012c).  
 
Czeslaw Tubilewicz’s research discusses Australia’s recent strategic response to China’s by focusing on 
Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper and examines Chinese responses to the White Paper (Tubilewicz, 
2010). James Reilly seeks to account for Australia’s strategic response to China by highlighting the 
relationship between deepening economic interdependence between the two countries and Australia’s 
strategic behaviour towards China.  
 
Zhang Jian’s survey of the ‘most revealing’ five-year period in Australia’s relations with China between 
2006 and 2011 reviews the Rudd’s government’s policy initiatives and the major political and economic 
hurdles that has emerged in the bilateral ties under the Labour government since 2007 (Zhang, 2012).  
 
You Ji’s work analyses the military dimension of Chinese-Australian relations in the context of the 
potential strategic impact of the People’s Liberation Army’s transformation on Chinese-Australian 
strategic relationship (Ji, 2013). Former Australian Ambassador Geoff Raby’s policy review highlights the 
importance and nature of Australia’s critical relationship with China and sets out several 
recommendations on how to improve Australia’s policy approach to the indispensible ties with China 
(Raby, 2013). 
 
The significance of China’s economic rise for Australia’s economic prosperity and foreign policy is 
recognised by more recent works on the bilateral relations. The pre-2008 literature asserted that growing 
bilateral trade has become the basis and the stabiliser of Chinese-Australian relations; and that the 
natural complementarities between the two economies would ensure smooth development of the 
economic relationship. These simple assumptions however neglected the potential for conflict. The 
economic ties are currently undergoing significant transformations that are capable of creating conflicts in 
the economic relationship. There is only one notable exception that has looked into the conflict side of the 
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economic ties in an article focusing on the politics of Free Trade Agreement between China and Australia 
(English et al., 2005). Yet, the full implications of China’s domestic economic processes on bilateral 
relations have not been fully appreciated. The impact of China’s growing economic ambitions, domestic 
economic incentives and constraints on the bilateral ties and China’s Australia policy needs to be the 
focus of more research. 
 
More recently, there has been a growing research interest in the bilateral resource relations. Since 2008, 
there has been a growing body of journal articles that investigate the politics of major bilateral trade and 
investment issues of great political significance to both countries. 
 
Yu Changsen and Jory Xiong examine the current features of the Sino-Australian relations from the 
perspective of asymmetrical interdependence. Having analysed the patterns of relative sensitivity and 
vulnerability, Yu and Xiong argue that both countries are sensitive to policy shifts made by the other given 
the structure of the trade relationship, and that Australia is vulnerable in that she is not able to choose her 
major trading partner (Yu & Xiong, 2012).  
 
Richard Leaver is one of the few Australian scholars who has paid close attention to the politics of 
Australia’s iron ore war with China. Leaver offers an insightful review of the hurdles over the iron ore price 
issue since 2010. He criticises the Australian government’s approach to the iron ore relationship and 
disputes with China, suggesting a long-term approach on the part of the Australian government to ensure 
the sustainability of the iron ore business with China is desirable (Leaver, 2010).  
 
Bruno Mascitelli and Mona Chung discuss the significance of the arrest and trial of Stern Hu in the 
context of the struggle over iron ore pricing and Rio Tinto’s difficult relationship with the Chinese 
authorities and businesses. Their works analyses the implications of the incident for Chinese-Australian 
relations and foreign businesses operating in China (Mascitelli & Chung ,2011; Mascitelli & Chung, 2012). 
The failed Chinalco-Rio deal is also the topic of discussion for Yao Shujie and Dylan Sutherland, whose 
study sought to explore the motivations for China’s outbound foreign direct investment in Australia’s 
resource sector, in relation to China’s growing resource needs and attempts at nurturing Chinese national 
champions on the world stage via the ‘going-out’ strategy (Yao & Sutherland, 2009).  
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James Laurenceson’s work compares the state of Chinese and other foreign investment in Australia and 
attempts to account for the causes for the ‘immaturity’ of the Chinese-Australian investment relations. 
Laurenceson is critical of Australia’s restrictive and discriminatory approach towards Chinese investment 
and urges the Australian authorities to further improve the investment environment for Chinese 
businesses (Laurenceson, 2013).  
 
Peter Drysdale and Christopher Findlay also share the view that Australia’s foreign investment regulatory 
regime has become unnecessarily restrictive and discriminatory in response to the surge of Chinese 
state-owned investors in Australia’s resource sector. Their study finds ‘no persuasive case’ for regulatory 
discrimination against government investment from China, and suggests that anxiety about the question 
is unfounded as it was in earlier times over the growth in foreign investment by Japan (Drysdale & Findlay, 
2009). In a comprehensive overview of Australia’s economic relations, Findlay also criticises Australia’s 
approach to approval of Chinese investment projects for being ‘unnecessarily discriminatory’, and 
creating opportunities for Australia’s competitors and risking trade relations with China (Findlay, 2011).  
 
Jeffrey Wilson defends the Australian approach towards Chinese investment in the minerals sector, and 
discusses the shift in Australian government’s foreign investment regime in relation to the characteristics 
of the Chinese mining FDI and the dilemmas it presents to the Australian authorities. Wilson suggests 
that Australia’s regulatory response to Chinese investment is entirely legitimate, defensive and restrained; 
instead of being the result of resource nationalism, it is actually aimed at defending market liberalism 
(Wilson, 2011).  
 
In their analysis of the resource politics between China and Australia, Mark Beeson and Li Fujian’s article 
illustrates the impact of the resource ties with China on Australia’s economy and domestic politics, and 
underscore the growing tension between Australia’s geo-economic and geopolitics interests. Given the 
display of overt hostility in Australia’s strategic posture, Beeson and Li suggest that the bilateral 
economic relations are rendered increasingly uncertain by Australia’s strategic choice, together with the 
frictions caused by the incompatibility of the two countries’ respective economic and political institutions 
(Beeson & Li, 2012)  
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Mark Beeson, Mills Soko and Wang Yong undertook a comparative analysis of China’s resource 
partnerships with resource-rich middle powers. The study compared the resource politics between 
Australia and China with that between South Africa and China. The authors observed that Chinese 
investment in Australia is politically more controversial than in South Africa, and that the resource ties 
between Australia and China prove to be an uneasy partnership. This despite the fact that both sides 
have no choice but to make it work since material interests are likely to override ideological preferences 
in this new resource politics. They assert that Australia must adjust to the political and economic impact 
of closer ties with China, and eventually come to terms with China by dealing carefully with the 
misalignment between its economic and strategic interests (Beeson, Soko & Wang, 2011).  
 
There are also some studies on the ongoing Free Trade Agreement negotiations between China and 
Australia (Cheng, 2008; Tran, 2008; Leahy et al., 2008; Yang, 2008). Yang Jiang’s work seeks to explain 
the slow progress of the FTA negotiation, as well as China’s negotiation approach, by looking into 
domestic political resistance in China and China’s policymaking institutions (Yang, 2008). 
 
Dynamics of Sino-Australian relations can also be found in the trilateral relationships between China, 
Australia and a third party. This trilateral approach was applied in the early 1990s to study the 
relationships between China, Australia and Southeast Asia (Wang, 1992). In the literature on 
Chinese-Australian relations, the United States has been given the most attention amongst all other third 
parties. Australia’s China policy is constrained by American attitudes towards China. This fact is widely 
acknowledged amongst students of Chinese-Australian relations. Scholars have increasingly registered 
the risk that the bilateral relations could easily fall victim to the volatile U.S.-China strategic relationship in 
the face of China’s rising power (Malik, 2001; Wesley, 2007a). 
 
This trilateral interplay also frequently occurs in the literature on the U.S.-Australian alliance in recent 
years. Some Americans advocate strengthening the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security 
Treaty (ANZUS) alliance to contain China (Baker & Paal, 2000). The Australians, however, are much less 
antagonistic towards China; they call for greater policy independence and are not afraid of upsetting the 
Americans by acknowledging their tension over attitudes towards China within the alliance. Amongst 
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those who continue to see the merits of the alliance, some tend to take a sanguine view of the tensions 
and even see a mediating role for Australia in moderating U.S. strategic perceptions of China so as to 
facilitate more stable Sino-American relations (Rudd, 2001). For the more nationalistic Australians who 
oppose Australia’s subservience to the United States, the discord is simply another instance of American 
contempt for the national interest of its junior ally: U.S. pressure over Australia’s China policy regarding 
Taiwan would inevitably put Australia at risk of being dragged unnecessarily into a great power conflict 
(Fraser, 2001). 
 
The China-U.S.-Australia interplay became an important topic of research in Australia during the 2000s, 
and there are works devoted specifically to this set of trilateral relations. The first detailed study of the 
triangle appeared as a monograph in the late 1990s (Harris, 1998b). Thereafter, at least eight academic 
journal articles on the subject were produced up until 2007.  
 
Some of these are geared towards the discussion of the impact of China’s rise on the U.S.-Australia 
alliance.(Harris, 1998b; Malik, 2005, 2006). Others approach the question from the perspective of 
Australia’s strategic posture by highlighting the foreign policy dilemma faced by Australia in balancing its 
relations with the two great powers (Tow & Hay, 2001; Tow, 2005; White, 2005; Pan, 2006; Tow & Yen, 
2007). 
 
As China’s power grows, realists are doubtful about the prospect of an easy strategic accommodation 
between China and the United States (Tow, 2005; White, 2005, 2007). If their strategic competition 
intensifies, both great powers are likely to try to pull Australia into their orbits of influence by imposing 
excessive and countervailing expectations and make Australia’s efforts at neutrality difficult (Harris, 
1998b; Tow, 2005; Wesley, 2007a). 
 
The United States is worried about the strategic consequences of Australia’s growing dependence on 
China for economic growth. It demands that Australia follow the U.S. lead on a range of China-related 
issues where vital U.S. interests are at stake, such as the defence of Taiwan and how to respond to 
China’s rising power (Harris, 1998b; Tow & Hay, 2001; Tow, 2005; Malik, 2005, 2006). China on the other 
hand, is deeply unsettled about the prospect of Australia joining America in containing China and 
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depriving China of its right to reclaim Taiwan (Tow & Hay, 2001; Tow, 2005). 
 
Australian responses to the predicament are varied. Some call for a decoupling strategy to preserve 
Australian neutrality (Wesley, 2007a). Others propose dialogues and consultations as confidence 
building measures to avoid miscalculation, misperception of intentions and inflated expectations on 
Australia (Tow & Hay, 2001; Tow, 2005; Pan, 2006). Some entertain hopes of encouraging the United 
States to maintain its engagement strategy and curb the influence of the neoconservatives in America 
and at home (Tow & Hay, 2001; Pan, 2006). U.S. hardliners assert that the different perspectives on 
China between the United States and Australia, are due to Australia’s fallacious assumptions and 
misperceptions of China rather than their diverging interests; sitting on the fence is never an option for 
Australia, which will ultimately side with the United States in the most difficult situations (Malik, 2006). 
 
There are also competing views on China’s intentions towards ANZUS. According to the more relaxed 
interpretation, China recognises and accepts its long history and, subject to its character not changing, its 
contribution to regional stability; the Australia-U.S. alliance in itself is not problematic for Australia’s 
relationship with China (Harris, 1998b). The more cynical voices, however, point to Chinese concern 
about Australian susceptibility to U.S. influence, and Chinese efforts to use her economic clout to convert 
Canberra into a more independent security actor (Tow, 2005). The most alarmist interpretations highlight 
China’s desire to eventually neutralise the San Francisco alliances system by economic and security 
diplomacy that undercuts alliance politics (Tow & Hay, 2001); some alarmists believe that Beijing still 
harbours ambitions of driving a wedge between Australia and the United States (Malik, 2005). 
 
Nevertheless, there is a consensus amongst all analysts that the alliance remains robust. Many indeed 
believe that discord over China has not endangered Australia’s alliance with America; China will not 
succeed in dividing the alliance, because it is based on shared values and common regional and global 
strategic interests; and Australia has a considerable interest in a strong Australia-U.S. relationship (Harris, 
1998b; Malik, 2005, 2006). From the Australian perspective, Australian discontent with the alliance is 
unlikely to hinge centrally on the relationship with China (Harris, 1998b). A careful survey of the vast 
literature on ANZUS confirms this as a common opinion. 
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Since 2008, there has also been a revived research interest in the China-Australia-U.S. strategic triangle 
and the U.S. factor in Australia-China Relations. This more recent literature focuses not so much about 
the bilateral relationship between Australia and China per se as Australia’s foreign policy. More 
specifically, this group of writings discuss Australia’s relationships with China and the United States in the 
context of the strategic triangle. The main concern that runs through this body of literature revolves 
around the question of whether Australia is able to reconcile its most important trading partnership with 
China with her indispensible traditional alliance ties with America.  
 
Shannon Tow surveys Australian efforts to reconcile Chinese-Australian relations with the ANZUS 
alliance during the period between 1971 and 2007, and elaborates on how Australia’s leaders have 
managed to expand the country’s relations with China under the Whitlam, Hawke and Howard 
administrations without jeopardising alliance relations with America (Tow, 2012).  
 
Hugh White’s works offer an extensive treatment of the strategic dilemma facing Australia in the current 
era of shifting global power dynamics (White, 2010, 2011). Having assessed the changing power 
dynamics between China and the United States, White sets out his policy recommendations for 
rethinking Australia’s strategic orientation in the Asian century. White’s proposal of an Asian ‘Concert of 
Powers’ arrangement is centred on the idea of the United States conceding American strategic primacy 
and sharing power with China in Asia, if China manages to surpass the United States in national power in 
the future. White’s thesis has provoked widespread and sharp criticism in Australia, and initiated a heated 
national debate around Australia’s strategic choice vis-à-vis China and America, as well as the regional 
security order in the age of power transition. Carlyle Thayer’s account of Australian responses to White’s 
thesis offers an interesting insight into Australia’s mainstream attitude towards White’s advocacy of 
accommodating Chinese power on the part of the United States and regional countries including 
Australia (Thayer, 2011).  
 
In response to White’s thesis, many Australian scholars have come up with alternative visions of regional 
security architecture and policy prescriptions for Australia. For instance, He Baogang criticises White’s 
proposal of a ‘Concert of Powers’ for overlooking the role of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and suggests that Australia should embrace a regional security order that is centred on both 
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ASEAN-led regionalism and the ‘Concert of Powers’ mechanism to constrain the domineering influence 
of great powers, the United States and China alike (He, 2012b).  
 
Derek McDougall’s work also discusses Australia’s strategies in the face of China’s rise in power in 
relation to the United States. In response to White’s thesis, McDougall suggests that the best option for 
Australia to constrain Chinese influence is a hedging strategy that combines soft balancing and 
accommodation, since ‘in the normal flux of international politics’ Australia does not have to choose 
between the United States and China (McDougall, 2011).  
 
Lowell Dittmer also advocates a triangular perspective on Sino-Australian relations with reference to the 
United States. Dittmer concurs with the view that the incompatibility between Australia’s relationships 
with China and America is not yet significant, and criticises White’s ‘Concert of Powers’ idea for being 
unsustainable on the grounds that Beijing may not agree with the arrangement. He continues that 
Australia may eventually be forced to choose if China gets powerful enough and coexistence with 
continuing U.S. strategic presence in the region becomes intolerable for the Chinese (Dittmer, 2012).  
 
You Ji’s work analyses the U.S. factor in the strategic dimension of Chinese-Australian relations, 
suggesting that as the Chinese military capabilities continue to grow and challenge U.S. strategic primacy, 
Australia faces the risk of being drawn into an unwanted major power confrontation between China and 
America (Ji, 2013).  
 
Scott Dewar also presents an analysis of the trilateral great power politics between Australia, China and 
the United States. Dewar warns that for Australia, the U.S. alliance and the economic partnership with 
China will become irreconcilable in the foreseeable future. In response to White’s idea of Washington 
ceding strategic primacy to Beijing, Dewar asserts that the power reality ‘is nowhere near that point yet 
and it may never come’. Nevertheless, Dewar holds the view that China would not expect Australia to end 
alliance relations with America and there is scope for Australia to develop a closer political relationship 
with China (Dewar, 2011).  
 
He Baogang provides a critical overview of Australian, Chinese and American perceptions of the 
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triangular politics. Having reviewed the three national perspectives, He stresses the need for more 
trilateral dialogue on the subject if the Australian debate initiated by White is to have any real and wider 
policy impact in Asia for the management of the strategic triangular politics between China, America and 
any regional U.S. ally/security partner, such as Australia (He, 2012a).  
 
1.4.3 The Broader Literature 
There is a broader body of literature relevant to this study, particular on Chinese outbound foreign 
investment and the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The works of Rosen and Hanemann 
examine the drivers and implications of Chinese outbound foreign direct investment mainly in the 
European context (2009, 2012). In the African context, Bräutigam and Tang closely follow the 
development of Chinese investment in the special economic zones (2011, 2012), while the issue of 
‘China Inc.’ is examined by Taylor and Xiao (2009). Liou’s studies the role of Chinese SOEs, focuses on 
the overseas expansion of central SOEs (2010), as well as the bureaucratic politics in the overseas 
expansion of Chinese oil companies (2009). Downs’ works examines the role of China’s oil companies as 
business interest groups (2008, 2010). Breslin’s study of government-industry relations in China is a 
good starting point for understanding the role of Chinese SOEs in overseas investment (2012b); while his 
analysis of Chinese resource foreign policy is also a relevant work as far as China’s resource diplomacy 
is concerned (2012a). Linda Jakobson’s research on new foreign policy actors in China also offers 
insights into this issue (Linda & Knox, 2010). Her analysis of the role of economic actors such as the big, 
powerful SOEs and industry associations in Chinese foreign policy making is revealing and suggestive of 
the difficulties in terms of access to data. This broader literature provides valuable insights into the role of 
Chinese SOEs in China’s outbound foreign direct investment and foreign economic policymaking. 
 
1.4.4 Critique of the Existing Literature and Contribution of the Thesis to 
the Studies of China-Australia Relations 
The existing literature on China-Australia relations has four areas of inadequacies. The first issue is the 
lack of treatment of the Chinese policy perspective. The second problem concerns the lack of discussion 
of the interaction between the resource ties and the strategic dimension of the bilateral relations. The 
third problem relates to the relatively narrow focus on the realist perspective in the analysis. Finally, the 
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domestic dimension deserves greater research attention insofar as the Chinese side of the story is 
concerned. These four areas of weaknesses apply to both the earlier works on the bilateral ties well as 
the more recent writings on the subject. The aim of this general critique of the existing literature on the 
bilateral relations is to briefly explain where this study sits and what it adds to the existing research. 
 
By and large, the lack of treatment of the Chinese policy perspective is a common problem. As 
mentioned in the previous review, it is fairly obvious that a more substantial analysis of China’s policy 
approach and concerns is lacking in the works by Chinese scholars as well as the English language 
sources. More often than not, the existing literature only contains passing reference to China’s policy. 
Instead, the discussions tend to be heavily influenced by Australia’s policy concerns and dilemmas. 
Efforts have been made to address this inadequacy in the recent studies of the bilateral resource politics 
from 2008 onwards; but overall the existing scholarship does not offer a balanced account despite a few 
notable exceptions.
13
 The discussion remains skewed towards the Australian side of the story and fails 
to thoroughly cover the Chinese policy perspectives and agendas. Most of the recent literature continues 
to shed light mainly on Australia’s policy concerns, such as the country’s alignment vis-à-vis China and 
America in the strategic triangle, the question of how to accommodate China without having to lose her 
autonomy, and the growing tensions between geopolitical imperative and geo-economic interest in 
Australia’s China ties. What has been insufficiently addressed in this intellectual discourse is the Chinese 
side of the story. 
 
This study offers a thorough analysis of the Chinese policy thinking and is more reflective of China’s 
policy concerns and priorities, especially with respect to the resource issues. The roles of the various 
transnational Chinese actors involved in the bilateral undertakings, so as the important domestic sources 
inside China, are so important for understanding the evolving power dynamics between the two countries 
                                                        
13
 A notable example of such exception is the joint research report on the bilateral relations produced by the Australian 
Centre on China in the World (CIW) and China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) (CIW & 
CICIR February 2012). This high-profile joint report offers a distinct overview of all the major aspects of the bilateral 
relationship and incorporates insights and perspectives from the officials and policymakers of both countries. The 
report stresses the importance of social and cultural links and the need to diversify the bilateral ties beyond economic 
interdependence, as well as the urgent need to adapt the bilateral strategic relationship to the rapidly changing 
geopolitical environment in the Asia-Pacific. 
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towards the end of the 2000s. The extensive analysis of the iron ore pricing issue in this thesis is a major 
contribution to the discussion of the Chinese side of the story. It is worth emphasising here that this 
particular policy issue has so far received very limited research attention from the students of the bilateral 
relations despite its huge policy significance to the Chinese. This thesis has explained in detail why and 
how this issue has caused a huge political controversy in China and become a major policy agenda. The 
thesis also covers extensively the analysis of the Chinese policy motivations and perceptions of the 
Australian discrimination against Chinese government investment in Australia. Most importantly, this 
study has helped illustrate the paradox of China’s rise by examining both her rising power and 
entrenched vulnerability in the resource power politics versus Australia. Since the existing academic 
discourse on the bilateral relations is very much overwhelmed by the perception of China’s rise, the 
vulnerability aspect has been largely neglected in the discussions. By focusing on Chinese vulnerability, 
this study hopes to offer a more accurate depiction of China’s rise in the context of China-Australia 
relations. 
 
Secondly, the existing literature on the bilateral relations tends to isolate the discussion of economic 
issues from the strategic analysis of the geopolitical dimension. As pointed out in the previous review, 
many studies tend to divide the bilateral relations into the political, security/strategic, and the economic 
domains without addressing the links between them. This is especially common in book-length studies. 
Another common tendency is to focus exclusively on the analysis of either economic or strategic issues 
in a research articles without considering the interplay between the two dimensions. Such a 
‘compartmentalised’ approach does not fully reflect the reality of the bilateral relations given the close 
interactions of geopolitical dynamics and economic issues. As this thesis argues, the progress in China’s 
political relationship with Australia is largely underpinned by the economic ties centred on resource 
coopeartion. Again, even the more recent literature has showed little improvement in this regard; despite 
one or two exceptions, the majority of the recent studies on the resource relationship and the academic 
discourse on geopolitical issues fail to make any major breakthrough in this regard. 
 
This study has attempted to make an explicit link between geopolitics and the vital resource ties. It 
analyses the geo-strategic context for the bilateral resource politics and investigates how the changing 
patterns of the geopolitical/security relationship has shaped the scope and nature of the resource 
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partnership. In particular, arguments have been made from the Chinese perspective about the policy 
dilemma faced by China in relation to the growing tensions between her vital resource interests that are 
at stake in the resource ties with Australia and the deteriorating security relationship that is set to 
constrain and pose strategic risks for the development of the resource partnership. 
 
The third problem of the existing scholarship of China-Australia relations relates to the relatively narrow 
focus on the realist perspective in the analysis of the bilateral ties. To a large extent, the existing literature 
tends to discuss the bilateral relations under a realist framework. Much of what has been said about the 
bilateral relations reflects realist concerns for the traditional security agendas pertaining to alliance and 
strategic alignment behaviour. For instance, the intense debates about Australia’s strategic response to 
China and the continued research interest in the Australia-China-U.S. strategic triangle have constituted 
a significant proportion, if not the majority of the academic writings on Chinese-Australian relations. On 
the one hand, this is understandable because the rise of China has posed an unprecedented strategic 
dilemma for Australia; from the Australian perspective, it is entirely fair to devote the academic discussion 
to the country’s biggest foreign policy challenge, at least from a realist perspective. On the other hand, 
such a realist-oriented academic discourse fails to depict the full complexity of the bilateral relations and 
fully reflect the Chinese perspective. For instance, such a realist approach largely fails to capture the vital 
transnational dimension of the bilateral relations. Given its focus on the inter-state (or to be more specific 
the inter-governmental) level, it tends to neglect the transnational political and economic processes that 
have in fact played a critical role in shaping the bilateral relations. A lot of political tensions and policy 
conflicts have emerged from the transnational level pertaining to resource and other economic policy 
agendas. Moreover, the realist concern for the security agenda and geopolitics does not accurately 
reflect the Chinese policy concerns and the Chinese resource interests that are at stake. This is because 
China’s Australia policy is very much dominated by the resource security agenda, even though 
Canberra’s strategic behaviour vis-à-vis China remains a relevant foreign policy concern for Beijing. Yet, 
despite the heavy reliance on realist insights, many existing works often fail to acknowledge and declare 
the theoretical assumptions behind their empirical analysis. 
 
This study has not only explicitly clarified its theoretical assumptions but also adopted a more neoliberal 
analytical approach that emphasises the economic agendas and the idea of interdependence. Instead of 
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relying on the more conventional realist perspective, the study has mainly drawn on the theoretical 
insights of complex interdependence theory for the analysis of resource-related policy issues. This 
neoliberal perspective on the bilateral relations has allowed the research to focus on the important 
economic issues that are actually high up on China’s policy agenda and helped capture some of the most 
important political and economic dynamics at the transnational dimension. Moreover, the neoliberal 
theory of asymmetrical interdependence has enabled this study to combine the realist focus on power 
with the liberal focus on (economic) interdependence in the analysis of the bilateral resource power 
politics under extensive economic interdependence, where the traditional realist conceptions of power 
politics do not appear to be readily applicable. Furthermore, as will be explained in the subsequent 
section on theory, the ‘spectrum’ perspective of complex interdependence theory has also given enough 
scope for the analysis of the realist-oriented security dimension and its relationship with the resource 
issues. 
 
Last but not least, the thesis hopes to make a modest contribution to the literature on China-Australia 
relations by giving a more in-depth analysis of China’s domestic economic and political factors and how 
they may affect China’s policy and power position vis-à-vis Australia especially in the resource power 
politics. To some extent, the full implications of China’s domestic economic processes on the bilateral 
relations have not been fully appreciated by the existing scholarship. It is often acknowledged by the 
academic discourse that China’s economic growth and domestic economic transformations have been 
instrumental in the development of the bilateral economic partnership. However, there is still a lack of 
in-depth analysis of how some of the domestic factors have shaped China’s dealings with Australia, not 
least with respect to the bilateral resource politics. In fact, even those works on resource politics fail to 
give an in-depth account of the relevant Chinese domestic factors and their implications for the resource 
ties. Arguably, this inadequacy is partly attributable to the above-mentioned relative neglect of the 
transnational dealings in the existing scholarship. As this study shows, much of the analysis of the politics 
of inter-state and transnational economic relations would indeed require a thorough examination of the 
domestic sources. Insofar as this research is concerned, the thesis has looked into the various relevant 
domestic and industry-level factors, such as the roles and interests of the various Chinese market actors 
and the structural economic problems faced by the resource-dependent industries. Arguments have also 
been made in relation to the explanation of the political process of agenda formation (the rise of resource 
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security agenda in China) and the domestic sources of Chinese vulnerability in the transnational struggle 
for iron ore pricing power. The empirical findings of these analyses could enrich the academic 
understanding of some of the major domestic constraints on China in the resource power politics versus 
the Australian mining companies.  
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1.5 Research Methods 
This study relies mainly on qualitative data. As this research is concerned with recent events and policies, 
it does not use any archival materials. For this study, I have consulted both Chinese and English 
literature as secondary sources. Some of the secondary sources, especially the English-language 
academic works written by Australian scholars, are accessible at the London School of Economics and 
Political Sciences and in the U.K.; but they are of limited use in terms of providing the most relevant 
empirical materials for the purpose of this thesis. More fruitful secondary sources in the Chinese 
language are available in China, where appropriate books authored by Chinese writers tend to show 
greater relevance to the study in one way or another. Media coverage has been an important secondary 
source of data. Online information such as news reports and special coverage of relevant issues is 
abundant and has been extremely useful for the iron ore and investment chapters. 
 
Fieldwork is indispensable for obtaining primary data. Three rounds of semi-structured key informant 
interviews were undertaken for this research. The Appendix provides more detailed information on these 
research trips. The first two rounds of fieldwork were carried out in Beijing and Shanghai (trip 2 and trip 3 
in the Appendix), and the final round was conducted in Canberra and Sydney (trip 4 in the Appendix). In 
addition to the three major research trips, some interviews were undertaken in Shanghai during my 
internship at Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) in the summer of 2009 and on the 
sidelines of the ‘12
th
 International Conference of Australian Studies in China’ in October 2010. The 
fieldwork was conducted mainly through research interviews with selected interlocutors. Efforts were 
made to broaden the scope of fieldwork by reaching out to as many interlocutors as possible, from both 
the foreign policy establishment and the industry. 
 
It was difficult to gain access to policymakers, government officials, business practitioners and 
representatives of the mining and metallurgical industries. Practitioners in the diplomatic and business 
circles were much less approachable in my current capacity as a research student. Problems of 
accessibility and accountability however do not present an overwhelming barrier to the researcher’s 
ability to examine the bigger picture.
14
 Analysts based at independent think tanks in Australia and 
                                                        
14
 Again, this is compensated for by extensive media reports on the economic issues by Chinese journalists.  
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government-affiliated research institutions in China and university scholars were relatively more 
accessible. More viable alternative sources, such as academics at leading Chinese universities, were 
also available, while informed journalists, market observers and business analysts were also useful 
primary sources. Whilst the focus is on Chinese sources, the insights of Australian analysts were also 
proactively pursued in order to obtain a more balanced overall perspective. 
 
Quantitative data is obtainable from open sources, and some qualitative data was available in the 
relevant academic literature on Chinese-Australian relations. However, many of the economic and 
industry figures used in this study are taken from news reports. Industry data contained in annual 
yearbooks prepared and written by relevant business associations, industry confederations and 
government agencies can be useful; but they were not available in the U.K. Published market research 
reports, industry reports and business analyses produced by investment lawyers, think tanks and 
universities also proved to be invaluable sources of relevant quantitative data. 
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Chapter 2 From Post-9/11 to Post-2008: China’s 
Rise and the Evolving Strategic Context 
2.1 Introduction 
This study’s core research question is concerned with analysing the Chinese response to the evolving 
power dynamics which underpin bilateral resource politics with Australia. In order to address this topic, it 
is important to first examine the broader geopolitical context of the resource ties between these two 
countries, before examining the specific aspects of the bilateral resource politics. The first major research 
objective as set out in the introduction chapter is therefore to investigate the geopolitical background of 
the bilateral resource politics. Indeed, all economic ties between states emerge out of a specific political 
framework, and China’s vitally important resource ties with Australia have developed out of the specific 
political context of Chinese-Australian bilateral relations. Although Chinese-Australian relations have first 
and foremost been driven by the development of resource ties, the bilateral economic relationship has 
very much been shaped by evolving geopolitical realities. The rapid development of these resource ties 
by and large began in the first decade of the new century. During the same period, the rise of China has 
transformed Australia’s strategic environment, and Australia’s reaction to China’s rise has also shifted 
significantly over the short span of the 2000s. Thus, China’s increasingly vital resource partnership with 
Australia has grown out of a highly dynamic political framework. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the geopolitical context in which the bilateral resource politics 
between China and Australia has played out. It discusses the strategic dimension of the bilateral relations 
by investigating the evolving trajectory of the changing strategic dynamics between the two countries in 
the post-9/11 and post-2008 eras, respectively. The chapter begins with a survey of the post-9/11 
geopolitical setting, which, together with China’s economic rise, accounts for the Sino-Australian entente 
which emerged during the Howard years in the post-9/11 era. The second half of the chapter examines 
how and why the strategic dynamics of the bilateral relationship has deteriorated since 2008 in relation to 
some systemic changes in the wider regional geopolitical setting such as: China’s increasingly 
expansionist foreign policy posture; Australia’s changing strategic attitude towards China’s rise; and the 
new Australia-U.S. alliance dynamics targeted against China. 
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This background analysis of the geopolitical context is highly relevant for understanding China’s relative 
power position vis-à-vis Australia, and her policy response in the bilateral power struggles over Chinese 
investment in Australia’s resources sector and iron ore pricing, which are the focus of the ensuing 
chapters. By illustrating the ups and downs of the bilateral relations during the post-9/11 and post-2008 
eras, the strategic analysis provided in this chapter will help readers to better appreciate the delicate 
geopolitical context of the bilateral resource ties and its implications for the development of this resource 
partnership. As the subsequent chapters will illustrate, the precarious nature of this bilateral political 
relationship has seriously limited the potential for economic cooperation and prevented China and 
Australia from establishing a reliable and intimate resource partnership.  
 
In this chapter I argue that China’s delicate strategic relations with Australia underwent major changes in 
the first decade of the new century. Bilateral relations improved significantly during the post-9/11 era, but 
there has been a serious deterioration in the strategic dimension of the bilateral relations since 2008. 
China’s growing economic salience combined with her posture of strategic restraint in the post-9/11 era 
significantly improved the way in China’s rise was viewed by the Howard government. Her strategic 
restraint, together with the Bush administration’s preoccupation with the War on Terror and the Middle 
East, led to a period of stability in China-U.S. relations; thereby providing a generally permissive strategic 
environment for a Sino-Australian entente to occur in the post-9/11 era. However, China’s growing power 
and her assertive and expansionist behaviour since 2008 has resulted in the deterioration of the regional 
strategic environment, with growing tensions between China and the United States and intensified 
security competition and strategic rivalry between China and her neighbouring states. In response to the 
new strategic uncertainty amidst power shifts in the post-2008 era, Australia’s strategic stance towards 
China has hardened. As the Labour government reassessed the strategic implications of China’s rise, 
Australia endeavoured to reorient her foreign policy away from China, build up her defence capabilities 
and adapt her alliance with the United States to challenge China’s rise. Hence, the strategic dimension of 
post-2008 Chinese-Australian relations has been marked by revived strategic tensions and competitive 
realist dynamics. 
 
The geo-strategic context set out in this chapter underlines the geopolitical constraints faced by China in 
conducting bilateral resource power politics vis-à-vis Australia. Although this chapter itself only seeks to 
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analyse the strategic dimension of the bilateral relations, its findings nonetheless provide important 
insights into the political context of the resource politics, which in turn reinforces the central argument of 
this thesis. As the ensuing chapters on the specific issues of resource politics will show, the nature and 
scope of the bilateral resource ties were in no small measure affected by the geopolitical realities 
emerging from the broader relationship. Indeed, one major argument of this thesis is that geopolitical 
constraints set the limit on bilateral resource cooperation. The geopolitical realities of Chinese-Australian 
relations entail considerable strategic uncertainty and political constraints on the development of a 
genuine, deep and reliable resource partnership between the two countries. Chinese efforts to maximise 
resource interest therefore continually come up against inherent political risks in the bilateral relations. 
Despite Australia’s important role in ensuring Chinese resource supply, the revived strategic tensions in 
Chinese-Australian bilateral relations during the post-2008 era have begun to undermine China’s 
resource security interests. Unfortunately, China is hard pressed to find a way of circumventing this 
geo-economic dilemma in her resource relations with Australia. 
 
Against this context, I have chosen to use complex interdependence theory to help make sense of this 
strategic aspect of China-Australia relations. This theory presents a spectrum of world politics whereby 
the typical situations of complex interdependence and realism are ideal types whilst most situations of 
world politics will fall somewhere between the two extremes. Accordingly, one needs to understand the 
degree to which realist or complex interdependence assumptions correspond to the actual situation 
under analysis, or where that particular situation of world politics sits on the spectrum, before deciding 
which explanatory model to apply to a situation or problem (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 20). This means that 
the position of a given situation along this complex interdependence-realism continuum has real world 
implications, and constitutes an important independent variable for analysis. In other words, the analysis 
of the resource politics between China and Australia depend on its specific position on the spectrum. 
 
In this regard, it can be said that the condition of Chinese-Australian relations does not strictly reflect the 
ideal-type of complex interdependence. This is because realist dynamics are ever-present in the bilateral 
relations, due to inherent strategic tensions between China and Australia. Their divergent strategic 
preferences, geopolitical interests and political outlooks, together with East Asia’s precarious regional 
security environment and rapidly changing power structure, mean that China’s relations with Australia 
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always contain a significant geo-strategic dimension under the sway of realist logic. In this regard, the 
revived strategic tensions in the bilateral relations, which flared towards the end of the 2000s, mark a 
further shift towards the realist end of the continuum. The realist dimension and the apparent recent shift 
towards realism on the spectrum, have to be taken into consideration in any analysis of the bilateral 
resource power politics. As the subsequent chapters will demonstrate, the inherent strategic uncertainty 
and revived tensions between China and Australia have imposed considerable constraints on the 
development of the resource partnership. The very existence of these realist dynamics, means that 
China’s resource ties with Australia are developing within a constrained and precarious political 
framework. 
 
Despite this chapter’s emphasis on the realist dynamics of the strategic dimension, the forces of 
economic globalisation have arguably still prevailed in the context of Chinese-Australian bilateral 
relations. After all, there have been no major strategic conflicts or direct confrontations between China 
and Australia. Both Beijing and Canberra have been careful not to let the worsening security dynamics 
jeopardise their vital economic ties and interests. To some extent, deepening economic interdependence 
and continued growth of the resource partnership are indicative of the strength of the bilateral economic 
ties. What this means in theoretical terms is that Chinese-Australian relations are nonetheless still 
situated closer to the complex interdependence end, rather than the realist end, along the continuum. In 
other words, insights from the complex interdependence theory remain valid as providing a more relevant 
and appropriate explanatory model than a realism-focused theoretical framework for analysis of China’s 
resource politics with Australia, as will be shown in subsequent chapters. Indeed, the predominance of 
complex interdependence is also the logic that underpins the background analysis provided in Chapter 1, 
which sets out the overall characteristics of China-Australia relations in terms of complex 
interdependence. 
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2.2 Post-9/11 Global and Regional Geopolitical Setting: 
2001-2007 
China’s strategic relations with Australia have been shaped by global and regional geopolitical dynamics. 
The security stance taken by the United States has been the most decisive factor in this regard. George 
W. Bush came to power in 2001 with a weak electoral mandate and a hawkish eye on relations with 
China. However, the terrorist attacks on 11
th
 September completely transformed U.S. foreign policy and 
Bush’s presidency, triggering a series of systemic effects on international politics. The War on Terror, the 
Middle East and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction became the three prongs of U.S. 
global security strategy. The United States waged its global War on Terror, toppled the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan that harboured Al-Qaeda, singled out Iran, Iraq and North Korea as the ‘axis of evil’ amongst 
rogue states, invaded Iraq without U.N. sanctions and brought down the Saddam regime. The terrorist 
attacks and America’s quick military victories in Afghanistan and Iraq boosted domestic support for 
Bush’s presidency, making him a ‘War President’ and counterterrorism the centrepiece of American 
politics. 
 
The two wars once again demonstrated the supremacy of America’s unrivalled military might. U.S. 
strategic penetration of Central Asia and its increased involvement in the Middle East were some of the 
immediate strategic gains. However, both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars cost America money and lives, 
preoccupied America’s strategic planning, and consumed its diplomatic and military resources. America’s 
image as a ‘world leader’ was also tarnished by its de facto war against the Muslim world in the 
anti-terrorist campaign, its diplomatically unpopular and illegal invasion of Iraq, and the subsequent 
failure to find weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in that country as well as the torture and ill-treatment 
of terrorist suspects. These actions weakened the transatlantic alliance, and undermined U.S. soft power 
and the legitimacy of American hegemony and leadership. Anti-U.S. sentiments became pervasive 
across Europe and the Muslim world when the Bush doctrine and neo-conservatism came to be regarded 
as destabilising and imperialist. East Asia (especially Southeast Asia), where Chinese influence 
continued to expand and U.S. hegemonic power was still admired and relied upon by most of the 
countries in the region, was very much neglected by the Bush administration, which became bogged 
down in the quagmires of Middle Eastern geopolitics. 
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The post-9/11 transformation of U.S. foreign policy gave fresh impetus to the Australia-U.S. alliance. 
Howard was in Washington on the day of the terrorist attacks witnessing the tragedy unfold, and he 
immediately seized an historic opportunity to further strengthen the alliance. Australia proved its value 
and loyalty as a junior ally by fully committing itself to U.S. security needs in the post-9/11 era. It invoked 
the ANZUS treaty immediately after the terrorist attacks, contributed troops to the war efforts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and joined the Proliferation Security Initiative. The Bali bombings in 2002, which killed 88 
Australians, further strengthened the case made by the Howard Administration for Australian 
engagement in the U.S.-led global War on Terror. Howard managed to convince the Americans that 
Australians shared Americans’ sorrow and security concerns, and a close bond was thus forged between 
him and Bush (Sheridan, 2006; Garran, 2004). 
 
Not least for alliance considerations, Howard sought to bring Australia in line with the United States on 
strategic assessment and revolutionised the way in which Australia perceived and responded to its 
security challenges. Howard spearheaded the transformation of Australian defence strategy from the 
‘continental defence’ approach (‘Defence of Australia’ doctrine) to a ‘forward defence’ posture with the 
aim to build up the expeditionary capabilities to deal with low-intensity contingency operations against 
non-state security challenges globally (Dibb, 2006; Dupont, 2003; White, 2002). This changing defence 
posture was also designed to make Australia more useful to the United States by raising its military 
capability to help fight America’s war (Kelly, 2006). Indeed, support for American war efforts had always 
been enthusiastically embraced by Britain and Australia, so much so that the Anglo-sphere has come to 
be seen as the main countries that wage war. Having kept Australian causalities on the battlefields to a 
minimum, Howard managed to sustain domestic support for Australia’s participation in the military 
campaigns (Kelly, 2006). 
 
Even when the United States later became more isolated internationally, Australia showed its affinity with 
America and offered its wholehearted support entirely on its own initiative. The strategic dividend of this 
alliance policy was tremendous for Australia. Allied intelligence cooperation deepened as Bush granted 
Australia unprecedented access to U.S. intelligence resources, bringing Australia to the most exclusive 
inner circle of intelligence collaboration - the ‘3 ears only’ countries along with Britain (Sheridan, 2006). 
Australian dependence on alliance with America was further entrenched as Australian armed forces were 
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given more access to America’s most advanced military technology and resulted in a revolution in Military 
Affairs. Howard was proud of Australia’s unprecedentedly close relationship with America, as the junior 
ally was increasingly regarded as the ‘Britain of the Asia-Pacific’. For a middling power like Australia, this 
constituted a remarkable foreign policy achievement. The level of trust between Australian and American 
leaders was at a historic high. Insofar as Chinese-Australian relations were concerned, this intimacy and 
mutual trust gave Australia considerable room for manoeuvre in dealing with a rising China without 
damaging its alliance with the United States. 
 
By the time Bush came to power, the United States had already begun to experience the strategic 
challenge emerging from China’s rise. An acknowledgement of the Chinese threat, however it was 
defined, had been growing in the United States since the beginning of the new century. China was 
anxious about the new Bush administration’s China policy, when American power was at its height and 
the global power structure was heavily unbalanced in favour of the United States, particularly during the 
first years of Bush’s presidency. The Chinese leaders were acutely aware of the fact that China was at 
the receiving end of U.S. hegemonic power in what was clearly a unipolar era. Whilst the search for 
strategic stability with the United States remained China’s top foreign policy priority at the turn of the 
century (Wang, 2005), the events of 9/11 and its consequent impact on U.S. global strategy offered the 
Beijing leadership a golden opportunity to mend China’s ties with the superpower and cultivate a sound 
working relationship with American leaders. Having seized this ‘historic strategic opportunity’, China 
pursued a successful foreign policy that enabled Beijing to build a positive and stable strategic 
relationship with Washington and to maintain a generally stable external strategic environment. 
 
Beijing chose to align itself with Washington by cooperating with America on counterterrorism and a 
non-proliferation agenda, and avoided confronting the Bush administration on the U.S. decision to invade 
Iraq before and after supposed termination of the war. While the Bush administration focused on the 
chaos in the Middle East, China shouldered U.S. burden by playing a constructive and ‘leading role’, with 
U.S. encouragement, on the North Korean nuclear issue in the Six-Party diplomacy. As China’s economic 
presence and interests expanded globally, the United States found China’s cooperation increasingly 
important on a range of issues such as North Korea, Iran and Sudan, etc. When Chinese cooperation 
became indispensable on nuclear non-proliferation, U.S. debt financing and global economic governance, 
75 
 
a stable, pragmatic and constructive working relationship with Beijing became invaluable to the Bush 
administration 
 
As China’s economic growth continued apace, China’s trade, investment and financial links with America 
further developed, and mutual dependence between the two economies reached an unprecedented level. 
Despite the ‘symbiotic’ economic relationship, perception of the ‘China threat’ had never completely 
receded in U.S. strategic thinking. Hardliners in the U.S. defence and security establishment were 
becoming increasingly alarmed by China’s growing regional influence and global profile, when the United 
States was concentrated on the Middle East and the global War on Terror. Yet, many American political 
and business leaders came to realise that the United States had a huge and growing stake in a stable 
and economically prosperous China. The U.S. government’s official China policy was moderated by a 
more balanced view of China, and the Bush administration in effect ruled out the containment option 
(Wang, 2004). Engagement remained the cornerstone of Bush’s China policy, where the guiding principle 
was to encourage China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’. Although China had already emerged as 
America’s ‘strategic competitor’ in the Western Pacific geostrategic theatre, political necessity and 
strategic expediency forced the Bush administration to base its China policy on more balanced and 
pragmatic footing.  
 
Beijing’s foreign policy also remained cautious and prudent during this period. An important line of 
thinking underpinning Beijing’s approach to international conflicts and frictions was that economic 
development was China’s source of strength and the essential way leading to peaceful solutions to 
problems at home and abroad (Hou, 2008); it was thus deemed that difficult external foreign policy 
challenges should not be allowed to jeopardise economic development at home. The leadership 
succession between 2002 and 2004 brought no major changes to China’s U.S. policy and bilateral 
relations. In part because of the revival of the notion of in ‘China threat’ in the region and in the United 
States, China lowered its previous anti-U.S. profile in the region and began to engage with a policy of 
reassurance by affirming its peaceful intentions and acknowledging the United States as a constructive 
player in regional security. When Sino-American relations improved after the September 11
th
 incident, 
Chinese officials and analysts seemed more relaxed about their country co-existing with U.S. alliances in 
the Western Pacific. The development of Sino-American bilateral relations thus came to be regarded as 
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having been in its ‘best shape in history’ by some U.S. leaders and Chinese strategists and officials 
during the period between 2003 and 2005. 
 
Beijing’s approach towards the East Asian region was rather effective since the 1998 Asian financial 
crisis. China’s vision of ASEAN-centred ‘regional cooperation’ was based on proactive economic 
diplomacy, regional multilateralism and a reassurance strategy. Chinese economic concessions, efforts 
to promote economic integration with the regional countries, diplomatic engagement in multilateral 
regional forums, together with an accommodating posture of self-restraint on territorial and maritime 
disputes, largely dispelled regional fears of China’s rising threat and enhanced Beijing’s standing as a 
responsible regional power. Despite increasing tensions between Beijing and Taipei, the risk of military 
conflict and the independence movement on the island were contained by Beijing and Washington based 
on a de facto U.S.-China strategic coordination on the Taiwan issue. China’s cautious approach to 
maritime disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea minimised the escalation of security 
tensions in Southeast Asia, as well as with Japan. China’s mediating efforts in the North Korea nuclear 
issue were appreciated in the region and the United States; Beijing’s diplomatic leadership was 
perceived as a critical contribution to non-proliferation efforts and regional stability. These developments 
were in stark contrast with the sense of insecurity (partly triggered off by the regional perception of 
Chinese bellicosity) experienced by the region in the early and mid-1990s, when China was widely 
considered to be a destabilising factor in regional security. 
 
China was perceived by the Bush administration as a strategic 'peer competitor' to the United States. 
Although engagement remained the basic approach toward China during the post-9/11 era, the Bush 
administration also embarked on a hedging strategy to limit China’s hegemonic ambitions and strategic 
options by strengthening U.S. alliances. America spared no efforts to strengthen its existing major 
strategic alliances and security partnerships in the Western Pacific, and encouraged multilateral 
cooperation among its bilateral allies in the region
15
 (Medeiros, 2005). It also reached out to countries 
                                                        
15
 A key function of this strategy was to encourage closer strategic coordination with and among its allies in their 
approaches to a rising China (Dibb & Blackwill, 2000). Policy coordination with respect to China was hard given 
differing perspectives held by America and its allies. As China’s power and influence continued to grow, American 
strategic policymakers were anxious about the widening gap between Washington’s views of how best to deal with 
Beijing and those of America’s Asian allies. The U.S. administration therefore worked hard to bring Asian allies into 
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such as Vietnam, Indonesia and India to seek new strategic partnerships. Among other security 
imperatives, the challenge of China’s rise was a key factor driving these strategic moves. If the first Bush 
administration was mostly distracted by the chaos in the Middle East, East Asia was given relatively more 
strategic attention during President Bush’s second term when conservative U.S. strategists grew more 
agitated about the implications of China’s rise for American supremacy in the region. 
 
Nevertheless, those developments need to be understood in the context of U.S. global priorities, whereby 
East Asia was not a major theatre. The Greater Middle East remained the focus of U.S. global strategy 
throughout the Bush presidency. The hedging strategy against the potential strategic risks brought by 
China’s rising power did not amount to a containment strategy against China. President Bush himself 
was not interested in the containment of China; and his presidential preference was decisive in 
determining U.S. regional strategy towards East Asia.
16
 U.S.-China strategic rivalry had yet to occur in 
the post-9/11 phase largely because of U.S. strategic neglect of the region (especially Southeast Asia) 
and Beijing’s diplomatic prudence and strategic self-restraint in the region. Growing American anxiety 
over China’s enhanced diplomatic status in East Asia had yet to be translated into any serious American 
efforts to contain or arrest China’s diplomatic ascent in the region.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                              
line with American thinking by seeking to harmonise their opportunity and threat assessments concerning China’s 
rising power, and to formulate a shared position on the Taiwan question among other issues of common concern. The 
United States was initially not fond of this idea, but had shown an increasing interest in this approach during the Bush 
administration under the influence of some American strategists who advocated creating an ‘Asian NATO (North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation)’ to prepare for what they viewed as an upcoming Sino-American strategic competition 
(White, 2007). This U.S.-led multilateral security structure in Asia was designed to expand and draw in a wider group 
of hitherto non-aligned but pro-U.S. countries that shared America’s concerns about the growing power of China.  
16
 Source: Wang Jisi’s public lecture on Chinese foreign policy in Nankai University, November, 2010, Tianjin.  
78 
 
2.3 Post-9/11 Sino-Australian Entente (Pre-2008) 
Since the beginning of the new century, China’s strong and sustained economic growth led to surging 
demand in China for overseas energy and mineral resources, propping up global commodity prices and 
intensifying global competition for energy and other raw materials. China began to take a more strategic 
approach to its increasing dependence on overseas resources. Resource-driven economic diplomacy 
became ever more important in China’s relations with resource-rich countries. Insatiable Chinese 
demand for overseas natural resources fuelled a resource boom and propped up the economies in 
resource-producing countries. Economic ties based on cooperation in resources became the pillar of 
China’s bilateral relations with those countries. 
 
Sino-Australian relations had taken on a fundamentally new shape in this context. Indeed, 
resource-related economic diplomacy became the centrepiece of China’s Australian policy since the 
1990s. As Chinese demand for Australian resources rocketed, China’s approach towards Australia was 
first and foremost shaped by Australia’s relevance to China’s economic objectives. During Chinese 
President Hu Jintao’s visit to Canberra in 2003, the two governments singed the Trade and Economic 
Framework agreement. China also initiated its FTA negotiation with Australia in 2005, thus making 
Australia the second developed country that had begun FTA negotiations with China, after New Zealand. 
 
China was careful not to let diplomatic troubles interfere with the burgeoning resource ties and trade 
relations with Australia. Bilateral political and security differences did not disappear; but their importance 
diminished as the resource agenda grew in salience. China began to place great stress on the economic 
complementarities between the two economies, and Australia came to be regarded as a critical and 
reliable resource supplier. Conscious of the strategic implications of the growing economic 
interdependence, Beijing also pursued economic diplomacy to advance its diplomatic agenda. However, 
Beijing did not have unrealistic expectations, and did not set out to divide the Australia-U.S. alliance 
(Harris, 1998b). Nevertheless, it was hoped that greater economic collaboration between the two 
countries could persuade Canberra to maintain a more balanced position between Washington and 
Beijing, especially on matters pertaining to Taiwan and other political and security issues in which 
important Chinese interests were at stake. 
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The exponential growth in bilateral trade and other forms of economic cooperation since the mid-1990s 
gradually became the cornerstone of Sino-Australian relations. Two-way trade in goods and services 
started to pick up speed towards the end of the 1990s, and underwent rocketing growth since the 
beginning of the new century. Over the last decade, the share of Australia’s two-way trade in goods and 
services with China increased rapidly, from just 5.1 percent at the end of the 1990s to 17.6 percent at the 
end of the 2000s.
17
 China had become Australia’s largest merchandise trading partner in 2007, with 
two-way trade rising from AU$8 billion in the mid-1990s to AU$74 billion in 2008.
18
 As dependence on 
Chinese demand for Australian minerals and energy resources continued apace, China’s growing 
economic importance became apparent to the Australian leaders. The Australians increasingly came to 
regard China as an economic opportunity and even a critical determinant of Australia’s Asia strategy. 
Consequently, the Howard government became eager to maintain a stable and cordial relationship with 
Beijing. 
 
A subtle but significant policy shift was thus underway and remained steady as the Howard government 
began to adjust Australia’s position on a number of issues concerning China. There was a growing 
perception of Australian acceptance of a Sino-centric view of Asia, as Australia had already begun to 
recognise that China should be accorded some kind of leadership role in Asia as its power grew. 
Australia appeared rather cautious about committing itself to any political and strategic initiatives 
sanctioned by America and its regional allies that might arouse Chinese suspicions of Australia’s motives. 
A divergence of strategic outlook on China’s rise began to emerge between Australia and the United 
States in this context. 
 
The depiction of China in the declaratory policy of the Howard government became positive and 
remained so throughout the Howard years since 9/11 (McDowall, 2009). Canberra’s strategic depiction of 
China contained three basic elements. The first was the recognition of China’s vital economic importance 
                                                        
17
 Source: ‘China Tops Trade in Goods and Services’ (December 22, 2010) 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/releases/department/2010/101222.html 
18
 Source: ‘Australia's Composition of Trade 2008’ (June 17, 2008) 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/releases/department/090617_dmr_cot08.html 
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and its growing strategic weight as a significant regional and global power. The second was that the 
Australian government viewed the rise of China as an essentially positive process and the recognition 
that the behaviour of the rising China was generally responsible and benign. The third was that 
Australia’s relationship with China was not confined to economic engagement but also encompassed a 
strategic dimension whereby China was deemed a valuable strategic interlocutor, albeit Australia’s 
strategic relationship with China was not the same as its strategic partnerships with the United States 
and other American allies (such as Japan). The most formal policy enunciation in this regard was found in 
the 2003 foreign policy white paper, Advancing the National Interest (Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, 2003). Accepting that ‘China’s growing economic, political and strategic weight is the single most 
important trend in the region’,
19
 the white paper chose to characterise Australia’s relationship with China 
as a ‘strategic economic partnership’ (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2003). The same note 
was struck repeatedly in a number of significant foreign policy speeches made by Prime Minister John 
Howard, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer and senior Australian diplomats on various occasions. 
Howard saw a ‘confident, peaceful and prosperous China, with an open market economy and 
constructively engaged in global and regional institutions, as an enormous asset for the Asia-Pacific 
region and the wider world’ (McDowall, 2009). 
 
Australia’s strategic depiction of China began to diverge from that of the United States since the 
mid-2000s (McDowall, 2009). This divergence became rather apparent at the White House joint press 
conference between Howard and Bush in July 2005. While Bush’s strategic depiction of China 
emphasised the sensitivities and complexity in the U.S.-China relationship, Howard’s reflected a much 
friendlier tone. Prime Minister Howard conveyed a number of clear messages with regard to his 
understanding of Australia’s role in the China-U.S.-Australia triangular relationship: first, the alliance 
relationship was rock-solid; second, Australia had good relations with both the United States and China; 
third, these relations were positive yet different at the same time; fourth, Australia had an optimistic view 
of the region’s future; fifth, Australia was not an intermediary between the United States and China and 
                                                        
19
 China's rising power was already recognised by the Howard government as nothing short of 'the most important 
strategic development in the next fifteen years' in the 1997 foreign policy white paper (Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade, 1997). This official assessment represented a remarkable turnaround in the official strategic perceptions of 
China's rise and its significance to Australia since the normalisation of Sino-Australian relations (Tow, 2004). 
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did not wish to play the role of a mediator; and sixth, the alliance was not directed against China 
(McDowall, 2009). 
 
In October 2003, Chinese President Hu Jintao was invited to address the Australian Parliament, an 
honour previously extended only to American presidents.
20
 Washington was disconcerted by the display 
of symbolic parity in Australia's treatment of its relationships with America and China. Lest Beijing should 
feel as if it was being ‘ganged-up on’, Australia, to America’s disappointment, declined to participate in 
the so-called 'Halibut Group' in 2005, which was a series of private and secret multilateral meetings 
initiated by the United States on how to deal with the rise of China amongst selected U.S. allies and 
‘like-minded’ countries. The United States also became increasingly concerned about the perceived 
Australian weakness in pressing China to improve its human rights practices, Australia’s clear inclination 
to separate economic issues from power considerations, its alleged vacillation in endorsing U.S. security 
treaty obligations in a regional context, and its refusal to join the United States and Japan in pressing the 
European Union (E.U.) not to lift its arms embargoes against China. Australia’s recognition of China’s 
market economy status in 2005 was one more gain for Beijing, especially when the United States, Japan 
and E.U. nations refused to grant such recognition to China. 
 
During Foreign Minister Alexander Downer’s visit to Beijing in August 2004, he intimated that Australia 
would not automatically come to the assistance of the United States should it engage in a military conflict 
over the Taiwan Strait.
21
 This might not have represented a change in Canberra’s official policy as 
Howard was quick to assure the United States of Australia’s awareness of its alliance obligations to the 
United States in the event of any conflict in the Asia Pacific shortly after Downer’s pronouncement.
22
 
                                                        
20
 U.S. President Bush also addressed the Australian Parliament, only one day before Hu’s address. This highly 
symbolic arrangement indicated Canberra’s intention to pursue both economic gains from China and security and 
strategic benefits from America, and not to choose sides between Beijing and Washington. 
21
 In response to a carefully constructed question by the media regarding Taiwan, Downer said, ‘Well, the ANZUS 
Treaty is a treaty which of course is symbolic of the Australian alliance relationship with the United States, but the 
ANZUS Treaty is invoked in the event of one of our two countries, Australia or the United States, being attacked. So 
other military activity elsewhere in the world, be it in Iraq or anywhere else for that matter does not automatically 
invoke the ANZUS Treaty’ (Dobell, 2009). 
22
 Downer’s remark immediately triggered off strong Australian and American responses. The U.S. State Department 
immediately corrected Downer, noting that if U.S. naval or air elements came under attack by China while they were 
defending Taiwan, Australia was obligated to come to their defence. Downer quickly retracted his original statement 
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Nonetheless the utterance of an alternative policy preference by the Australian Foreign Minister himself 
might have pleased Beijing;
23
 and it gave a clear indication that the United States could not take 
Australia’s assistance for granted over the Taiwan issue. After the passage of China’s anti-secession law 
in March 2005, Downer was quoted as saying that the ANZUS Treaty could be invoked if war broke out 
across the Taiwan Strait, ‘but that's a very different thing from saying we would make a decision to go to 
war’ (AAP March 14, 2005). For many observers, Downer’s contradictory and ambiguous remarks 
indicated a shift from the Howard government’s previous clear-cut and tough stance on the issue. 
 
While demonstrating mild defiance towards America’s policy on China, Canberra did not forget to remind 
China that it did not want to make a choice between Beijing and Washington, and managed to do so 
without causing any fierce response from China. On many occasions, senior Chinese foreign ministry 
officials and diplomats explicitly or implicitly warned Australia not to invoke the ANZUS Treaty against 
China and even demanded a ‘review’ of the terms of the ANZUS Treaty to exclude a future Taiwan 
contingency (Tow, 2005). However, while publicly repeating its ambiguity over Taiwan, Canberra refused 
to give unequivocal assurance that it would satisfy the Chinese request for Australian neutrality in the 
event of a military conflict across the Taiwan Strait. Indeed, the Howard government was not prepared to 
go as far as some officials in Beijing would have expected. 
 
Australia was earmarked by some American strategists as a potentially ‘soft ally’ with a weak military 
capability and ‘limited geographic preoccupation’ that, if left unattended, could lead to ‘strategic myopia’ 
(Baker & Paal, 2000, 87-110). The United States therefore sought to broaden Australia’s perception of 
national interests and to encourage more active Australian involvement in Northeast and Southeast 
Asian security affairs. During President Bush’s second term, a prominent objective of U.S. alliance policy 
towards Australia was to promote a common position vis-à-vis China. In this regard, America pushed for 
greater trilateral strategic coordination between the United States, Australia and Japan through the 
Trilateral Strategic/Security Dialogue (TSD). In the context of Australia’s growing pro-Beijing tendencies, 
                                                                                                                                                              
(Tow, 2005). A few days later Howard responded that ‘nobody can doubt that Australia is a loyal ally of the United 
States’, and reverted to the orthodox interpretation of ANZUS as being invoked in an attack on ANZUS forces 
(McDowall, 2009). 
23
 Interview: 6 
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harmonisation of the China policy was believed by many strategists to be a chief strategic imperative for 
the TSD (White, 2007). 
 
To Beijing’s disappointment, Australia took an active part in initiating the first ministerial-level 
U.S.-Australia-Japan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) process in 2006,
24
 and concluded a bilateral 
defence and security cooperation pact with Japan a year later. To many Chinese commentators, the TSD 
and Australia-Japan security agreement would encourage the emergence of an ‘Asian NATO’, which 
would be perceived by Beijing as a serious deterioration in China’s regional security environment. Yet by 
voicing a different view on China and reiterating that it would be a mistake to seek to contain China 
shortly before the March 2006 TSD meeting in Canberra, the Howard government told Washington, 
Tokyo and Beijing that the TSD process was not and should not be designed against China. A month later 
Canberra signed nuclear energy cooperation agreements with Beijing, paving the way for the sale of 
Australian uranium ore to China. This was an act which surely pleased China and caused worry for the 
United States. China was aware of its incapacity to forestall the TSD process. Accepting the fact that 
Australia was the most moderate of the three TSD countries, Beijing recognised that Australia was 
playing a role different from those of the other two dialogue members, and lowered its official critique of 
Canberra compared with the years of 1996 and 2001
25
 (Hou, 2008). 
 
The shift in the Australian position vis-à-vis America and China was strategically viable only in the context 
of the Sino-American entente in the post-9/11 period, when both Washington and Beijing were displaying 
                                                        
24
 The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue was elevated from senior official level to ministerial level in 2006, largely driven by 
perceptions in Washington of Australia’s strategic drift towards China that the United States found worrying (White, 
2007). 
25
The first ministerial meeting of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue in 2006 was an unsatisfactory, if not a disappointing 
experience for America. The meeting reflected, more than anything else, U.S. concerns about China's growing power 
and influence, and the expectation that Australia could be brought back into line with American thinking on China and 
become more vocal in expressing concerns about China’s  rise. On the issue of how best to respond to the rise of 
China, American and Japanese interests and policies may have been converging, but Australia's policy was heading 
in a different direction. Having become more wary of offending Beijing, Canberra wanted to avoid anything that might 
look to Beijing like containment and argued that alliance coordination should not be specifically targeted at China. The 
Trilateral Strategic Dialogue thus had done nothing to bring Australia into line with its interlocutors. America's failure 
only went to show how serious the problem had become: if a country as close and dependent on the United States as 
Australia was not prepared to join America in taking a frosty approach to China, the prospect of building support 
among others in Asia was doomed (White, 2007). 
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greater strategic tolerance towards Australia. Canberra enjoyed considerable leeway as it was able to 
express different opinions to both great powers without damaging its economic ties with China and its 
security alliance with the United States. Howard refused to accept the notion that Australia had to make a 
choice between its history and geography. In retrospect, Howard managed to avoid the dilemma largely 
because of the permissive strategic environment then in place had allowed him to embark on a delicate 
balancing act between Beijing and Washington, without inviting hostility and suspicion from both capitals. 
 
The Howard government was also not enthused by the quadrilateral proposal when it was first floated in 
2007 by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
26
 Australia was persuaded by the United States to take 
part in the first Quadrilateral Initiative gathering with Japan, the United States and India held on the 
sidelines of the ASEAN Regional Forum Ministerial Meeting in Manila in May 2007. Howard was wary of 
getting involved with the quadrilateral grouping for fear of arousing Chinese suspicion and antagonising 
Beijing. Beijing had already taken a dim view of Canberra’s U.S.-backed bilateral and trilateral defence 
ties with Japan. From the Chinese perspective, such a quadrilateral initiative was apparently directed at 
China, and her relations with Japan and India were not cordial. Having grave misgivings about Abe’s 
notions of ‘value diplomacy’ and an ‘arc of freedom and prosperity’ stretching across Asia, Beijing viewed 
the four-power meeting as symbolising a nascent geopolitical line-up of maritime democracies against 
China, and sent protests to the four governments. Despite the precarious strategic situation in the 
Western Pacific, Asian leaders (probably with the exception of the Japanese) were playing down the risk 
that contrasting regime characteristics would constitute the main geopolitical dividing line, potentially 
pitting a China-led axis of autocracies against an alliance of democracies. In this context, Australia’s 
growing wariness may have been no different from India’s.
27
 
 
By 2006, the good mood and warm atmosphere of the China-Australia bilateral relationship was apparent. 
This was in a stark contrast with the acrimony and hostility that characterised the initial phase of the 
bilateral ties in 1996 and the frequent disputes during much of the pre-9/11 reconciliation period. During 
his meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in Canberra in April 2006, Australian Prime Minister 
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 Interview: 49 
27
 Shortly after Kevin Rudd came to power, Australia unilaterally withdrew from the Quadrilateral Initiative in February 
2008. 
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Howard acknowledged that of all the major relationships that Australia had with other countries, none had 
been more completely transformed than the relationship with China over the last ten years: ‘Now I don’t 
seek to invoke language such as special relationships and so forth, but I simply make the point that the 
transformation of the relationship with China has been remarkable’
28
 (McDowall, 2009). 
 
Given the diplomatic warmth and Australia’s perceived importance as a regional power in the Asia Pacific 
region (not to mention its salience as one of China’s top resource suppliers), the relationship with 
Australia apparently deserved the characterisation of a ‘strategic partnership’ from the Chinese 
standpoint. After all, China had established various kinds of ‘strategic relations’ and ‘partnerships’ with 
many other regional powers. It was curious, if not somewhat abnormal, that the perceived importance of 
this relationship was yet to be recognised and affirmed in China’s official characterisation. The 
Sino-Australian relationship still remained at the level of ‘a cooperative relationship’ throughout the 
decade since it was first officially recognised as such in 1999.
29
 
 
In the light of the geopolitical flux in the Asia-Pacific strategic arena, Chinese analysts viewed Australia 
as a significant player in the regional balance of power. Australia’s strategic relevance to China derived 
from its strengthened alliance with the United States since the mid-1990s and tightened defence ties with 
Japan in the mid-2000s. Australia also upgraded its strategic cooperation with South Korea, cemented 
partnership with ASEAN, and established strategic partnership with India. In a number of fluid power 
configurations involving strategic triangles and strategic squares in the region, Australia was courted by 
various powers, including the United States, Japan, India, South Korea, and ASEAN, as a valuable 
strategic partner in the precarious power dynamics of the region (Zhai September 4, 2007). Given 
Australia’s growing salience in regional strategic diplomacy, Beijing’s intention around the mid-2000s was 
                                                        
28
 Howard’s personal diplomacy had advanced from the low point of his office—a crisis meeting with Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin in Manila in 1996—to the intimate honour of ‘jogging diplomacy’ with Chinese Premier Wen 
Jiabao on the banks of Lake Burley Griffin, Canberra in April 2006. As the Chinese embassy noted, Premier Wen ‘was  
the first foreign leader he (Howard) walked with in the early morning and that it was a major breakthrough in 
Australia–China relations’ (McDowall, 2009). 
29
 Both sides agreed to characterise the relationship as a ‘comprehensive long-term stable and healthy cooperative 
relationship towards the 21
st
 century’ in 1999 during President Jiang’s visit to Australia. During Premier Wen’s visit to 
Australia in 2006, the relationship was reaffirmed as a ‘comprehensive cooperative relations with mutual benefit and 
win-win results for the 21
st
 century’. 
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to give a further boost to the political ties with Canberra.
30
 The strategic significance of the bilateral 
relations was often emphasised by Chinese officials and leaders.
31
 Indeed, China’s leaders had on a 
number of occasions hinted at the possibility of further cooperation with Australia along the direction of 
working towards a strategic partnership. China made it clear that the bilateral ties were of strategic 
importance, and the Beijing leadership repeatedly stressed China’s commitment to ‘unswervingly handle 
and develop the relationship between the two countries from a long-term and strategic perspective’ 
(changyuan jiaodu he zhanlue gaodu)
32
 (Hu 2003). Chinese analysts admitted that China ultimately was 
seeking to upgrade the bilateral relationship to a strategic partnership.
33
 Arguably, the decision to 
establish the annual bilateral Strategic Dialogue between Canberra and Beijing was largely a Chinese 
initiative to facilitate bilateral cooperation over bilateral and regional strategic issues. This Chinese 
initiative was also made in response to the upgrading of the Australia-U.S.-Japan Trilateral 
Strategic/Security Dialogue to ministerial level in 2006. 
 
The statement made by the Australian Foreign Minister in Beijing in 2004 was revealing: 
 
With Premier Wen we agreed that Australia and China would build up a bilateral strategic 
relationship, that we would strengthen our economic relationship and we would work together 
closely on Asia Pacific issues, be they economic or security issues…Diplomatic relations 
between countries evolve, you know, rather than change by gigantic steps—and what we are 
seeing through what Premier Wen said to me about building a strategic relationship between 
Australia and China is a significant development, in that I think China has seen Australia in 
years gone by as an important economic partner and a less important political and strategic 
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 Interview: 27 
31
 Australia was an important target audience for China’s ‘New Security Concept’ diplomacy and reassurance policy at 
multilateral regional forums. China also engaged in active military diplomacy with Australia as an integral part of this 
security strategy. Australia was ranked among China’s most important partners in regular bilateral dialogues on 
defence, arms control and non-proliferation issues; and it was also one of the few countries with which China actively 
pursued bilateral military exchanges. 
32
 This was interpreted by the Australian administration as a tacit Chinese invitation to build a strategic relationship 
with Australia that would move beyond trading ties to substantive collaboration on security and political issues in the 
Asia-Pacific region. 
33
 Interviews: 19, 27, 66 
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partner, and I think now there is a recognition by the Chinese leadership of the significant role 
that Australia plays in the region…I think we are seeing the evolution of a much stronger and 
much fuller relationship which encompasses many challenges of the Asia-Pacific region of the 
political and security nature, not just of an economic nature. (McDowall, 2009) 
 
This was a ground-breaking statement because by accepting Wen’s overture of a strategic relationship, 
Downer was changing Canberra’s official line, according to which Australia’s relationship with China still 
remained a ‘strategic economic relationship’ (rather than a strategic relationship of an all-round type). It 
was argued that there had been a steady evolution in Australia’s official characterisation of the bilateral 
relationship, from an ‘economic relationship’ (used in 1996), to an ‘economic relationship with strategic 
significance’ (used in 1997), to a ‘strategic economic relationship’ (used in 2003). From the vantage point 
of this gradual evolution, Downer’s remark was interpreted as indicating that Australia and China had 
established an explicit ‘strategic relationship’ (or a ‘strategic partnership’), thus completing the transition 
(McDowall, 2009) 
 
Downer’s statement, however, was widely criticised at home. The ensuing controversy surrounding this 
new ‘strategic partnership’ forced the Howard government to retreat from publicly acknowledging the 
‘strategic relationship’. The Australians were arguably more serious about the potential policy 
connotations that might be implied by the term ‘strategic’, not least because their understanding of the 
commitment to a formal strategic partnership/relationship was not exactly the same as the Chinese. The 
Australians had cautioned themselves against developing formal strategic ties with China lest any policy 
confusion or suspicion jeopardise the country’s alliance with the United States, which kept a close watch 
on how Australia approached its Chinese ties. In fact, before the term ‘strategic economic relationship’ 
was used in the 2003 foreign policy white paper, there was a tense debate within the Howard government 
about the choice of word: the alliance-focused conservatives wanted to avoid anything that was ‘strategic’ 
with China, while others advocated that Australia’s economic future lay with China and it was imperative 
to forge a strategic relationship with the rising power.
34
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 Interviews: 54, 66 
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In his official visit to Australia in 2006, Chinese Premier Wen allegedly proposed again of upgrading the 
relationship to strategic partnership during his meeting with Prime Minister Howard. Premier Wen’s 
proposal was reportedly declined by Howard (Boxun May 14, 2010). This was understandable from the 
Australian perspective. The Chinese Premier’s visit came not long after the first ministerial Trilateral 
Strategic Dialogue was held, where considerable differences over strategic interpretations of China’s rise 
were evident between Australia on the one hand and America and Japan on the other; Canberra was 
extremely sensitive to the U.S. attitude and had considerable qualms about the necessity of moving 
strategically too close to China under the circumstances of the time. Howard himself had serious 
reservations about the idea of a strategic partnership with Beijing, not least because there was no added 
incentive or strategic imperative for Canberra to upgrade its political ties with Beijing in this way.
35
 In the 
end, diplomatic pragmatism prevailed. After the controversy over Downer’s Beijing remark, Canberra 
refrained from making overt references to a ‘strategic relationship’ (McDowall, 2009), although warm 
overtures towards China continued.  
 
Beijing understood Canberra’s position, and was by and large content with the pragmatism and ‘benign 
ambiguity’ (vis-à-vis China and the United States, especially on Australia’s role in conflict over Taiwan) 
displayed in Australia’s changing posture. The Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson’s remark at a 
regular press conference on 27 November 2007 provided a revealing insight into China’s take on 
Howard’s China policy. When asked to comment on the prospects for Sino-Australian relations under the 
newly elected Australian Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, in addition to expressing congratulations and good 
wishes for further growth of the bilateral relations, Qin Gang referred to John Howard by stating: 
 
I would like to mention former Prime Minister Howard here. In his term, the Australian 
government and Mr Howard himself attached great importance to the relationship with China 
and made positive effects for the development, which we appreciate. We are satisfied with the 
development of Sino-Australia relationship, and have full confidence in its broad prospect. 
(Hou, 2008) 
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2.4 A Rupturing Sino-Australian Strategic Relationship since 
2008 
Howard’s approach to managing ties with China was effective as Canberra successfully decoupled its 
relationship with Beijing from its alliance relationship with the United States. By nurturing rapidly growing 
economic ties with China and welcoming its rise, while acting as a loyal ally of America in 
counterterrorism and the wars in the Middle East, Canberra managed to move closer to both Washington 
and Beijing. The Howard government was pragmatic enough to avoid becoming overly enthusiastic 
about building a too-intimate strategic relationship with Beijing; and neither did it allow pressure from the 
alliance to interfere with Australia’s important economic partnership and growing political ties with China. 
The steady improvement in strategic relations between China and Australia during the post-9/11 period 
however failed to persist after 2008.  
 
Howard’s successor failed to maintain the positive momentum. Fluent in Chinese, Kevin Rudd was more 
ambitious in elevating ties with China to a higher political tier. Beijing initially welcomed Rudd’s early 
political enthusiasm for increased ties with China and was almost delighted by Rudd’s diplomatic fixation 
on improving relations, but were somewhat put off by his push for a ‘true friendship’ (zhengyou) (Zhang, 
2012). Rudd’s initiative for a new type of relationship with China based on the ‘zhengyou’ model focused 
on the Labour Prime Minister’s idealistic agenda on human rights and an expectation of genuine equality. 
This arguably would require Chinese acceptance of Australia’s candid criticisms of the Chinese 
government and even Chinese acquiescence on what could be deemed foreign interference in China’s 
internal affairs, as well as challenges to China’s core interests. Apparently Kevin Rudd’s idealistic 
aspirations to make Australia a ‘critical friend’ to China caused great annoyance amongst the Chinese 
leadership, despite Rudd’s other friendly diplomatic overtures. Beijing managed keep to its displeasure at 
a relatively low-profile in public to avoid explicit embarrassment; but Chinese protests were conveyed 
through covert diplomatic channels with unequivocal messages to express Chinese disappointment and 
objections to what they saw as Australian interference in China’s internal affairs.  
 
In retrospect, this early hurdle in the relationship between the Rudd government and Beijing was only the 
first in a series of events that quickly worked to derail the bilateral relations during the two years between 
2008 and 2009. However, the more significant factors that had brought the Sino-Australian entente to an 
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abrupt halt came from the changes in international politics and regional strategic circumstances towards 
the end of the 2010s. Up until 2008, Rudd and Howard alike perceived China’s rise and Beijing’s 
international behaviour in a positive light; but when the financial and economic crisis broke out, it 
triggered changes in global and regional strategic circumstances that completely transformed the 
pre-2008 situation. 
 
During its final years, the Howard government did consider the potential negative strategic implications of 
China’s rising hard power; but these concerns at the time remained more abstract than real. They were 
not reflected in the main trends of Howard’s China diplomacy, nor did they characterise the distinctly 
positive mood of the post-9/11 Howard years. Concerns about the Chinese threat neither featured in 
official discourse nor resonated with the dominant mood in the region. In the post-9/11 context, Beijing 
and Washington were on good terms with each other. Beijing’s willingness to seek Sino-American 
strategic stability, Chinese cooperation in counterterrorism and other security issues, as well as China’s 
posture of strategic self-restraint were understood and appreciated by the Bush administration, which 
indulged in the global War on Terror and the Middle East affairs with prolonged strategic neglect of East 
Asia. 
 
Before more cracks appeared in the bilateral relations, the Rudd government at the time also shared 
Howard’s general sentiment, despite concerns over China’s human rights record. Rudd recognised that 
the generally benign regional strategic circumstances presented a window of opportunity for everyone, 
though he soberly observed that it was uncertain how long the strategic stability would last. He pressed 
Beijing and Washington to seize the historic opportunity to build a closer partnership and advocated a 
‘bridge’ role for Australia between the two great powers (Rudd April 20, 2007; Rudd March 31, 2008). Not 
long after Rudd came to power, that ‘window of strategic opportunity’, as perceived by the new Labour 
Prime Minister, began to close. China gradually began to project its power and to throw its weight around 
in the region. From the outset of his presidency, President Barack Obama became determined to elevate 
East Asia in U.S. global security and strategic priorities. However, the early period of the new 
administration’s East Asia strategy was not so much fixated on containing Chinese expansionism, as it 
was attempting to make up for the benign neglect of the region which characterised the previous 
administration’s focus on the Middle East. Only after unsuccessful initial attempts to make diplomatic 
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overtures to Beijing during much of 2009, did the new American administration decide to take a harder 
line on China. President Obama’s initial diplomatic overtures to Beijing were met with Chinese arrogance 
and failed to secure a common understanding with the Chinese leaders. As Beijing’s new assertive and 
expansionist strategic posture became more apparent, the Obama administration eventually began to 
centre its Asian ‘pivot’/re-balancing strategy on countering Chinese assertiveness and growing 
expansionist tendencies. China-U.S. strategic tensions surged accordingly and their strategic 
competition in the region and beyond intensified as a result 
 
Howard had been able to decouple the relationship with China from the alliance ties (Qiu & Huang June 
27, 2006). By 2008 and 2009, Rudd no longer had that luxury. Even if the Labour government wanted to 
maintain a friendly posture towards Beijing and wished to continue to proceed with a decoupling strategy, 
the rising strategic competition between China and America in the post-2008 period had already begun to 
generate huge pressures from the alliance that would pull Canberra and Beijing apart. More importantly, 
it was the dramatic change in Australia’s strategic perception of Chinese behaviour that altered 
Canberra’s approach towards its strategic relationship with Beijing. Both China and Australia coped very 
well in the global financial and economic crisis and China’s growth and demand were a major reason why 
Australia did not suffer recession. However, China’s increasing economic importance was growing in 
parallel with the perceived threat posed by China’s new behaviour. If anything, the former was being 
completely overshadowed by a looming fear of Chinese domination in Canberra’s evolving strategic 
perceptions. 
 
2.4.1 The Changing Face of Chinese Foreign Policy 
As part of the profound strategic consequences of the 2008-2009 global financial and economic crisis, 
China began to project its growing power. The Chinese leadership began to believe that the global power 
configuration had changed in China’s favour (Wang, 2010); from the Chinese perspective, the end of 
America’s unipolar status had arrived. The relative decline of the West and the rise of the emerging 
powers from the developing world in Asia and elsewhere, were the new power realities. Having emerged 
as the world’s second largest economy, China was leading this global power shift and gradually 
narrowing the disparity in hard power with the United States, first and foremost measured by the size and 
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growth rate of GDP.  
 
Also significant was the Chinese perception that the strength of China’s development model had been 
vindicated by the resilience of the Chinese economy during the economic crisis. By contrast, Washington 
was financially crippled, fiscally ill and bogged down in a morass of strategic misadventures abroad and 
foreign policy quagmires. A ‘success mentality’ had become pervasive among the Chinese elite. The idea 
emerged that China no longer needed to look to the West for inspiration and guidance: the country had 
graduated from being a student and imitator of the developed world to having the capacity to chart its 
own path toward modernisation; China had been doing things its own way and achieved great success; it 
would walk tall and stick with its own way of doing things; already an economic great power, the country 
no longer had the imperative to learn from others because its development model had so far proved 
equal if not superior.
36
 This new thinking marked an emerging competition of (development/economic) 
models between China and the United States, whereby the Chinese had come to develop a rather bold 
and triumphalist outlook and more assertive posture towards the United States in particular and the West 
in general. 
 
This buoyant sense of triumphalism and the perceived U.S. decline emboldened China to redefine its 
terms of engagement with America and others. This changing mentality translated into China increasingly 
projecting her assertiveness,
37
 And becoming more self-righteous in pursuing her national interests. The 
Chinese expected other states to offer realistic and sober assessments of the new power reality and be 
prepared to deal with a new type of relationship with China, including paying more respect to China’s 
interests.
38
 Indeed, protecting China’s core interests became more important than preserving inter-state 
friendships. Changes in figures by themselves did not really tell the whole story; the Chinese themselves 
understood clearly and recognised the shortcomings of power comparisons based on GDP figures alone. 
However, the psychological environment had already changed along with the perceived power shift; it 
was this changing mentality that had been consequential in redefining China’s external behaviour.
39
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China’s rising power over the past ten years and the changing strategic circumstances were gradually 
undermining both the material and ideological basis of Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy thinking conceived 
two decades prior. The global financial and economic crisis had greatly accelerated this process and 
increased pressure for a paradigm shift in foreign policy thinking. As China sought to chart a new foreign 
strategy commensurate with its newfound power and expanding interests, domestic support for Deng’s 
foreign policy paradigm was rapidly waning rapidly amongst the Chinese elite and the general populace. 
The strategy of ‘biding one’s time and hiding one’s capabilities’ (taoguang yanghui), once the keynote of 
China’s international policy, had come under sustained attack at home and become virtually impossible 
to gain universal support (Wang, 2011b). 
 
Towards the end of the 2000s, the search for stability with the United States no longer dictated Beijing’s 
approach towards Washington. America still remained the centrepiece of Chinese diplomacy, and by and 
large, the Chinese leadership still favoured a good and stable relationship with America and could not 
afford to allow conflicts with the superpower to spiral out of control.
40
 However, Beijing had begun to 
demand a more equal relationship and expected Washington to adjust its behaviour towards China in 
accordance with the new power realities;
41
 thus the diplomatic slogan for a ‘new type of great power 
relationship’ was championed by the Beijing leadership. Accepting the new terms of engagement with 
China on a more equal footing was seen as an essential prerequisite for a stable U.S.-China relationship 
(Yang July 9, 2010). Unless Washington adopted this new mindset and abandoned its ‘arrogant and 
hostile’ behaviour and attitude towards Beijing in accordance with the requirements of the new power 
parity, the two great powers would be bound to have a rocky relationship. Without reciprocal concessions 
from Washington, Beijing would not be as submissive and ready to accommodate U.S. interests as it had 
been in the past; consequently, the two nations would embark on a collision course. 
 
Beginning in 2008, rising assertiveness and an emerging offensive posture thus featured prominently in 
China’s policy towards the U.S. over a wide range of issues. There has been considerably more vigorous 
Chinese opposition to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 2009. Beijing also adopted a more offensive 
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rhetorical position in criticising America’s role in the financial crisis and castigating U.S. fiscal and 
monetary policies. The Chinese even stepped up efforts to challenge America’s global financial 
hegemony and more actively promoted the reform of the global financial and economic order (Zhou, 
2009). 
 
Most notably, the Chinese also intensified their efforts to undermine U.S. strategic/military hegemony. 
This partly manifested in the increasing hawkishness of the Chinese military that was fixated on U.S. 
military strength. Beijing’s offensive posture towards Washington manifested in a new defence orientation 
that increasingly sought to challenge U.S. military dominance in the Western Pacific. The People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) had become much more assertive in opposing what the Chinese saw as 
‘provocative’ high-intensity oppressive offshore maritime surveillance activities along Chinese coast by 
the U.S. Navy. Beijing demonstrated its growing determination to seek sea power by developing its 
‘Blue-Water Navy’ and maritime-denial capabilities. Since 2008, the PLA Navy has increasingly carried 
out unilateral force projection manoeuvres in and beyond the East China Sea; and there was a 
significantly increase in incidences of Chinese submarines and naval fleets making ‘provocative’ 
appearance in waters close to Okinawa and beyond the first island chain. The mounting tensions and 
intensifying rivalries between the PLA navy and the American and Japanese naval forces considerably 
increased the risk of violent sea incidents; as a result, maritime conflicts and misfires at sea have come to 
be seen as a real danger. 
 
With years of double-digit growth in defence spending, Beijing has been able to devote huge resources to 
catch up with Washington and gradually close the military power gap between the PLA and its U.S. 
counterpart. Having developed formidable maritime-denial and strategic delivery capabilities, the PLA 
displayed a growing tendency to flex its muscle by showing off its high-tech weaponry systems and 
bolstering its military deterrence. The competition also went beyond the strategic theatre of the Western 
Pacific and conventional arms races. The arms race extended to non-conventional and asymmetrical 
warfare as both countries strived to build up their respective outer space, cyber warfare and nuclear 
capabilities. While China’s defence planning, weapons programmes and military strategy were said to 
have been geared towards a military contingency over the Taiwan Strait against U.S. forces, China’s 
military modernisation in recent years were thought to reflect growing Chinese strategic ambitions that 
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reached beyond the Taiwan scenario.
42
 
 
With its growing security needs and expanding strategic ambitions, an ascendant China also started to 
test the limits of the regional influence it garnered during its effective charm offensive since the end of the 
1990s (Bower, 2011). Assertiveness also featured prominently in Beijing’s posture towards its regional 
neighbours since 2008. This new stance may not have been hegemonic, but it was designed to expand 
the area of Chinese influence to meet China’s growing security needs and great power ambitions. 
Beginning in 2008, China began to project assertiveness and to adopt an offensive orientation in 
asserting sovereignty in maritime disputes. The intensification of maritime tensions in recent years was 
caused first and foremost by deliberate Chinese attempts to employ new tactics and an increasingly 
hard-nosed approach in maritime disputes, in addition to being partly driven by China’s growing concerns 
for resource security. However, the country’s changing foreign policy outlook was arguably the most 
consequential factor in leading to more forceful and intensified efforts to preserve Chinese sovereign 
interests as Beijing sought to take advantage of China’s rising power and exploit U.S. weakness. 
 
Beijing tested its power by declaring the South China Sea China’s ‘core interests’ and substantially 
stepped up efforts to strengthen and expand Chinese presence and effective control in the disputed 
waters of the South China Sea. Assertive Chinese manoeuvres were carried out to undermine the 
territorial claims of other rival claimants and the legitimacy of foreign occupation of the disputed islands 
and reefs. Since 2008, there has been a dramatic increase in the incidence of the dispatch of Chinese 
law enforcement vessels (mainly the Chinese fisheries administration and marine surveillance vessels) to 
the disputed waters to assert sovereignty and to stop alleged encroachments on Chinese sovereignty by 
Vietnamese and Filipino vessels in those areas, through using direct and forceful physical disruptions. 
Beijing also rapidly enlarged its maritime law enforcement fleets, many of which had come close to 
becoming paramilitary forces. A modern naval submarine base was built on Hainan Island to extend the 
projection of the PLA’s capabilities into in the South China Sea. Battlefield simulation and naval exercises 
aimed at seizing control of occupied islands were conducted with growing frequency (Jia, 2012). Towards 
the end of the 2000s, Beijing also began to take on Tokyo over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East 
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China Sea. Chinese warships, fighters, and civilian vessels (including fishery patrol boats, maritime 
surveillance ships, and scientific expedition vessels and fishing boats) were dispatched to the disputed 
waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to assert territorial rights. Military confrontation and direct 
contact between the Chinese fighters, naval warships and civilian surveillance vessels with their 
Japanese counterparts became dangerously common in those waters. 
 
2.4.2 Canberra’s Hardening Strategic Attitude towards Beijing 
Beijing’s growing assertiveness triggered fears of Chinese domination and aroused apprehension about 
the prospects for U.S. strategic primacy in East Asia. Australia’s strategic anxiety surged with an 
increasingly domineering Chinese posture that led to rising Sino-American military competition, 
intensified international rivalries over maritime disputes, heightened regional security crises, and 
strategic tensions across the region. As the East Asian security environment slipped into security 
competition and strategic rivalry, Australia’s perceptions of China’s rise and growing military power began 
to fundamentally change. From a defence point of view, the Australian policymakers were increasingly 
alarmed by the PLA’s rapid modernisation. Their concern was that over time China could get into a 
military position where there would be a distinct shift in the balance of power that could be detrimental to 
Australia’s interests.
43
 
 
Apart from the deteriorating regional strategic environment set off by China’s new posture and growing 
hard power, Australia’s hardening attitude towards China was further reinforced by the events that took 
place in the bilateral context. The period between 2008 and 2009 marked a turning point in the 
relationship. The good faith and high expectations that existed on both sides at the beginning of the year 
were slowly eroded by events such as Rudd’s pointed remarks about Tibet which were aired in Beijing, 
the emotional political rows over the security arrangement for the Olympic torch relay in Australia, and 
the tightening of Australia’s investment regime against Chinese capital.
44
 The political relationship 
reached its lowest point in the following year as a series of unfortunate incidents sustained and further 
intensified the bilateral tensions and resulted in months of diplomatic confrontation and stalemate, if not 
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crises. The spy scandal involving the then Australian Defence Minister and a Chinese businesswoman, 
the publication of the Labour government’s ‘anti-China’ Defence White Paper; the collapse of the 
Rio-Chinalco deal; the arrest of Rio Tinto employees including the Chinese-Australian manager Stern Hu 
by China’s state security service on spying charges; the heated diplomatic quarrels over exiled Uighur 
leader Rebiya Kadeer’s visit to Australia. Each of these unfortunate developments dealt a heavy blow to 
the fragile and precarious bilateral ties, thereby completely removing any residual mutual trust and 
goodwill between the two countries’ governments. The signing of the 2009 Sino-Australian Joint 
Declaration in September marked a diplomatic truce (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade October 
30, 2009). As the two governments reached a kind of modus vivendi, both sides pledged to respect their 
respective core interests and move the relationship forward by setting aside their political differences. 
This helped ease the political deadlock because both sides understood that the relationship was too 
important to be left adrift; but it failed to revitalise the political ties, which were further damaged by the 
2010 WikiLeaks revelations concerning Kevin Rudd’s hard-nosed realist views on China and the hawkish 
advice on China he provided to the Americans.
45
 From the Australian perspective, the Chinese had 
become increasingly arrogant and supercilious in their bilateral dealings. Arguably, given the hurdles that 
had emerged in her relationship with China in 2008 and 2009, Australia got a foretaste of China’s 
domineering assertiveness.
46
 
 
Consequently, the surging strategic anxiety about China formed the cornerstone of Australia’s 2009 
defence white paper (Defence May 2, 2009). The potential adverse consequences of China’s rising hard 
power and the beginning of U.S. decline, the security ramifications of the global power shift and the 
alarming long-term strategic consequences of the economic crisis, all featured prominently in the white 
paper’s assessment of Australia’s strategic environment. Each of these elements was overshadowed, 
however, by the looming Chinese threat. The explicit expressions of doubt concerning the prospects for 
U.S. strategic primacy were unprecedented in Australia’s strategic documents and official enunciation of 
the country’s strategic outlook. The white paper thus offered a rather pessimistic and alarmist outlook on 
the Asian-Pacific strategic scene, which it predicted would be characterised by escalating power rivalry, 
increasing strategic competition, growing risks of strategic shocks, and great power wars, as well as 
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intensified regional military build-up and arms race. 
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2.5 New Alliance Dynamics: Preparing for China’s Rise 
The alliance dynamic between Australia and the United States also underwent a significant transition in 
the post-financial crisis era. At the core of this marked shift was a shared concern over China. Alliance 
discord over China during the Howard years was carried over into the first year of the new Labour 
government after the 2007 Australian general election. The prolonged effect of this particular alliance 
legacy had simultaneously reinforced and been further accentuated by low trust between the Bush 
administration and the new Labour government (Fullilove, 2008). Rudd did not inherit the kind of personal 
trust and intimacy his predecessor had achieved with the American President. More importantly there 
was no genuine convergence of strategic priorities between the Bush administration and the new Labour 
government in 2008. While the security strategy of the U.S. administration remained fixated on 
counterterrorism, the Middle East and the two ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Rudd 
government did not see Australia’s immediate and most vital strategic interest in that part of the world. 
The new government even reduced Australian commitment to the coalition efforts in Iraq by withdrawing 
Australian combat troops from that country (AUSMIN February 23, 2008a, 2008b) 
 
On the other hand, Rudd was absorbed by East Asia. The new Australian government’s foreign policy 
preoccupation with Asia led to an elevated regional agenda; and China was at the centre of this move. At 
least for the first half of 2008, Rudd wanted to promote Canberra’s engagement with Beijing, both 
economically and politically. As the Rudd government began to embrace its ambitious China project, the 
elevated centrality of China in Australian diplomacy and Rudd’s supposedly pro-China disposition could 
not but exacerbate the embedded unease and mistrust that somewhat characterised the fragile rapport 
between the Australian and U.S. governments in 2008 (Fullilove, 2008; AUSMIN February 23, 2008a, 
2008b). By the second half of 2008, Rudd had come to develop a more cautious attitude in his China 
agenda as his strategic perception of Beijing was beginning to be changed by events and his experience 
of dealing with the rising power of China. However, the relationship with the U.S. administration did not 
really get back on track until the election of Barack Obama in 2009.  
 
The new U.S. administration’s global security posture diminished the importance of allied cooperation in 
the War on Terror on which the close allied partnership had been built during the Howard-Bush years. 
100 
 
Australia’s increasing economic dependence on China, the Labour government’s traditional pro-Asia 
foreign policy outlook, Canberra’s increasing accommodative approach towards China during the 
Howard years, and Kevin Rudd’s ostensibly ambitious China policy, all made Washington worried about 
Canberra’s future strategic orientation and even loyalty to the alliance. Whether the new leaders of both 
countries could rebuild the kind of personal trust and intimacy Howard and Bush had shared was an open 
question for the new Australian and American governments (Fullilove, 2008). 
 
The Labour government was eager to continue the close strategic partnership with Washington and 
regain its alliance credentials. Anxious to give the alliance new momentum and reaffirm Australia’s loyalty, 
Canberra attempted to rebuild alliance trust by looking for new areas of strategic cooperation with 
Washington; i.e., Australia was searching for new ways to be useful to the United States. Given 
Canberra’s growing anxiety about Beijing, it became all the more imperative to reassure the Western 
world and the United States in particular about Australia’s deep and special affinity to the West and the 
American alliance. Thus, since taking office in 2008, the Labour government endeavoured to adjust 
Australia’s defence policy and security posture to meet its ally’s expectation, as the new American 
administration was determined to prepare the United States for the arrival of a ‘Pacific Century’ (Clinton 
November, 2011). 
 
Whilst shifting its foreign policy priority away from counterterrorism, non-proliferation and the war in Iraq, 
the Obama administration pursued a proactive East Asian strategy to preserve U.S. hegemonic position 
in the region. The ANZUS alliance imperatives changed accordingly with this American policy shift. On 
the one hand, Canberra was compelled to pursue greater allied strategic cooperation with Washington in 
East Asia and on the question of China. But more importantly, the Labour government of Australia shared 
the Obama’s administration’s growing concern over China’s behaviour and the alarming shifts in the 
regional balance of power. There was genuine convergence of foreign policy priorities between the two 
new governments in the East Asian theatre. By the end of 2009, the Labour government had also proved 
its credibility in the alliance by deepening Australia’s commitment to the Afghan endeavour, as Australia 
became the largest military contributor to the coalition amongst America’s non-NATO partners; Canberra 
also enhanced Australian civilian efforts in the post-conflict state-building project in Iraq (AUSMIN April 9, 
2009a, 2009b). 
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In the first year of the Obama administration, the thrust of America’s East Asia policy rhetoric was defined 
by not so much an all-out diplomatic and strategic offensive against China’s expansionist behaviour in the 
region, as a long-needed effort to redress years of strategic neglect of the region by the Bush 
administration. However, by the time the Obama administration experienced its failed overtures to Beijing 
and witnessed Beijing’s emerging assertiveness in 2009, Washington began to turn its gaze towards 
China by focusing U.S. Pacific strategy on managing China’s rise and countering Beijing’s growing 
ambition in the region. Given Washington’s increasing fixation with China’s rise in Asia, a de facto 
containment strategy aimed at China came to define America’s pivot/re-balance in Asia. Since 2010, the 
renewed policy emphasis on Asia and the Pacific region reflected the Obama administration’s growing 
anxiety over China’s strategic intentions. These anxieties compelled the U.S. administration to reassert 
its influence in regional security affairs, strengthen regional alliances, expand strategic partnerships with 
the Asian powers that shared America’s strategic concern about China, and enhanced military 
deployments in the Western Pacific. 
 
Given the looming prospect of intensified U.S.-China strategic competition in the Pacific and Asia, 
Washington increasingly looked to its allies for greater sharing of the burden. America’s Asian allies were 
expected to play a more active role and enhance policy harmonisation with the United States in tackling 
the challenge of China’s rise. As an important part of America’s pivot/re-balancing efforts, Canberra was 
an expected and willing partner. The execution of a more vigorous U.S. Asian strategy largely centred on 
China therefore coincided with the beginning of the Rudd government’s policy realignment. With a shared 
concern over Chinese and U.S. standing in the region, Canberra and Washington once again forged a 
close intellectual intimacy, and the alliance agenda was therefore transformed accordingly. By the end of 
2009 and the beginning of 2010, the allied priorities were shifting to the wider Asia-Pacific region rather 
than focusing on counterterrorism and the Middle East affairs. The purpose of the alliance was redefined 
as Washington and Canberra began to prepare the alliance for the re-balancing efforts against China’s 
growing ambitions and aggressive behaviour (AUSMIN November 8, 2010a, 2010b). Alliance intimacy 
and trust were quickly regained at a time of great geopolitical change and power shifts. That Australia 
was the only Western democracy and Anglo-Saxon ally in this part of the globe made the alliance all the 
more valuable. This was arguably the first time ever in the alliance’s history that Australia was deemed a 
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strategic asset by the United States mainly for the purpose of containing China. The alliance’s discord 
over China, which had become a point of division for the alliance’s relations during the later years of the 
Howard era, had completely disappeared. By the end of the decade, the Labour government and its 
leaders had demonstrated their loyalty and credentials to the alliance, rebuilt allied trust and proved 
themselves to be useful partners in Washington’s Asia pivot/re-balance strategy. 
 
Since the onset of the global financial crisis, there was a burgeoning anxiety over U.S. decline in 
Australia; and the prospect of America’s strategic retrenchment and disengagement from East Asia had 
increasingly become a worry. By 2009, Canberra was largely no longer worried about American neglect 
of East Asia and the Pacific. Nevertheless, worries remained acute in 2009 and 2010 about continued 
distractions of the unfinished businesses in the Middle East and the constraints imposed by the 
continued uncertain legacies of the protracted military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan (and 
increasingly in Pakistan as well) on the Obama administration’s ability to focus on East Asia. The new 
concern was whether Washington still had the will and capability to preserve U.S. strategic supremacy 
and honour its security commitments in the face of protracted domestic economic and political 
weaknesses and growing challenges posed by an ambitious China. By the end of the 2000s, the 
prolonged war in Afghanistan and the tremendous budgetary pressure raised doubts about whether the 
United States would have the resolve and resources to remain committed to Asian security and regional 
strategic stability. Australia’s fears were further reinforced by America’s prolonged economic difficulties, 
protracted political infighting due to partisan division, and the immediate prospect of massive cuts in U.S. 
defence budget, at a time when the sense of Australian dependence on U.S. strategic primacy to 
underpin East Asian stability had never been more acute. 
 
Like many other East Asian countries, Australia was worried about whether the United States could 
effectively check China’s rise and her strategic expansion at a time when domestic economic crises and 
political stalemate seemed to have eroded U.S. strategic assets and undermined America’s ability to 
project its power, not to mention the protracted security situations in the greater Middle East that 
continued to preoccupy the Obama administration. To Australian eyes, the challenges facing U.S. 
statecraft were formidable. The Australian leadership understood the budgetary pressure on the U.S. 
government but cautioned against defence budget cuts that would cripple America’s ability to maintain its 
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strategic presence in the Western Pacific.  
 
The Labour government was therefore keen to urge the Obama administration to step up its engagement 
in East Asia. Australia’s message was that the United States should shift the focus of its global strategy to 
East Asia and the Asia-Pacific sooner rather than later. Canberra urged Washington to be bold and stay 
closely involved in the Asia-Pacific in order to take on Beijing decisively by deterring and resisting 
Chinese expansionism. The Australian leaders recognised that the United States would always have vital 
interests in the Middle East, but nevertheless pressed their U.S. counterparts to focus more on East Asia. 
As both Kevin Rudd and Julie Gillard put it, American policy attention needed to fully embrace the deep 
changes underway across Asia, the Pacific and the Indian Oceans; and it was imperative to intensify 
focus on the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean, so that the strategic stability that had underpinned the 
region’s prosperity could be sustained into the future (Rudd September 15, 2011; Gillard March 10, 2011). 
The Australians were keen to remind the Americans that strong American leadership and capabilities 
were essential for the preservation of stability. Canberra repeatedly reassured Washington that the vast 
majority of the countries of Asia welcomed continued and expanded American strategic role in the 
hemisphere; and the consensus in ASEAN was that the United States remained irreplaceable in East 
Asia. Canberra also reassured Washington that Australia remained a loyal ally and a true friend of the 
United States, and that the U.S. alliance would continue to be regarded as vital to the nation’s security 
and strategic interests, as demand for U.S. leadership and power would only be higher in the 21
st
 century 
(Rudd September 15, 2011; Gillard March 10, 2011). 
 
These arguments set the tone for the Labour government’s U.S. policy and regional strategy. Beginning 
in 2009, if not earlier (arguably from the second half of 2008), Australia repeatedly warned the United 
States about the danger of being too soft on China or even capitulating to China’s growing power and 
revisionist behaviour (Garnaut December 6, 2010). On the question of how to deal with a rising and more 
assertive China, Canberra also cast aspersions on the purpose of China’s growing hard power and 
military capabilities in particular, which were deemed destabilising and threatening, and therefore needed 
to be contained. In a sense, the Labour government’s regional diplomacy was executed largely through 
the alliance relations with the United States. By influencing Washington’s strategic outlook and regional 
posture through the alliance linkage, Australia acquired extended strategic influence and more diplomatic 
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leverage to shape the regional processes. Summits and regular consultations between Australian and 
American leaders through the AUSMIN (Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations) mechanism 
enabled policymakers of both countries to meet and discuss strategic matters on a fairly frequent basis. 
This helped foster trust and rapport between the two allies, not least on a more personal level between 
key individuals and policymakers such as Kevin Rudd and Hilary Clinton, who established a close 
working relationship in spearheading diplomatic offensives against China (Kelly December 8, 2012). 
Rudd reportedly always presented himself as a leader able to add value to U.S. dealings with China. It 
was also reported that Rudd’s policy recommendations on how to deal with China were heeded and 
carried weight in Washington. Secretary Clinton had on many occasions publicly praised Rudd for his 
advice on China and even credited him for the U.S. decision to join the East Asia Summit (EAS). As 
China’s assertiveness and expansionist tendencies became more apparent, particularly after 2010, the 
United States effectively pushed back against Chinese power in ways that strongly resembled what 
Kevin Rudd had privately advocated (Garnaut December 6, 2010) 
 
2.5.1 Beefing up Allied Diplomatic and Defence Collaboration 
As both countries’ leaders recognised that a more focused and robust alliance partnership was the key to 
responding and adapting to the shifting power matrix in Asia, the Obama administration and the Labour 
government managed to chart a new course for the alliance and pledged to move the alliance forward 
with a 21
st
-century agenda (AUSMIN September 15, 2011a, 2011b; Sheridan November 6, 2010). Allied 
collaboration between the two administrations was mainly guided by one fundamental imperative: to 
adapt the alliance for the strategic challenges of China’s rise in power. While counterterrorism, 
non-proliferation and the military efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan still remained important agenda, 
their relevance had gradually declined and been marginalised by the growing regional strategic 
challenges in the wider Asia-Pacific region, with China being at the centre of that challenge. Under the 
alliance framework, the Labour government and the Obama administration deepened bilateral defence 
cooperation and renewed diplomatic collaboration in regional affairs. From the Australian perspective, 
these urgent efforts could help shore up U.S. strategic primacy and diplomatic influence and thus served 
Australian security interests well when U.S. strategic supremacy was increasingly tested. Moreover, 
having a strong alliance with the United States and formidable strategic capabilities were instrumental in 
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maintaining Australia’s geopolitical weight and strategic credibility as a capable middle power in a time of 
great change and uncertainty. 
 
The Rudd government was also a staunch advocator of U.S. leadership in creating an open and inclusive 
pan-regional institutional architecture with a broad mandate (Rudd May 29, 2009; Rudd May 3, 2011; 
Rudd September 15, 2011). Part of Rudd’s concern about the processes of regional institutionalisation 
was that over the decade following the Asian financial crisis they had excluded the United States. From 
the Labour government’s point of view, only if the United States was brought in to curb China’s growing 
centrality and diplomatic influence in East Asian multilateral institutions and remained in control of the 
regional process, could Australia’s interest be protected and Canberra avoid being marginalised and 
ostracised; the United States had to underwrite the regional (institutionalisation) process, with its military 
capability, diplomatic muscle and sense of fairness. Hence, the Labour government was keen to 
advocate U.S. leadership in pan-regional institutions and urged the United States to formally join the EAS 
even after the Labour government had later quietly dropped the idea of an ‘Asia-Pacific community’.  
 
According to the WikiLeaks revelation, the Labour government’s promotion of an ‘Asia Pacific community’ 
was intended to blunt Chinese influence and deny China regional hegemony in Asia (Kelly December 8, 
2012). To Kevin Rudd’s eyes, the overarching challenge for the Asia-Pacific region for the decade ahead 
was to ensure that all major regional institutions included rather than excluded the United States. 
Canberra asserted that this was a task Australia and the United States together as an alliance could see 
through. In retrospect, Kevin Rudd’s goal for the proposed ‘Asia-Pacific community’ has been gradually 
achieved through the inclusion of the United States in the East Asia Summit. A pan-regional institution 
was beginning to emerge across the wider Asia-Pacific region in the form of the EAS. Canberra saw the 
EAS as a great opportunity for Australia and America to act as allies in regional security diplomacy. The 
Labour government repeatedly urged the Obama administration to strengthen the EAS’ institutional 
structures, establish concrete security agendas and build links between it and other critical 
ASEAN-centred ministerial-level regional institutional arrangements such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, 
and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (Rudd May 3, 2011; Rudd September 15, 2011). 
 
The allied defence relations were adapted for the post-2008 strategic circumstances centred on China’s 
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rise. At the turn of the decade, China’s rise had nevertheless begun to feed into the agenda of the allied 
defence cooperation and transform the defence partnership. The strategic focus of the defence 
partnership between Australia and the United States shifted from the global theatre (the Middle East) 
back to the regional theatre (the Asia-Pacific/Western Pacific). This process was accompanied by a 
dramatic shift in strategic planning, capability requirements and force structuring from building a 
combined capacity for non-conventional combat against non-state actors to preparing for high-intensity 
conventional inter-state war between major powers in the Western Pacific. As far as non-traditional 
security agenda was concerned, the collaboration on counterterrorism and non-proliferation, which 
dominated the allied defence agenda during the Howard-Bush years, had been institutionalised as a 
matter of routine, whilst space and cyber security gradually emerged as the new practical and pressing 
agenda for the operation of the military alliance. 
 
Canberra also agreed on the pre-positioning of U.S. defence materiel and military equipment in Australia 
and allowed increased U.S. access to Australian training, exercise and test ranges, as well as increased 
use by the U.S. military of Australian defence facilities and ports. These collective deliberations, which 
were carried out in the AUSMIN meeting in September 2011 and formally announced during President 
Obama’s visit to Australia in November, were intended to ‘send a clear signal to the Asia-Pacific region... 
and to those that would threaten us (Australia and America) that we are going to stick together… and that 
the United States will always maintain a very strong presence in that part of the world…’ This constituted 
the single biggest change to the day-to-day working arrangements of the alliance since the negotiation of 
the joint facilities in the 1980s (AUSMIN September 15, 2011b). The arrangements of new force would 
lock the United States ever more deeply into a forward military presence in the Western Pacific (Miles 
May 21, 2012).  
 
The Australian government also began the process realigning its own major force posture in tandem with 
America’s regional military redeployment. Australia’s Defence Force Posture Review (DFPR), which ran 
in conjunction with the U.S. Global Force Posture Review, was primarily about hedging against the threat 
posed by China’s growing naval and air power to Australia’s sparsely populated but resource-rich 
northern and western regions. The force posture review, which would be the most thorough full-scale 
appraisal of Australia’s domestic military deployments in the past three decades, was intended to build on 
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and refine the conclusions of the Labour government’s 2009 defence white paper and help determine 
where Australia should base many of its planned new military capabilities for optimum regional use. The 
DFPR was basically designed to complement the ongoing work on U.S. force posture review and 
enhance Australia’s capacity to assist U.S. military actions in the wider Asia-Pacific region. It bore out 
Australia’s willingness to contribute to a U.S.-led military coalition in a future regional contingency against 
China. 
 
2.5.2 Defence Build-up and New Defence Doctrines 
The Labour government’s 2009 defence white paper recommended the largest peacetime defence 
expenditure and called for the most dramatic military build-up since the Second World War (Defence May 
2, 2009). A ‘major new direction’ of the defence planning was set out to build up Australia’s maritime 
capabilities with the aim of having ‘a more potent and heavier maritime force’ by the mid-2030s in the 
Asia-Pacific. Notably, it was planned to double the size of Australia’s submarine force by replacing the 
current fleet of six Collins class submarines with 12 conventional Future Submarine of a more capable 
class. This alone would be Australia’s largest ever single defence acquisition project. The Australian 
government also pressed ahead with ambitious armament plans for the air force. For instance, a plan 
was laid out to enhance Australia’s air combat capability by purchasing the fifth-generation multirole 
combat fighters, which would deliver a potent strike capability. 
 
The long list of weaponry acquisitions marked a huge doctrinal shift in terms of the task priorities of the 
Australian Defence Force (ADF). The range of the planned weaponry and the costly expansion of sea 
and air defence reflected a return of the traditional emphasis on the ‘ability to engage in conventional 
combat against other armed forces’ as the most basic and main role of the ADF (Defence May 2, 2009). 
Priority was given to preparing the ADF for high-intensity interstate warfare and the risk of major power 
wars as well as deterring direct armed attack and ensuring the defence of maritime approaches to 
Australia. Other kinds of low-intensity non-traditional warfare were no longer treated as the most 
fundamental task and the most pressing force structural determinant. This represented a significant 
departure from the defence policy emphasis of the Howard Government in the post-9/11 era, which was 
realigned to reflect U.S. global security concerns, especially the needs of the coalition’s war efforts in the 
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Middle East. Indeed, the white paper suggested that ‘the remote but plausible potential of confrontation 
with a major power adversary’ was ‘conceivable’, and envisaged that ‘Australia might have to attend to its 
local defence needs against a major power adversary in the event of its being involved in a wider conflict’ 
in the Asia-Pacific region. The defence document cautioned that such contingencies looked ‘unlikely’, but 
‘are not so remote as to be beyond contemplation’ (Defence May 2, 2009). According to the white paper, 
Australia would face a real risk of being drawn into a regional security crisis and military contingency; and 
‘… Australia might need to be prepared to engage in conventional combat in the region, in coalition with 
others, in order to counter coercion or aggression against our allies and partners’ (Defence May 2, 2009). 
 
While reaffirming the critical importance of continued U.S. strategic preponderance, the defence white 
paper also put new emphasis on the importance of self-reliance as a defence doctrine. As weakened U.S. 
strategic predominance would cast doubt on America’s defence commitment to Australian security, in 
terms of U.S. willingness and ability to intervene militarily. Because China’s military rise would be 
accompanied by the weakening of U.S. strategic primacy over time, Australia had to begin to hedge its 
bets by enhancing its military capabilities and seeking to become more self-sufficient in national defence.  
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2.6 Conclusion 
Although Chinese-Australian relations were primarily driven by the development of resource ties, the 
bilateral economic relationship was very much influenced by the nature of the evolving geopolitical 
realities of Chinese-Australian relations. In no small measure, China’s increasingly vital resource 
partnership with Australia was grown out of a highly dynamic and complex geopolitical context. The 
analytical objective of this chapter was to set out this wider political context in order to analyse the 
bilateral resource politics in the subsequent chapters. The insights provided in this chapter suggest that 
the delicate strategic dimension of China’s relations with Australia underwent two distinct phases during 
the 2000s.  
 
The post-9/11 era featured a steady warming of the bilateral relations. Thanks to China’s growing 
economic salience and strategic restraint in her foreign policy behaviour, China’s rise was viewed 
benignly by the Howard government. As China sought stability in her relations with the United States, the 
post-9/11 stability of China-U.S. relations, which was anchored in a modus vivendi between Washington 
and Beijing, provided a generally permissive strategic environment for a Sino-Australian entente to occur. 
Given America’s preoccupation with the War on Terror and the Middle East, Australia had much leeway to 
pursue a closer diplomatic relationship with China and to adopt a more accommodating posture on 
certain strategic issues without jeopardising alliance solidarity. 
 
However, China’s growing power and expansionist tendencies following the global financial crisis brought 
about a chain of systemic changes that led to a deteriorating regional strategic environment, 
characterised by intensified tensions in China-U.S. relations, changing U.S. regional strategic posture, 
and heightened strategic rivalry in East Asia. The deterioration in China-Australia strategic ties since 
2008 was part of this wider geopolitical change. In response to the growing expansionist tendencies of 
China, Australia’s Labour government reassessed the strategic implications of China’s rise, reoriented its 
foreign policy away from China, built up defence capability and adapted the U.S. alliance to the challenge 
of China’s rise. 
 
110 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the apparent realist dynamics in China-Australia relations suggest that 
the bilateral relationship does not reflect a typical situation of complex interdependence. Given the 
inherent strategic tensions between China and Australia, China’s relations with Australia always 
contained a significant geo-strategic dimension under the sway of realist logic. Moreover, the revived 
realist security dynamics since 2008 indicate a further shift away from complex interdependence. 
According to complex interdependence theory, this general position of China-Australia relations on the 
spectrum and the recent tendency to move towards realism along the continuum, carry important 
implications for (the analysis of) the bilateral resource power politics. 
 
The precarious nature of this realist strategic context underlines the geopolitical constraints faced by 
China in her bilateral resource politics vis-à-vis Australia. As the subsequent chapters will show, the 
geopolitical realities of Chinese-Australian relations entailed considerable strategic uncertainty and 
political constraints for the development of a genuinely reliable resource partnership. Chinese efforts to 
maximise resource interests therefore always faced inherent political risks in the bilateral relations. 
Despite Australia’s important role in ensuring Chinese resource supply, the revived strategic tensions in 
Chinese-Australian bilateral relations during the post-2008 era began to undermine China’s resource 
security interests. Given the lack of sustained political stability and genuine strategic trust between the 
two countries, the resource partnership was by no means an easy affair. For China, the scope for a 
genuinely reliable and fair resource partnership with Australia was limited at best. 
 
Having emphasised the realist-focused strategic aspect of the bilateral relations, it is important to keep 
the discussion in perspective. Despite the realist dimension, complex interdependence remains the 
dominant character of China’s relations with Australia. As Chapter 1 has already illustrates, the forces of 
economic globalisation largely prevailed in the context of China-Australia bilateral relations; and the 
extensive economic interdependence between China and Australia by and large reflect the key 
characteristics of complex interdependence. In terms of theory, it means that the overall position of 
Chinese-Australian relations is closer to complex interdependence than realism on the spectrum, even 
though it has been gradually shifting towards the realist end. What this suggests is that complex 
interdependence theory remains the more relevant analytical framework for the study of China’s resource 
politics with Australia. The analysis of the bilateral resource power politics pertaining to the struggles over 
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Chinese resource investment and iron ore pricing in the following chapters, will mainly draw on the 
theoretical insights of asymmetrical interdependence under the condition of complex interdependence. 
  
112 
 
Chapter 3 Struggle over Chinese Sovereign 
Resource Investment 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter set out the geopolitical context of the resource power politics between China and 
Australia. From this chapter onwards, the study will seek to address the specific issues of China’s 
resource politics with Australia. Whilst the next two empirical chapters focus on resource trade issues 
concerning iron ore pricing specifically, Chapter 3 is concerned with the investment aspect of the bilateral 
resource politics. More specifically, it discusses the power politics revolving around Chinese investment 
in Australia’s resources sector. Indeed, one of the most difficult aspects of the bilateral resource 
relationship lies in the investment arena. China’s investment ties with Australia have grown rapidly since 
2008 thanks to the surge in Chinese government-related investment in Australia’s resources sector. 
China’s government-related foreign direct investment caused a huge controversy in the bilateral relations. 
Guided by a state-led mercantilist mission to acquire resources, Chinese government investors flocked to 
Australia in search of greater control of resource assets. In response to China’s ambitious agenda, 
Australia sought to control and restrict Chinese government investment in order to protect her national 
interests. The controversy over Chinese government investment in Australia highlights one of the most 
important and thorny aspects of the evolving resource ties between China and Australia. This is therefore 
an arena in which the power dynamics behind the politics of the resource relationship plays out most 
intensely. 
 
This chapter aims to answer the research question by addressing the power dynamics in the realm of 
resource investment. More specifically, its purpose is to examine Chinese efforts to shape and adapt to 
the power politics of China’s dynamic resource investment relations with Australia, which will throw light 
on the limits of the bilateral resource investment ties and the nature of the resource partnership.  
 
This chapter is organised in a structure designed to address some of the research objectives as outlined 
in Chapter 1, and focuses respectively on the roles of the Chinese actors, China’s power position 
vis-à-vis Australia, as well as Chinese and Australian attempts to shape the power dynamics in the 
struggle for resource power. The analysis begins with a brief overview of the development of Chinese 
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investment in Australia’s resources sector. The next section analyses some of the general patterns of 
China’s aggressive investment behaviour and explains the driving forces behind China’s scramble for 
Australian resources. In particular, it considers the Chinese State-owned enterprise (SOE) investors’ dual 
role as both mercantilist policy instrument for implementing the state’s resource acquisition strategy 
abroad, and autonomous market entity pursuing an independent investment agenda. By exploring the 
nuances and complexities underpinning the relationship between the SOEs and the Chinese state, this 
section sheds light on the geo-economic and market rationales for China’s growing investment interest in 
Australian resource assets, as well as the complicated roles and intentions of government investors in 
the Chinese investment spree in Australia.  
 
The following two sections examine Australia’s political and policy reaction to China’s governmental 
investment in the resources sector. Section four offers a broad survey of the political reactions that were 
sparked against the influx of Chinese government investment from the various sections of the Australian 
polity, as well as the mining industry; while section five traces the successive major policy adjustments in 
Australia’s foreign investment regime against foreign (Chinese) government-related investment from 
2008 to 2010. It also seeks to highlight a number of typical case scenarios to demonstrate how the 
Australian authorities attempted to block and restrict Chinese (government) investment in the resources 
sector in order to protect Australia’s national interest. The sixth section discusses Chinese misgivings 
about Australian discrimination against Chinese investment. In particular, it highlights deep-seated 
Chinese scepticism about Australian concern over the governmental background of Chinese SOE 
investors, as well the various Chinese interpretations of the Australian motivations for constraining 
Chinese government investment in the resources sector. The final section of the chapter discusses how 
the Chinese government and investors sought to adapt and adjust themselves to the investment 
predicament faced in Australia. By looking at how the restrictive Australian foreign investment regime 
was able to constrain Chinese government investment and alter Chinese investment behaviour, the 
analysis illustrates the vulnerable position of Chinese investors vis-à-vis the Australian authorities, and 
highlights China’s true power position vis-à-vis Australia in the politics of resource investment. 
 
The findings of this chapter reinforce the conclusion of the thesis, which argues that China has to cope 
with her vulnerability in her resource politics vis-à-vis Australia despite her growing power. China carried 
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out a mercantilist strategy of resource acquisition in Australia via her government investment vehicles in 
an attempt to enhance her control of Australian resource assets. The Australian authorities were 
determined to protect Australia’s resource domination by blocking and restricting China’s government 
investment in the country’s resources sector. This chapter argues that China’s resource investors were 
vulnerable to Australian restrictions on foreign government investment. Despite their great financial 
power and mercantilist ambitions, the Chinese investors had no choice but to adapt to Australia’s rather 
stringent and restrictive foreign government investment regime.  
 
Having demonstrated Chinese vulnerability in the face of the Australian policy restrictions on Chinese 
government investment, this chapter also illustrates the limits of the resource investment ties. To a 
certain extent, the fact that the power politics have revolved around the Chinese resource investment 
issue is suggestive of the limited scope of the resource investment ties. Given the inherent sensitivity of 
the foreign investment issue, the political controversy that has arisen is indicative of the nature of the 
overall economic partnership and how far (or deep) the economic partnership can develop. Surely 
Australia’s political reaction and policy response against the influx of Chinese resource investment can 
be most revealing in this regard. The intense power struggle and complex political manoeuvres on both 
sides have clearly revealed the lack of trust and depth in the resource cooperation that has seriously 
impinged on the development of a genuinely reliable resource partnership between China and Australia. 
 
Chinese vulnerability in the resource investment politics can be best understood in terms of complex 
interdependence theory. As the previous chapter concluded, complex interdependence is a more 
prevalent condition than realism in China-Australia relations. According to complex interdependence 
theory, traditional (military) security agenda no longer dominate states’ agendas, and the use of military 
force is too costly. Military power is no longer a viable policy instrument under complex interdependence; 
consequently, strong states will find it more difficult to use their overall (military) dominance to control 
outcomes on issues in which they are weak. Since the more powerful states can no longer use their 
overall dominance to prevail on their weak issues under complex interdependence, the linkage 
strategy/process whereby a state can use its overall power advantage to link policy issues in order to 
secure a favourable outcome of power struggle in a particular issue, breaks down (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 
25-26). What this issue-specific perspective means is that the discussion of power politics under complex 
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interdependence has to focus on the structure of power relationships specific to the issue under analysis: 
the outcome of power politics in a specific issue area has to be determined by the distribution of power in 
that particular situation, rather than by the overall power relationship between the two countries 
(Keohane & Nye, 2011: 42-44). By implication, the issue-structure model is a more relevant analytical 
perspective than the overall structure model in explaining the power dynamics in China’s resource 
politics vis-à-vis Australia under complex interdependence.  
 
The next relevant question is, what determines the structure of issue-specific power relationships? 
Complex interdependence theory postulates that the issue-specific power politics under complex 
interdependence can be explained by the liberal theory of power politics of (asymmetrical) 
interdependence. According to Keohane and Nye, states tend to manipulate asymmetrical vulnerability 
interdependence as a power resource to wield influence (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 14-15). Moreover, if a 
state is disadvantaged at the level of sensitivity interdependence but has the potential advantage over its 
rival at the level of vulnerability interdependence, it would raise the level at which the controversy is 
conducted by seeking favourable asymmetry in vulnerability interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 
14-15). After all, according to the hierarchy of power resources model as developed by Keohane and Nye, 
power derived from asymmetrical vulnerability interdependence would ultimately dominate over power 
derived from asymmetrical sensitivity interdependence, since ‘influence deriving from favourable 
asymmetries in sensitivity is very limited when the underlying asymmetries in vulnerability are 
unfavourable’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 13-16). In other words, the key to understanding the power 
struggle behind the resource investment issue is the issue-specific power structure analysis that focuses 
on the patterns of sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence between China and Australia over the 
investment issue.  
 
This theoretical exposition of the power dynamics of asymmetrical interdependence is extremely relevant 
to the analysis of the politics of foreign investment in this chapter. In fact, in order to illustrate the power 
dynamics, Keohane and Nye have used a typical example in relation to the power politics of foreign 
investment: 
 
For instance, in a concession agreement, a multinational oil company may seem to have a 
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better bargaining position of output, and the price, of the petroleum produced, thus making 
government revenues to company decisions. Yet such a situation is inherently unstable, since 
the government may be stronger on the vulnerability dimension. Once the country has 
determined that it can afford to alter the agreement unilaterally, it may have the upper hand. 
Any attempt by the company to take advantage of its superior position on the sensitivity 
dimension, without recognising its weakness at the vulnerability level (much less at the level of 
military force), is then likely to end in disaster. (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 14-15) 
 
Financially weakened by the global financial and economic crises, many of the Australian resource 
companies could easily have fallen prey to Chinese capital sponsored by the Chinese state. China’s 
aggressive investment, which was largely driven by the state’s desire to acquire and seize valuable 
resource assets, posed a serious threat to the Australian control of some of the country’s most prized 
resource assets. In other words, China’s scramble for Australian resource assets, if unchecked, would 
seriously undermine the established Australian dominance in the resource arena; consequently, the 
Australians were extremely sensitive to the impact of the influx of Chinese state capital, as they were the 
disadvantaged party vis-à-vis the Chinese government investors at the level of sensitivity 
interdependence.  
 
However, the initial power advantage enjoyed by the Chinese government investors was indeed 
inherently unstable because the Australian authorities were stronger on the vulnerability dimension. As 
the host government, the Australian authorities had the ultimate upper hand because it could introduce 
policy measures to contain and restrict Chinese government capital. By raising the level of the political 
game to vulnerability asymmetry, the Australian government’s intervention was able to protect Australia’s 
control of the country’s most vital resource assets from the unfavourable pattern of sensitivity asymmetry. 
The Chinese investors were vulnerable to the Australian government intervention and policy shift that 
discriminated against the government background and the strategic pattern of Chinese resource 
investment. Moreover, there were few private Chinese companies that were able to carry out substantial 
foreign direct investment in the capital-intensive resource acquisition projects abroad without state 
support. In the face of the exercise of Australian sovereign powers, the Chinese had no option but to 
conform and adapt their investment behaviour to the increasingly stringent Australian foreign investment 
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regime targeted against foreign government investment. In short, although China’s government investors 
had initially prevailed at the level of asymmetrical sensitivity, they ultimately succumbed to Australian 
dominance at the level of asymmetrical vulnerability. This power-oriented analysis of the politics of 
(asymmetrical) interdependence suggests that the Australians had the upper hand in the political 
controversy over the Chinese resource investment in Australia; despite China’s overall power advantage 
vis-à-vis Australia (in both military and economic terms), the Chinese government investors remained the 
more vulnerable party in this particular issue area. 
 
The discussion of the relationship between theory and the empirical analysis also pertains to the 
implications of the existence of realist dynamics in the broader political context of the resource 
investment ties. Although complex interdependence remains the more prevalent condition than realism in 
China-Australia relations, the previous chapter underscored the precarious and deteriorating bilateral 
strategic relationship, which nonetheless contained growing realist dynamics. As such, the realist 
dynamics must have had an impact on the resource power politics. According to Keohane and Nye, the 
position of a given situation on the complex interdependence-realism spectrum has real significance; 
after all, ‘the position of a given situation along this continuum constitutes the independent variable’ for 
analysis (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 270). In the context of this chapter, it can be asserted that the inherent 
strategic tensions in the bilateral political ties, and the growing adversarial dynamics in the strategic 
dimension of China’s relations with Australia, were in no small measure responsible for the political 
tensions in the controversy over Chinese resource investment in Australia. Since these investment ties 
were grown out of such a complex political framework, the constraining influence of the latter on Chinese 
governmental investment also constitutes a primary theme of this chapter, as will be illustrated in the 
empirical analysis that follows. 
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3.2 The Rise of Chinese Resource Investment in Australia 
Chinese investment in overseas resource sectors constituted a significant share of China’s total direct 
overseas investment. Australia was one of China’s largest overseas investment destinations as well as 
the largest host of China’s outbound resource-related investment. The Portland aluminium smelter and 
the Channar iron ore joint venture established in Australia in the 1980s used to be China’s largest 
overseas investment projects (Drysdale & Findlay, 2009). 
 
Chinese investment in Australia’s resources sector was a fairly recent phenomenon, and began to 
increase only during the first decade of the new century.
47
 Having recognised the importance of 
acquiring overseas market and resources through outbound foreign direct investment, the Chinese 
government began to encourage more Chinese outbound investment starting in the late 1990s. Driven by 
the so-called ‘going abroad’ policy initiative, Chinese investment in the Australian resources sector 
increased. The steady improvement in bilateral political ties from the late 1900s onwards had to some 
extent given the China-Australia trade and investment relationship a significant boost.  
 
The relations continued to warm and experienced a rare period of amity and stability during the turn of 
the new century. China’s economic take-off and the stabilisation of major power relations in the post-9/11 
era created a benign economic and strategic environment for the steady improvement in the bilateral ties. 
The new Chinese leadership harboured great expectations for China’s relationship with Australia in both 
political and economic terms; and Australia had increasingly come to be seen as a valuable resource 
partner to support China’s economic development. Nevertheless, despite a few sporadic resource 
investment endeavours in the early 2000s, China’s resource-related investment in Australia did not really 
pick up speed until 2005.  
 
The emergence of the Sino-Australian entente around the mid-2000s heralded the beginning of a new 
phase of China-Australia economic partnership. Chinese investment in Australia also started to gain 
momentum in the second half of the 2000s as China began to target Australia as a key resource base 
and supplier. Official visits by the Chinese Premier and the Chinese President in 2006 and 2007 not only 
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helped secure huge energy and minerals procurement contracts but also large resource investment 
projects.
48
 
 
The global financial crisis in 2008 gave fresh impetus to Chinese investment in Australia. The economic 
downturn of 2008/2009 caused a plunge in the value of Australian mining assets and created an 
unprecedented investment and acquisition opportunity in the country’s resources sector for 
resource-hungry Chinese capital. As Chinese investors scrambled for Australia’s mining assets during 
that turbulent period, the influx of direct Chinese investment picked up speed and reached a climax 
towards the end of the 2000s. By the end of 2011, the cumulative total direct Chinese foreign investment 
in Australia reached US$29.7 billion
49
 (MOC April 11, 2011). What was more impressive was the speed 
and scale of the surge in Chinese investment, which became the most remarkable phenomenon in the 
development of China-Australia economic relations in recent years. 
 
The bulk of the Chinese investment in Australia went to the mineral and energy resource sectors. Insofar 
as the investment in mineral resources was concerned, the Chinese investors were most interested in 
iron ore assets, which made up the biggest share of the total Chinese resource investment in Australia. 
Resource assets such as bauxite, copper, nickel, zinc and other non-ferrous metals were also amongst 
the popular investment and acquisition targets for Chinese companies. Natural gas and coal made up the 
bulk of Australia’s energy exports to China as well as the most important and attractive energy assets for 
the Chinese investors.  
 
Direct Chinese investment in the Australian resources sector has taken a variety of forms. Many projects 
were ‘greenfield’ investments, whereby Chinese investors invested directly in resource development 
projects. Such direct investment projects usually took the form of joint ventures with other transnational 
firms (usually the local Australian partners) in the mining sector. These projects would require the 
Chinese investors to be directly engaged in the mineral exploration, mine development, mineral 
extraction, and sale. This type of ‘greenfield’ investment dated back to the 1980s and characterised most 
of the early Chinese investment in Australia’s resources sector before the 2008 financial crisis.  
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The more recent investment endeavours in the post-2008 era were marked by a surge in Chinese 
portfolio investment, whereby Chinese firms sought to acquire stakes in Australian resource businesses. 
This investment approach was pioneered by China’s largest private steel mill – Shasteel, and was quickly 
followed by China’s state-owned companies. This form of investment might not necessarily lead to direct 
Chinese involvement in the operation of the target company, but the Chinese investors were entitled to 
the usual benefits of a stakeholder in accordance with the size of the Chinese shares in the target 
company and the specific arrangement that had been worked out and agreed to by both sides before the 
acquisition. The ambitions of the Chinese investors varied from case to case, and ranged from gaining a 
controlling stake in the target company to becoming a strategic partner with a rather limited role in the 
target company’s management. There were also cases where the Chinese investors resorted to capital 
market operations to launch hostile takeover bids. Such cases were rare but there had been successful 
examples in practice. 
 
In conceptual terms, portfolio investment is strictly speaking not direct investment according to 
conventional understanding. However, these days the line between direct and portfolio investment is 
blurring. In statistical terms, investments are counted as direct investment by the Australian government 
if the proportion of the acquired stake exceeds 10 percent of the total company stock, and has real 
impact on the operation of the target company; for instance, on the sales strategy
50
 (Drysdale & Findlay 
2009). For analytical purposes, this form of Chinese portfolio investment will be treated as direct 
investment in this analysis. Transnational portfolio investment through mergers and acquisitions has 
increasingly become the predominant form of China’s outbound resource investment in Australia. 
 
The controversy over Chinese resource investment in Australia has centred on the government 
background of the Chinese investors. The majority of the Chinese investment entities have been 
state-owned enterprises or state-controlled public companies, which were China’s national champions 
from a variety of resource-related industries and sectors, most notably the iron and steel industry, the 
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non-ferrous metallurgical industry and the mining industry. There were also national SOEs from the 
resource development-related construction and heavy machinery manufacturing industries, and even the 
transportation sector. These companies were actively involved in the development of large mining 
facilities for many of the giant Chinese resource projects, mostly in the vast mining region of Western 
Australia, where the basic mining and transportation infrastructures were under-developed and had 
become increasingly inadequate to support the rapidly expanding mining activities. 
  
122 
 
3.3 Accounting for the Surge in Chinese Resource Investment 
The surge in Chinese resource investment in Australia since 2008 occurred as a result of a combination 
of several domestic and international factors. Growing Chinese demand for minerals and energy 
resources was the most significant factor behind the rise of Chinese investment in the overseas 
resources sector since the second half of the 2000s. The growing wealth of the Chinese government and 
investors was another major factor contributing to the rapid increase in Chinese outbound foreign direct 
investment to acquire resource assets globally. The Chinese government had not only amassed huge 
foreign exchange reserves of around 2 trillion U.S. dollars, but also faced the problem of how to invest 
this growing fortune and diversify its investment portfolio and reduce investment risks (Bardeesy July 4, 
2009). In this regard, mineral and energy resource investments had come to be seen as a good 
alternative investment option. Given the growing Chinese anxiety over resource security and the 
expectations of rising commodity prices over the long run, the idea of holding resource assets abroad 
had gained increasing currency in China’s policy and business circles. 
 
In the above context, Australia’s abundant resource reserves, the high-grade quality of its minerals (such 
as iron ore) and the country’s good investment environment in general were the main attractions for 
Chinese investment in Australia in recent years. The rapid growth of the Chinese economy since the 
early 2000s led to a breathtaking growth of investment in China’s steel and non-ferrous metallurgical 
industries.
51
 The first wave of expansion of the resource-intensive heavy industries occurred between 
2003 and 2007. It was followed by another round of expansion after the 2008-09 global financial crisis, as 
the post-crisis domestic economic stimulus package encouraged further expansion of those 
resource-intensive manufacturing industries.  
 
The rapidly surging prices for imported minerals (most notably the soaring prices of imported iron ores 
since 2003) had significantly raised the production costs and squeezed the profit margins of the 
metallurgical industries in China. There had been a growing strategic imperative to increase control over 
upstream raw materials (especially with respect to pricing) to ensure reliable and sustainable access to 
mineral supplies from abroad. In this sense, the ‘greedy’ global mining companies helped fuel Chinese 
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enthusiasm for investing in the Australian resources sector. 
 
Furthermore, the global financial crisis had a devastating systemic impact on the global economy and 
created a very rare historic opportunity for Chinese investors to buy up overseas resource assets. The 
declining global demand for mineral and energy resources during and immediately after the financial 
crisis led to the sharp plunges in the global commodities markets and the prices of resource assets. The 
asset values of many Australian resource companies had fallen to a historic low; this considerable drop in 
asset value rendered these Australian companies more attractive for investment and acquisition. At the 
same time, the financial and economic turmoil had put a severe strain on the finances of the resources 
companies from the mining and energy sectors globally. Many Australian resource companies, big and 
small, encountered cash flow problems; some were threatened by debt crisis partly due to 
over-expansion during the boom years. The urgent financing needs of the Australian resource sector 
during and in the aftermath of the financial crisis had significantly lessened resistance and obstacles to 
Chinese investment, and rendered Chinese capital all the more welcome. From the Chinese perspective, 
the financial crisis presented a ‘once in a hundred years’ historical opportunity for bargain hunting in the 
global resources sectors (Anonymous author November 28, 2008; Zhang, 2010: 37-38, 86-88; Jia 
December 20, 2008; Liu December 22, 2008). Chinese resource investment interests in Australia’s 
mining and energy sectors therefore reached an all-time high in the aftermath of the financial crisis. This 
round of investment and acquisition was further fuelled by a declining Australian dollar during the crisis 
period (Anonymous author, 2008). 
 
The improvement in China’s policy environment also helped facilitate outbound resource investment. In 
the past, overseas investment had been strictly regulated and restricted by a tight Chinese regulatory 
regime. Since 1997, the Chinese government had begun to encourage Chinese companies to invest 
abroad. During the 2000s, the Chinese government attempted to facilitate and support more Chinese 
outbound investment with less regulatory restrictions and greater financial support. This ‘going out’ 
strategy corresponded to and was reinforced by China’s overseas resource acquisition strategy, which 
also encouraged and supported Chinese investment in overseas resources sectors.
52
 Indeed, a 
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significant proportion of the so-called ‘going out’ efforts were targeted at the resources sector. Much of 
the government’s policy deliberation to remove the regulatory hurdles was designed to create a policy 
environment more conducive to resource acquisitions abroad (Zhang, 2010: 159-166; Jia December 20, 
2008). The Chinese government loosened the regulatory regime by making government verification and 
approval more efficient and easier for companies seeking to invest in overseas resources projects. There 
were also increases in fiscal, foreign exchange and banking assistance from the state to help finance big 
resource-related overseas investment endeavours during the 2000s (Liu December 22, 2008). 
 
The 2008 financial crisis had speeded up this development by giving a new impetus to the government’s 
push for the country’s overseas investment programme. The Chinese government acted quickly to 
introduce and implement a series of policy changes that aimed to facilitate outbound investment and 
encourage resource-related companies to take advantage of the investment opportunities presented by 
the financial crisis (Zhang, 2010). Overseas resources investment was the preferred target for state 
support; and in this regard, Australia was one of the most important investment destinations for state 
support.  
 
China’s banking regulator in 2008 loosened the regulation by providing Chinese investment entities with 
easier access to banking services and allowing qualified domestic commercial banks to arrange and 
provide loans for overseas acquisition, which had become an important means of financing for 
transnational acquisition activities undertaken by Chinese firms (Liu December 22, 2008). The state’s 
foreign exchange authorities also endeavoured to offer greater access to the nation’s foreign exchange 
reserves to support overseas investment. Major Chinese policy banks such as the China Development 
Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China also provided easy credits to Chinese investors seeking to 
engage in overseas resource-related projects.
53
 Some of China’s multi-billion investment and acquisition 
deals, regardless of their outcomes, were made feasible only with the generous financial support from 
state-owned commercial and policy banks. These state-owned lending institutions had become an 
indispensible source of finance for many of China’s largest overseas resource investment and acquisition 
deals, such as Chinalco’s 2009 acquisition deal with Rio Tinto, which was worth 19.5 billion U.S. dollars 
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and eventually failed (Zhu June 5, 2009); and Valin Steel’s acquisition of 16.5 percent stake in Australia’s 
third largest iron ore producer, Fortescue Metals Group, which was worth US$770 million and was 
completed successfully (Bardeesy July 4, 2009). The Ministry of Commerce and the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) also looked with favour upon overseas resource 
investment applications and proposals. In 2009, the Ministry of Commerce introduced a new regulatory 
regime that aimed to simplify and better streamline the state’s verification and approval procedures for 
overseas investment applications. For instance, by giving local governments greater authority to oversee 
overseas investment proposals while minimising the control of the national (central) government over the 
process; the regulation also gave greater autonomy to Chinese companies in determining the viability 
and feasibility of their overseas investment projects (China News March 17, 2009). Resource-related 
investment projects were always favoured by these policy measures and reform initiatives.  
 
3.3.1 China’s Aggressive Investment Behaviour and Mercantilist 
Intentions 
Chinese SOEs’ ambitious investment and acquisition approach was a serious cause for alarm and 
fuelled Australian mistrust of the intentions of Chinese investment. The perception of an imminent threat 
of Chinese state domination in Australia’s resources sector was reinforced by aggressive and calculated 
Chinese investment behaviours such as: aiming at the most valuable resources and core assets; striving 
for controlling stakes and substantial interests in target companies; seeking board seats, information 
access and corporate decision-making powers in target companies; paying scant attention to financial 
risks; and not paying significant heed to the commercial viability.
54
 In light of the determined and 
ambitious Chinese takeover bids launched by the giant SOE investors such as Sinosteel and Minmetals 
(for Midwest and OZ Minerals respectively), most Australians believed that Chinalco would progressively 
increase its shareholding in Rio and eventually seek a complete takeover of Rio Tinto in due course, 
despite Chinalco’s repeated protests that it had no intention of doing so (Callick June 6, 2009; Hou, 
2010).  
 
Even the Chinese themselves had recognised the threatening nature of such an aggressive approach, as 
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well as its limitations. Some Chinese observers recognised that Australian perceptions could not merely 
be dismissed as innocence and bias, and called for a more restrained approach to resource acquisition.
55
 
In their joint post-mortem on the collapse of the Chinalco-Rio deal, Chen Daofu and Su Yang warned 
against an overly ambitious approach in the acquisition of overseas resource assets. In light of the fact 
that China’s resource investors consisted largely of government companies engaged in an aggressive 
state-initiated resource acquisition strategy, China’s resource investments were bound to face some 
degree of wariness and resistance on the part of the host governments and local communities. However, 
they suggested that as latecomers and new players in the global resource arena, Chinese resource 
investors should avoid aggressive acquisition of substantial/controlling stakes in foreign resource 
companies; nor should every Chinese investor aim for a board seat in the target company. In their view, 
both of these aggressive investment behaviours, that had played a role in Chinalco’s failure, were neither 
viable nor necessary (Chen & Su, 2010a, 2010b). Hou Minyue also had serious reservations about the 
aggressiveness of Chinese investment behaviour in Australia’s mining sector: the Australians were 
completely overwhelmed by the intensive Chinese investment activities carried out within such a short 
period of time; the enormous capital injection especially into the targeted mining giants with high-quality 
and well-developed resource assets, as well as a number of ambitious takeover raids on mining 
companies; and the Chinalco-Rio deal was the most notable example in this regard (Hou, 2010). 
 
Despite Chinese reassurances, the Australians had become increasingly wary of the market implications 
of growing Chinese ownership. Mounting fears of Chinese control over Australian resources were not 
only about the extent of Chinese ambition to expand her growing presence in terms of enlarging Chinese 
ownership per se. Amongst Australia’s greatest concerns was the progressive and creeping Chinese 
attempts to seek greater pricing power and the long-term impact on the prices of major commodities that 
Australia exported. Arguably, the prospect of Chinese acquiring a significant influence over the pricing of 
iron ore was the least desirable outcome for the Australians. Yet, insofar as China’s resource acquisition 
strategy in the Australian theatre was concerned, the quest for pricing power was one of its driving 
motives, if not the most immediate objective.
56
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Indeed, the growing Chinese desire for pricing influence was keenly reflected in the insatiable appetite of 
the Chinese sovereign investors for Australia’s iron ore assets. Although access to ore supplies was also 
a major consideration, the quest for greater pricing power was the main impetus for the surge of Chinese 
investment in Australia’s iron ore mines since 2008 (Liu December 22, 2008). China’s strong desire for 
pricing power led to a systematic and aggressive asset acquisition spree, via a number of strategic 
investments in Western Australia and other iron ore producing states in Australia. This round of the 
aggressive iron ore acquisition strategy, which targeted the core assets of the established giant iron ore 
producers and the major undeveloped mining assets owned by the smaller Australian miners, was 
undertaken by a handful of China’s most powerful SOE investors. It was hoped that acquisition of a 
significant proportion of stakes in Australia’s major resource companies would over time help Chinese 
firms establish some degree of influence over the pricing policy of the upstream resource suppliers, thus 
reducing the cost of raw materials for the downstream iron and steel industry in China (Rong & Ye 
February 23, 2009). 
 
This strategy was based on the presumption that increasing stakes in iron ore mines abroad would 
reduce Chinese dependence on the dominant miners for ore supply, as well as enhance Chinese steel 
mills’ bargaining position and influence over the prices of imported iron ores - thereby rendering the 
downstream Chinese steel industry less vulnerable to iron ore price hikes (Rong & Ye February 23, 2009; 
Li, 2010). Even if increased stakes in upstream resource companies failed to strengthen Chinese pricing 
power, they would nevertheless help enhance Chinese ability to cope with hikes in iron ore prices and the 
resultant rising production costs, which would be expected to be offset by the gains from the increased 
dividends received as significant shareholders of the upstream raw material suppliers. This has been the 
experience of the Japanese steel mills, which benefited from their significant stakes in upstream iron ore 
producers acquired in the 1970s and 1980s. This partly explains why the Japanese steel industry, in 
relative terms, appeared significantly less sensitive than its Chinese counterpart to the dramatic rises in 
imported iron ore prices over recent years.
57
 
 
Chinalco’s investment bids for Rio Tinto stakes were the most notable example in this regard. The 2000s 
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witnessed a merger and acquisition spree in the global resources sector involving the largest 
cross-border deals in history. Even as the global credit crisis was beginning to unfold, the scramble for 
resources reached its zenith by late 2007, when Rio Tinto became an acquisition target of BHP Billiton. 
BHP was then the third largest producer of iron ore and second of copper globally, whilst Rio was the 
second and fifth respectively. The proposed merger would have created the largest single producer of 
iron ore and copper, as well as aluminium and power-station coal, in the world. The imminent tied-up 
between the two Australian-based global mining giants would lead to further consolidation of the global 
metal mining business. This would threaten to push up the costs of China’s development considerably, 
given China’s massive demand for metals such as iron, steel and copper, driven by the country’s 
breakneck economic growth. It was against this global market background that Chinalco’s two 
successive strategic moves to invest in Rio Tinto in 2007/2008 and 2009 were conceived and 
implemented. 
 
Owing to the collapse in demand for aluminium, Chinalco’s profits dropped by 99 percent in 2008, and its 
original 2008 investment in Rio Tinto lost 70 percent of its market value, approximately US$10 billion 
(Yao & Sutherland, 2009). Despite the loses, four of the biggest Chinese state-owned banks (including 
two state policy banks) lined up to lend Chinalco US$21 billion at very low interest rates for its second bid 
for Rio’s stake (Yao & Sutherland, 2009). Moreover, Chinalco’s acquisition moves appeared to defy 
commercial logic and existing theories concerning foreign direct investment and acquisition in the light of 
the fact that the company had no distinct advantages over Rio Tinto and was in fact smaller and less 
profitable than its target company. As a result, Chinalco’s ambitious international expansion and desire 
for vertical integration with Rio could only be fully explained in terms of state-sponsored resource 
acquisition act and China’s growing dependence on mineral resources
58
 (Yao & Sutherland, 2009). From 
the Australian perspective, it was also legitimate to question why one should sell assets to Chinese firms 
that could sacrifice commercial efficiency in the service of state objectives. 
 
In retrospect, Chinalco's successful first move into Rio Tinto in early 2008 was already an indication of 
the company’s important status in the overseas resource acquisition strategy and the national mission 
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entrusted to it by the state to become China’s globally diversified mining champion. Given the strategic 
significance of its failed second attempt in 2009 to acquire a large stake in Rio Tinto, Chinalco was surely 
in the vanguard of Chinese acquisition of iron ore assets in Australia. Indeed, the case for approval of the 
deal was reportedly being pressed at almost every encounter between Chinese officials and Australians, 
in both countries, whatever the reason for the meeting (Callick May 13, 2009). None of the other Chinese 
investment moves into Australia had anything like the same weight in the eyes of the Chinese 
government, which had pulled out all the stops to support Chinalco’s bid for Rio Tinto. Where core 
national interests were concerned, the Chinese government was sufficiently well managed to ensure its 
state priorities would take precedence. Hence, although Chinalco was not itself a buyer of iron ore, it 
would be hard to conceive of Chinalco being free, in its amplified role in Rio Tinto, to maximise iron ore 
prices, given the fact that Rio Tinto was Australia’s dominant iron ore producer and China was Rio’s 
biggest iron ore customer. 
 
The Australian government therefore remained rather cautious about approving major Chinese 
investment projects that would have a systemic impact on the iron ore trade in China’s favour at the 
expense of the Australian companies and industry. Mindful of the strategic rationale behind China’s iron 
ore acquisition strategy, the Australian authorities had been keeping a firm grip on the scale and pace of 
the inflows of Chinese capital lest the latter should be able to undermine Australian control over iron ore 
pricing. 
 
China’s domestic propaganda and media reports that trumpeted Chinese achievements in overseas iron 
ore acquisition also reinforced Australian mistrust towards Chinese investment intentions. Remarks by 
senior Chinese officials about how China’s strategic investments in overseas resource assets could help 
the country control key commodities (such as iron ores) and their import prices received extensive press 
coverage. For example, Wang Xiaoqi, the planning director at the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council that owns Chinalco, once told 21st Century Economic 
Report, an influential Chinese business newspaper, that ‘stabilising the prices of mineral resources 
should be the aim of this round of overseas acquisition for resources’ (Callick May 13, 2009). Official 
comments and media commentaries on why overseas resource investment should be encouraged and 
promoted, and how the central government mobilised and coordinated major overseas resource 
130 
 
investments, also appeared in the press. It was widely reported in Chinese media that the proposed 
Chinalco acquisition deal was directly handled and managed by the State Council and the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) (Xu February 12, 2009). These startling 
revelations about Chinese investment motives only further undermined China’s own claims of its modest 
resource and investment ambitions, and confirmed Australian and foreign suspicions (Liu & Liu & Liu 
February 3, 2009). Hence, the Australian criticisms levelled at Chinese sovereign investment were not 
entirely xenophobic. 
 
Australian mistrust of Chinese intentions was further undermined by the lack of adequate communication 
between the Chinese and Australian governments on major Chinese investment projects.
59
 Canberra 
was concerned that Beijing had been less than willing to consult with the Australian government 
concerning major Chinese investment moves before they were formally launched. For instance, 
Chinalco’s 2007/2008 raid on Rio shares had taken Canberra by surprise. Neither Rio Tinto nor Canberra 
reportedly knew anything about Chinalco’s meticulously planned raid on Rio shares in London when 
Chinalco bought its initial 9 percent stake in the company in late 2007, with the transaction completed in 
early 2008
60
 (Callick June 6, 2009). Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi commented on a visit to 
Canberra soon afterwards (in early 2008) that this was not a government-initiated strike and denied he 
had been aware of the development. However, the Australians were left unconvinced; and the lack of 
frank exchange about the deal fuelled Australian suspicion and compounded the challenge for Chinalco’s 
second major bid for Rio stakes in the following year (Hou, 2010). It was an important event that led to 
the context in which the six guidelines on foreign government investors were deliberated in the following 
year. 
 
3.3.2 Strategic Role of National SOEs in the State’s Overseas Resource 
Acquisition Strategy 
As to the identity of the Chinese government investors, an important dimension of the question pertains 
to the relationship between the national (or central) SOE investors and the Chinese state. As an integral 
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part of the Chinese state apparatus, the national SOEs are owned and regulated by the State-Owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC). It is reasonable to 
assume that the national SOE investors were effectively investment entities ‘of the state’, ‘by the state’ 
and ‘for the state’. Their business interests constituted the economic interests of the state; state interests 
were also embodied in the interests and aspirations of the industries and economic sectors dominated by 
those national SOEs. Top managers of the national state companies were high-level party cadres 
appointed by the central government (i.e., the Party); many came from a bureaucratic background; and 
some successful managers would later be transferred to the government bureaucracy by the party-state 
as political reward. As guardians of state interests, these state appointees were, in general, keen to 
execute state policy and follow the will of the central government.
61
 Success in this regard could lead to 
personal political benefits and career advancement in government for those top management personnel 
with political acuity. The most notable example in this regard was the promotion of Chinalco’s General 
Manager Xiao Yaqing. Xiao, who was an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party, left Chinalco to become Deputy Secretary-General of the State Council shortly after the 
announcement of the Chinalco-Rio deal. His government role was to assist the Vice Premier responsible 
for the nation’s industrial development. Xiao was hailed by the Chinese media as ‘a national hero for 
promoting overseas acquisitions’
62
 (Callick May 13, 2009). Xiao’s predecessor in Chinalco had also 
become the Vice Governor, and later the party secretary, of Guangxi Province (Callick May 13, 2009). 
The significance of Xiao’s timely promotion was widely cited in both the Chinese and Australian media, 
and testified to the close links between Chinese corporations and the state (Xiao & He & Bai, 2010; 141). 
 
The close institutional relationship between the national SOEs and the Party state seems to justify the 
‘China Inc.’ view when it came to how the major Chinese government investors were perceived abroad. 
The national SOEs were politically responsible for the central government and were charged with policy 
missions to fulfil state objectives, as well as to protect and advance national interests (Liu December 22, 
2008). If required, they could be used as policy instruments by the government for national economic 
                                                        
61
 Interview: 8 
62
 Source: ‘Reasons for Chinalco’s Failure’ (June 10, 2009) 
http://money.163.com/09/0610/15/5BF5BNBB00251LJJ.html 
132 
 
agenda.
63
 As the commercial agent of the state or the central government, they were obliged to carry out, 
execute and implement national economic strategy. The central government led behind the scenes by 
determining the strategic goals, coordinating domestic actors, mobilising national resources and 
providing policy and financial support;
64
 whereas the national SOEs were at the forefront of China’s 
inter-state economic diplomacy and transnational economic engagement. For instance, the idea of 
acquiring Rio Tinto was first conceived after the NDRC summoned Chinalco, Baosteel, Shenhua Group 
and the CDB on a number of occasions at the end of 2007 to discuss a Chinese response to BHP Billiton’ 
proposed acquisition of Rio Tinto. Chinalco was hand-picked for the task of forestalling BHP’s acquisition 
plan, and was soon approved by the SASAC to expand the company’s main business scope to cover 
mining and all the non-ferrous metals in order to clear the way for Chinalco’s plans to acquire Rio Tinto. 
(Xiao & He & Bai, 2010: 129). 
 
In the resources sector, the national SOEs were the principal executors of the nation’s overseas resource 
acquisition strategy. Notably, the SASAC reportedly selected a group of task force-like national state 
companies specifically for carrying out those biggest overseas resource-related investment and 
acquisition projects, which were deemed strategic moves and of critical importance in China’s overseas 
resource strategy; according to a senior SASAC official, this group consisted of ten national SOEs who 
came from the petroleum, metallurgical, mining and other resource-related industries; and all of them 
were industry leaders in those sectors (Jia December 20, 2008; Liu December 22, 2008). Through these 
critical foreign investment projects, China was seeking to establish and expand its foothold in the global 
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mining and extraction sectors, and to protect and promote the long-term developmental and commercial 
interests of its downstream metallurgical and energy businesses. The central government intended to 
mobilise all necessary resources from the state apparatus to support their overseas endeavours. The 
chosen national champions were proud to be at the vanguard of the nation’s resource acquisition 
strategy (Chinalco August 24, 2011). The national SOE investors had been the indispensible agent of the 
overseas resource acquisition strategy. Many resource investment projects were not entirely driven by 
commercial investment objectives, but were also strategic national investments undertaken by the 
national SOEs on behalf of the state in support of its resource security strategy. It was the central 
government that had provided the political impetus for these mega projects, which were oriented to the 
national goals of sustainable economic development and the security of resource supply.  
 
Large resource-related investment projects, be they greenfield investments or mergers and acquisitions, 
were capital-intensive, high-risk, and required long-term commitment, which meant that state support, if 
not direct government involvement, were essential for their viability and success. Despite their domestic 
success (achieved with the support from the state), these national champions were novices in the 
international resources arena.
65
 Because of the risky nature of big resource-related investment 
undertakings and the volatility of the global commodities market, commitment to these national missions 
might lead to the compromise of short-term business interests. From the firm’s perspective, many of the 
giant resource projects might not necessarily make much financial sense, as they entailed too many 
investment risks or debt burdens on the part of the investors from a business point of view. To undertake 
these risky mega projects, the firms would likely have to compromise their short-term interests.
66
 Some 
of the investment initiatives might not necessarily have direct relevance to the corporate agenda or the 
long-term development needs of the firms that were tasked with carrying them out.
67
  
 
Nonetheless, the national SOE investors were backed by the state, both materially and politically; the 
government ensured that they had a considerable margin for error and investment loss, so long as their 
overseas investment deals made strategic sense in the long run. In fact, by undertaking the initiative to 
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pioneer the state’s resource strategy at the cost of their business interests, the national imperative of 
seeking expansion of the state’s resource territory abroad might very well translate into the companies’ 
own agendas, necessitating it to alter its corporate and business strategy accordingly. Most importantly, 
given the government’s full backing for the sake of resource acquisition, these national SOE investors 
could quickly diversify their business portfolios, increase their company assets, expand their global 
presence, and elevate their corporate profiles internationally; all of which served their long-term interests 
for growth that would not have otherwise been possible.  
 
Autonomy of Chinese SOEs as Market Actors and Business Motivations for Overseas Resource 
Investment 
China’s national SOEs by and large faithfully executed the state’s resource strategy. Nonetheless, 
China’s government-related investors acted simultaneously as market actors that enjoyed a considerable 
degree of autonomy over their own corporate affairs, including their investment decisions. It is therefore 
necessary to place their relationship with the government in perspective. After all, China no longer had a 
command economy. Despite their close links with the government, Chinese SOEs had over the years 
become increasingly oriented to the requirements of a market economy, following years of SOE 
corporate governance reforms. As much profit-oriented as private commercial entities, Chinese SOEs 
also had strong incentives to operate according to market forces. When it came to overseas investment 
decisions, the behaviour of the SOEs was not micro-managed by the government. Insofar as national 
SOEs were concerned, those powerful national enterprises possessed a considerable degree of 
autonomy.
68
 The top management of some of the big national champions were high ranking party cadres 
of ministerial or vice-ministerial levels and enjoyed considerable leeway and autonomy in business 
management, including on the question of overseas investment. For China’s numerous local SOEs, 
market forces might override the perceived state agenda; and commercial logic might be a better guide 
for understanding their overseas investment behaviour. Contrary to popular perception, the Chinese 
government was on the verge of losing its grip on Chinese SOEs’ overseas investment activities. 
Government regulation and official supervision in this particular policy domain was said to be impotent 
and limited (Qi May 11, 2010; Finet April 27, 2010; Deng May 5, 2010). An institutionalised performance 
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management framework was not yet properly developed to oversee the country’s vast (resource) 
investment ventures and assets abroad (Lu & Li July 4, 2011; Li, 2011). The pace of overseas expansion 
of the national state companies had outrun the regulatory capacity of the SASAC and other regulatory 
bodies, such as the Ministry of Commerce and the NDRC. The central government was in fact struggling 
to keep up with the overseas ventures of national and local government-related companies, whose 
scramble for resource investment opportunities abroad lacked a clearly formulated strategy to coordinate 
their activities. 
 
Despite the state missions and national resource security strategy entrusted to national SOEs, the 
overseas resource investment activities of these enterprises were very much driven by market 
considerations and commercial logic. In many respects, the industry- and firm-levels business 
imperatives were consistent with both the national resource security interest and the development needs 
of the Chinese businesses in the relevant sectors;
69
 it thus blurred the distinction between state-directed 
behaviour and market-oriented commercial decisions. 
 
A significant driving force was the industry imperative of vertical integration, whereby the steel mills and 
non-ferrous metallurgical producers in China sought to upstream supply chain integration.
70
 Insofar as 
the downstream resource-related Chinese metallurgical sectors were concerned, the goal was to gain 
greater and more reliable access to raw materials abroad and to improve the competitive edge of the 
downstream metallurgical industries and companies, by ensuring a minimum and optimal level of 
Chinese control of the costs and supply of essential raw materials. Chinese ownership of upstream 
mines would supposedly reduce supply risks and stabilise the procurement of minerals. By acquiring 
more overseas captive mines (quanyi kuang), downstream Chinese companies could ensure a more 
secure supply of raw materials from abroad, and presumably at a fair price. Apart from greenfield 
investment, acquisition of stakes in upstream mining companies and their mineral assets, would also give 
Chinese investors the chance to negotiate agreements with the targeted companies so as to guarantee 
the Chinese side adequate supplies of the mining output from the target companies.  
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However, Chinese metallurgical industries had only limited control of minerals assets outside the country. 
Take the Chinese steel industry in 2008 for example: the volume of iron ores imported from China’s 
overseas captive mines amounted to only 700 to 800 million tons a year, which accounted for only 20 
percent of China’s total iron ore imports. By contrast, more than 60 percent of iron ore imports in Europe 
and Japan came from the captive mines abroad owned by European and Japanese firms.
71
 Hence, 
there was a huge incentive for Chinese metallurgical companies to engage in mineral resource 
acquisition and investment activities globally. 
 
Another major commercial objective of resource investment related to asset management strategy on the 
part of the Chinese companies. According to a Chinese expert on China’s energy and non-traditional 
security issues, China’s overseas resource investment was not entirely (if at all) driven by a national 
resource acquisition strategy; rather, it was driven by an expectation of a long-term trend towards rising 
prices of mineral commodities and rising energy prices.
72
 Chinese investors were betting on future 
increase in the asset values of their overseas minerals mines and energy assets. This investment 
motivation reflected the so-called ‘resource replacement’ strategy, which had been used by the Western 
petroleum companies seeking to expand their investment portfolio through acquisition of oil fields 
globally.
73
 This ‘resource replacement’ strategy had significantly expanded the assets of companies such 
as BP and helped elevate their market status. Similarly, many of the overseas investment and acquisition 
projects undertaken by the Chinese petroleum giants and resource-related companies were essentially 
driven by the same logic.
74
 The drop in asset values of the mines and resource companies worldwide 
following the 2008-09 financial crisis offered unprecedented opportunity for such resource replacement 
strategies, and gave added impetus to the outbound investment and acquisition spree. 
 
Many of the investment decisions were oriented towards large-scale expansion. There was a huge 
incentive for the Chinese SOEs to enlarge their business empire and internationalise their operations 
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both abroad and domestically, so as to avoid being acquired by their competitors.
75
 This concern for 
survival was partly a result of fierce competitive pressure faced by the national state companies as the 
Chinese government was looking for ways to enhance industry concentration by encouraging and 
initiating mergers and acquisitions in order to nurture giant and internationally competitive state-owned 
corporations in key economic sectors. From the individual firm’s point of view, overseas acquisitions and 
investment in the global resources sector were a convenient way to increase company scale and raise 
corporate profile. 
 
Contrary to popular belief, the overseas corps of state-owned Chinese resource investors - the ‘China 
Inc.’ that had constantly been implied by Western sceptics - did not always act in a manner that would 
maximise the interests of the state. In fact, it had almost become a sore point with the Chinese 
government that those (national) SOEs often acted in the opposite manner. A notable phenomenon in 
this regard was the internecine competition among the Chinese SOEs themselves for resource projects 
abroad, which demonstrated the lack of collaboration and coordination among the SOEs
76
 (Zhang, 2010: 
195-196). Instances of competitive bidding amongst China’s national SOEs in Australia for mining assets 
were common. Such activities had often led to higher investment costs at the expense of the Chinese 
bidders, thereby rendering the Chinese the big loser in the end. For instance, Wusteel, Ansteel, Baosteel 
and Sinosteel were reportedly competing for an iron ore asset located in the Pilbara region. By outbidding 
each other, they pushed up the final transaction price by as much as one third of the original price (Wu 
May 10, 2011). 
 
Moreover, it had become increasingly apparent that many of the transnational overseas resource 
investment and acquisition activities of Chinese SOEs actually lacked clear strategic vision and long-term 
planning.
77
 Contrary to popular belief, many ambitious investment and acquisition projects were actually 
the outcome of impetuous decisions; they had been carried out without a thorough risk-benefit analysis 
or a clear understanding of how such endeavours would help achieve the firms’ long-term strategy or 
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enhance their core competitive advantage.
78
 As observed by some scholars, many Chinese SOE 
investors were neither following any government orders nor possessed a clear idea of what they were 
doing; they were merely ‘following the crowd’.
79
 The investment behaviour of the leading players in 
China’s metallurgical industry was often ‘exemplary’ and could shape the investment preferences of the 
smaller players, which tended to be in the habit of following the behaviour of industry leaders in their 
search for investment opportunities. Those who acted on impulse might still be able to postulate a 
number of reasons such as those mentioned above to rationalise their investment decisions; but in 
practice, their behaviour would almost be tantamount to ‘blind investment’ that collectively resembled the 
so-called ‘sheep effect’ or ‘herd behaviour’
80
 (Dou & Tang, 2009: 191-198). 
 
John Garnaut, the China correspondent of The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald, made some 
revealing remarks about Chinese fragmentation (Garnaut February 21, 2009). According to Garnaut, the 
widely-held yet misguided perception of a monolithic China, where the party dominated and controlled 
every activity, was simply an outdated and gross misrepresentation of the reality: contrary to the general 
impression of centralisation, China’s state apparatus was highly plural and decentralised today. 
According to Garnaut, the Australians had got China seriously wrong with ‘a kind of unthinking response, 
which talks about China not only like it's a simple, un-complex whole, but also a country where the 
Communist Party makes the decision and everybody else jumps’ (Garnaut February 21, 2009). Garnaut 
observed that Chinese government companies, industry associations and various government agencies 
did not in fact act in a coordinated way; rather their behaviour often contradicted and undermined each 
other: China’s ‘sprawling family of state-owned companies can be fragmented, internally competitive and 
beyond the central government’s powers of orchestration – however it might try’ (Garnaut February 21, 
2009). 
 
With regard to Chinese government investment intentions, Garnaut believed that the Chinese system 
had become substantially market-oriented: the pursuit of profit was transforming China’s channels and 
hierarchies of power and ‘leaders of state-owned enterprises survive in a world of market forces and are 
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judged largely on their ability to make more money than their peers’ (Garnaut February 21, 2009). With 
reference to Chinalco’s investment motive in particular, Garnaut went so far as to claim that Chinalco 
‘has zero interest’ in helping China’s steel makers get cheaper iron ore – and the Chinese were not 
capable of doing so anyway (Garnaut February 21, 2009). Arguing that the ‘China Inc.’ was highly 
fragmented, Garnaut asserted that there was no cause for concern and that Chinalco would not ‘attempt 
to subsidise its domestic competitors at the expense of itself (and the reputation of Chinese companies 
everywhere) by supplying them with discount Australian resources’ (Garnaut February 21, 2009). In his 
view, even if Chinalco could buck the trend of Chinese corporate history, there appeared to be no 
practical mechanism for this to happen: ‘Chinalco has been given the right to talk about everything but 
control nothing – least of all the pricing of its product’ under the strategic partnership agreement between 
Chinalco and Rio Tinto; and if these contractual constraints did not work, the export sales will be 
scrutinised by the corporate regulator – the Australian Taxation Office’s transfer pricing team and Rio 
Tinto’s minority shareholders (Garnaut February 21, 2009). 
 
Garnaut also noted that the prospects of the Chinalco bid had been severely compromised by the 
comments made by the chief of China Iron and Steel Association that the deal ‘will help China break the 
duopoly in Australian iron ore supply over time’ (Garnaut February 21, 2009). This comment was 
reported in almost every major Australian business publication as having accidentally revealed 
Chinalco’s true intentions: to act as a stalking horse for ‘China Inc.’ and push down the price of Australian 
commodities in China’s favour, and as further proof of sinister intentions behind the gathering wave of 
Chinese investment. Furthermore, the poor timing of sprawling investment activities undertaken by other 
Chinese companies also made it easier for the government to reject the Chinalco deal – by providing the 
option of letting other smaller deals through. The flurry of Chinese investment left an impression of an 
opportunistic ‘Team China’ raid on prized Australian resources at the bottom of the market (Garnaut 
February 21, 2009; Xiao & He & Bai, 2010: 141). 
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3.4 Australian Reaction against Chinese Resource Investment 
3.4.1 The Labour Government’s Stance 
The Australian government appeared to have an ambivalent attitude towards Chinese investment in the 
country’s mining sector. On the one hand, the government and mainstream politicians were sensitive to 
the charge of investment protectionism and resource nationalism. The Labour Party and government 
officials had been at pains to insist that Australia welcomed and did not discriminate against Chinese 
investment. In practical terms, direct investment from China did bring about tangible benefits for 
Australian businesses and the economy by providing much-needed capital to finance the mining 
operations and sustain the momentum of the mining investment and export boom in Australia, particularly 
in the midst of the global economic crisis. Furthermore, Canberra did not want to upset relations with 
Beijing, which attached great importance to its resource investment in Australia; the Labour government 
and key policy makers were always cautious about making policy remarks about Chinese investment, by 
denying xenophobia and discrimination and avoiding making overtly protectionist and hostile comments 
on Chinese investment.  
 
In fact, the Australian government was anxious to defuse the heat and mounting tensions over Chinese 
investment. When it came to policy statements about Chinese government investment, the Labour 
government preferred to take a moderate stance and was careful not to allow government policy to be 
misrepresented or hijacked by radical politicians with nationalist and xenophobic agendas. In order to 
quell domestic sceptics who criticised the government for selling out Australia, Treasurer Wayne Swan 
was forced on many occasions to defend Chinese investment. The Treasurer and his cabinet colleagues 
also repeatedly reassured and explained to international investors, particularly the Chinese government, 
that Australia remained open for business and the foreign investment regime was essentially welcoming 
and not discriminatory between countries. The message was that the Labour government did not operate 
as a roadblock but was there to maximise capital inflow. The Treasurer also agreed with a Senate 
Economics Committee report that Australia's foreign investment guidelines could be better explained and 
had ordered the FIRB to make minor changes and initiatives to improve the agency’s transparency,  
 
141 
 
On the other hand, the Labour government had committed itself to undertake a series of measures to 
tighten the country’s foreign investment regime against Chinese investment. Canberra was getting 
increasingly anxious about China’s aggressive investment spree. Arguably, this was the true face of 
Labour’s policy towards Chinese investment. Canberra was unnerved by Beijing’s overwhelming 
resource ambitions. There was a deep anxiety about the prospect that Beijing could undermine the 
independence of the Australian resource businesses, influence the pricing of mineral exports and thus 
affect the profits of the Australian businesses and government revenues. As the prospect of Chinese 
domination loomed large, policymakers in the Labour government went to great lengths to block or 
restrict Chinese investment and prevent Chinese control of the country’s resource assets.  
 
These genuine sensitivities to threat, however, were always veiled and rarely enunciated in public; but 
they had been brought to light by two revealing U.S. diplomatic cables leaked by WikiLeaks in 2010 
(Dorling March 3, 2011). According to the U.S. embassy report on the matter, titled ‘New foreign 
investment guidelines target China’, Patrick Colmer, the then Treasury’s foreign investment division head 
and the FIRB General Manager, said that the Australian government aimed to introduce disincentives for 
large-scale Chinese investments. In a confidential discussion with U.S. embassy officials in late 
September 2009, Patrick Colmer ‘confirmed to Econoff the new guidelines are mainly due to growing 
concerns about Chinese investments in the strategic resources sector’. Colmer’s private remarks were 
made in the aftermath of reports that he allegedly told a Chinese investment audience in September 
2009 that foreign investors with ‘significant government ownership’ should limit ownership stakes in 
greenfield resource projects to less than 50 percent and shares in major resource companies to 15 
percent (Colmer September 24, 2009). 
 
According to the leaked cable, Colmer told the U.S. officials that the FIRB ‘has received more than one 
Chinese investment application every week this year’. Colmer was reported as saying that ‘the measure 
is also meant to prevent complex investment schemes, such as proposals with loans that are convertible 
to equity, which sought to circumvent existing FIRB rules’. The comments made by U.S. officials in the 
cable were also revealing: 
 
…(the new guidelines) clearly signal a stricter policy aimed squarely at China’s growing 
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influence in Australia’s resources sector, and serves as a warning to potential 
investors…Thanks largely to Chinese financing, Australian companies have continued to 
develop the resources sector, despite the GFC (global financial crisis). Larger-scale Chinese 
financing may become harder to come by for these companies in the future… on the core issue, 
the GOA (Government of Australia) prefers to retain maximum flexibility on how it handles deals 
and has steadfastly resisted a clear checklist that could tie its hands. Instead, the FIRB's broad 
national interest mandate allows the Government considerable discretion to impose conditions 
on approvals. (U.S. Embassy Canberra September 30, 2009) 
 
According to another leaked cable, BHP Billiton CEO Marius Kloppers once had a private discussion with 
the U.S. Consul-General in Melbourne in June 2009 against the backdrop of intense lobbying of ministers 
and government officials over the proposed Rio-Chinalco deal (Murphy February 16, 2011; Dorling 
February 15, 2011). What Kloppers told was also indicative of the Labour government’s true stance on 
the Chinese investment issue. Describing himself as being ‘only nominally Australian’ in the diplomatic 
cable, the South African-born BHP chief told the Consul-General that the Australian federal government 
‘would like to build up trade with China, but there is “real fear” of the Chinese government’. Kloppers was 
reported to have said that ‘Australia does not want to become an open pit in the southernmost province of 
China’ (U.S. Embassy Canberra June 5, 2009). The U.S. Consul-General reported in the cable that 
‘Kloppers thinks the (Australian) government is drawing a line in the sand to keep Chinese state-owned 
firms from owning the larger mining companies such as Rio Tinto, BHP Billiton and Woodside… He also 
believes Chinese state-owned firms would encounter heavy resistance should they make overtures at 
Australia’s telecommunications and banking giants’ (U.S. Embassy Canberra June 5, 2009). 
 
3.4.2 Reaction from Opposition Parties 
The opposition coalition by and large shared the Labour government’s concern about Chinese 
investment. There were no major policy differences between Labour and the Liberal-National coalition on 
this issue. Both the government and the opposition supported the ‘case by case’ approach and insisted 
on the national interests test in reviewing foreign investment and greater scrutiny of government-related 
investment. In short, this was a bipartisan approach and the Liberal Party had shown solidarity with the 
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Labour government. 
 
However, there was a shift of Australian politics into populist avenues on the question of Chinese 
investment. Some radical opposition politicians launched fierce campaign against Chinese investment, 
arguably with the aim of whipping up nationalist sentiment against Chinese capital. The Chinalco case 
provided a rallying point for the opponents of Chinese investment and a platform to launch an attack on 
the Labour government’s handling of the Chinese investment issue. While the Labour government said a 
decision on the deal would be made in accordance with the national interest, Green politicians opposed 
outright the proposed tie-up. Almost all the submissions to the Senate Economics Committee inquiry into 
the deal opposed it on nationalist grounds. 
 
Malcolm Turnbull, the Opposition leader from the Liberal Party at the time of the Chinalco deal, used his 
first major foreign policy speech to say the Chinalco deal was against the national interest (Turnbull May 
1, 2009). Turnbull’s central point was that a corporation owned by a communist regime should not be 
given increased influence in or control over Australia’s resources; only if Chinalco was privatised should 
the offer be entertained. In his Lowy Institute speech of May 2009, Turnbull said China’s investment 
strategy was to use the global crisis to acquire as many resource assets as cheaply as possible to secure 
its long-term supply and use such influence to reduce its contract prices. Turnbull warned that China’s 
state-owned enterprises were seen to act in accord with Beijing’s strategic goals.  
 
Malcolm Turnbull’s successor also supported careful selection and restriction of Chinese investment. 
Shortly after becoming the new leader of the Liberal Party in December 2009, Tony Abbott said a more 
stringent national interest test needed to be applied when considering foreign investments. In response 
to a question about his finance spokesman Barnaby Joyce’s warning about doing business with 
government-owned entities, Abbott said, ‘We think that there are some concerns when that investment is 
by state-owned enterprises, whether they be Chinese or any other country… In the end, what you’ve 
always got to do is to apply a national interest test. That’s been our position in the past, it is our position 
now and it will be our position in the future’ (Kelly December 11, 2009). 
 
These remarks were made when Tony Abbott was forced to restate the coalition’s support for Chinese 
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investment in Australia after the Opposition coalition’s finance spokesperson Barnaby Joyce, the 
National senator from Queensland and a strong critic of Chinese ownership of resource projects, called 
for a ban on Chinese government investment. As a Queenslander, Joyce also opposed Chinese 
investment in Australian coal mines and said it was ‘in the long-term interest of our nation that the 
Chinese government doesn’t own our coal’. Joyce appeared in two television commercials screened in 
the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and Queensland to warn against foreigners buying the source of 
Australians’ wealth (Coorey March 17, 2009). The advertisements came as the Treasurer extended the 
review period by a further 90 days to scrutinise the Chinalco bid. 
 
Like the Labour government, the Opposition coalition chose not to adopt an explicit stance on the 
question and preferred to maintain a degree of ambivalence. Asked about Joyce’s remarks, Abbott said 
the coalition welcomed foreign investment: ‘it certainly is not and never has been coalition’s policy to 
oppose Chinese investment in Australia… everyone understands that they’ve got to support the team 
position’ (Kelly December 11, 2009). However, its thinly disguised fear of Chinese government 
investment was hard to conceal.
81
 After becoming the new Opposition finance spokesman in December 
2009, Barnaby Joyce stepped outside the coalition’s line by calling for an outright ban on investment by 
Chinese state-owned companies in Australia’s resources sector. Joyce warned that, although he 
welcomed foreign investment by private companies, investment in sovereign resources by 
government-owned businesses turned corporate disputes into diplomatic disputes (Uren December 11, 
2009). Joyce said he was amazed at the acceptance of Chinese investment after China’s arrest of Rio 
Tinto representative Stern Hu (Uren December 11, 2009). 
 
Barnaby Joyce was joined by South Australian independent senator Nick Xenophon in the campaign to 
block Chinalco’s bid, and attack on the Labour government for selling Australia’s strategic assets to the 
Chinese government. In the same TV advertisement with Joyce, Xenophon likened the Chinalco-Rio deal 
to selling the resources to the Chinese government:  
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taking an even more opposing and restrictive position on Chinese government investment (U.S. Embassy Canberra 
June 5, 2009). 
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This isn't about stopping a takeover by a foreign company; this is about a takeover by a foreign 
government. As a nation, we must protect our key strategic resources. This deal is not in the 
national interest. You sell the milk, not the cow, and we should be selling the minerals and not 
the mine. (Pepper May 9, 2009) 
 
The Greens took a particularly right-wing nationalist slant, declaring that the Chinalco-Rio deal should be 
blocked on the grounds that the ‘communist bosses in Beijing will exert control’ over mining operations in 
Australia. Green senator Bob Brown launched a vocal campaign against the Chinalco bid, saying ‘it is 
hazardous for our open and democratic nation to have the Beijing dictatorship… take control of these 
companies and our resources’ (Perry February 18, 2009). Brown continued, ‘This nation should not vest 
power over its future resource management in the hands of the brutally repressive Beijing bosses’ (Perry 
February 18, 2009). He also extended his concern to China Investment Corporation (CIC) by claiming 
that ‘there is a real danger of Chinalco's bid to control Rio Tinto today extending to the CIC's control over 
roads, public transport or privatised water corporations in Australia tomorrow’ (Perry February 18, 2009). 
 
3.4.3 Reaction from Local Politicians and Governments 
By contrast, the state government and politicians on the whole were more receptive than the federal 
government and politicians to Chinese investment because of the tangible benefits that flowed from 
Chinese capital. For instance, like Western Australia, Queensland relied heavily on mineral exports and 
was a big host state for Chinalco. Queensland State Premier Anna Bligh urged the national government 
to approve the Chinalco deal to save mining jobs. She said prior to election, ‘I think that the proposal 
between Chinalco and Rio Tinto is absolutely vital to the strength of the Queensland economy’ (Kerr & 
Parnell February 18, 2009; Murphy February 19, 2009). Her Liberal National Party opponent had been 
non-committal on the issue. When Wusteel’s iron ore joint venture in the Woomera Prohibited Area was 
turned down by the Defence Department for national security concerns, South Australian Premier Mike 
Rann was reportedly seeking to reverse the decision. South Australian Mineral Resources Development 
Minister Paul Holloway reportedly wanted the Federal Government to clarify foreign investment 
conditions for mines in the Woomera Prohibited Area and said the project could have been a major 
economic contribution to South Australia (ABC September 24, 2009). 
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3.4.4 Business Lobbies and Interest Groups 
On the question of Chinese investment, Australia’s business lobbies and interest groups from the mining 
and related industries were divided into two camps. The pro-China group included some Australian 
mining companies that looked upon Chinese capital and markets and those corporate advisers providing 
legal services to their Chinese customers seeking to invest in Australia. For instance, mining gurus such 
as Clive Palmer once criticised the government’s handling of Chinese investment applications for being 
‘opaque and racist’ (Garvey May 30, 2011). Some medium and small Australian resource companies 
were not against Chinese investment because they were keen to cultivate business ties with the Chinese 
companies and government. During the global financial and economic crises when debt pressure was 
high and widespread, Chinese capital injection and sales contracts were deemed most favourably in 
terms of improving cash flow, repaying debt and helping business and mining operations grow and 
expand. Business connections with China would enhance their long-term growth prospects and help the 
smaller and emerging players survive and compete with the dominant major miners. The Chinese 
favoured deepening partnerships with these smaller players in the Australian resources sector. This was 
because the growth of the emerging miners would ultimately undermine the dominant market power of 
Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton. However, these emerging major players and those who possessed huge and 
good-quality resource assets, were only looking to use Chinese capital and markets for further business 
expansion and profit growth; they were not willing to be acquired, absorbed, controlled or eliminated by 
Chinese business interests, regardless of whether they were private or state-owned enterprises. 
 
Established dominant minerals producers such as Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton by contrast showed a much 
less positive attitude towards the inflow of Chinese investment in the Australian resource sector. China’s 
resource acquisition strategy was developing into a head-on confrontation with the strategic interests of 
these leading mining companies, who sought to preserve their privileged market position and dominant 
power. The established mining giants would do whatever it took to prevent Chinese mining interests from 
taking root in Australia and emerging as their strategic competitors, which the Chinese were capable of 
doing if unchecked. BHP Billiton in particular was hostile to major Chinese investment in Australia’s 
minerals sector. This was most notably illustrated by BHP’s fierce and determined propaganda offensive 
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and political campaigns against Chinese investment in general, and the proposed Chinalco-Rio Tinto 
deal of 2009 in particular, as revealed by WikiLeaks. According to the leaked U.S. diplomatic cables, BHP 
Billiton’s senior executives had talked in private to government and national political leaders (including 
the Prime Minister and the Treasurer) to lobby against the Chinalco-Rio Tinto deal; and the company had 
also sent China-bashing emails to all senior cabinet officials and bureaucrats of all relevant government 
agencies talking about the ‘China Inc.’ stuff. 
 
Rio Tinto shareholders’ strong opposition to Chinalco’s 2009 acquisition and strategic partnership offer 
represented a similar underlying hostility towards Chinese government capital and potential Chinese 
control. Some of Rio’s Australian shareholders slammed the deal for handing too much control to China 
and were deeply concerned about Chinalco becoming involved in running Rio because it was an arm of 
the Chinese government, a customer and a competitor. 
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3.5 Tightening Up Foreign Investment Policy Restrictions on 
Chinese Resource Investment Since 2008 
In 2008 the Labour government introduced a series of amendments to the Australian Foreign Investment 
Policy (Policy). Particularly important was the evolving stance the Policy took towards investment by 
foreign governments. Insofar as the expressed policy stance towards foreign government investment 
was concerned, the Labour government insisted that Australia had a liberal foreign investment regime 
that welcomed all foreign investment; that the changes were intended to clarify and enhance 
transparency; that they were the principles and practice that had been consistently adopted by 
successive Australian governments; that the case-by-case review mechanism was the right approach to 
maximise investment flows while protecting Australia’s national interest; and that the guidelines were 
non-discriminatory and were applied equally to investments by all foreign government entities as they did 
not target or restrict investment from any particular country. 
 
Despite government claims indicating otherwise, it was understood that ‘the particular country’ was 
unequivocally identified as China, who was the largest source of recent government investment in 
Australia. The successive changes that had been put in place were primarily triggered off by the inflow of 
Chinese government investment since 2007-08. The timings of the policy decisions closely corresponded 
to major developments in Chinese resource investment in Australia. Most of the measures introduced 
were designed to prevent Chinese state-owned or -controlled corporations from taking technical control 
of the Australian businesses, obtaining significant industry influence (e.g., over pricing, output and sales 
of specific mineral resources as consumers) or establishing dominant market positions in Australia’s 
resources sector. Enhancement of transparency was the professed policy objective, but greater policy 
transparency about what were essentially policy restrictions were also intended to deter further 
significant investment from the Chinese government and its related entities.  
 
The evolving content of the compulsory notification requirements and national interest considerations 
since 2008 was apparently directed at the characteristics of China’s government-related resource 
investment in Australia, and reflected the preferred investment approach adopted by Chinese 
government investors. Analysis of the specifics of these rules suggest that the Australian government 
was deeply concerned about the sheer size (often involving multi-billion deals) of large-scale inflows of 
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Chinese sovereign investment in the Australian resources sector, as well as the strategic investment 
behaviour of the Chinese investors in terms of the objectives (the quest for a controlling stake or a 
substantial interest) and the choice of target company (major minerals producers and mining companies) 
and resource assets (e.g., iron ore) of their proposed investment.  
 
3.5.1 2008 
In response to the surge in foreign investment by Chinese government enterprises in the resources   
sector, against a backdrop of growing media attention on the matter, on 17 February 2008 the Treasurer 
announced six principles the government would consider in determining whether investments by foreign 
governments and their agencies were consistent with Australia’s national interest: 
 
1. An investor's operations are independent from the relevant foreign government; 
2. An investor is subject to and adheres to the law and observes common standards of business 
behaviour; 
3. An investment may hinder competition or lead to undue concentration or control in the industry 
or sectors concerned;  
4. An investment may impact on Australian Government revenue or other policies;82 
5. An investment may impact on Australia's national security; and 
6. An investment may impact on the operations and directions of an Australian business, as well 
as its contribution to the Australian economy and broader community. (Swan February 17, 
2008) 
 
In accordance with the six guidelines, the government would conduct a national interest test on a 
case-by-case basis by considering the extent to which the prospective foreign investor ‘operates at arm’s 
length from the government’ (Swan February 17, 2008). It would also examine the corporate governance 
practices of foreign government investors and consider whether the investor’s governance arrangements 
‘could facilitate actual or potential control by a foreign government (including through the investor’s 
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 For example, direct export of coal to the investor’s refineries or power stations could lead to a loss of income tax 
revenue for Australia. 
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funding arrangements)’ (Swan February 17, 2008). Proposals by SOEs that operated on a ‘transparent 
and commercial basis’ and had been ‘subject to adequate and transparent regulation and supervision’ 
would be less likely to raise national interest concerns (Swan February 17, 2008). However, investments 
that would impact on Australia’s ability to protect its strategic and security interests, hinder competition or 
impact on Australian revenue policies would be closely scrutinised. The government would also examine 
the extent of Australian participation in the ownership, control and management of the company after 
being acquired by the foreign investor, including the interests of employees, creditors and other 
stakeholders.
83
 
 
When releasing the guidelines, Australian Treasurer Wayne Swan stated that ‘proposed investments by 
foreign governments and their agencies (state-owned enterprises and sovereign wealth funds) are 
assessed on the same basis as private sector proposals. National interest implications are determined on 
a case-by-case basis’ (Swan February 17, 2008). However, Swan emphasised that: 
 
…the fact that these investors are owned or controlled by a foreign government raises additional 
factors that must also be examined. This reflects the fact that investors with links to foreign 
governments may not operate solely in accordance with normal commercial considerations and 
may instead pursue broader political or strategic objectives that could be contrary to Australia's 
national interest. (Swan February 17, 2008) 
 
Although Swan claimed that these guidelines only aimed to improve the transparency of foreign 
investment screening process, it was clear that they were primarily aimed at the rapidly growing Chinese 
government investment in Australia’s resources sector. In a speech to the Australia-China Business 
Council in July 2008, the Treasurer revealed that in the nine months following the 2007 Federal Election, 
the value of applications for proposed investment from mainland China had reached almost AU$30 billion 
(Swan July 4, 2008). That amount was three times the value for approved investment proposals in the 
                                                        
83
 The six principles of national interest considerations appeared as an attachment (A) entitled ‘Guidelines for Foreign 
Government Investment Proposals’ in the ‘Summary of Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy’ released in April 2008 
and in the ‘Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy’ released in September 2009, until the substantial revision of the 
Policy in 2010. 
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fiscal years 2005-06 and 2006-07 combined, which amounted to less than AU$10 billion (Swan July 4, 
2008). Given the role of the state in Chinese businesses, these applications invariably originated from 
China’s government-owned or -supported enterprises. The Treasurer stated in his speech that foreign 
government investment guidelines were released with the aim of maintaining a market-based system in 
which companies were responsive to shareholders and in which investment and sales decisions were 
driven by market forces rather than external strategic or political considerations. In that July speech, the 
Treasurer further stressed that the ‘key differences for investments associated with foreign governments 
concern independence, commerciality, corporate governance, and business behaviour’ (Swan July 4, 
2008). 
 
While differentiating between investments in existing productive firms with developed resources and 
undeveloped greenfield projects in the resources sector, Swan indicated that proposals to control the 
existing producing firms owning developed resource assets would be closely scrutinised by the 
government. In particular, Swan emphasised the government's predisposition to ‘more carefully consider 
proposals by consumers to control existing producing firms’: 
 
In particular, Australian governments – now as in the past – are particularly attentive when the 
proposed investor in an Australian resource is also the buyer of that resource or linked with the 
buyer of the resource. Our predisposition is to more carefully consider proposals by 
consumers to control existing producing firms… We usually welcome and encourage some 
participation by the buyer, because that offers the buyer some security of supply and the seller 
some stability in the market. But we need to ensure that investment is consistent with 
Australia's aim of ensuring that decisions continue to be driven by commercial considerations 
and that Australia remains a reliable supplier in the future to all current and potential trading 
partners… [I]t follows that as the proposed participation by a consumer of the resource 
increases to the point of control over pricing and production, and especially where the 
resource in question is already developed and forms a major part of the total resource, or 
where the market disciplines applying to public companies are absent, I will look more 
carefully at whether the proposal is in Australia's national interest. (Swan July 4, 2008) 
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The Treasurer denied that the government had changed its policy to a more restrictive stance or slowed 
down the processing of Chinese applications: ‘I have approved a Chinese investment proposal on 
average once every nine days since coming into office. This is certainly not a slowing pace’ (Swan July 4, 
2008). However the Treasurer acknowledged that some Chinese proposals involving ‘large or complex 
cases’ had required more time than the general 30-day time limit. Swan noted that in such cases, ‘for 
commercial reasons, most proponents prefer to withdraw and resubmit, rather than having their bid 
become known publicly through the gazettal of a formal interim order’ (Swan July 4, 2008). 
 
Defending the screening regime, the Treasurer claimed that the approval timelines had been very 
reasonable in view of the complexity and substantially increased volume of Chinese investment 
proposals. Swan insisted that the regime was ‘open, in the national interest’ and ‘takes into account our 
responsibilities to be a reliable supplier to many different customers, and ensure the maximum 
development of our resource base, and a fair return for the Australian people’ (Swan July 4, 2008). The 
Treasurer asserted that the current case-by-case approach was preferable to formal foreign investment 
rules adopted by previous Australian governments in response to the issues of resource consumers 
investing in resource producers in the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
3.5.2 2009 
In February 2009, the Treasurer announced his intention to amend the Foreign Acquisitions and 
Takeovers Act (FATA) in response to the growing use of more complex investment structures (Swan 
February 12, 2009). The ministerial statement suggested that in the light of the growing use of more 
complex investment structures, in particular instruments such as convertible notes, the government was 
seeking to broaden the operation of the FATA to require compulsory notification of foreign investment 
proposals, where there was a possibility that the type of arrangement being used would deliver influence 
or control over an Australian business – whether currently or at some time in the future. The decision was 
taken largely in response to the use of complex instruments in the proposed Chinalco-Rio deal. Such 
structures and arrangements potentially would allow ownership and control events to arise in a variety of 
ways other than through the traditional acquisition of shares and exercise of voting power, that is, in ways 
which were not envisaged when the FATA was originally drafted. 
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The Australian government was concerned that various modern transaction structures and financing 
arrangements did not fall within the scope of the FATA. The proposed amendments differed from the 
previous regime whereby only foreign investment proposals actually exhibiting such an effect (as 
opposed to potentially) were notified. The proposed amendments were intended to capture those 
complex investment structures which might provide avenues of control beyond the traditional means 
through shares or voting power, and to ensure that the Treasurer’s powers would apply equally to all 
foreign investments irrespective of the way they were structured. The amended FATA could extend the 
mandatory notification and screening process to a greater range of foreign investment transaction 
structures. In particular, equity-like financing arrangements and instruments such as convertible notes, 
warrants and other types of grant of equity options would be treated as equity for the purposes of the Act. 
On 20 August 2009, the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Amendment Bill 2009 was introduced into 
Parliament.
84
 The amendments effectively widened the scope of mandatory notification and screening. 
 
The amendments also broadened the definition of ‘substantial interest’ through the introduction of the 
notion of 'potential voting power'. The relevant amendments took a forward-looking approach by requiring 
statutory notification of acquisitions of ‘potential voting power’ of 15 percent. Potential voting power was 
the notional maximum number of votes that might be cast at a general meeting of the corporation in 
question, including all votes that might be cast as a result of the exercise of a right (whether exercisable 
presently or in future, and whether on fulfilment of a condition or not). Under the previous FATA, a 
convertible note would generally only result in a substantial interest if it was converted; but under the 
FATA amendments, the issue of a convertible note might, of itself, be an acquisition of a substantial 
interest. This meant that the FATA would require notification where a foreign person proposes to acquire 
convertible notes or options over unissued shares which would confer 15 percent or more of the votes in 
an Australian corporation following the notional conversion or exercise of those instruments. 
 
Indirect foreign investment in Australian assets via foreign-to-foreign acquisition by a foreign person 
investing in a foreign entity holding those (Australian) assets would be subject to compulsory notification 
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 The Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Amendment Bill 2009 received Royal Assent on 12 February 2010, and 
applied retrospectively from the date of the Treasurer’s announcement. 
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under the revised FATA if the transaction would result in acquisition of a substantial interest in that 
Australian business. Notification would be mandatory under those circumstances if the foreign person 
wished to protect themselves from the prospect of the Treasurer reversing the transaction on national 
interest grounds. The practical implications of this change were significant. One key outcome was that a 
foreign company and its officers might theoretically be criminally liable if they pursued an acquisition of 
15 percent of another foreign company that had Australian assets or Australian subsidiaries of sufficient 
value to trigger the requirements of the FATA without first notifying the Treasurer. 
 
In September 2009, the guidelines were the subject of further comment by a senior public official. The 
comment, albeit undocumented, provided a rare insight into the FIRB’s decision-making process (Yeates, 
Garnaut September 25, 2009). Speaking to the Australia-China Business Council in Sydney, Patrick 
Colmer, the General Manager and executive member of the FIRB, reportedly expressed the view that the 
government had placed a cap on the maximum aggregate foreign government ownership in Australian 
resource assets: 
 
What we prefer to see is … various sorts of cooperative or partnership arrangements. In the 
resources industries and where there is significant government ownership, our Government has 
expressed a preference for projects which are joint projects in various forms, and in particular 
we are much more comfortable when we see investments which are below 50 percent for 
greenfields projects and around 15 percent for major producers. (Colmer September 24, 2009) 
 
Colmer also suggested that FIRB’s preference was for the Australian companies to remain listed. 
However, he qualified his statement by adding that the FIRB would remain flexible and consider deals 
made outside Policy parameters and on a case-by-case basis. Colmer also highlighted FIRB’s 
willingness to work with foreign investors in the early stage of their proposal and encouraged foreign 
investors to hold discussions with the FIRB prior to a transaction being announced. 
 
This was not the first time that Colmer had revealed the Australian government’s regulatory preference 
for small stake investment by foreign government investors. At the Senate Standing Committee on 
Economics inquiry into foreign government investment on 22 June 2009, Colmer stressed that 
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investment proposals were examined on a case-by-case basis; however, he noted that FIRB's 
preference was for small stakes in large Australian resource producers and partnership or joint venture 
type arrangements of up to 50 percent in smaller companies (Philips & Malone 2009). 
 
In his December speech to the Global Foundation at the end of 2009, the Treasurer commented that 
there had been some consistent themes emerging as to how the government considered a foreign 
investment proposal: 
 
One – that we carefully consider cases were a proposed investor is also a buyer of the 
resource – in particular, where the proposal involves potential control over pricing and 
production; 
Two – that foreign investment in a resources company must enable Australia to remain a 
reliable supplier in the future to all current and potential trading partners; 
And three – that business transparency and shareholder discipline is important in promoting 
and maintaining sound business practices. Essentially, that we prefer to see major companies 
maintain their listing on stock exchanges. (Swan December 10, 2009) 
 
3.5.3 2010 
On June 30 2010, the Australian government released a substantially revised version of its Foreign 
Investment Policy, which provided greater specific detail about how it would administer foreign 
investment into Australia (FIRB January 2012). The purported aim was to clarify and provide more 
certainty as to when foreign governments and their related entities must notify the government about a 
proposed investment. When it was introduced, the new Policy was widely perceived as an attempt by the 
government to tighten its control over Chinese investment. It basically formalised a number of practices 
the FIRB had adopted since 2008, and updated principles contained in policy attachments and 
pronounced in various policy statements and key policy speeches over that period, particularly in 
response to significant foreign investment into Australia's resources sector by Chinese state-owned 
enterprises. 
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There were three major changes to the Policy that had direct implications for Chinese investment in the 
resources sector. First and foremost there was a refinement of the national test. The new Policy replaced 
the six principles contained in the ‘Guidelines for Foreign Government Investment Proposals’ attachment 
with five ‘New National Interest Considerations’, which would apply to all foreign investments and not just 
investments by foreign governments. The five National Interest Considerations were: 
 
i. National Security 
ii. Competition 
iii. Other Australian Government Policies (including tax) 
iv. Impact on the Economy and Community 
v. Character of the Investor (FIRB January 2012) 
 
The five National Interest Considerations basically re-framed the six guidelines and raised concerns 
about continuing Chinese government investment. For instance, a particular concern of the new Policy 
was ‘the extent to which an investment may allow an investor to control the global supply of a product or 
service’. This was exactly the same concern that had previously been underscored in the Treasurer’s 
July speech in 2008 (Swan July 4, 2008). The emphasis that ‘the investment should also be consistent 
with the government’s aim of ensuring that Australia remains a reliable supplier to all customers in the 
future’ was also emphasised in the Treasurer’s 2008 July speech, and reflected the ongoing concern 
about China gaining control of products in the resources sector (Swan July 4, 2008). 
 
Nonetheless, the five National Interest Considerations introduced a more stringent approach to the 
screening process. For example, competition issues would still be assessed by the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), but the FIRB must also assess whether a proposed 
investment involved ‘a customer of a product gaining control over an existing Australian producer of the 
product, particularly if it involves a significant producer’, and whether it would have an impact on the 
‘make-up of the relevant global industry, particularly where concentration could lead to distortions to 
competitive market outcomes’ (FIRB January 2012). The changes reflected the government’s concern 
that acquisitions by foreign investors must not cause issues in the export market, such as one country 
cornering the market in certain minerals. As to the ‘impact on economy and the community consideration’, 
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in addition to the concerns described in the old Policy, the FIRB would also consider the extent to which 
the investor would develop the project and ensure a ‘fair return for the Australian people’ (FIRB January 
2012). 
 
The issue of foreign government investment was singled out and given separate treatment in the new 
Policy under the section ‘Foreign Governments and Their Related Entities’ (FIRB January 2012). Under 
the new Policy, where a proposal involved a foreign government or a related entity, the government 
would consider: 
 
…if the investment is commercial in nature or if the investor may be pursuing broader political or 
strategic objectives that may be contrary to Australia’s national interest. This includes assessing 
whether the prospective investor’s governance arrangements could facilitate actual or potential 
control by a foreign government (including through the investor’s funding arrangements). 
Proposals from foreign government entities operating on a fully arms length and commercial 
basis are less likely to raise national interest concerns than proposals from those that do not. 
Where the potential investor has been partly privatised, the government considers the size, 
nature and composition of any non-government interests, including any restrictions on the 
exercise of their rights as interest holders. The Government looks carefully at proposals from 
foreign government entities that are not operating on a fully arms length and commercial basis. 
The Government does not have a policy of prohibiting such investments but it looks at the 
overall proposal carefully to determine whether such investments may be contrary to the 
national interest. (FIRB January 2012) 
 
The document contains much more detailed and specific elaboration of the relevant treatment of 
government investors in comparison with what was provided in the old Guidelines for Foreign 
Government Investment Proposal (FIRB January 2012; Swan February 17, 2008). The changes 
introduced a more stringent regulatory approach to handling Chinese government investment in the 
resources sector. Insofar as government investment in a major Australian resource company was 
concerned, only if the investment was truly passive with no control elements attached (in particular the 
right to appoint a director), would it be deemed acceptable by the Australian authorities. 
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The new Policy also expressly set out a range of mitigating factors designed to help determine whether 
proposed investments were compatible with national interest. These factors, which were not mentioned 
in the previous Policy, included: 
 
i. The existence of external partners or shareholders in the investment;  
ii. The level of non-associated ownership interests;  
iii. The governance arrangements for the investment; 
iv. Ongoing arrangements to protect Australian interests from non-commercial dealings; and  
v. Whether the target will be, or remain, listed on the ASX (Australian Securities Exchange) 
or another recognised exchange. (FIRB January 2012) 
 
3.5.4 Typical Case Scenarios of Selective Restriction on Chinese 
Investment 
Although the Australian government tightened the foreign investment regime against Chinese investment, 
instances of formal rejection were rare. Indeed, approval was granted for the overwhelming majority of 
proposed Chinese deals in the resources sector. Between the 2007 and 2010 financial years, the 
Australian government approved over AU$400 billion of proposed foreign investment into Australia; over 
AU$70 billion of this total was from China and channelled through more than 280 individual transactions 
(Handley 2011). There were 230 investment approvals for Chinese investment from November 2007 to 
mid-2011, only six with conditions attached; and there had been no rejections over this period (Larum 
June 24, 2011; Larum, 2011). Despite tightening of the screening process, actual Chinese direct 
investment still increased threefold since 2009; in 2010, China was the sixth-largest source of new 
investment to Australia; and Australia remained China’s number one direct foreign investment destination, 
aside from Hong Kong (Larum June 24, 2011). 
 
In fact, the various ‘caps’ were not applied rigidly and there were instances where approval was given to 
proposed investments seeking a controlling stake. Notable examples include: Sinosteel Corporation’s 
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takeover offer for 100 percent of Midwest Corporation in 2008,
85
 Yanzhou Coal’s full takeover bid for 
Felix Resources in 2009,
86
 China Minmetals’ takeover offer for 100 percent of OZ Minerals in 2009,
87
 
Zijin Mining’s offer to acquire 100 percent of Indophil Resources in 2009,
88
 PetroChina’s acquisition of 
100 percent of Arrow Energy through a 50/50 joint venture with Shell Energy Holdings in 2010,
89
 and 
Hunan Non-ferrous Metals’ buyout of Abra Mining in 2011, following its first acquisition of a 70 percent 
shareholding interest in Ara Mining in 2008.
90
 
 
Other cases where formal approval was granted to proposed Chinese investment acquiring a majority 
interest in a target Australian business include: China Petrochemical’s (Sinopec) acquisition of a 60 
percent joint venture interest in the assets held by AED Oil in 2008 (the first ever Chinese acquisition of 
oilfield in Australia);
91
 Shagang Group’s (Shasteel) acquisition of 73.9 percent of Grange Resources in 
2008;
92
 China Uranium Development Company’s A$100 million bid for 70 percent of emerging Australian 
uranium company Energy Metals (EME) in 2009 (the first ever Chinese acquisition of uranium mine in 
Australia);
93
 Shenzhen Zhongjin Lingnan Nonfemet’s acquisition of 50.1 percent of Perilya Limited (PEM) 
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through share placement in 2009;
94
 and China Metallurgical Group (MCC)’s acquisition of majority 
shareholding in Cape Lambert Iron Ore in 2008.
95
 All of these transactions proceeded smoothly with 
FIRB approval. 
 
There were also cases where acquisitions of more than 15 percent stake in major producers went ahead 
without raising official objections from the FIRB or the Treasury. For example, Baosteel’s proposed 
acquisition of 15 percent stake in Australia’s fourth largest iron ore producer Aquila was granted in 2009; 
the transaction rendered Baosteel the second largest shareholder of Aquila. Approval was also given to 
Baosteel by the FIRB to subsequently raise its maximum shareholding in Aquila to 19.9 percent. Other 
examples include Hunan Valin Iron & Steel Group’s purchase through share placement of 17.34 percent 
stake in Fortescue Metals Group (FMG) in 2009 (which rendered Valin the second largest shareholder of 
FMG),
96
 and Anshan Iron & Steel Group (Ansteel)’s acquisition of an additional 23.68 percent 
shareholding through share placement in Gindalbie Metals in 2009 (which resulted in total ownership of 
36.28 percent of Gindalbie share capital and rendered Ansteel Gindalbie’s biggest shareholder).
97
 
 
These examples show that the Australian government was not prohibiting Chinese investment in 
resources altogether. Thus, it is important to keep accusations of ‘Australian discrimination’ against 
Chinese resource investment in perspective. However, this data and specific cases may not necessarily 
provide an appropriate benchmark against which the Australian government’s true attitude towards 
Chinese (government) investment in the resources sector should be measured. These approved cases 
only reflect the specific circumstances of the individual investment proposal. It is true that the national 
interest test was being conducted with a degree of flexibility and discretion for each individual case; but it 
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was also an established fact that significant restrictions had been imposed on Chinese investment by the 
Australian federal government. 
 
The Labour government was sensitive to the charge of investment protectionism. That Australia could 
never afford to shield its economy from foreign investment was a bipartisan policy upheld by successive 
governments, and its significance was very well understood by the Labour government. Indeed, the 
government had taken a rather cautious approach towards the screening of Chinese government 
investment in the resources sector. Rather than trying to insulate the resources sector from Chinese 
capital, the Australian government’s approach was to strategically restrict Chinese government 
investment, by allowing the needed and the beneficial to come in while fending off or limiting those that 
were deemed suspicious and detrimental to Australian interests. 
 
Potential Applications Being Deterred 
In practice, very few proposals were formally rejected by the Treasurer. What the figures do not and 
cannot show, however, is the number of Chinese investment proposals which had been ‘deterred’ by the 
stringent foreign investment rules. For instance, some Chinese investors saw the 15/50 caps as an 
unacceptable line in the sand and accordingly gave up the idea of investing in Australia. On the face of it, 
that the formal rejection rate was low seemed to suggest that the investment review process was not 
particularly restrictive. However, the data does not really allow us to make a fully informed assessment, 
mainly because we do not know how many investment interests were not submitted for review, which 
would otherwise have flowed into Australia if they had not been discouraged by the prevailing investment 
regime. 
 
Informal Rejections and Withdrawal of Applications during Early Consultation 
There have reportedly been a large number of cases where the Chinese investors opted to withdraw their 
investment proposals after being explicitly told by the FIRB that their proposals were likely to be 
considered contrary to the national interest, and therefore unlikely to be approved by the government 
(Economic and Commercial Section June 22, 2011). This often took place during the initial informal 
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consultation phase, even before the Chinese investors formally submitted their investment proposals to 
the FIRB. The FIRB always advised prospective foreign investors to initiate informal dialogue with them 
regarding their investment proposals before the formal submission of their investment applications. A 
large number of Chinese investment proposals had reportedly been discouraged and withdrawn at this 
stage.  
 
According to official Chinese government sources, during the period from November 2007 to January 
2011, 53 Chinese government investors withdrew their investment proposals prior to a formal decision 
being made by the Australian government;
98
 Chinese investors made up more than a quarter of all the 
investors that had withdrawn their investment applications. According to other sources, 521 out of a total 
of 8548 applications had been withdrawn during the 2007-2008 period alone (FIRB 2009). This 
proportion seemed significant compared with the 0.1 percent formal rejection rate. These figures, 
however, cannot be verified. 
 
Withdrawal after Formal Submission of Applications 
There were also Chinese investment proposals that had been withdrawn after investment applications 
were formally submitted. In that way, the investment proposals were also effectively blocked without 
having been formally rejected. The Chinese investors were given feedback on their proposals from FIRB 
or Treasury officials during the formal review process and were advised to make the necessary revisions 
and re-submit their proposals. Under those circumstances, it was not rare for an applicant to withdraw its 
proposal after receiving government advice that the acceptance of the proposal would be subject to 
stringent conditions that were unacceptable to the investor. There were also cases where applicants had 
made repeated efforts to meet the requirements of the authorities by revising the original investment 
application in accordance with the official recommendations received and re-submitting the revised 
proposals as instructed by the FIRB, but still opted to withdraw in the end after the FIRB repeatedly 
raised the bar and imposed even more stringent conditions which were deemed contrary to the original 
investment purposes. China Nonferrous’ failed acquisition of Lynas Corporation in September 2009 was 
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a typical example in this regard (Li October 23, 2009; Garnaut October 15, 2009; Yi November 15, 2010). 
 
Deferred Government Decision 
The Australian authorities would postpone their review decision in cases involving certain large and 
complex investment projects, which would require more time to review and assess the investment 
proposals than the normal 30-day time frame allowed. However, when dealing with politically thorny and 
diplomatically sensitive investment proposals, especially when an outright rejection might be 
diplomatically inconvenient or politically contentious (e.g., inviting allegations of investment/resource 
protectionism), the Australian government would also arbitrarily choose to postpone its decision rather 
than immediately reject the application altogether
99
 (Garnaut May 21, 2009; Murphy & Garnaut June 5, 
2009; Freed June 5, 2009). In that scenario, some Chinese investors would prefer to withdraw their 
applications.  
 
However, some more determined investors would resist government pressure to significantly revise the 
investment proposals by insisting on the original investment plans and refusing to make any substantial 
compromises. Under those circumstances, the government would continue to withhold the formal 
decision and issue an ‘interim order’ accordingly. This would usually lead to two outcomes: either the 
applicants were left with no other options but to withdraw their applications eventually, or the proposed 
transactions lapsed or were shot down by the changing business circumstances as a result of the 
postponement. The most notable case in this regard was Chinalco’s failed attempt to forge a strategic 
partnership with Rio Tinto in 2009.
100
 It was reported that repeated delays in foreign investment 
approvals by the federal government were causing ‘significant and damaging misconceptions’ in Beijing; 
and according to investment lawyers, some of their Chinese clients were dropping their investment 
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applications believing they were unwelcome. It was widely believed amongst the Chinese that the 
approval delays revealed the true position of the Australian government, contrary to public assurances by 
senior ministers and the Prime Minister (Garnaut April 29, 2008). 
 
Rejections by the Defence Department for National Security Concerns 
There were a few Chinese government investment bids that were blocked not by the FIRB or the 
Treasurer, but by Australia’s national security establishment, most notably the intelligence agencies and 
the Department of Defence. Proposed investment projects might cover defence-sensitive mining areas 
and require the necessary security clearance. Under such circumstances, the FIRB and the Treasury 
would always require the investment applicant to secure an approval from those security agencies (in 
practice, only the Department of Defence would directly deal with the investors) before beginning to 
review such investment proposals. If the Department of Defence rejected the investment project for 
national security reasons, that would save the FIRB or the Treasury the trouble of turning the application 
down by itself if the proposed investment was deemed contrary to national interest. Sometimes the FIRB 
would still give the green light to the proposed investment but only under the condition that the 
defence-sensitive mining area must be abandoned and excluded from the investment package. 
Nevertheless, rejections by the Department of Defence were not included in the number of rejected 
cases officially registered on the FIRB’s record (La Canna September 23, 2009; Murchpy September 24, 
2009; Faulkner September 23, 2009; Burke May 4, 2011). 
 
Compromised Investment Proposals 
The FIRB figures tell us very little about how many approved investment proposals were deliberately 
structured in a way to reduce the risk of rejection. Some investors would take the initiative to structure 
their investment in accordance with some of those ‘mitigating factors’ in order to facilitate their clearance 
through the review process and enhance the approval prospects for their investment applications. Those 
investment applications were designed to meet the various requirements as set out by the Policy and 
would otherwise have taken on a significantly different structure if there had not been such stringent 
regulatory restrictions imposed. The more experienced investors would have known the Australian 
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government’s regulatory preferences and understood that any ambitious strategic investment 
applications would be bound to come under the very close scrutiny of the foreign investment authorities, 
and would likely fail the national interest test.  
 
Many of the joint ventures between the Chinese steel mills and the Australian resource companies for 
iron ore projects were conspicuous examples in this regard. Most of the iron ore exploration and 
development joint ventures established since 2007 had followed Patrick Colmer’s ‘50/50’ rule. Because 
the risk of FIRB/Treasury objection remained their biggest concern, the increasingly risk-averse Chinese 
steel mills had scaled down their ambitions by voluntarily avoiding going over the 50 percent limit (on 
Chinese ownership). In such joint ventures, both the Chinese and the Australian parties would structure 
their investments in accordance with the rule by dividing the ownership of the joint business into equal 
partnerships. The Chinese investors caution not to exceed the 50 percent bottom line, lest the entire deal 
be rejected by the Australian authorities, may well have been the reason for the rather frequent 
occurrence of the 50 percent cap placed on Chinese ownership. Indeed, this seemed to follow a similar 
pattern (not least across most of the major iron ore joint ventures) as observed after 2007, since the 
preferences of the Australian government had become clearer and better understood.  
 
For instance, in the Wusteel-WPG deal, executive director of Western Plains, Heath Roberts, reportedly 
said the transaction was deliberately structured to allow for the constraints of foreign ownership within the 
Woomera Prohibited Area. In response to the Defence Department’s decision to reject the proposed joint 
venture with the Chinese partner, the WPG executive director emphasised that the proposed deal 
deserved a better outcome and ‘ought to have been considered differently’ because the proposal allowed 
the ‘Chinese group WISCO (Wuhan Iron and Steel Corporation) (to) acquire 50 percent only of the 
project’ and ‘had some critical checks and balances to see that the Defence's interests weren't 
jeopardised’ (ABC September 24, 2009). Wusteel had also forged joint ventures on the 50/50 basis with 
Centrex Metals (CMX) to develop the Eyre Peninsula project in 2008 and entered into an agreement with 
CMX to jointly build the iron ore Sheep Hill Port and Spencer Port in 2009 and 2012 respectively. Ansteel 
established a 50/50 joint venture in 2007 with Gindalbie Metals to develop the Karara project in the 
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Mid-West region in Western Australia.
101
 Baosteel in 2007 signed a 50/50 joint venture agreement with 
Fortescue Metals Group to jointly develop FMG’s iron ore mines in the Pilbara region in Western 
Australia.
102
 The main point is that the scale of Chinese investment in these cases had arguably been 
reduced by the self-restrained approach adopted by Chinese investors as a result of the restrictive 
foreign investment Policy. The extent of this voluntary scaling-back on the part of the Chinese investors is 
hardly quantifiable. 
 
Conditional Approvals 
Government interventions to restrict Chinese investment and prevent Chinese control also took the form 
of the imposition of compulsory conditions on individual investment proposals. A number of the 
investment approvals were subject to stringent conditions on ownership requirements and corporate 
governance practice that reflected specific national interest concerns and aimed to limit Chinese control 
over Australian businesses. In such cases, Chinese investors were forced to accept strict conditions 
imposed by the foreign investment authorities by altering their investment plans accordingly in order to 
secure government approval. Such cases of conditional approvals were not rare. Indeed, some corporate 
advisors hired by Chinese investors observed that imposing undertakings on Chinese SOEs had in fact 
become the rule, rather than the exception under the Labour government.
103
 However, the number of 
such conditional approvals was not fully disclosed by the relevant Australian authorities. 
 
There have been a number of notable cases of conditionality in relation to the approval of Chinese 
investment transactions in recent years. The flexible application of stringent self-restrictive conditionality 
was generally aimed to address the following two broadly defined concerns: whether the Chinese SOEs 
sought control over the Australian business and/or intended to act in an organised way with one another 
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and with downstream users of commodities to distort the market for those commodities; and whether the 
application possessed any national security or strategic implications, such as the above-mentioned 
Wusteel-WPG deal and the Minmetals-OZ Minerals deal, etc, (Swan July 9, 2010). Instances of 
conditionality reflecting industry and competition concerns were much more common (Swan August 24, 
2008; Sherry October 23, 2009; Swan March 31, 2009; Swan April 23, 2009). Government rulings in this 
regard tended to address such issues ranging from corporate structure to conflict of interests concerns. 
Some were imposed to prevent Chinese investors from ‘colluding’ with each other and with the 
downstream users of commodities in China to distort the market at the expense of the Australian 
businesses. Others were designed to forestall ‘Sinolisation’ of Australian businesses. 
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3.6 Chinese Misgivings about Australian Discrimination 
Chinese investors and government officials were deeply sceptical about the Australian government’s 
assertion that it was genuinely welcoming to Chinese investment.
104
 In fact, they had serious concerns 
about perceived Australian discrimination against Chinese investment. The successive adjustments in 
Australia’s foreign investment policy, such as the six guidelines on foreign government-related 
investment introduced in early 2008, were widely regarded as discriminatory against the Chinese.
105
 
Their practical impact demonstrated beyond doubt who those measures were aimed at (Larum June 24, 
2011). The Chinese government recognised Australian concerns about excessive foreign control of 
Australian resources by any single country; but it also expected its Australian counterparts to recognise 
the fact that China already possessed a market economy and Chinese SOEs were independent market 
entities, many of whom were publicly listed companies not only at home but globally.
106
 This theme was 
repeatedly emphasised by Chinese officials in response to the question of Chinese SOE investment.  
 
In fact, Chinese government officials were sceptical of foreign concerns about the government 
background of Chinese investment. According to Li Rongrong, the Chairman of the SASAC, the issue 
was used as an excuse to block or restrict Chinese foreign direct investment. Li also attributed foreign 
scepticism to prejudice against Chinese SOEs and ignorance about their development needs and their 
corporate structure (Ye July 6, 2009). Chinese business leaders were very vocal in their criticism of the 
Australian government’s approach. For instance, at a lunch hosted by the Australian ambassador Geoff 
Raby in April 2011, several Chinese executives reportedly told the visiting Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, of 
their concerns about the FIRB, labour laws, environmental regulations, and various approval processes. 
Shen Heting, chairman of China Metallurgical Construction, put his criticisms on record. None mentioned 
the carbon or resource rent taxes to Gillard as they were focused on more pressing things. In May 2009, 
Luo Tao, chairman of China Nonferrous Metals, complained of ‘biases against Chinese investors’ 
(Garnaut May 31, 2011). 
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The Chinese side felt that the Australian government was not forthcoming in its communication of any 
foreign investment policy changes to the Chinese government and investors, who were often left in the 
dark about Australia’s foreign investment policy adjustments when they were announced;
107
 and 
investors were often left clueless about the Australian government’s preferences and official attitude 
towards major Chinese investment applications during the review and approval process. For instance, 
the Chinese government had grave misgivings about the failure on the part of the Australian government 
to communicate to the Chinese the six guidelines on foreign government-related investors, which were 
taken by the Chinese government as new arrangements specifically targeted at Chinese investors 
despite Australian claims otherwise. These guidelines were introduced without any prior notification, let 
alone any consultation with the Chinese government, which was the largest stakeholder and yet was 
taken by surprise by the big policy move.
108
  
 
Nor did the Chinese believe that the Australian federal government had been an innocent bystander, as 
was claimed by the Labour government amidst a number of failed high-profile Chinese investment 
cases.
109
 Most notably, few Chinese believed that the Rudd government had been a neutral party during 
the breakdown of the Chinalco-Rio deal, and the subsequent merger between the iron ore businesses of 
Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton. Although the Australian government asserted that it did not have a hand in the 
process and the outcomes were solely the business decisions of the firms, the Chinese could hardly 
accept this claim. The Chinese government even suspected the Australian government of deliberately 
disclosing details of Chinese investment proposals and acquisition bids to the press for the purpose of 
instigating public debate and setting off media sensationalism against Chinese investment, so that 
Canberra could discourage and/or delay the proposed Chinese investment on the pretext of political 
pressure and public resistance towards the Chinese investment deal.
110
 The Chinese government 
reportedly preferred to be dealt with in private and was furious with the Australian government and media 
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 According to Duncan Calder, the Western Australian president of the Australia China Business Council, once the 
deal became public, it became difficult for the (Australian) government to respond; if issues had been negotiated 
discreetly beforehand, less of the overall bilateral relationship would have been exposed and thus placed at risk 
(Callick June 6, 2009). 
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when debates over major Chinese investments, such as the Chinalco-Rio deal, played out in public 
arena and greatly compromised the prospects of Chinese investments in Australia (Callick & Sainsbury 
October 27, 2009). 
 
A sense of suspicion was pervasive in the Chinese discussions around Australian discrimination towards 
Chinese resource investment since 2009. The Chinese discourse mainly arose in the context of 
discussions about the political difficulties facing China’s outbound resource-related investment. There 
were few thorough studies in China of the issue of Australian discrimination against Chinese (resource) 
investment. However, numerous media commentaries had been made on the issue by business 
journalists, investment experts and scholars. Notably, the high-profile Chinalco-Rio investment deal in 
2009 generated a lot of reflective discussions focused on the Chinese investment experience in Australia, 
and the important lessons drawn from the case for China’s overseas (resource) investment. The 
Chinalco case was seen as a typical example illustrating the investment dynamics and political 
environment for Chinese investors in Australia. 
 
Foreign academic literature on Chinese perceptions of Australian discrimination against Chinese 
investment is also rare; but numerous journalistic accounts are available of this sentiment in the 
Australian media (Garnaut April 29, 2008; Korporaal July 2, 2008; Garnaut May 31, 2011; Larum June 24, 
2011). The findings of some business reports produced by Australian investment lawyers and accounting 
firms testified to this sentiment amongst the Chinese. The Australian government’s approach to Chinese 
investment was also labelled by some corporate lawyers as ‘opaque and guess work’. John Larum’s 
report offered a rather thorough account and systematic summary of Chinese perceptions of Australian 
discrimination, based on extensive interviews in Australia and Beijing in early 2011 (Larum, 2011). 
 
Larum’s study suggested that the Chinese regarded Australia as an attractive investment destination. 
However, many Chinese investors believed that Australia was a more difficult place to invest in compared 
with other countries. Chinese investors and officials believed that the FIRB and the Australian 
government in general discriminated against China, particularly with regard to ownership restrictions for 
natural resource investment. Larum noted that the Australian government’s approval process for foreign 
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investment was overwhelming the focus of Chinese complaints. He went on to say that investments in 
other sectors were generally uncontroversial, with the exception of agricultural land (Larum, 2011). 
 
The report underlined a number of points which Larum’s interviewees raised when asked about evidence 
for discrimination. In general the evidence they provided dealt with the following five issues. First, 
developments in Australian foreign investment regulatory rules since 2008 were perceived by the 
Chinese as new and directed against Chinese investor/investment. Undocumented policy guidelines on 
foreign government ownership caps, such as Patrick Colmers’ ‘informal’ yet targeted comments in 2009 
about acceptable levels of foreign government ownership in equity (15 percent) and greenfield (50 
percent) investment, were perceived as targeted at Chinese investors. Despite the FIRB’s denial of policy 
change, this sensitive policy deliberation was generally interpreted by Chinese investors and officials, 
alike, as a major policy change in the foreign investment regime. Second, the report noted that the 
Chinese felt that the FIRB review process was not effectively managed. Proposals made by Chinese 
government investors were subject to excessive scrutiny by the Australian authorities whereby the review 
process was slow, inefficient, uncertain, and opaque. Third, the failure of a number of huge and highly 
publicised Chinese investment proposals also reinforced the perceived unwelcoming attitude of 
Australians towards Chinese investment. Larum’s report highlighted the three high-profile cases that 
were deemed most notable in this regard. These were the Chinalco-Rio Tinto deal, the China 
Nonferrous-Lynas deal and the Minmetals-OZ Minerals deal, respectively. In the view of many Chinese 
investors and officials, the failures or problems encountered by Chinese investors in these cases would 
not have arisen for a non-Chinese investor. Fourth, according to the Chinese investors and officials 
interviewed, the Australian media played a negative role in scaremongering around Chinese FDI into 
Australia. This negative media attention was seen as influencing popular opinion and government policy 
by demonising Chinese investment and government. Finally, Chinese suspicion of the Labour 
government’s discriminatory foreign investment policy received some empirical support in the form of the 
WikiLeaks report of a cable from the U.S. Embassy in Canberra. The leaked diplomatic cable relayed 
comments made by a senior FIRB official (Patrick Colmer) that the additional measures were ‘aimed 
squarely’ at China (Dorling March 3, 2011). 
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3.6.1 Chinese Distrust of Australian Policy Intention 
As to the motivations behind Australian discrimination against Chinese investment, Larum’s report 
suggested that Chinese investors and officials gave no consistent response, although there were some 
recurring and overlapping themes, such as: Australian protectionism/nationalism; suspicion of China 
because it is a communist country; concerns about Chinese state ownership of Australia’s resources 
(especially when both an owner and customer); subsidised Chinese state financing (via Chinese banks); 
concerns about China’s growing economic strength; and related to that, Australia playing a part in a 
U.S.-led strategy to contain China (Larum, 2011).  
 
The Chinese discussions that emerged since 2009 also suggested a wide array of Chinese opinions 
about the causes of Australian discrimination. The Chinese had some rather heated discussions about 
the collapse of the Chinalco-Rio deal; many of the Chinese post-mortems on the failed deal were very 
revealing in this regard. The problem of Chinese foreign direct investors’ government background 
constitutes a potentially sensitive topic.
111
 Nevertheless, many Chinese observers acknowledged that it 
had become a significant barrier for outbound Chinese investment and resource acquisition abroad. 
Zhang Guangrong, an expert on China’s resource-related outbound direct investment from the Chinese 
Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC) affiliated with the Commerce 
Ministry, recognised the growing anxiety of many host governments about the national security 
implications of state-owned (or sovereign) foreign investors. Zhang’s work, which was one of the most 
thorough studies of China’s outbound foreign direct investment in the resources sector, suggested that 
state-ownership and government background of the Chinese investors were thought to have been an 
important factor contributing to Western scepticism (Zhang, 2010: 125). Reflecting on the failure of the 
Chinalco deal, Chen Daofu and Su Yang believed that China’s overseas resource investment would 
inevitably face foreign resistance given the government background and state-ownership of Chinese 
investors. As both authors were from the Development Research Centre of the State Council, their 
analysis reportedly provided a revealing insight into the official views of the Chinese government (Chen & 
Su, 2010a, 2010b). Xing Houyuan, who was a prominent scholar on Chinese overseas investment and 
headed the Research Centre of China’s Overseas Investment at the CAITEC, suggested that one major 
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reason for the setbacks in the overseas acquisition attempts by some of China’s national SOEs in the 
West, was that their investment had been subjected to strong political interference as their government 
identity and state-ownership were called into question and deeply resisted by the Western host countries, 
which by and large were welcoming Chinese investment in government bonds only, but not their resource 
assets or most-valued core companies (Gong June 15, 2009). 
 
However, a closer look at the Chinese sources suggests that many Chinese had serious doubts as to 
whether the government background of (Chinese) sovereign investors was the true or the most 
significant source of Australian concern. What seemed to have had the most sway over Chinese elites 
were in fact other political considerations. Many believed that it was not so much about the growing 
anxiety over state-ownership of foreign investors per se as other political factors. They rejected the 
concern over government investors, claiming that it was merely a pretext for other politically-motivated 
reasons to limit Chinese investment in Australia.
112
 This entrenched perception was suggestive of the 
deep distrust of Australian attitude towards Chinese investment. 
 
For instance, some Chinese scholars and officials were receptive to the idea that the real source of 
resistance to Chinese investment was Australia’s growing resource nationalism. Hou Minyue, who was a 
leading Chinese scholar of China-Australia relations, argued that the government background of Chinese 
SOEs was merely the most ostensible reason for Australian concerns; the real source of the country’s 
anxiety was strong economic nationalism that had been surging in Australia in the face of overwhelming 
Chinese resource investment. According to his interpretation of the events, Australian concerns about the 
government background of Chinese investors were nothing more than a superficial phenomenon, if not a 
convenient excuse used by the Australians to block or restrict Chinese capital in the resources sector. In 
Hou’s opinion, the real problem for the Australians was not so much the state-ownership or government 
identity of the Chinese investors, as resource security-related economic nationalist anxiety in response to 
the surging Chinese resource investment in the country (Hou, 2010). 
 
Others were inclined to view the anti-Chinese sentiment and partisan politics as the most fundamental 
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factor, believing that investment discrimination was consistent with the perceived broader unfriendliness 
towards and ‘demonisation’ of China by the Australian media and politicians. Guo Chunmei, an analyst of 
Australia-China relations based at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), 
emphasised the constraints on domestic politics faced by the Australian policymakers in dealing with 
Chinese investment. Guo argued that Kevin Rudd was in a difficult position on the question of Chinese 
investment as he was very much tied down by partisan politics on the question of Chinese investment for 
fear of being attacked by political opponents for being pro-China, or being labelled by the media as too 
soft on the investment issue vis-à-vis the Chinese. Guo noted that Kevin Rudd was susceptible to the 
sway of growing anti-Chinese popular and political sentiment in Australia, to which Rudd’s policy on 
Chinese investment had been held hostage (Ma June 11, 2009; Ifeng TV June 25, 2010).  
 
Mei Xinyu, who was a research fellow of the CAITEC and an active media commentator, also had 
significant misgivings about the adverse impact of Australia’s anti-China partisan politics on Chinese 
investment. As to the specific example of the Chinalco case, Mei unequivocally argued that the deal was 
killed essentially by political considerations that led to deliberate delays in the government review 
process that allowed Rio to wait for the markets to recover, and help set Rio on its feet again accordingly 
(Cai July 10, 2009; Cai & Chen & An June 11, 2009; Ma June 11, 2009). Mei believed that the Australian 
opposition parties were keen to demonise China and to play up the fear of the Chinese threat, thereby 
forcing Rudd to distance himself from China in the face of extreme anti-Chinese political sentiment. The 
decision to extend the review process for the Chinalco deal, the initial rejection of the Minmetals-OZ 
Minerals deal on national security grounds, and the strict conditions imposed on Valin’s acquisition of 
interests in FMG, all testified to Rudd’s attempt to dissociate his government from playing into Chinese 
interests (Mei June 8, 2009; Mei June 7, 2009). 
 
Indeed, many Chinese believed that Australian discrimination stemmed from hostility towards China, as 
some sections of Australia’s ruling elite still adopted a Cold War mentality and perceived China’s rise as a 
threat in all respects.
113
 There were also views that attributed Australian discrimination to political bias 
against a communist country/regime on ideological grounds. Some Chinese voices even drew great 
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attention to the geo-strategic factors, by suggesting that the U.S. factor had come into play and Australia 
was just playing a part in a U.S.-led strategy to contain China by blocking and restricting Chinese 
investment. For example, Mei Xinyu asserted that the involvement of ‘external forces’ – presumably the 
United States – had further complicated the issue: had Australia been able to make an independent 
choice without the American influence, the controversy over Chinese investment would not have 
escalated into such a serious political issue. Mei blamed China’s hurdle on the Americans and the 
pro-U.S. elements in Australia who were fanning the flames of anti-Chinese sentiment and seeking to 
lock Australia into America’s orbit in containing China. Whilst recognising that the government identity of 
the Chinese SOEs had become an easy target for Westerners hostile to Chinese capital and constituting 
a topic vulnerable to media sensationalisation, Mei Xinyu expressed his doubts concerning the motives 
behind foreign scepticism about the identity of Chinese SOE investors. He suggested that it was nothing 
but a convenient excuse for attacking and blocking Chinese investment, whatever the real reasons might 
be. According to Mei’s observation, even if the Chinese investors had no government background, 
Western governments would still use other excuses to limit Chinese investment. Mei argued that 
Australian hostility towards Chinese government investment fundamentally derived from an identity 
barrier, given the growing conflict between Australia’s Anglo-Saxon Western identity and its irresistible 
and deepening economic integration with East Asia (Mei June 8, 2009; Mei June 7, 2009). 
 
Some Chinese scholars suggested that China’s overseas resource-related direct investment in Western 
developed countries often encountered investment barriers that took legislative forms and allowed the 
foreign investment authorities to exercise significant discretionary power to block and restrict foreign 
investment into certain economic sectors. They suggested national security concerns were the most 
common forms of political resistance against Chinese resource investment from the host governments in 
developed countries (Zhang, 2010: 114-120). However, some held the view that national security 
concerns would not have arisen in the first place if the investment had come from other Western 
countries instead. There was also a common perception that in some investment cases national security 
concerns had been used as a pretext for protectionist purposes. For instance, Zhang Guangrong noted 
that resource security was not the only or even the most important source of national security concern; in 
fact, national security concerns were used as a pretext for investment protectionism, and that there were 
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some circles in these Western countries that still held distorted views about China under the sway of the 
Cold War mentality (Zhang, 2010: 115). 
 
Some Chinese commentators even suggested anti-Chinese racism as the source of Australian 
discrimination against Chinese investors. He Liangliang, who was a senior commentator with Phoenix TV, 
aired his grievances in an article for the Hong Kong-based newspaper Wen Hui Bao, denouncing racial 
discrimination faced by Chinese investment in Australia following the collapse of the Chinalco deal (He 
June 10, 2009). According to He’s understanding of the event, Chinalco had fallen victim to the mentality 
of ‘White Australia’ that had worked against the deal. Furious at the Australians getting so paranoid about 
Chinese investment, He warned that the future prospects of Australia’s economic partnership with China 
would be marred if the Australian government succumbed to (racist anti-Chinese) public opinions and 
acted based on unfounded allegations of sinister Chinese intentions. 
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3.7 Chinese Adaptation to Investment Predicament 
3.7.1 Inter-governmental and Public Diplomacy 
The issue of Australian discrimination against Chinese government investors had become a major 
agenda in the bilateral inter-governmental dealings. The Chinese government was eager to break down 
Australia’s regulatory barriers for Chinese investment via economic diplomacy. They had repeatedly 
urged the Australian government to remove the discriminatory policy measures against China’s SOEs 
and not to make an issue of the government background/state-ownership of Chinese investment 
entities.
114
 China’s policymakers and officials would use every opportunity to press their Australian 
counterparts to treat Chinese investors fairly and make the approval process more transparent, efficient 
and fair.
115
 Access for Chinese investment was also a key agenda for discussion during senior- and 
summit-level talks. Behind-the-scene economic diplomacy was also under way at the bilateral free trade 
negotiation.
116
 Beijing made a great fuss about the investment entry issue and was pressing Canberra to 
grant greater investment access for Chinese state-owned enterprises to Australia’s resources sector 
(Larum, 2011). 
 
Much of the inter-governmental dealings took place behind closed doors. However, Chinese officials 
were also keen to defend Chinese SOE investment and dispel foreign concerns about Chinese SOE 
investors in the public arena. Chinese diplomats in Australia actively engaged in public diplomacy, 
lobbying the Australian government for Chinese investment. Since 2008, the Chinese ambassador to 
Australia, Zhang Junsai, had repeatedly made public pleas to Australian society to accept and welcome 
Chinese investment (Korporaal July 2, 2008; Xinhua April 3, 2009; Zhang April 3, 2009). 
 
In an exclusive interview with The Australian, the ambassador called on the Rudd government to adopt 
‘an attitude of welcome’ to Chinese companies investing in Australia, ‘not the other way around’ 
(Korporaal July 2, 2008). He said some Chinese companies were ‘puzzled’ by some of the difficulties in 
investing in Australia. He continued that he hoped that these were ‘technical difficulties’ that could be 
resolved by discussions between the two governments (Korporaal July 2, 2008). The ambassador 
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asserted that trade and investment should be a two-way street, and Chinese companies should be 
allowed to invest without discrimination.  
 
The ambassador defended Chinese investors by claiming that Chinese SOEs would operate 
independently from the Chinese government. He reassured the Australians that China’s resource 
investment in Australia did not seek to control Australia’s resource, and was not politically motivated or 
orchestrated by the Chinese government (although he admitted that the Chinese were concerned about 
a potential monopoly in the international iron ore market). The ambassador also pointed out that the total 
stock value of Chinese investment in Australia remained rather modest, whether in terms of investment 
growth or compared to cumulative investments of other countries in Australia (Korporaal July 2, 2008; 
Xinhua April 3, 2009; Zhang April 3, 2009). 
 
However, the reassurance provided by Chinese officials and diplomats hardly dispelled Australian 
suspicion of China’s investment intentions. The Australians found the abrupt surge in Chinese sovereign 
resource investment in Australia since 2008-09 too unusual to be taken as a normal market phenomenon, 
and could hardly accept the claim that the Chinese government had stayed clear of this process. In the 
face of aggressive Chinese investment behaviour, Australia’s growing wariness of Chinese penetration 
into the country’s most critical economic sector was not unreasonable. Arguably, at the core of Australian 
distrust were Chinese investment intentions and the government background of Chinese investors. 
 
3.7.2 Adjustments in Chinese Investment Behaviour 
Chinese investors also endeavoured to change their investment strategy in order to reduce the risks of 
rejection by the Australian authorities. Efforts were made to take into account the Australian 
government’s concerns over Chinese control, the mitigating factors set out by the FIRB and the lessons 
of failed Chinese investment attempts. Chinese ambitions were significantly set back after experiencing 
great disappointments and frustrations in Australia during the difficult years of 2008 and 2009 (Gao, 
2013). Thereafter, Chinese investors appeared to have become more self-restrained and less ambitious. 
Adjustments were made with respect to the forms of cooperation, the scale of investment and the choice 
of investment targets. For instance, by aiming for lower shareholding, imposing voluntary caps on 
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Chinese ownership in greenfield joint ventures, and avoiding seeking controlling or substantial stakes in 
major resource producers. The FIRB Annual Report 2009-2010 revealed a significant fall in the average 
deal size for Chinese investment approvals (FIRB 2010). Many Chinese investors also recognised that 
they could achieve their primary objectives (for example, through financial returns from rising commodity 
prices and securing ore supply contracts) without taking a ‘controlling’ stake or seeking to be the 
dominant equity holder.
117
 The Chinese government and state-owned companies actually had no option 
but to come to terms with Australia’s tough foreign investment review regime. 
 
Chinese investors also considered various alternative investment platforms and channels to reduce risks. 
Some Chinese financial investors turned to private equity (PE) funds and other collective investment 
vehicles (Larum, 2011). This was seen as a way to avoid negative media coverage, while still allowing 
their primary financial objectives to be achieved. As a way to ‘denationalise’ Chinese capital, other less 
direct investment means were also pursued, such as the use of U.S.- or Hong Kong-domiciled Chinese 
companies (SOE and private) as the special-purpose investment vehicles. Another channel was for a 
Chinese company to acquire a controlling stake in a small Australian company, which was then used as a 
vehicle to acquire stakes in a much larger Australian company. Perceived Australian hostility to Chinese 
equity ownership was also leading to more joint venture arrangements between the Chinese and 
Australian businesses, such as those iron ore joint ventures established by the Chinese steel mills and 
Australian mining companies in recent years. 
 
3.7.3 Greater Role for Private Chinese Investors? 
Many Chinese scholars advocated for the Chinese government to allow and encourage private Chinese 
investors to play a greater role in overseas resource acquisition. Having recognised the difficulties 
created by Chinese investors’ government background, they urged greater state support for private 
Chinese businesses pursuing investment opportunities abroad. By de-politicising Chinese investment 
and de-nationalising China’s overseas resource strategies, they hoped that it would reduce the 
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nationalist sentiment against Chinese capital and reduce anxiety in the host country (Zhang, 2010: 121, 
125, 202, 207; Chen & Su, 2010a, 2010b; Gong June 15, 2009). However, the nature of China’s 
domestic politico-economic institution appeared to be rather restrictive in this regard. 
 
Although instances of private Chinese investment in overseas resource sectors were increasing over the 
years, private Chinese investors remained marginal players in resource-related investment ventures 
abroad. Amongst the private Chinese investors that invested abroad, only a handful had undertaken 
foreign acquisitions; and amongst those with experience in overseas acquisitions, few had ventured into 
the resources sector (Zhang, 2010: 206). A notable example of successful private resource investment 
was the acquisition of a 90 percent stake in Savage River by Shasteel, which was then China’s largest 
private steel producer.
118
 The US$108 million transaction, which was made in September 2007, was the 
biggest overseas acquisition deal made by a private Chinese investor in the resources sector (Zhang, 
2010: 206). Nonetheless, this was the exception rather than the rule. Overall, private Chinese businesses 
lacked the financial strength to compete with the state-owned companies in the overseas resource 
investment spree.
119
 
 
In fact, China’s resource-related industries were dominated by state-owned or state-controlled 
companies. Private companies lacked a supportive market and policy environment to prosper and 
expand. In addition, they rarely had the chance to compete on an equal basis with the well-protected 
state companies. Most of these private companies neither had the financial prowess nor the political 
connections to raise the necessarily huge capital from the banks or the government to undertake risky 
overseas investment ventures, such as those in the resources sector. This domestic reality dictated that 
in practice the majority of China’s transnational resource investors had to be powerful, mega-sized 
state-owned companies.  
 
Despite their increasing interest in transnational resource investment, private companies by and large 
received no significant support from the government in this regard. Arguably, they had never been in 
favour with the government insofar as transnational resource investment was concerned. Private 
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businesses were discriminated against at home under the state-centred economic system.
120
 Whilst 
Chinese SOEs had much easier access to government funding and bank credit, it was virtually 
impossible for private companies to obtain state sponsorship for transnational resource investment 
undertakings. The Chinese government was unwilling to provide financing guarantee to help indigenous 
private businesses obtain loans from state-owned commercial banks to carry out resource investment 
abroad. Strict restrictions imposed by foreign exchange authorities remained in place on the amount of 
loan guarantees the domestic parent company was able to provide to its overseas subsidiary; the 
overseas branches of the Chinese banks were also prohibited from lending loans to private Chinese 
companies operating abroad (Zhang, 2010: 206). Under these rather prohibitive financial circumstances, 
the ability of China’s private companies to raise funds for resource investment abroad was extremely 
limited. In practice, the Chinese government on the whole remained mistrustful of private capital and was 
not in favour of the idea of letting private entities play a major role in transnational resource investment.  
 
Given the above politico-economic realities, a shift towards a more enhanced role for private capital in 
China’s overseas resource investment undertakings was likely to encounter tremendous difficulties under 
the current state-dominated economic system. The opinion of Mei Xinyu, a Chinese scholar with statist 
leanings, provides a revealing insight into the prevalence of statist thinking. Firmly against any 
suggestions about a diminished role of the state in overseas resource acquisition, Mei claimed that the 
SOEs (especially those national SOEs) were legitimately tasked with strategic missions in the functioning 
and development of the Chinese economy and were duly charged with acquiring overseas resources for 
the nation; China must adhere unswervingly to the basic institution of her state-led political economic 
structure and not bow to pressure from the West. Mei warned that if China yielded to foreign pressure by 
altering the fundamental structure of the Chinese economic institutions in accordance with foreign 
preferences, China would lose her economic sovereignty (Mei June 8, 2009; Mei June 7, 2009). 
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3.8 Conclusion 
Given her large resource endowment, Australia was a major destination for China’s outbound 
resource-related investment. The global financial crisis provided Chinese capital with a rare opportunity 
to prey on Australia’s resource assets. Chinese SOEs were able to carry out intensive investment and 
acquisition projects with decisive policy and funding support from the state. To a large extent, many of the 
SOE investors were state agents playing an important role in China’s overseas resource acquisition 
strategy. In particular, the country’s resource acquisition mission was entrusted to a group of selected 
national SOEs. These national champions were instrumental in executing the state-led mission, and 
were at the forefront of the scramble for Australian resources. China’s aggressive investment and 
acquisition spree was targeted at some of Australia’s most valuable resource assets. This strategic 
investment pattern was suggestive of a mercantilist agenda on the part of the Chinese government 
investors. The powerful national SOEs were eyeing not only reliable long-term resource supplies but also 
a more structural control of Australia’s major resource assets, in an attempt to build up China’s own 
market influence in the global resource supply chain. The scale and intensity of the Chinese investment 
spree, together with the calculated nature of some of the most significant investment bids as exemplified 
by the Chinalco-Rio Tinto deal, were indicative of China’s thirst for resource power.  
 
Having said that, a more nuanced appreciation of the complexity of SOE identity and behaviour does not 
warrant a simplistic view of the role of the Chinese government investors in the resource scramble. Their 
evolving institutional links with the Chinese government, as well as the market imperatives for business 
expansion, internationalisation and vertical integration, all have to be taken into consideration when 
attempting to understand their motivations for investing in overseas resource projects. When looking at 
the Australian theatre, one has to recognise the degree of pluralism and fragmentation amongst the 
Chinese investors on the ground, which all too often could be neglected and overshadowed by the 
overwhelming perception of ‘China Inc.’ Arguably, those elements of pluralism and fragmentation could 
create difficulties for China’s own strategic deliberations in the quest for resource assets in Australia. 
Nonetheless, the mercantilist drive underpinning China’s state-sponsored scramble for Australian 
resources was hard to ignore. 
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Australia’s anxiety about Chinese government investment led the Australian government to tighten its 
foreign investment regime against foreign government-related investment starting in 2008. The policy 
shift was in effect primarily targeted at the Chinese SOE investors, whose investments constituted the 
majority of Australia’s foreign government-related investment. Australia’s policy response was a 
bipartisan political reaction against Chinese penetration of Australia’s vital economic sector. The 
implementation of the stringent national interest test and additional scrutiny for government-related 
investment reflected Australian distrust of the government background of Chinese investment entities 
and their investment intentions.  
 
The pace of policy updates and adjustments was suggestive of a deep sense of wariness on the 
Australian side. In particular, the Australians were most worried that the close relationship between the 
Chinese SOE investors and the Chinese government might enable China to gain a distinct advantage in 
the bilateral resource politics at Australia’s expense. If uncontrolled, the rapid expansion of Chinese 
presence and influence in the resources sector might fundamentally undermine Australia’s existing 
power position and market advantage as a dominant resource supplier; since Chinese control of major 
Australian resource assets might jeopardise Australia’s dominance over resource pricing and production, 
and affect Australia’s ability to be an independent major resource supplier to the world.  
 
The Australian authorities sought to control and limit the Chinese penetration of the Australian resources 
sector. The strict adherence to the case-by-case principle and the specific cases cited in this chapter 
suggested a strategic and selective approach. In other words, the Australian government was not trying 
to impose a complete ban on Chinese SOE investment: Australia could let Chinese government capital in 
but was only willing to forge a limited investment relationship with China (and on Australia’s terms); and 
China should never expect Australia to compromise her core interests and dominant position in resource 
politics by giving China a free hand to take over Australia’s most jealously guarded resource assets. 
 
Australia’s policy response was widely seen as discriminatory by the Chinese government and sovereign 
investors. Chinese investors and government officials alike expressed grave misgivings concerning 
Australia’s policy discrimination against Chinese investment. There was deep mistrust amongst the 
Chinese of Australia’s real attitude towards Chinese investment, despite Australian reassurance and 
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denial of discrimination against Chinese SOEs. The Chinese acknowledged the Australians concern over 
the government background of SOE investors, but there remained a pervasive Chinese distrust of 
Australian motivations for restricting Chinese investment. 
 
From the Chinese perspective, the Australian government’s ambivalence, if not hostility, towards China’s 
government-related investment had considerably strained bilateral relations and undermined China’s 
resource security interest. The issue of Australian discrimination had consequently become a major 
Chinese policy concern and an area where China’s power was tested and her vulnerability exposed. The 
Chinese government and investors tried in vain to persuade the Australian government to loosen 
restrictions on Chinese government-related investment. Chinese investors had no option but to adapt 
and adjust to the increasingly stringent foreign investment regime by restraining their own investment 
ambitions and appetites. Constrained by China’s state dominated economic institution at home, there 
was limited scope for private Chinese investment in the business of overseas resource acquisition for the 
foreseeable future. As a result, China’s mercantilist-driven resource investment and acquisition push into 
Australia was frustrated by Australia’s firm political response. In short, Chinese government investment in 
Australia’s resources sector remained vulnerable to Australian policy restrictions of the foreign 
government investment. 
 
This observation is consistent with the overall argument of this thesis that China has had to cope with her 
vulnerability in her resource politics vis-à-vis Australia despite her growing power. Although the 
resource-hungry Chinese government investors had enormous financial resources to draw upon from a 
mercantilist-minded state apparatus, they had no option but to abide by the strict rules laid down by the 
Australian authorities against foreign government investment. China’s apparent vulnerability in the 
resource investment politics was in stark contrast to the general perception of growing Chinese power 
that was derived from the phenomenal surge of Chinese investment in Australia’s resources sector. 
When it comes to assessing the real power relationship between China and Australia in the specific area 
of resource investment, the reality of Chinese vulnerability is perhaps a more revealing indicator than the 
overwhelming yet to some extent misleading sense of rising Chinese purchasing power that engulfed 
Australia. 
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From a theoretical perspective, it can be said that the powerful Chinese government investors enjoyed a 
distinct advantage at the level of sensitivity interdependence: given the enormous financial support from 
the state, they seemed to have a better bargaining position vis-à-vis the Australian resource companies 
thirsty for capital. As the Australian resource companies could easily fall prey to the Chinese capital, 
Australia’s resource interest was extremely sensitive to the huge impact of the aggressive investment 
and acquisition spree sponsored by the Chinese state. However, this situation was inherently unstable 
because the underlying vulnerability asymmetry was in Australia’s favour. The Australian efforts to limit 
the inflow of Chinese state capital by changing the rules of the game, was an attempt to take advantage 
of the underlying patterns of vulnerability interdependence. Since the Australian authorities had the 
sovereign powers to impose a more stringent policy regime against foreign government investment, the 
Chinese investors were ultimately extremely vulnerable to the ‘discriminatory’ policy of the host 
government. This combined with the fact that China’s politico-economic institution itself was very much 
state-dominated, also rendered China’s outbound resource investment in Australia even more vulnerable 
to the screening regime that discriminated against government-related investment entities. In other words, 
the power position in terms of the patterns of asymmetrical interdependence was ultimately in favour of 
the Australian side in this particular issue, because Australia enjoyed a favourable power position 
deriving from asymmetrical vulnerability interdependence, which dominated the power deriving from 
asymmetrical sensitivity interdependence. The Chinese attempt to take advantage of its superior position 
(derived from state support) on the sensitivity dimension therefore ended in disaster. Surely an 
issue-specific perspective on the relative power relationship is necessary for analysing the power 
struggle here: China’s overall power advantage vis-à-vis Australia could not be translated into a 
favourable outcome in the specific investment issue because the linkage process – whereby stronger 
states could also use their overall power advantage to dominate the outcome of specific issue areas – 
could not work under the condition of complex interdependence. 
 
The political controversy over Chinese investment also displayed the limit to the extent to which the 
bilateral resource investment relationship could develop under a difficult geopolitical context. Given the 
inherent strategic tensions in the bilateral relations, it was extremely difficult to develop mutual trust in the 
bilateral investment relationship. In no small measure, the political hurdles faced by the Chinese 
investors in Australia demonstrated the constraining influence of a strained strategic relationship on the 
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resource investment ties. Arguably, there is a close relationship between the general pattern of Chinese 
resource investment and the strategic dynamics in the broader bilateral relations. China’s investment 
spree roughly began in 2007-08 when the two countries were experiencing a heyday in their bilateral 
relations. As the short-lived Sino-Australian entente of the post-9/11 era quickly came to an end after 
2008, the political and policy environment for Chinese investment in Australia also deteriorated 
accordingly. The rise of the Australian political discourse against Chinese investment and the successive 
tightening of foreign investment regime against Chinese government investment, all corresponded to a 
worsening of the strategic ties between the two countries. Australia’s growing fear of losing economic 
autonomy was closely intertwined with a deepening distrust of the strategic intention of a rising China, 
which had arguably very much shaped the Australian assessment of the economic and security impact of 
Chinese government investment. The revived strategic tensions also transformed the Chinese 
perception of Australia as a favourable destination for China’s outbound resource investment. Chinese 
investment interests had already begun to wane towards the end of the 2000s. Not only did strategic 
tensions contribute to the regulatory barriers and undermined the Chinese perception of Australia as an 
accessible destination for resource investment, but the looming geopolitical uncertainty also posed a 
potential threat to the long-term security of the Chinese-owned resource assets in Australia. From a 
theoretical perspective, this constraining impact of the revived adversarial dynamics in the strategic 
dimension of the bilateral relations was arguably a consequence of realism. According to Keohane and 
Nye, the specific position of a situation on the complex interdependence-realism spectrum constitutes an 
independent variable. The increased strategic tensions in the bilateral relations marked a further shift 
towards the realist end along this continuum. If this theoretical notion has any real world relevance in this 
particular context, it can be said that the constraining effect of the strained strategic relationship on the 
resource investment ties, was a direct result of this movement on the spectrum. 
 
Whilst the politics of resource investment is an important dimension of resource politics, the politics of 
resource trade constitutes another crucial aspect of the power politics over the distribution of gains from 
bilateral resource cooperation. In fact, there is an inherent link between these two aspects of resource 
power politics, not least because China’s aggressive investment spree was in no small measure a direct 
response to the Chinese predicament in the iron ore trade with Australian mining companies. China’s 
entrenched vulnerability in the power struggle over iron ore pricing was costly and taught the Chinese a 
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painful lesson about the importance of gaining control of the upstream resources for the survival of 
downstream resource-dependent industries. In this regard, one has to look at the trade dimension of this 
resource partnership to fully appreciate China’s thirst for market power in Australia’s resources sector. 
The next chapter will discuss in detail this important dimension of the resource politics. 
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Chapter 4 China’s Struggle for Pricing Power in 
the ‘Iron Ore War’ 
4.1 Introduction 
China’s gigantic demand for iron ores resulted in rising prices for imported iron ores from Australia and 
elsewhere. The country had become the world’s largest iron ore importer and consumer during the 2000s, 
and also emerged as Australia’s largest iron ore export destination. Inspired by the growing salience of 
the Chinese market in the global iron ore trade, the Chinese steel industry endeavoured to fight a ‘war’ 
against the dominant Australian mining companies over iron ore import prices, in response to the 
companies’ attempts to raise ore prices. This chapter discusses the power politics of this transnational 
struggle over iron ore pricing between China’s steel makers and the Australian mining companies. By 
analysing how the various Chinese industry actors endeavoured to shape and adapt to the evolving 
power dynamics behind the transnational battle over iron ore pricing power against the dominant 
Australian miners, Chapter 4 seeks to answer the thesis’ research question by addressing one of the 
most significant aspects of China’s resource politics with Australia. 
 
Indeed, like the issue of Chinese resource investment in Australia, the battle for iron ore pricing power 
was one of the major arenas for Sino-Australian resource power politics. The struggle over iron ore 
pricing assumed an even more transnational character than the resource issue, in the sense that it 
involved direct conflicts between the Chinese steel industry and the major Australian (and Brazilian) iron 
ore companies, without the governments being at the front line. Perhaps because of this, the struggle 
over iron ore pricing was very much neglected in the academic literature on the bilateral relations. 
However, both countries had a huge stake in the outcome of this vital transnational struggle. To some 
extent, the issue of resource trade was more reflective of the fundamentals of the resource partnership 
than the investment issue was. This was because the trade relationship constituted the main pillar of the 
resource partnership, whereas resource investment ties remained relatively underdeveloped between 
the two countries. After all, the bulk of the bilateral resource trade was iron ore, best epitomised by 
China’s dependence on Australia for resource supply, which was Australia’s most important and lucrative 
exported commodity to the Chinese market. Because of the immense interests at stake for both countries, 
the iron ore pricing issue was arguably the focal point of the resource interdependence between China 
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and Australia; and the battle for iron ore pricing power became the most intense battle in the bilateral 
power struggle over resource interests.  
 
In fact, even China’s scramble for Australian resource assets was closely related to the Chinese battle 
with the Australian mining giants for iron ore pricing power. As mentioned at the end of the previous 
chapter, there was a strong causal relationship between the battle for iron ore pricing and the struggle 
over Chinese resource investment in Australia. The aggressive Chinese investment spree in Australia 
was in no small measure a direct response to the Chinese predicament in the iron ore trade with the 
dominant Australian mining companies. China’s entrenched vulnerability in the power struggle over iron 
ore pricing was costly and taught the Chinese a harsh lesson about the importance of gaining control of 
the upstream resources for the survival of downstream resource-dependent industries. Although the 
acquisition of Australia’s iron ore assets was not the only target for Chinese investors, large iron ore 
assets were indeed among the most popular targets for Chinese investment and acquisition projects in 
Australia. After all, China’s experience in the iron ore pricing debacle had led the Chinese to believe that 
increased Chinese ownership and control of upstream iron ore resources in Australia could significantly 
enhance Chinese market influence over iron ore pricing and increase downstream steel makers’ ability to 
absorb the costs of surging raw material costs. This market logic was quite a transparent motivation 
behind many of the huge Chinese investment ventures into Australia’s iron ore assets. In a sense, the 
Chinese experience in the transnational struggle over iron ore pricing greatly influenced Chinese 
geo-economic thinking about the mineral resource strategy at both the national and corporate levels. In 
other words, if Chinese resource investment in Australia was ultimately aimed at acquiring a dominant 
market influence centred on the control over resource pricing, then the iron ore pricing issue could be 
regarded as the ‘fuse’ that lit the great controversy over Chinese investment. From this perspective, the 
power politics over Chinese resource investment was essentially a continuation of the power politics over 
iron ore pricing between China and Australia. In order to fully appreciate China’s geo-economic and 
market rationale behind her thirst for Australian resources assets, it is necessary to look deeper into the 
trade dimension of the bilateral resource politics; and the iron ore pricing war is the most relevant starting 
point in this regard.  
 
This chapter begins with a description of the iron ore market background, followed by an account of the 
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strenuous iron ore benchmark price negotiations since China joined the annual benchmark price 
negotiation in 2003. The next section illustrates the disunity within the Chinese steel industry (between 
the state sector and the private sector), and how this undermined Chinese negotiation efforts and power 
position vis-à-vis the mining companies. The fifth section discusses how the Chinese steel industry’s 
grievances led to the politicisation of the iron ore price issue in China and state intervention on economic 
security grounds, albeit not a full-scale one. The sixth section explains why the growing prices of 
imported iron ore became an issue for the Chinese steel industry itself and the market dynamics which 
rendered it an intolerable burden for Chinese steelmakers. The seventh section illustrates some major 
Chinese efforts to reduce China’s dependence on the three dominant iron ore suppliers.  
 
This chapter aims to shed light on the market rationale for the Chinese steel industry’s (especially the 
state-owned sector) growing sensitivity to iron ore price increase, and the process whereby the iron ore 
price issue became politicised in China to emerge as a national economic security agenda. It will cover 
three areas of discussion: the steel industry’s power position vis-à-vis the Australian mining giants in the 
transnational struggle for pricing power; how Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton were able to dominate iron ore 
prices and pricing regime; and Chinese attempts to assert their own influence. These three areas of 
discussion ensure that the analysis is in keeping with some of the research objectives set out in Chapter 
1. More specifically, the chapter contains discussions of the roles and interests of various Chinese actors 
involved in the politics of iron ore pricing, the basic pattern of power relationship between the Chinese 
and Australian actors, and the Chinese and Australian responses in the transnational power struggle. 
 
The main argument of this chapter is consistent with the thesis’ central assertion that China has to 
navigate between vulnerability and power in her resource politics vis-à-vis Australia. The Australian 
mining companies were pushing for a price rise for long-term contract ores in the annual benchmark price 
negotiations with the major iron ore buyers. Since joining the collective price negotiation regime, the 
Chinese iron ore buyers had been striving to bring down benchmark prices and fight for pricing power 
vis-à-vis the dominant iron ore mining companies. This chapter argues that the Chinese steel makers 
remained vulnerable to iron ore price hikes initiated by the Australian (and Brazilian) mining companies in 
the transnational struggle for pricing power. Despite becoming the world’s largest iron ore importing and 
consuming country, China still lacked and failed to acquire market influence over iron ore price, as well as 
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initiate a pricing regime that was commensurable with the country’s overall market status in the global 
iron ore trading business. The Chinese ore buyers had no option but to adapt to the dominant influence of 
the Australian mining companies over iron ore pricing, even while the Chinese steel industry had become 
increasingly sensitive to the growing costs of imported iron ores. 
 
The conflicts over iron ore pricing demonstrate that the bilateral resource partnership was far from 
harmonious and equitable. The outcome of the power politics revolving around the iron ore pricing issue 
was suggestive of the vast disparities in pricing power between the Chinese ore buyers and the 
Australian ore suppliers. Arguably, this unequal power relationship had in effect led to a disproportionate 
distribution of gains from the massive iron ore trading between the Chinese and Australians; and the 
continuation of such inequitable terms of trade was highly suggestive of the true nature of China’s 
resource partnership with Australia. It might not be entirely fair to suggest that Australia had been 
exploiting China in the iron ore business. To some extent, this claim can even seem somewhat 
counter-intuitive, since it is the resource-supplying country that is usually at the receiving end in the 
political economy of dependency theory, not to mention the vast overall power disparities between the 
two countries that remain in China’s favour. Nonetheless, China’s vulnerable situation in the intense 
power struggle over iron ore pricing vis-à-vis the Australian mining companies, as well as the ensuing 
political manoeuvres inside China, do seem to suggest that this resource trading partnership was far from 
a genuinely equitable and reliable one. The analysis of the iron ore pricing war therefore also sheds light 
on the fundamental character of China’s resource relationship with Australia. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the Chinese predicament in the iron ore pricing issue demonstrates the 
Chinese steel industry’s sensitivity and vulnerability vis-à-vis the Australian mining giants in the power 
politics of asymmetrical interdependence. As with the investment politics, the power politics of iron ore 
trade also took place under the condition of complex interdependence. Hence, similar dynamics of 
complex interdependence as seen in the resource investment arena can also be observed in this 
particular arena of resource trade. Under complex interdependence, the linkage process breaks down: 
thanks to the diminishing role of military force and traditional (military) security agendas, stronger states 
are no longer free to resort to a linkage strategy to dominate the outcomes of specific issues. Since the 
more powerful states cannot use their overall power advantage to secure a favourable outcome on a 
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particular issue area, the outcome of that issue is likely to be determined by the patterns of issue-specific 
power relationship rather than the overall power relationship between the states. As a result, the 
issue-structure model is a more relevant explanatory model than the overall structure model for analysing 
the issue-specific power politics under complex interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 42-44). 
 
According to Keohane and Nye, asymmetrical interdependence can be a source of political power; hence, 
the issue-specific power relationship is very much determined by the underlying patterns of asymmetrical 
interdependence. Moreover, since power deriving from asymmetrical vulnerability interdependence tends 
to dominate over power deriving from asymmetrical sensitivity interdependence, the outcome of a 
specific issue under complex interdependence is most likely determined by the patterns of asymmetrical 
vulnerability interdependence between the two opposing sides. The policy implication of this power 
perspective is that states can manipulate the issue-specific asymmetrical interdependence as a policy 
instrument in the power politics of economic interdependence. As the patterns of asymmetrical 
vulnerability interdependence are more important than those of asymmetrical sensitivity interdependence, 
the less vulnerable states in an issue area would try to use asymmetrical vulnerability interdependence 
as a source of power and eventually dominate the outcome in that particular issue area (Keohane & Nye, 
2011: 13-15). 
 
These dynamics of issue-specific power politics under complex interdependence are by and large 
consistent with the patterns of the political struggles over the iron ore pricing issue. The outcome of 
asymmetrical power politics over iron ore pricing was more or less determined by the patterns of 
sensitivity and vulnerability asymmetrical interdependence between the Chinese steel industry and the 
Australian mining giants. The key to understanding the power dynamics behind the iron ore pricing 
struggle is therefore the issue-specific power structure analysis that focuses specifically on the patterns 
of sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence between the Chinese and Australian actors. 
 
Declining earnings performance during the last few years of the 2000s rendered the Chinese steel 
makers increasingly sensitive to the Australian mining companies’ attempts to raise the annual 
benchmark prices for long-term contract iron ore. However, the Chinese steel industry was not only 
sensitive to iron ore price rises but also extremely vulnerable to the Australian pricing initiatives to raise 
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the benchmark prices for long-term contract ores. This was because there were no alternative available 
other than to accept the price increase imposed by the mining companies. In other words, the costs of 
making any effective adjustment to create a viable alternative would be too high under the existing 
market situation and policy framework. It can therefore be said that the Chinese steel industry was 
seriously disadvantaged in terms of both asymmetrical sensitivity interdependence and asymmetrical 
vulnerability interdependence vis-à-vis the dominant Australian iron ore suppliers in the battle for pricing 
power. More precisely, the Australian mining giants had the upper hand in the power struggle over iron 
ore pricing power because they were able to successfully manipulate the asymmetrical sensitivity and 
vulnerability interdependence to maximise their gains from the iron ore trade with China. In the face of 
the Australian mining companies’ pricing initiatives, the Chinese steel industry had no option but to 
accept price increases and adapt to the new short-term index-based pricing regime that was imposed on 
them.  
 
In summary, although China emerged as the biggest importer of Australian iron ores, the Chinese steel 
industry nonetheless succumbed to Australian dominance in each round of the traditional annual 
benchmark price negotiations, since the Chinese steel mills were virtually deprived of any effective 
influence over the price negotiation or the choice of the new pricing regime. The power-oriented analysis 
of the politics of asymmetrical interdependence under complex interdependence theory suggests that the 
Australians ultimately had the upper hand in the transnational power struggle over iron ore pricing. Under 
complex interdependence, China’s overall power advantage vis-à-vis Australia (in both military and 
economic terms) could not be translated into effective bargaining power in the specific issue of iron ore 
pricing. As the patterns of asymmetrical vulnerability were predominantly favourable to the Australians in 
the iron ore pricing issue, the Chinese steel makers remained the weaker party vis-à-vis the Australian 
mining companies, and were essentially denied a fair share of the gains from resource trade with the 
Australians. 
 
Such inequitable terms of trade were also indicative of the true nature of the resource relationship 
between China and Australia within a delicate geo-strategic context. Indeed, the fact that the bilateral 
resource trade ties were far from harmonious and equitable was consistent with the general observations 
about the evolving nature of China’s strategic relationship with Australia. The growing realist dynamics 
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observed in the bilateral strategic relationship marked a further shift towards the realist end on the 
continuum between the ideal types of realism and complex interdependence. The geo-economic 
implication of this movement along the spectrum for the resource trade relationship was that, given the 
increasingly precarious and strained strategic relationship between the two countries, the bilateral 
resource trade ties could hardly develop into a genuinely reliable and fair partnership. The logic of this 
theoretically framed argument, which has been applied in the context of resource investment politics in 
the previous chapter, is also relevant to understanding the relationship between the broader geopolitical 
setting and the politics of trade in this chapter. Since the bilateral resource trading relationship also grew 
out of a complex geopolitical framework, the increased geopolitical tensions in the strategic dimension of 
the bilateral relations must have affected the structure of the political economy of the vital resource trade 
between the two countries. Indeed, although the robust resource trade relationship was much more 
developed than the investment relationship, it was by no means a genuinely equitable and fair 
partnership, as Australia’s dominant mineral suppliers were bent on taking advantage of the vulnerability 
of the Chinese steel industry to maximise short-term profit. In a sense, Chinese vulnerability in the 
transnational struggle for iron ore pricing power was to an extent attributable to international geopolitical 
constraints that stemmed from China’s broader geopolitical interactions with Australia. 
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4.2 Iron Ore Market Background 
The global iron ore market used to be a buyer’s market in the 1980s and 1990s. Since the mid-1990s up 
until the 2000s, the global mining industry witnessed a series of mergers and acquisitions. Vale 
(alternatively known as CVRD), Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton emerged as the three largest iron ore 
producers and exporters, respectively, that dominated the global market (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 53-54). 
The combined total of their iron ore output in 2008 constituted about 33 percent of global output: with 
Vale accounting for 15 percent, Rio Tinto for 10 percent and BHP Billiton for 7 percent. In addition, the 
combined total of their iron ore exports in the same year made up more than 70 percent of the world’s 
iron ore trade; with Vale contributing 33 percent, Rio Tinto 23 percent and BHP Billiton 16 percent (Liu 
March 2, 2011). In other words, the iron ore market was dominated by Australian, and to a lesser extent 
Brazilian, companies. Beginning in the early 2000s, global demand for iron ore rose dramatically, with 
China playing a pivotal role in the process. The consolidation of the iron ore mining industry and the rising 
demand for iron ore, together transformed the iron ore business from a buyer’s market into a seller’s 
market. 
 
During the same period, the centre of gravity for the global iron ore business shifted from the European 
market to East Asia. This was marked by the rise of China in the global iron ore trade. During the 2000s, 
China became the world’s largest importer and consumer of iron ore, and was also the largest import 
market for long-term contract iron ore and had the world’s biggest iron ore spot market. China became 
the world’s largest steel-consuming country in 2001 (Yang, 2010: 53). The country’s annual steel output 
had already surpassed 100 million tons in 1996 to become the largest in the world (Yang, 2010: 51). 
During the years that followed, Chinese steel output rose annually, and the Chinese steel industry 
experienced a period of unprecedented rapid expansion and growth in the 2000s
121
 (Dou & Tang, 2009: 
153, 165). With a thriving steel industry and surging crude steel output, China became the world’s biggest 
iron ore importing country in 2003 (Yang, 2010: 53), and a net steel exporter in 2006 for the first time in 
history (Yang, 2010: 51). 
 
Despite expanding domestic iron ore production, the output and quality of indigenous ore could not meet 
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the demand and requirements of China’s fast-growing steel industry. Chinese iron ore mines were difficult 
to develop, containing mostly magnetite ores, which were costly to extract, and low-grade ores with very 
low iron content.
122
 Imported iron ores had significant advantages over indigenous ores in terms of 
quantity (output), quality (ore grade) and cost (extraction costs). The proportion of domestically produced 
iron ores to total iron ore consumption fell despite increasing indigenous output over the years (Yang, 
2010: 121). Meanwhile, China’s overseas iron ore dependence ratio rose from 44 percent in 2002 to 69 
percent in 2009 (Drysdale & Hurst, 2012). Before the global financial crisis, the ratio peaked at 58.8 
percent in 2004, and remained over and above 53 percent with growing volume of iron ore imports 
thereafter (Yang, 2010: 120-122). Over the period between 1997 and 2008, the volume of imported iron 
ores surged from 55.11 million tons to 443.66 million tons (Yang, 2010: 121-122). 
 
Australia, Brazil, India and South Africa were China’s biggest iron ore suppliers. The combined volume of 
Australian and Brazilian iron ores flowing into China constituted about two-thirds of the total iron ore 
imports in 2008 (Yang, 2010: 123-124). As China’s largest source of iron ore imports, Australia was of 
critical importance to China’s iron and steel industry. From 2008 onwards, the proportion of Australian 
ores to the total iron ore imports (measured by weight) remained over 40 percent, and increased steadily 
over the years. In the period between 2003 and 2007, the proportion of Australian ores was very close to 
40 percent of the total iron ore imports, and in 2005, the ratio exceeded 40 percent.
123
 Out of the 686 
million tons of total iron ore imports in 2011, 297 million tons were from Australia alone, which was about 
43 percent of the total imports.
124
 The proportion of Brazilian ores has experienced a gradual and slight 
decline since 2007, while the proportion of Indian ores has also been in steady decline since 2005.  
 
The global iron ore trade has mostly been carried out through the negotiation of long-term contract 
arrangements; a system which has been in place since 1981 (Yang, 2010: 130). The main advantage of 
this arrangement has been to reduce risks for both iron ore producers and steelmakers in a volatile iron 
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ore market, to reassure both sides about future demand (for producers) and supply (for buyers) within the 
contract period (over the agreed number of years). The price of long-term contract ore is subject to 
annual negotiation. The long-term contract benchmark pricing is a mechanism whereby the major three 
iron ore sellers (Vale, Rio and BHP) and major buyers, would gather together annually to negotiate and 
determine the price for the long-term contract ores for the forthcoming fiscal year. The annual benchmark 
pricing regime would fix the ore prices for a year and hedge against the risks of large price fluctuations for 
both ore suppliers and buyers during that period. The annual benchmark price negotiation would 
traditionally begin during the previous December and usually conclude in March or April at the latest.
125
 
The new annual pricing agreement would then apply from April 1 to March 31 in the following year, a 
period which would correspond to the Japanese financial year.
126
 Each individual steelmaker and 
producer negotiated with each other simultaneously. Once an initial settlement was reached, the rest of 
the steelmakers and iron ore producers were expected to automatically accept the initial settlement, and 
agreed prices would subsequently be followed by all parties as the benchmark prices for long-term 
contract ores in that particular year (Yang, 2010: 130). 
 
Spot market trading took place at the designated iron ore ports with ad hoc transactions and immediate 
delivery. The spot market prices were set instantaneously, much more volatile and responsive to the 
changing demand and supply conditions. Virtually all of the world’s iron ore trade outside of China was 
carried out under the long-term contract arrangement. China hosts the world’s only significant iron ore 
spot market, which is growing rapidly. The majority of China’s small- and medium-sized steel mills, which 
numbered in the thousands and are mostly private businesses, were excluded from the long-term 
contract system and had to buy imported iron ores at the spot market.
127
 A significant proportion of the 
spot market ores came from India, but the spot market had been dominated by Australian and Brazilian 
ores. The volume of spot market trading had been modest in the past, and for many years spot market 
ores were cheaper than the long-term contract ores. After market conditions reversed in the early 2000s, 
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iron ores were in short supply and growing demand forced Chinese steel mills into the spot market. By 
2008, the volume of trade in the spot market had grown to approximate the volume of long-term contract 
ore supplies (Leaver, 2010). During this booming period of the iron ore business, the spot market price 
became persistently higher than the long-term contract benchmark price. 
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4.3 Benchmark Price Negotiations 
China joined the long-term contract benchmark price negotiation at the end of 2003 for the 2004-05 
round. Until the 2008-09 negotiation, the Chinese team was led by Baosteel, which was China’s biggest 
steelmaker. As a latecomer, the Chinese negotiators played only a marginal role in the first few years, but 
they soon became dissatisfied with their position on the periphery, particularly in the face of Japan’s 
leading role on the buyers’ side. The Chinese became increasingly disgruntled at the fact that they had to 
accept and follow the benchmark price set by the Japanese steelmakers with the iron ore producers, 
despite their position as number one position iron ore importing country (Leaver, 2010). The first ‘Chinese’ 
benchmark price appeared three years after China joined the negotiations. In December 2006, Baosteel 
secured the first benchmark price settlement for 2007 with Vale by agreeing to a further 9.5 percent rise 
in the iron ore price from the previous year.
128
 This was the first time ever that the long-term contract 
benchmark price had been set by the Chinese, and was consequently viewed as a great success and a 
landmark event in pursuance of iron ore pricing power (Yang, 2010: 133; Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 79). 
 
Despite this success in securing the initial settlement, Chinese misgivings and anguish over successive 
dramatic benchmark price hikes grew considerably. Since the mid-2000s, Chinese steelmakers and 
government officials were disturbed not so much by Japan playing a dominant role in the talks, as by the 
aggressive rise in ore price over the years (Leaver, 2010). The Chinese became increasingly worried 
about the continued surge in the benchmark and spot market prices. A deep sense of vulnerability 
became pervasive amongst the Chinese elite in the face of the dominant bargaining position of the iron 
ore producers and the lack of bargaining power on the buyers’ side. This generated a new imperative to 
fight for market power on long-term contract pricing in order to keep the price hikes in check. Growing 
demand for imported iron ore fuelled growing expectations that China, as the biggest buyer, deserved 
fairer (if not special) treatment by the iron ore producers, and that Chinese steelmakers should seek 
greater pricing power given China’s growing prominence in the global iron ore business.  
 
Chinese vulnerability in the iron ore benchmark price negotiation was felt most acutely in the final three 
years of the 2000s. During this period, not only did the benchmark price continue to rise exponentially 
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beyond Chinese control, but the very mechanism determining the annual benchmark pricing also 
collapsed to the detriment of Chinese interests. During this process, both the Chinese side and the iron 
ore suppliers significantly stepped up actions to fight against the other, whether in benchmark price 
determination or over the reform of the benchmark pricing mechanism. China’s lack of bargaining power 
became fully evident in the cut and thrust and arm-twisting that culminated in the final showdown with the 
dominant iron ore producers. 
 
4.3.1 2008 Negotiation 
In February 2008, the Chinese negotiators accepted and followed the Japanese benchmark agreement 
struck with Vale despite their initial hesitation and reluctance. The negotiations between the Chinese 
steelmakers and the Australian mining companies entered a deadlock and dragged out for more than half 
a year. The Chinese negotiators rejected outright Australian attempts to raise the benchmark price by 95 
percent and refused to accept demands for CIF (cost, insurance, freight) pricing, which would supposedly 
give the Australian companies a free hand in taking further control of iron ore shipping and freight costs, 
and marking up the iron ore price. The stalemate in Sino-Australian price negotiations persisted into late 
June, when the expiry date of Rio’s long-term contracts was only 7 days away. On June 23, the Chinese 
negotiators eventually yielded to Rio Tinto’s demands by agreeing to a 79.88 percent increase in the 
price of iron ore fines and 96.5 percent increase in the price of lump ores with retrospective effect from 
April 1.
129
 The agreement came after Rio and BHP issued an ultimatum that threatened to permanently 
and completely terminate the long-term contract supply arrangement unless the Chinese accepted 
increases in iron ore benchmark prices by 85-95 percent from the previous year. 
 
The tense situation had almost brought the traditional long-term contract and annual benchmark pricing 
systems to the verge of collapse, and would have done so if the two sides had failed to reach an 
agreement on the new benchmark price. Not only was the extent of the price rise in the 2008 benchmark 
negotiation unprecedented, but the negotiation showed the first signs of a rupture in the annual 
benchmark pricing mechanism: the long-term contract ores from the Australian and Brazilian producers 
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began to be charged differently; and the mining companies began to charge higher prices to Chinese 
steelmakers, i.e., a ‘discriminatory’ benchmark price came into effect and was targeted at China.
130
 The 
Chinese gave up resisting at the last minute because they could not afford to allow the benchmark pricing 
arrangement to collapse. If the long-term contract regime and benchmark pricing mechanism were to 
collapse, Chinese steelmakers would have to buy the more expensive spot market ores and become 
more vulnerable to the price fluctuations and price rises in this volatile market. 
 
4.3.2 2009 Negotiation 
The onset of the global financial crisis in the second half of 2008 altered the demand and supply 
conditions of the global steel and iron ore markets. The slowing Chinese economy slashed demand for 
steel products and iron ore. The Chinese steel market experienced months of sluggish demand for steel 
with plunging steel prices. As demand for iron ore dropped, Chinese steelmakers stopped buying new 
ores from the spot market. Spot market price (in China) plummeted to an all-time low. For the first time in 
many years, the spot market price fell below the long-term contract benchmark price (Leaver, 2010). The 
market conditions now seemed to be in the ore buyers’ favour; and the Chinese bargaining position 
vis-à-vis the iron ore producers seemed to have been significantly enhanced. The Chinese thus expected 
that the time had come for China to reverse her vulnerable position and to gain pricing power in the 2009 
benchmark negotiation. The consensus then was that the iron ore market had entered a phase of 
oversupply and was moving away from being a seller’s market.
131
 Exhilarated by this unprecedented 
opportunity, the Chinese were determined to take full advantage of the new market situation to push 
down the benchmark price.  
 
Unlike Baosteel, China’s new lead negotiator - China Iron and Steel Association (CISA) - assumed a high 
profile from the very beginning. The CISA’s vowed never to give in even if the price talks would 
breakdown. By talking tough and adopting a proactive media strategy, the CISA hoped to put pressure on 
the mining companies and convey the message to the domestic audience that the CISA would take a 
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tough stance on the matter.
132
 In fact, since the 2005 negotiation whereby the benchmark price was 
raised by 71.5 percent, the CISA had come to regard the annual benchmark price negotiation as a 
contest for market power and become determined to fight a battle for national honours.
133
 
 
In reality, the Chinese assertion of pricing power had little influence over the mining companies. BHP 
Billiton was insisting on pushing for a new index-based pricing mechanism; Rio Tinto was keeping silent 
on index pricing, but was keen to increase spot market sales and rejected outright the Chinese demand 
for a 40 percent price cut and would only accepted a price reduction of no more than 33 percent.
134
 Like 
BHP, Rio was not anxious to finish price negotiation; instead, it was waiting for the recovery of the steel 
and iron ore markets. By May 2009, Rio Tinto began to threaten that it would duly scrap the long-term 
supply contracts in accordance with the relevant provisions if no benchmark price agreement was 
reached before June 30.
135
 The Chinese refused to accept and follow the initial price settlements 
reached by their Japanese and Korean counterparts with Rio and BHP and Vale, respectively, in late May 
and early June.
136
 Rio Tinto warned that the Chinese could either accept the terms or withdraw from the 
long-term contract system. 
 
In the face of the mining companies’ refusal to offer greater price concessions for Chinese customers, the 
CISA stepped up pressure on the companies by embarking on a number of initiatives which were 
intended to enhance China’s bargaining position. However, since July, China’s steel mills had already 
begun to buy long-term contract ores from the Australian mining companies at the discounted price 
proposed by Rio Tinto.
137
 Like their Japanese and Korean counterparts, China’s steelmakers had in 
effect accepted the 33 percent price cut. Although the CISA insisted on calling them ‘temporary prices’, it 
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had acquiesced to the reality, however reluctantly.
138
 In retrospect, the iron ore market rebounded faster 
than expected. As steel production regained the momentum, demand for iron ore recover quickly and 
pulled up the spot market price for iron ore. The demand and supply situation in the iron ore market was 
once again reversed in sellers’ favour. After dragging on for more than five months since passing the 
usual deadline in April, China’s long-term contract price negotiations with the three top iron ore miners 
had been terminated without formal conclusion. In fact, the 2009 price talks were the last round of 
successful negotiations: from 2010 onwards, the annual benchmark pricing regime was completely 
abandoned. 
 
4.3.3 2010 Negotiation 
Since the beginning of the 2010 long-term contract price negotiation, the benchmark prices proposed by 
the mining companies had been rapidly soaring. The percentage increase demanded by the mining 
companies far outpaced Chinese expectations, and were beyond the bottom line set by the CISA. The 
Australian and Brazilian ore producers were emboldened by soaring global demand for steel as the 
economy recovered, and their pre-crisis assertiveness was quickly restored. From the very start of the 
negotiations, Vale and BHP Billiton were demanding a transition from annual pricing to a quarterly system 
that would be aligned more closely with prevailing spot market prices. By early April, Rio was also in 
negotiation with clients about long-term contract supplies based on quarterly pricing. In June, Rio 
indicated that it would follow Vale’s prices for the third quarter supplies of long-term contract ores. Both 
the Australian and Brazilian miners were determined to abandon the annual pricing mechanism.
139
 The 
three iron ore giants persisted with their tough negotiating stance until their Chinese clients gave in. 
Whilst turning their backs on the long-term contract negotiations, they once again manipulated iron ore 
supplies to pressure their clients into accepting their demand for price rises and quarterly pricing.
140
 
 
The enunciation of the ‘China model’, which was set out by the Chinese in October 2009 shortly before 
                                                        
138
 Source: ‘Chinese Steel Mills Signed Contract Discreetly with 33% Price Cut, China May Lose Battle’ (July 16, 2009) 
http://news.163.com/09/0716/08/5EB4S9OH0001124J.html 
139
 Source: ‘Rio Declares Its Support for Quarterly Pricing’ (April 10, 2010) 
http://finance.qq.com/a/20100410/000768.htm 
140
 Source: ‘2010 Iron Ore Negotiation in Focus’ (Special Column) http://finance.qq.com/zt/2009/2010tks/ 
204 
 
the 2010 negotiation, was deemed a tone-setting exercise. The China model had three elements: first, to 
bring forward the beginning of iron ore trade accounting year from April 1 to January 1 so that it would be 
in line with the accounting convention of the Chinese steel mills; second, benchmark prices should be 
linked with volumes whereby greater procurement volume should warrant greater price discount; third, all 
foreign iron ores must be sold at one single price in China (Jia & Liu October 17, 2009). The CISA 
insisted that the Chinese negotiations must be separated from the rest of the benchmark price 
negotiations and the Chinese would not expect others to adopt the Chinese model or price; nor would the 
Chinese automatically accept and follow the negotiation outcomes reached by the mining companies and 
others steelmakers. 
 
This was the first time that the Chinese systematically put forward a Chinese way of price negotiation. 
However, the Chinese proposal was soon quietly dropped. Once the price talks were initiated in 
anticipation of significant price rises, it became apparent that the gaps between the Chinese negotiators 
and the mining companies would be hard to bridge. As the sellers firmly pressed for price increase and 
quarterly pricing, the CISA appeared to be completely and haplessly on the defensive.
141
 The Chinese 
side did not entirely give in to the mining companies’ pressure. Some large Chinese steelmakers had 
also been pleading with the Chinese government for greater policy attention and more direct government 
involvement in the matter.
142
 The Chinese government had indeed stepped up support for the Chinese 
steel industry.
143
 Nevertheless, the Chinese themselves had come to realise that the CISA had its 
limitations and was no saviour of the steel industry, and as long as the Chinese demand for steel and iron 
ore remained high, China’s steel mills would always be vulnerable to the dominant pricing power of the 
big mining companies.
144
 
 
Given the significant price cuts in 2009, the 2010 negotiation ended with ‘retaliatory’ price rises and a 
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decisive victory for the mining companies over the pricing reform.
145
 At the end of March, BHP reached 
agreements with its Asian clients on the second quarter benchmark price, with the (onshore) iron ore 
fines price raised by 99.7 percent. On April 1, Vale concluded its negations with most of its customers, 
who agreed to a 96.4 percent increase in the long-term contract price for the second quarter. Rio Tinto, 
which was the last to declare its intention to desert the annual pricing system, also joined Vale and BHP 
Billiton for the new quarterly pricing by April.
146
 
 
In the absence of a formal Chinese price agreement, Chinese steel mills began conducting individual 
negotiations with each of the three mining companies beginning in April. In May, Vale suggested that it 
would raise the third quarter price by 23 percent for the long-term contract ores sold to China based on 
the surging spot market price during the second quarter.
147
 In early June, Vale for the first time gave a 
detailed explanation of the index-based quarterly pricing methodology while confirming a further 30-35 
percent price rise for the next quarter.
148
 At the same time, Rio indicated its intention to follow Vale’s 
prices and reportedly raised its price by 19.5 percent.
149
 Shortly after the introduction of quarterly pricing, 
BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto had reportedly been pressing for an index-based monthly pricing mechanism 
that would track the spot market prices even more closely.
150
 
 
China’s price talks with the miners in 2010 once again ended in tatters without a formal agreement on the 
benchmark price and the pricing system. By the end of April, most of the big Chinese steel mills that had 
long-term contracts begun to arrange import of long-term contract ores from the three big mining 
companies under temporary price accords, based on Vale’s prices accepted by the Japanese and the 
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Koreans.
151
 The CISA also indicated at the end of the month that it had decided to give the green light to 
the steel mills to do so.
152
 This was an indication that the Chinese steel industry had already given in to 
the mining companies. This despite the fact that the CISA still remained nominally opposed to the 
companies’ price rise proposals and maintained that the temporary price accords struck by China’s 
steelmakers with the companies were expedient arrangements only and did not represent the final formal 
settlements and should not be taken as evidence of Chinese surrender. By mid-2010, the steel mills were 
faced with multiple pricing options ranging from quarterly pricing, monthly pricing to spot market prices. 
The negotiation was no longer about the price itself, but the pricing method and the specific index system 
used to determine the price. 2010 was thus tantamount to a transition year as the pricing regime shifted 
from the traditional annual pricing negotiation towards short-term index pricing. 
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4.4 Chinese Disunity and Internal Fragmentation during 
Negotiations 
In the face of the mining companies’ refusal to offer greater price concessions to Chinese buyers, the 
CISA stepped up pressure on the mining companies by embarking upon a number of initiatives which 
were intended to enhance China’s bargaining position. However, these efforts were seriously 
undermined by internal fragmentation and disunity on the Chinese side. 
 
China’s large steel mills had, during the previous price talks, raised their steel prices in anticipation of the 
increased long-term contract ore prices during the sensitive negotiation period. Such decisions were 
intended to hedge against the increased raw material costs, but were used by the mining companies as 
evidence of strong downstream demand for steel products and the steelmakers’ ability to absorb higher 
raw material costs. In the 2009 negotiation, the CISA reportedly pressed the big domestic steel mills not 
to raise the price of their steel products;
153
 it also requested all major steel mills to make a 20 percent cut 
in their steel output in an effort to create a more advantageous condition for the price talks (Yin & Fan & Li, 
2009: 99). However, the CISA did not succeed in bringing the pricing policy of major Chinese steelmakers 
into line with CISA demands. Baosteel apparently ignored CISA’s coordinating efforts by raising the July 
steel price in June, insisting that it was market behaviour. The CISA was therefore furious with Baosteel 
(Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 99). 
 
The CISA also organised a series of boycott campaigns against Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton during the 
negotiation periods. In May 2008, the CISA appealed to all Chinese steel mills and minerals import 
trading companies to scale down their procurement of spot market ores and to boycott Rio Tinto’s (and 
BHP Billiton’s) iron ores in the spot market as long as the Australian miners failed to fully comply with 
their long-term contract supply obligations.
154
 In the 2009 negotiation stalemate, the CISA ordered the 
Chinese steel mills and ore importers not to sign new benchmark price contracts with the Australian and 
Brazilian ore producers before obtaining CISA’s authorisation to do so. Without CISA authorisation, any 
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such agreements would be invalidated.
155
 When the negotiations between the Chinese and the 
Australians (and Brazilians) reached a deadlock, a number of Chinese steel mills were reportedly willing 
to accept Rio Tinto’s pricing proposals. The CISA however demanded unified actions and prohibited the 
Chinese steelmakers from conducting their own negotiations with the miners in private.
156
 In early April 
2010, shortly after the Japanese and Korean steelmakers gave in to BHP’s and Vale’s demand for 
quarterly price increases, the CISA, in conjunction with China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals 
and Chemicals Importers and Exporters (CCCMC) called on all qualified Chinese iron ore importers to 
halt iron ore imports from the three mining companies for two months so as to resist their demands for 
higher prices and quarter pricing.
157
 
 
However, the CISA’s leadership role proved ineffective in organising a credible industry-wide boycott. 
The boycotts initiated by the CISA were short-lived and lacked support at home. As Chinese iron ore 
stockpiles fell quickly and were about to run out, the boycott immediately lost steam because the steel 
mills could not afford to allow interruptions to their production. Indeed, few Chinese steelmakers had 
actually joined the boycott in the first place. China’s many small- and medium-sized steel mills had no 
incentive to answer the CISA’s call for boycott. These steel mills were mostly private businesses, and 
under China’s iron ore import regime, which favoured the big and state-owned steelmakers, these 
smaller private steel producers had no direct access to long-term contract ore in the first place, and 
therefore had no direct stake in the long-term contract price negotiation. Regardless of the level of the 
long-term contract benchmark price, they all would have to buy ores from the spot market at the spot 
price. They would not benefit from the lower long-term contract price; nor would the higher benchmark 
price directly impinge on their business. A low benchmark price would only benefit the state-owned big 
steel producers that had the right to sign long-term supply contracts with the big mining companies. 
Hence, the private and smaller steel producers in China were not keen to support the CISA initiative at 
the expense of their own interests: it was more imperative to ensure stable supplies of iron ores.
158
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The CISA blamed the Chinese steel mills, particularly the small and private steelmakers, for undercutting 
the boycott campaign, and the leading steel producers (such as Baosteel) for ignoring the CISA advice 
on pricing policy during the price negotiations. However, the rules set out by the CISA were mainly 
voluntary and not legally binding. Moreover, the CISA was by no means fully able to represent the entire 
Chinese steel industry. There were more than 1,200 steel mills in China; the CISA only had more than 
200 member companies, all of which were state-owned. Its core members (the biggest member 
companies by output and market share) were less than 80.
159
 The CISA’s private sector counterpart is 
the ACFIC (All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce) Chamber of Commerce of the Metallurgical 
Industry, whose members are entirely private steel producers and traders, large and small. The interests 
of the private and smaller steelmakers were not aligned with those of the big state-owned companies. 
The CISA therefore could not claim to represent the interests of these small- and medium-sized private 
steel mills, which collectively have a combined annual output of more than 200 million tons. It could not 
be expected that China’s private steel mills would follow the CISA’s directives and be willing to join a fight 
against the mining companies at the expense of their own interests for what was supposedly a state’s 
cause
160
 (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 114) 
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4.5 National Security Imperative for Government Intervention 
Since the Chinese steel industry remained vulnerable at the transnational level, the steel industry was 
actively politicising the iron ore issue in China’s government policy deliberation. The CISA had been 
pleading with the Chinese government for greater policy attention and more direct government 
intervention to save the industry.
161
 Industry leaders advocated elevating the profile of the issue on the 
national policy agenda and urged the central government to give high priority to the problem.
162
 For 
example, more than ten of China’s largest steelmakers reportedly made a joint petition to the Chinese 
Premier in March 2010 to campaign for state intervention in the iron ore issue.
163
 
 
Indeed, the issue of iron ore import pricing had become a strategic issue pertaining to national economic 
security
164 (Jiang August 8, 2009). The Chinese government had been closely involved in the iron ore 
war against the Australian and Brazilian miners all along
165
 (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 61, 76, 98). Chinese 
authorities were reportedly preparing further measures to protect the interests of China’s steel 
industry.
166
 Though the CISA had been at the forefront of the campaign since 2009, its leadership role 
was bestowed by the Chinese government
167
 (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 98). 
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The Chinese government was assuredly following the progress of the negotiations very closely. For 
instance, the Ministry of Commerce expressed its support for the joint efforts of the CISA and the 
Chinese steelmakers in their iron ore price talks with the ore producers in a press conference in 
mid-March 2010. The spokesperson indicated that the Ministry of Commerce, together with the Ministry 
of Industry and Information Technology, would use ‘necessary trade measures’ to assist the Chinese 
negotiators.
168
 The ministry spokesperson did not confirm what specific policy measures had been 
devised for the purpose, but nevertheless stressed that the relevant policy instruments were available 
and ready to hand. The official requested that the mining companies respect China’s interests as the 
largest iron ore consumer and take into consideration the legitimate interests of the Chinese steelmakers. 
The Ministry of Commerce also called on all relevant stakeholders to uphold the existing annual pricing 
regime for the long-term supply contract.
169
 
 
The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) also backed the CISA a week later. At a 
press briefing an official from its Raw Materials Department expressed the MIIT’s support for the existing 
long-term contract pricing arrangement and opposition to any forms of ‘monopolist’ behaviour on the part 
of the mining companies.
170
 The MIIT official reprimanded the miners for their demand for higher prices 
and blamed the miners for obstructing the price talks. Suggesting that the MIIT was following the 
negotiations closely, the official said that the MIIT supported the CISA and the Chinese steel mills in their 
negotiations and was highly concerned about the buyers’ interests in the price talks.
171
 
 
These instances of official posturing were arguably a last-minute attempt by the Chinese government to 
influence the price negotiation. The timings of such overt statements were carefully planned to influence 
the negotiation process as the mining companies were stepping up their push for higher prices and the 
traditional annual pricing regime was on the verge of being replaced. By throwing its weight behind the 
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ore buyers (and Chinese negotiators) in this way, the Chinese government was certainly anxious to 
pressure the mining companies and to prevent the worst-case scenario from emerging. 
 
As part of the effort to influence the price negotiation, the Chinese government even launched in 2009 a 
‘counter-espionage’ campaign to crack down on illegal leaks of Chinese commercial secrets by the staff 
of Chinese steel mills and alleged industrial espionage activities by the agents of the Australian mining 
companies.
172
 The rampant leaks of vital industry data on the operation of Chinese steel mills had 
allegedly given the Australian companies the upper hand in the struggle over iron ore price at the 
negotiation table. The Chinese security services (including the Administration for the Protection of State 
Secrets and the State Security authorities) reportedly carried out investigations into the Rio ‘espionage’ 
case and the information leaks in the steel industry
173
 (Wang July 17, 2009). The campaign against 
information leaks in the steel industry was arguably part of an unprecedented nation-wide campaign 
launched in 2009 to strengthen the protection of state secrets.
174
 Rio Tinto workers Stern Hu and three 
other Chinese Rio employees were arrested on suspicion of espionage. Subsequently, the Rio Tinto 
incident not only led to heightened diplomatic tensions and acrimonious public rows between China and 
Australia, but also caused widespread concerns amongst the foreign business community in China 
(Mascitelli & Chung, 2011, 2012). Although the Chinese authorities eventually dropped the charge of 
spying on ‘state secrets’ in the case, the accused Rio workers were found guilty of commercial bribery 
and industrial espionage. The operation necessarily involved top-level decision-making and 
interdepartmental coordination within the Chinese government. The whole affair demonstrated China’s 
heavy-handed approach in the crackdown on leaks of economic secrets, even occurring at the expense 
of diplomatic relations with Australia. 
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The Stern Hu incident was highly political. The timing of the arrest, which came not long after Rio Tinto 
rejected Chinalco’s investment proposal, indicated that the Chinese government was seeking revenge for 
Rio’s decision to turn down the Chinalco investment deal,
175
 which was indeed an outrageous outcome 
from the Chinese perspective and a bitter disappointment for the Chinese authorities; but the bigger 
picture really concerned the iron ore price issue (Leaver, 2010). Arguably, the Chinese move was aimed 
at influencing the iron ore price negotiation. It was intended to deter the mining companies from ‘spying’ 
on Chinese steel mills, or even to exert pressure on them to accept Chinese demand in the price 
negotiations. 
 
Rio Tinto was perhaps not the only mining company that was conducting alleged ‘espionage’ activities.
176
 
It remained unclear as to why the Chinese government only chose to strike out at Rio Tinto. The collapse 
of the Rio-Chinalco could have played a part, as well as the perceived ‘ultra-aggressiveness’ of Rio’s 
approach in the iron ore negotiation.
177
 Nonetheless, the move not only greatly unnerved Rio but also 
BHP Billiton and Vale regarding the security and safety of their China businesses.
178
 
 
The incident did not result in any substantial price concessions by the iron ore producers. However, the 
Chinese steel industry had been greatly shaken up by the pervasive leaks. The arrests and sentencing of 
a number of high-profile Chinese steel mill officials petrified the business circle of China’s steel industry, 
which was henceforth haunted by an insistent atmosphere of secrecy.
179
 Issues with respect to the iron 
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ore price, the steel industry performance and the collective deliberations of the steel industry in the iron 
ore struggle could easily become a highly sensitive topic for discussion.
180
 To some extent, the extensive 
media coverage of the incident in China also alerted the Chinese to the importance of economic 
security
181
 (Jiang August 8, 2009). Arguably, the Rio Tinto ‘espionage’ case had come to be seen as one 
of the most shocking lessons on economic security in recent history. 
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4.6 Why Does It Matter? 
4.6.1 Surging Raw Material Costs 
The rise in the price of iron ore has significantly increased the costs of China’s iron and steel industry. In 
the face of its continuous rise, the Chinese iron and steel industry has been hard hit over the years. For 
instance, it was estimated that the 71.5 percent rise in the price of imported iron ore in 2005 resulted in 
the Chinese steel industry paying an extra RMB¥20-30 billion to the mining companies in that year, which 
amounted to 40 percent of the total industry earnings in 2004 (Wan November 15, 2010). In 2008, it was 
variously estimated that China’s steel industry would have to pay an additional US$8.4 billion (about 
RMB¥60 billion) or US$12.428 a year for a 65 percent price increase from the previous year’s level.
182
 In 
2010, the Chinese steelmakers reportedly would have to pay RMB¥90 billion in extra raw material costs a 
year if the Chinese accepted a 96.4 percent rise in the price of imported iron ore; and the RMB¥69 billion 
industry-wide profit made in 2009 would be completely dwarfed by the increased costs from importing 
iron ores (Zhu April 26, 2010). It was also reported in 2010 that if the imported iron ore price increased by 
30 percent, the total profits of the Chinese steel industry would be expected to diminish by as much as 40 
percent (Bao March 18, 2010). 
 
According to a Chinese official from the MIIT’s Raw Materials Department, the imported long-term 
contract benchmark price had risen by 5.4 times from US$25 per ton in 2002 to US$136 per ton in 2008; 
China had paid an aggregate of RMB¥700 billion (or US$100 billion) in extra iron ore costs during the 
period between 2002 and 2008, in the face of the continual rises in the imported iron ores for six 
consecutive years; this aggregate extra spending on iron ores was more than the total industry earnings 
during the same period.
183
 An official of the Jiangsu State Administration for the Protection of State 
Secrets also cited the same figures in a controversial article published in the aftermath of the arrest of Rio 
Tinto executive Stern Hu (Jiang August 8, 2009). According to his analysis, this RMB¥700 billion was 
more than the sum of the annual government revenue of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing put 
together, or twice as big as the government revenue of Jiangsu Province; the loss also amounted to a de 
facto transfer payment worth US$100 billion to the mining companies, which was also equivalent to the 
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gross domestic output of Australia. The loss of RMB¥700 billion would also be tantamount to depriving 
every Chinese citizen of more than RMB¥500’s worth of consumption (Jiang August 8, 2009). Notably, 
this estimated loss of RMB¥700 billion was widely cited in news reports.
184
 
 
4.6.2 Growing Chinese Sensitivity to Raw Material Costs 
Chinese sensitivity towards surging raw material costs had increased with falling steel industry 
profitability. Although the continued increase in raw material costs was significant in itself, the rapidly 
declining earning performance of China’s steel industry since 2008 had rendered the rise in the price of 
iron ore even more intolerable. The impact of the iron ore price rise had become more acutely felt in the 
years since late 2008. The five years or so before 2008 corresponded to the first phase of the rapid 
expansion and growth of the Chinese economy during the 2010s.
185
 In that period, domestic 
downstream demand for steel products was growing steadily and keeping apace with the rapid 
expansion across economic sectors, such as: housing, infrastructure construction, automobiles, ship 
building, and home appliance manufacturing, etc. Profit margins for steelmaking during that early period 
remained high and the steel mills were under no pressure to liquidate stocks and clear inventory.
186
 The 
development of the overseas market and increased foreign demand further helped expand the market for 
steel products since 2005. As one of the largest and most direct beneficiaries of the Chinese economic 
expansion and growth during that period, the Chinese steel industry experienced rapid expansion as well 
as solid growth of earnings across the entire sector (Dou & Tang, 2009: 135, 165, 167, 189). The strong 
and growing demand for finished steel products from downstream economic sectors allowed Chinese 
steel mills to enjoy big profit margins without having to worry too much about the growing raw material 
costs. Hence, despite the gradual and then accelerated rise in iron ore prices during that period, China’s 
steelmakers could still achieve huge profits and the iron ore price issue had yet to attract extensive media 
and policy attention before 2008. 
                                                        
184
 See: http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20090811/00053002325.shtml; 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090714/13476477967.shtml; 
http://www.eeo.com.cn/eeo/jjgcb/2009/07/20/144301.shtml; 
http://money.163.com/09/0724/07/5EVITLLA00253B0H.html 
185
 Interview: 47 
186
 Interview: 39 
217 
 
 
Rising costs of imported iron ore became much more conspicuous beginning in late 2008. Both domestic 
and foreign demand for steel products diminished significantly as the Chinese and global economies 
slowed down rapidly after the onset of the global financial and economic crises in the second half of 
2008
187
 (Dou & Tang, 2009: 189). China’s RMB¥4 trillion stimulus package quickly brought temporary 
relief by propping up the Chinese economy during the crisis period and boosting steel demand. However, 
the days of easy profit and easy growth that the Chinese steel industry once enjoyed during the golden 
era before the economic downturn of 2008/2009 had gone forever. Henceforth, the annual earnings 
performance of the steel industry in China plunged and began to fall into what seemed to be an inevitable 
and long-term decline.
188
 The severity and harmfulness of the iron ore price rise had been thrown into 
sharp relief by the crisis of the Chinese steel industry thereafter. The steady deterioration in industry 
earnings in the post-2008 era rendered the continued rise in raw material costs an unbearable burden. 
As many Chinese steel mills became loss-making,
189
 the surging iron ore price was no longer merely a 
matter of raw material costs but had become a life-and-death struggle for Chinese steelmakers. That was 
arguably the reason why the long-term contract benchmark price negotiation has come under intense 
public scrutiny and media attention since 2008, and was sometimes even blown out of all proportion by 
the media. As the Chinese steel industry was increasingly brought to the verge of loss-making, the whole 
affair came to be viewed as a national affair on which the survival of the Chinese steel industry hinged 
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and China’s economic power was being tested. 
 
After the global financial and economic crises, the gross profit margin of Chinese steel producers 
declined steadily according CISA data. The annual gross profit margin reportedly fell from 7.5 percent in 
2007 to the level of 5 percent in 2008, and came down to 2.8 percent in 2009 and 2.91 percent in 2010 
respectively;
190
 the number reportedly fell further from 2.42 percent in 2011 to 0.04 percent in 2012.
191
 
China’s steel industry was hard hit by falling demand and plunging steel prices during the crisis and a 
significant number of Chinese steel mills incurred losses. Despite the fact that the steel market bounced 
back under the effect of the stimulus package, the annual gross profit margin for the steel industry in 
2009 was as low as 2.43 percent according to some news reports.
192
 This was reportedly less than half 
of the 5.47 percent average national industrial gross profit margin.
193
 The sector’s annual gross profit 
margin in 2010 (2.91 percent) was also reportedly far below the 6 percent average national industrial 
gross profit margin in that year.
194
 Some news reports even suggested that the steel industry had the 
lowest annual gross profit margin among all the Chinese industrial sectors in 2010 and 2011.
195
 The 
entire Chinese steel industry was said to be operating on an extremely thin and diminishing profit margin 
amidst adverse downstream market conditions and high raw material costs since the end of the 2000s. 
The steel mills no longer had the luxury of being able to transfer the burden of growing raw materials 
costs to downstream steel buyers. 
 
The steel industry’s situation was so severe that a significant number of steel mills, including the large 
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ones, had been forced to diversify into non-core business activities unrelated to steelmaking as a 
contingency measure in anticipation of the continued stagnation, if not further deterioration, of the steel 
market.
196
 This astonishing fact seemed to suggest that the world’s largest steel industry had reached a 
crossroads. Given the industry’s growing sensitivity to the impact of rising ore prices, the political 
salience of the iron ore price issue also considerably increased in the post-crisis years. If rising ore costs 
had not substantially impinged on the steelmakers’ incomes prior to the crisis, they had begun to 
seriously threaten the survival of China’s steel industry toward the end of the 2000s. Thus, to a large 
extent, the issue had become a matter of national economic security. 
 
4.6.3 China’s Iron Ore Complex: Chinese Misgivings and Perception of 
Unfairness 
After years of frustration and ‘defeats’ in the battle for pricing power, the Chinese developed a unique 
‘iron ore complex’: the whole business of iron ore trade was said to be unfair as the Chinese were 
disadvantaged and bullied into paying hundreds of billions of extra costs by the dominant mining 
companies. The world possesses vast reserves of iron ore and the market used to be dominated by 
buyers. The Chinese thus had huge misgivings about paying such a high price for such an abundant 
mineral. They believed that the high price of imported iron ore was not so much a result of normal 
demand and supply conditions as a consequence of an unbalanced market structure whereby the three 
dominant iron ore producers collectively monopolised the world’s iron ore supply. Such a market 
structure and pricing mechanism were unjust because they gave disproportionate market power to the 
dominant ore producers; this allowed the mining companies to prey on the ore buyers and maximise their 
interests at the expense of the ore buyers. In addition, Chinese steelmakers were almost blackmailed 
into agreeing to the mining companies’ demands for aggressive price increases. In short, the iron ore 
market was so distorted that it failed to protect the legitimate interests of the ore buyers. Indeed, the 
Chinese could hardly resign themselves and embrace their vulnerability in their struggle with the mining 
companies. As the largest iron ore buyer in the rapidly growing iron ore trade, China’s steel industry 
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ended up being the biggest loser in the battle over benchmark price. The Chinese felt that they deserved 
a more equitable market mechanism that gave due respect to the interests of the downstream Chinese 
iron ore buyers and gave them a reasonable amount of market power vis-à-vis the upstream ore 
producers, under a fairer pricing arrangement. 
 
From the Chinese point of view, the three iron ore miners had benefited immensely from trade with China, 
but they had shown little sympathy for the interests and concerns of their Chinese partners. In this regard, 
the Chinese were most annoyed with the Australians for their ungratefulness and selfishness.
197
 They 
were most resentful of the Australians’ demands for massive price rises and their leading role in 
abolishing the traditional pricing mechanism. Since the Australian economy was a large beneficiary of the 
Chinese market, the Chinese therefore expected the Australians to be more grateful and more receptive 
to Chinese concerns than the Brazilians were. Contrary to expectations, Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton 
showed no mercy to the Chinese buyers, and in fact were even more aggressive in pushing for 
short-term benchmark pricing and coercing the Chinese buyers into accepting price hikes.
198
 The 
Australians seemed to have completely ignored repeated Chinese calls for a more equitable partnership, 
which according to the Chinese should be the essential precondition for sustainable business ties with 
China in the long run. Many Chinese were of the view that the Australians would have to one day pay the 
price for showing scant regard for Chinese interests, and taking advantage of China’s growing 
dependence on overseas resources in the current climate, once China was able to overcome her 
vulnerability and get through with the resource-intensive development phase
199
 (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 
74-75). 
 
Arguably, the Chinese felt rather isolated in this battle. The three big mining companies effectively formed 
a de facto quasi-alliance to raise prices and imposed the new short-term pricing regime on the buyers; 
their tacit coordination amounted to something of an undeclared collusion. By contrast, the buyers were 
disunited, as the Europeans, the Japanese, the Koreans and Chinese steelmakers had been fighting 
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their own individual battles against the mining companies. China’s cause received little support from their 
Japanese and Korean counterparts. In fact, the competitive dynamics amongst the buyers predominated 
and worked in the sellers’ favour. The Chinese even believed that the Japanese had attempted to 
undermine Chinese negotiation efforts by colluding with the mining companies in negotiating a high initial 
benchmark price at an early stage of the negotiation so as to hurry the Chinese into following their initial 
settlement
200
 (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 67-69). According to the Chinese understanding of the situation, the 
Japanese had a large stake in the upstream mining businesses and would benefit from iron ore price 
rises in any event.
201
 Indeed, China was the largest ore importing country but also the only country 
whose steel industry was so severely disadvantaged in such a fundamental manner. Few countries in the 
world had such a rapidly expanding steelmaking industry as China had; few economies were in a 
comparable stage of development and had a similar mode of economic growth that resembled the 
Chinese economy. Given China’s uniquely high demand for imported iron ores, the Chinese found no 
international allies that shared their plight. The Chinese were proud to have become the world’s largest 
steel producer and ore buyer, but found themselves to have come to occupy a lonely position in the 
world. 
 
The Chinese were increasingly upset concerning their position in the global steel business. China had 
been importing iron ores at high prices whilst exporting steel products at low prices. The Chinese had 
grown increasingly disturbed by this pattern of trade, which were severely criticised at home amidst the 
rising iron ore prices over recent years (Xiong & Ji June 13, 2012). This was because this pattern of trade 
was tantamount to subsidising foreign downstream steel users with the profits of China’s steel industry. 
During the five-year period between 2007 and 2011, the increase in the average price of imported iron 
ore far outpaced the rise in the average price of China’s steel exports; and the same period witnessed 
simultaneous growth in both iron ore imports and steel exports (Xiong & Ji June 13, 2012). Like many 
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export products made in China, Chinese steel exports were mainly low-value added products with very 
thin profit margins. Given the high raw material costs, China would be seriously disadvantaged in the 
global production chains for being such a large steel exporting country. Many Chinese called for a 
scale-down of the country’s steel export sector and opposed the export tax rebates for steel products. 
Many industry experts held the view that China’s large steel export capacity was developing to the 
detriment of the Chinese steel industry; and that it would be a shame to allow this unfair distribution of 
benefits to continue any longer (Xiong & Ji June 13, 2012). 
 
The distribution of interest was even more unbalanced between the Chinese steel industry and the 
upstream iron ore suppliers. As the Chinese steel industry suffered in a deteriorating market environment, 
the iron ore producers were enjoying huge profit and riding the crest of the growing ore prices. China had 
become the largest customer of BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and Vale. The top mining companies’ sale 
revenues in China had kept pace with growing Chinese demand and rising ore prices over the years. The 
Chinese market reportedly more than one-third of their sales revenues. Even excluding Rio Tinto’s 2008 
revenue in China, their combined sales revenue in the Chinese market during the four years between 
2008 and 2011 had reportedly reached US$153.024 billion; BHP Billiton had the biggest share, with an 
aggregate Chinese sales revenue of US$55.04 billion during the four years (Xiong & Ji June 13, 2012). 
All of the three major iron ore mining companies had been expanding their iron ore production capacities 
in anticipation of continued growth in Chinese demand in the years ahead. At the same time, the growing 
income gap between the Chinese steelmakers and the major iron ore producers also reached an 
alarming level. The mining companies’ impressive earning performance over the years stood in sharp 
contrast with the widespread and deepening financial woes of China’s steelmakers since 2009.
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 Whilst 
the upstream ore producers were able to retain the bulk of the earnings from the global value chain for 
steelmaking and make huge and growing profits, China’s steelmakers were struggling to survive as the 
entire industry was brought to the verge of collapse.
203
 From this perspective, the Chinese steel mills 
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were thought to have been working for the upstream mining companies and being exploited ruthlessly by 
these dominant ore producers.
204
 
 
Despite the supply and demand dynamics that were in place in the iron ore market, the distribution of 
market power was so uneven that the Chinese steel mills virtually had to live at the mercy of the 
upstream miners. Liu Yongchang, former Director of the Iron and Steel Department of the dismantled 
Ministry of Metallurgy, compared China’s iron ore trade to a blood sucking tube that was injected into the 
Chinese economy to suck all the profits out of China’s steel businesses. Liu made the comparison in a 
MIIT round-table meeting held in June 2010 in the presence of MIIT Minister Li Yizhong. Denouncing the 
iron ore mining companies and the Western banks, Liu warned that the iron ore trade was draining the 
income of the Chinese steel industry and 12 related downstream economic sectors; and that the 
quarterly pricing system would further enhance the mining companies’ ability to maximise their income 
from their iron ore sales to China at the expense of the Chinese buyers (Zhang & Wan June 8, 2010). 
 
According to Liu’s theory, if the Chinese steel market recovered with improving profit margins, the new 
pricing mechanism would enable the three mining companies to raise the benchmark price more easily 
and quickly. In the event of falling steel demand and declining profitability on the part of the steelmakers, 
the companies would raise the benchmark price to a lesser extent (or even lower the benchmark price); 
but they would always feed the downstream steelmakers with minimum earnings so as to ensure that the 
margin of the price rise would not kill the goose that lays the golden eggs (Zhang & Wan June 8, 2010). 
The faster and bigger the Chinese steel sector would grow, the more income the mining companies 
would drain and suck out through the iron ore trade. 
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The enlarging profitability and income gaps between China’s steelmakers and the upstream miners 
(especially the Australian ones) led to continued Chinese frustration. The Chinese were therefore 
compelled to manoeuvre themselves out of this perceived unfair situation. However, China’s attempt to 
rid itself of its disadvantaged and weak market status vis-à-vis the dominant iron ore miners had so far 
been a dismal failure. The seemingly distant and gloomy prospects of success fuelled China’s angst over 
the country’s vulnerable position since the late 2000s.  
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4.7 Reducing Chinese Dependence on Major Iron Ore 
Suppliers 
China’s over-dependence on major Australian and Brazilian iron ore suppliers proved too costly for the 
Chinese steel industry. The rising costs of imported iron ores over the years provided strong impetus to 
reduce Chinese dependence on the three iron ore mining giants for ore supplies. Indeed, Chinese news 
reports frequently appeared before and during the annual price negotiations, making claims about: 
weakening demand for iron ore; discovery of big iron ore deposits at home and increased Chinese iron 
ore reserves; potential increase in domestic iron ore supplies; acquisition of new overseas iron ore 
assets; and further diversification of the sources of iron ore imports
205
 (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 76, 81-83). 
Presumably this was part of the state propaganda efforts to rally support for the steelmakers by fostering 
an atmosphere that would help enhance the Chinese bargaining position vis-à-vis the mining companies 
for the price talks. However, it remained to be seen whether in the long run such measures would 
significantly transform market demand and supply situations, and substantially enhance China’s 
bargaining power. 
 
Given China’s alarmingly high overseas iron ore dependence ratio, one obvious option was to expand 
domestic iron ore production. The government increased policy and financial support for iron ore 
exploration and prospecting. Iron ores had come to be included in the category of minerals whose 
exploration and prospecting was given high priority. The government not only increased public 
investment in domestic iron ore projects but also encouraged commercial development of iron ore 
resources funded by non-government funds from the private and banking sectors. Total Chinese 
investment in iron ore exploration had been increasing since 2000 (Wu & Liang, 2010). The Chinese also 
speeded up the exploration and mine development projects, with investment in iron ore mining capacity 
increasing year on year. Once put into operation, the newly built iron ore production capabilities would 
enhance domestic ore supplies (Wu & Liang, 2010). Between 2003 and 2007, there had been 
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significantly increased commercial exploitation and development of domestic low grade (magnetite) iron 
ore reserves, which were abundant in China, and output from these low-grade iron ore deposits has risen 
accordingly (Wu & Liang, 2010). Moreover, China’s steel producers were also seeking to acquire and 
manage their own iron ore assets, which would provide them with reliable and cheap iron ore supplies. 
Investment by steel mills in domestic iron ore projects has thus been growing fast in recent years. 
China’s domestic iron ore output grew rapidly as a large number of iron ore projects went into operation. 
National indigenous iron ore production capacity reached 900 million tons per year by the end of 2009, 
while domestic iron ore output had risen from 261.46 million tons in 2003 to 824.01 million tons in 2008, 
with an average annual growth rate of 25.8 percent. The 2009 domestic output was affected by the 
financial crisis but still reached 880 million tons with a 6.8 percent rise year-on-year (Wu & Liang, 2010) 
 
However, despite the growing supply of indigenous iron ore, China’s dependence on imported iron ores 
was hard to divest itself of. Given their low-grade class and high prices, domestic iron ores were much 
less competitive than the imported ores, with higher grades and lower prices. Because of the low iron 
content and the fact that the majority of domestic iron ore deposits were magnetite ores (Yang, 2010: 
114-115, 121), the mining and processing costs for the production of domestic ores were significantly 
higher than the production costs of foreign iron ore producers
206
 (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 49). Rather than 
competing with foreign miners in the Chinese market, the survival of Chinese iron ore producers had 
been seriously threatened by the massive influx of overseas iron ores, especially in more recent years 
when both steel and iron ore demand stalled. Many of the domestic iron ore mining companies had been 
on the verge of bankruptcy. Adding to the woes of the Chinese iron ore companies was the heavy tax 
burden. The high resource tax and production value-added tax imposed on the industry raised the prices 
of the indigenous ores, ate significantly into profit margins and discouraged domestic iron ore production 
and investment. There were growing calls from the mining and steel industries to implement tax cuts for 
iron ore producers. The CISA, the Metallurgical Mines’ Association of China (MMAC) and China Mining 
Association (CMA) all called for a reduction in the tax burden on domestic iron ore producers (Deng June 
4, 2009). 
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In order to diversify the sources of iron ore import, China’s steelmakers and mineral traders began buying 
ores from other mining companies in Australia, Brazil, and other iron ore producing countries and regions 
in Africa, South America, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. The number of countries that were selling 
iron ores to China increased markedly. For instance, by early 2010, there were more than 40 countries 
supplying China with iron ores; by 2011, the number had risen to 63 (Zhu December 8, 2011). Although 
the dominant market shares of Rio Tinto, BHP Billiton and Vale were unlikely be challenged in any 
fundamental way in the short-term, the Chinese were keen to trade with emerging iron ore producers if 
that would help them grow. After all, the world’s iron ore reserves remain abundant and ore deposits are 
scattered around the globe. In the long-term, the Chinese would welcome the emergence of competitors 
around the globe to dilute the market power of Rio Tinto, BHP Billiton and Vale. 
 
The Chinese were alert to the developments that would lead to further concentration of market power by 
the existing dominant mining companies. When BHP Billiton proposed a takeover bid in 2007 to acquire 
Rio Tinto, the Chinese were immediately galvanised into action to forestall the potential merger between 
the two mining giants, which if it succeeded, would further consolidate Australian miners’ dominant 
market position and give them enhanced monopoly control of supply and prices of mineral commodities, 
including iron ores. The Chinese government even threatened to resort to anti-trust measures against the 
Australian companies. The CISA in 2008 also extensively lobbied the Ministry of Commerce against the 
proposed BHP-Rio deal on antitrust grounds (Xu August 2, 2008). BHP submitted an application to 
China’s Ministry of Commerce for antitrust review purposes when China’s first comprehensive 
competition law (‘Anti-monopoly Law) took effect in August 2008, which arguably applied in the proposed 
BHP-Rio merger deal. According to a top official of the Ministry of Commerce, the Chinese anti-monopoly 
authorities were due to begin their review of BHP’s takeover bid for Rio on the very day BHP scrapped its 
bid.
207
 Chinalco’s initial acquisition of a 12 percent stake in Rio Tinto PLC in early 2008 (in partnership 
with Alcoa) arguably had significantly complicated BHP’s takeover efforts, although BHP’s eventual 
decision to drop its hostile takeover bid at the end of 2008 also had much to do with the deteriorating 
market environment during the economic crisis and Rio’s repeated rejections of the deal. However, after 
Rio Tinto turned down Chinalco’s second US$19.5 billion investment proposal in mid-2009, Rio and BHP 
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went ahead with the merger of their respective iron ore mining operations in the Pilbara region but with 
separate sales and marketing to address competition concerns (Cao May 17, 2010). The Chinese 
seemed powerless to intervene from a legal perspective.
208
 
 
The steel mills extreme vulnerability in the struggle against the companies over iron ore pricing taught the 
Chinese a harsh lesson on the critical importance of acquiring influence over the upstream mining 
industry. The experience of the Japanese steelmakers also served as a reminder of the necessity of 
establishing control of certain key commodities and how that could be achieved through extensive 
vertical (industry) integration. As a result, to invest in and acquire overseas iron ore assets became a 
pressing priority and the most effective way for reducing Chinese dependence on the three dominant 
mining giants. Australia became the top destination for overseas investment for this purpose; the 
scramble for iron ore assets in Australia was one of the major drivers of China’s massive resource-related 
investment in the country. China’s outbound iron ore investments also went to other iron ore-rich 
countries and regions especially in Africa, South America and Central Asia (Rong & Ye February 23, 
2009). The majority of Chinese investors were state-owned enterprises, many of them were big Chinese 
steel mills striving to gain their own iron ore resources abroad and reduce dependence on Rio Tinto, BHP 
Billiton and Vale for ore supplies.  
 
As discussed in previous chapters, direct investment in upstream raw material production companies, 
whether through greenfield investment or via the acquisition of interests in the target companies, would in 
theory deliver a number of advantages and benefits. The downstream steel companies would be less 
sensitive to rising iron ore prices because losses incurred from the increased cost of iron ore would be 
offset by capital gains and dividends from shareholding in the raw material suppliers. Through forging 
strategic partnership with target companies, Chinese investors could also seek some form of power in 
decision-making over the sales, output and even pricing (albeit less likely) of the iron ores produced by 
the target companies or the joint ventures. Very often the Chinese investors would be guaranteed stable 
and adequate supplies of iron ore produced from the target companies or the joint ventures, depending 
on the specific conditions worked out by the Chinese and the foreign partners.  
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The Chinese government also undertook a series of policy adjustments to facilitate investment in 
overseas resources sectors including the iron ore mining business. State-sponsored loans were given to 
help finance the capital-intensive iron ore investment projects and acquisitions. The goal was to increase 
the proportion of imported iron ores from China’s overseas captive mines to 50 percent of China’s total 
iron ore imports.
209
 
 
However, aggressive investment in offshore iron ore assets had yet to significantly enhance Chinese 
steel industry’s ability to control raw material costs. Overseas iron ore mining projects were costly to 
develop, and delays and cost overruns were common problems facing some of the large greenfield 
investment projects in countries such as Australia. More importantly, acquisition of stakes in overseas 
mining assets or investment in joint ventures might not guarantee Chinese investors control over pricing 
policy or other key decision-making power. As the Australian case shows, Chinese investment was often 
subject to strict limitations imposed by the foreign investment authorities of the host country. Whilst 
pricing power was the greatest prize of all, it was also the most sensitive and hard to achieve. Iron ore 
supplies from captive mines were modest compared to the total volume of Chinese iron ore imports. 
Given the long period of development of overseas iron ore projects, outbound investment strategy could 
not fundamentally alter demand and supply conditions in China’s favour in the short-term. The three 
dominant iron ore suppliers would most likely continue to dominate the global iron ore supply and prices. 
 
Nevertheless, the consensus in China was that the development of domestic iron ore resources and 
acquisition of overseas captive mines were the two most important components of China’s supply-side 
iron ore strategy. A key goal in the 12
th 
Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) for the iron and steel industry was to 
increase the proportion of domestic iron ore supplies to 45 percent by 2015 (Yang November 7, 2011). 
According to the CISA, China also harboured the ambition to raise the proportion of iron ore supplies 
from China’s overseas resource assets to 50 percent (up from the current 15 percent level) with the 
planned expansion of overseas investment.
210  
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4.8 Conclusion 
Despite being the largest purchaser of iron ore, China’s steel industry was repeatedly defeated by the 
major iron ore mining companies in the successive benchmark price negotiations. In the face of the 
mining companies’ dominant pricing power, China’s steelmakers failed to exert any effective influence 
over the iron ore prices and pricing mechanism. Rising iron ore costs depressed the profit margins of the 
steelmakers; the deterioration in the Chinese steel industry’s earning performance since the global 
financial crisis rendered the surging raw material costs increasingly intolerable towards the end of the 
2000s.  
 
Given the Chinese steel industry’s vulnerability and sensitivity to iron ore price hikes, the issue of the 
price of imported iron ore emerged as an important national agenda at the instigation of the Chinese steel 
industry. The state-owned enterprises, which were the biggest Chinese stakeholder, endeavoured to 
politicise the industry’s predicament over the affair and lobby the Chinese government to intervene in its 
transnational struggle with the global mining giants. This conflict consequently came to be seen as a 
matter of national (economic) security by the Chinese authorities, as demonstrated by the Chinese 
manoeuvres in the controversial ‘Rio Tinto espionage’ incident. 
 
China’s increasing adversarial stance was mostly targeted at Australia. This was partly because the two 
Australian companies were the most aggressive and domineering amongst the three major ore suppliers 
during the price negotiations. To Chinese eyes, the Australians also led the way in bringing down the 
traditional pricing mechanism and imposing an even more ‘exploitative’ pricing system on the iron ore 
buyers. 
 
The Chinese had grave misgivings about the Australian companies’ ruthless pursuit of profit 
maximisation at Chinese expense. Grievance against the Australian companies was understandable 
because China apparently paid an exorbitant price for Australia’s ore supplies. Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton 
had been using their leverage to ruthlessly prey upon the downstream Chinese steelmakers with scant 
regard for their development and survival. Their dominant power position deriving from favourable 
patterns of asymmetrical vulnerability interdependence enabled them to deny the Chinese steel industry 
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reasonable profits and equitable terms of trade in the iron ore trading business. 
 
In light of the immense benefits gained by the Australians from their lucrative iron ore business, the 
Chinese perceived the iron ore trading relationship as the most unfair and exploitative aspect of the 
bilateral resource ties with Australia. Since the iron ore business constituted the bulk of China-Australia 
resource trade, which in turn was the main pillar of the bilateral resource partnership, the pattern of 
distribution of the gains from the trade was to some extent indicative of the true nature of China’s 
resource relationship with Australia. From the Chinese perspective, this ongoing pattern of resource 
cooperation was inequitable, exploitative, bullying, and therefore unsustainable. 
 
The empirical findings of this chapter reinforce the overall argument of the thesis that China has to cope 
with her vulnerability despite her rising power, in her resource power politics vis-à-vis Australia. The 
Chinese steel industry’s growing sensitivity to iron ore price increases indicates an awareness of the 
unfavourable patterns of asymmetrical sensitivity by the Chinese. More importantly, the repeated failure 
of the Chinese to secure lower ore prices at the negotiation table and their reluctant acceptance of the 
new pricing regime imposed by the dominant Australian mining companies, suggest the underlying 
patterns of asymmetrical vulnerability interdependence were also disadvantageous for the Chinese 
actors in the struggle. As a result, the Chinese steel makers remained completely vulnerable to 
Australian pricing initiatives to raise the ore price. Despite the fact that China had emerged as the world’s 
largest iron ore importing country and the biggest export market for Australian iron ores, the Chinese 
failed to translate the country’s overall market strength into real market power over commodity pricing in 
the iron ore pricing war, and were forced to adapt to the Australian dominance over the iron ore trade. 
This, in tandem with surging raw material costs and a deteriorating Chinese economic environment, 
almost brought the entire Chinese steel industry to its knees.  
 
Arguably, China enjoyed an advantageous overall power position vis-à-vis Australia; but under complex 
interdependence, the outcome of a specific policy issue area is very much determined by the 
issue-specific power structure in terms of the patterns of asymmetrical interdependence. Hence, China 
could not secure a favourable outcome in the iron ore pricing issue by resorting to her overall power 
dominance via a linkage strategy.  
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Nonetheless, the Chinese actors also attempted to manipulate asymmetrical sensitivity interdependence 
as a bargaining strategy. Australian pricing initiatives led to Chinese countermeasures during the 
negotiation periods to drive down the ore prices. For instance, the Chinese steel makers resorted to 
bargaining techniques such as initiating a collective trade embargo against Australian iron ore imports 
with the aim of forcing the Australian mining giants to lower the iron ore import prices. The Chinese 
presumed the Australian companies would be sensitive to the impact of the Chinese boycott. However, 
this action turned out to be in vain. This was because the Chinese steel industry could not sustain any 
long period of boycott action, as the steel mills could not afford to allow steel production and operation to 
be disrupted for long. It was apparent that the Chinese had seriously miscalculated the patterns of 
asymmetrical sensitivity interdependence vis-à-vis the Australians.  
 
Similarly, miscalculation over the underlying patterns of vulnerability also led to a misguided Chinese 
attempt to promote a Chinese model for the benchmark price negotiation regime. The model was 
designed in accordance with Chinese preferences and was therefore thought to be favourable to national 
interests. However, this endeavour ended in disaster because the Chinese negotiators either pushed 
forward with scant regard for the underlying patterns of asymmetrical vulnerability interdependence, or 
seriously misjudged the power relationship defined by asymmetrical vulnerability interdependence 
between the Chinese steelmakers and the Australian (and Brazilian) mining companies. By contrast, the 
Australians eventually succeeded in imposing their preferred index-based short-term pricing regime upon 
the ore buyers because the favourable underlying patterns of asymmetrical vulnerability interdependence 
allowed them to replace the old pricing regime that was no longer deemed the most efficient arrangement 
for profit maximisation for the ore suppliers. As Keohane and Nye pointed out, ‘coherent strategies must 
be based on the underlying patterns of vulnerability interdependence; otherwise, an attempt to 
manipulate asymmetrical sensitivity interdependence without regard for underlying patterns of 
vulnerability is likely to fail’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 14). 
 
If anything, the iron ore pricing war illustrated the subjugation of the Chinese steel industry by the 
Australian mining companies in the political economy of iron ore trade. The vast power disparities 
between the Chinese ore buyers and the Australian ore suppliers enabled the latter to profit immensely 
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from the lucrative ore business by taking advantage of the Chinese vulnerability. From a geopolitical 
perspective, such inequitable terms of resource trade were consistent with the changing nature of the 
geopolitical ties between the two countries. Like the resource investment ties, the resource trade 
relationship had also grown out of a delicate and precarious geopolitical framework. Hence, the revived 
strategic tensions and even growing adversarial dynamics observed in recent years in the bilateral 
strategic relationship rendered the broader political context increasingly difficult for the development of a 
truly equitable and harmonious partnership, based on the vital and massive resource trade. In this regard, 
employing the theoretical framework, the movement towards the realist end along the continuum 
between the ideal types of complex interdependence and realism, could only make the nature of 
resource trade ties even more precarious and conflict-ridden between China and Australia, as they might 
evolve to become two strategic adversaries. 
 
The chapter also contains a brief discussion of Chinese attempts to reduce the level of vulnerability in the 
ore pricing struggle. The predicament in the iron ore issue taught the Chinese a painful lesson about 
over-dependence on the dominant foreign iron ore suppliers. In the face of surging ore prices, Chinese 
sentiment was galvanised to look for ways to reduce their dependence on the Australian (and Brazilian) 
mining companies. They attempted to do so by expanding domestic iron ore production and therefore 
increasing indigenous iron ore supplies, diversifying their sources of iron ore import, and forestalling the 
developments leading to further concentration of market power by Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton over iron 
ore trade. However, such efforts were not sufficient to undermine the dominant market power of the three 
mining giants or significantly help to reduce Chinese dependence on them in the short term.  
 
Notably, the steel mills also ventured into overseas resource investment and acquisition projects. The 
general aim was to enhance Chinese control of the upstream mining industry and enhance influence over 
major mineral resources. The Chinese government also undertook a series of policy adjustments to 
facilitate investment in overseas resource sectors including the iron ore mining business. In this regard, 
Chinese resource investment in Australia was very much driven by the same market imperative and 
geo-economic considerations. However, the aggressive overseas investment spree has yet to 
significantly enhance Chinese steel industry’s ability to control raw material costs any time soon. Insofar 
as the Australian theatre was concerned, the Chinese investment and acquisition efforts encountered 
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huge regulatory barriers and unforeseen operational hurdles that acted to greatly thwart Chinese 
ambitions, as discussed in the previous chapter. Whilst those above-mentioned measures were 
essentially supply-side strategies to reduce Chinese dependence on the major iron ore suppliers, the 
next chapter will look into the demand-side strategies the Chinese used to tackle their vulnerability in the 
iron ore pricing war. It will go on to examine in depth how various domestic economic constraints 
significantly contributed to Chinese vulnerability in the battle for pricing power, as well as explain why it 
was so difficult for the Chinese to get rid of those domestic constraints under complex interdependence. 
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Chapter 5 Chinese Predicament in the Iron Ore 
Struggle: Internal Fragmentation and Structural 
Economic Constraints 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter briefly discussed the ways in which the Chinese endeavoured to reduce the 
country’s dependence on the three dominant mining companies. Efforts to increase China’s indigenous 
iron ore supplies and Chinese-owned iron ore assets abroad were all supply-side strategies aimed at 
undermining the three mining oligarchs’ monopoly of iron ore supply, as well as to strengthen China’s 
market power. However, the surging price of imported iron ore was also attributable to China’s rigid and 
rapidly growing demand for iron ore; to a large extent, domestic constraints also contributed to Chinese 
weakness in the transnational struggle against the mining companies for pricing power. In no small 
measure, the issue of iron ore price emerged as a spill over from domestic economic problems. In order 
to achieve a deeper understanding of the domestic dimension of the Chinese vulnerability in the iron ore 
war, this chapter analyses the domestic constraints by mainly focusing on two major issues: the chaos in 
China’s iron ore import market; and the steel industry’s structural problems centred on overcapacity. 
These two domestic constraining factors considerably aggravated the Chinese predicament in the iron 
ore struggle, by propping up Chinese demand for imported iron ores and depressing steelmakers’ profit 
margins. By examining these domestic sources of China’s predicament, this chapter hopes to shed light 
on the enormous domestic obstacles to enhancing Chinese power position in the iron ore price struggle. 
 
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of how rampant speculation in the iron ore spot market 
undermined China’s bargaining position in the price negotiations and some of the major industry actions 
to curb the speculative trading activities. The next section explains the limited effectiveness of the 
anti-speculation measures undertaken by the Chinese industry actors, by looking into the political 
economy and the market dynamics of the Chinese iron ore import sector. The subsequent section 
addresses the other major domestic constraint by exploring how the problem of overcapacity contributed 
to the Chinese steel industry’s growing sensitivity to price hikes and entrenched vulnerability in the 
transnational price negotiations. 
 
236 
 
Having considered the domestic dimension of China’s transnational battle with Australia for iron ore 
pricing power, this chapter asserts that domestic economic constraints could seriously complicate 
Chinese efforts to manipulate asymmetrical interdependence and eradicate vulnerability in the iron ore 
pricing war against the Australian mining companies. This observation is important for understanding the 
sources of Chinese vulnerability in the transnational power struggle. An analysis of the domestic sources 
of Chinese vulnerability is not only necessary for understanding the roles and interests of the various 
Chinese actors involved in the struggle for pricing power, but also extremely crucial for understanding 
China’s disadvantageous power position vis-à-vis Australia and why the various Chinese endeavours in 
the transnational power politics of resource trade have always failed to enhance China’s bargaining 
power. Hence, although the analytical focus of this chapter concentrate on the domestic sphere, it 
nonetheless constitutes an integral part of the empirical analysis of this whole thesis, going some way to 
addressing the research question and some of the research objectives of this thesis, as outlined in 
Chapter 1. 
 
This chapter argues that, amongst other factors, internal fragmentation amongst the market actors in 
China’s iron ore import sector and the structural problem of overcapacity facing the Chinese steel 
industry, constituted the two major domestic factors that contributed to Chinese vulnerability in the 
resource politics vis-à-vis Australia. By elaborating on the domestic sources of Chinese vulnerability, the 
findings of this chapter reinforce the thesis’ core argument that China has to cope with her vulnerability 
despite her growing power in the bilateral resource politics vis-à-vis Australia. 
 
The interest fragmentation and lack of internal coherence amongst the Chinese market actors 
demonstrates one of the typical problems under complex interdependence. According to Keohane and 
Nye, internal fragmentation in terms of pluralisation of interests and multiplicity of actors will undermine a 
state’s ability to manipulate asymmetrical interdependence: ‘states that are better placed to maintain their 
coherence… will be better able to manipulate uneven interdependence than fragmented states that at 
first glance seem to have more resources in an issue area’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 29).  
 
This theoretical insight of complex interdependence is most evident in the analysis of the internal 
incoherence of the Chinese steel industry and iron ore import sector, which arguably reinforced Chinese 
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vulnerability in the iron ore pricing struggle. China’s enhanced market status and financial power 
appeared to have brought about an improvement in her power position vis-à-vis the Australia ore 
suppliers. However, because of the pluralistic patterns of actors involved and the divergent interests at 
stake, the Chinese industry actors remained incapable of maintaining their coherence in the collective 
struggle against the Australian mining companies. Notably, the divergent interests amongst the various 
state-owned and private market actors of the Chinese steel industry – as well as infighting between the 
steel industry actors and the minerals trading community – clearly demonstrated how internal 
fragmentation jeopardised Chinese efforts to curb rampant speculative trading, and undermined the 
strength of some of the collective bargaining strategies used against the Australian mining oligarchs in 
the price negotiations. 
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5.2 Chaos and Rampant Speculation in Iron Ore Import Market 
A major culprit behind China’s inability to win price concessions from the mining companies was the 
rampant speculation in imported iron ores in China. Iron ore speculation was lucrative business when 
demand for iron ore was high and when the downstream steel market was booming. Speculators were 
able to easily accrue profits from exploiting the huge differential between the high spot market price and 
the relatively much lower long-term contract benchmark price. Large Chinese steel mills made a fortune 
by preying on the numerous small steel mills. They possessed the iron ore import qualifications and 
access to long-term contracts ores from the big mining companies. Huge profits were made by buying the 
cheaper long-term contract ores at the benchmark prices from the iron ore producers and reselling the 
extra long-term contract ores on China’s spot market to other Chinese buyers, such as the numerous 
small- and medium-sized steel producers or the large number of iron ore speculators trading in the spot 
market. 
 
By convention, Vale, Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton would only sign long-term supply contracts with big 
end-users of iron ores, i.e., the big steel mills (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 114). However, the three big iron ore 
producers had reportedly begun to sign long-term contracts with some small- and medium-sized Chinese 
steel mills and even mineral trading companies amidst the deadlock in the 2009 price negotiation.
211
 
Nonetheless, in general, only those large steel mills had direct access to long-term contract ores from the 
three big producers; and China’s mineral import and export companies by and large were unable to buy 
and import long-term contract ores directly from the three largest mining companies because they 
themselves were not the consumers of iron ores.
212
 
 
China’s small- and medium-sized steel producers had no direct access to long-term contract ores. 
Lacking iron ore import qualifications they were barred from buying and importing iron ores from 
overseas mining companies in the first place. It was virtually impossible for those small players, most of 
whom were private businesses, to obtain iron ore import qualifications. Hence, China’s iron ore import 
qualification system had effectively prohibited China’s small steel mills from importing the cheaper 
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long-term contract ores. 
 
Apart from the large steel mills that possessed iron ore import qualifications, China’s mineral import and 
export companies could also profit easily in the Chinese iron ore market. These mineral trading 
companies acted as middlemen between the end users of iron ore (i.e., the steel mills, especially the 
numerous small to medium-sized ones) and the iron ore producers (for those with iron ore import 
qualifications) or iron ore importers (for those without iron ore import qualifications). Some large mineral 
import and export companies with iron ore import qualifications had direct access to imported spot 
market ores;
213
 they would resell their imported spot market ores to steel mills (that had no iron import 
qualifications) or other numerous small iron ore import companies (that did not possess import 
qualifications but were engaged in the iron ore resale business). The rest of China’s iron ore trading 
companies that did not have iron ore import qualifications could not directly import any iron ores; they had 
no choice but to buy imported iron ores from the large importers in China’s spot market;
214
 these small 
trading companies active in the spot market would either sell iron ores to China’s small steel mills or 
resell the ores to other intermediate iron ore traders that engaged in the iron ore resale business.
215
 
 
With the participation of the numerous small steel mills competing for imported iron ores, China’s iron ore 
spot market became the largest in the world
216
 (Richard, 2010; Yang, 2010: 136). The aggregate output 
of China’s hundreds of small- and medium-sized steel mills collectively accounted for more than half of 
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the country’s national steel output
217
 (Dou & Tang, 2009: 135). As these steel producers were effectively 
barred from buying long-term contract ores, they were forced to flock into the spot market for supplies of 
imported ores, creating a gigantic demand for spot market ores.
218
 
 
As the imported long-term contract and spot market ores changed hands in the spot market, their prices 
would be raised accordingly on each occasion. Hence, the imported iron ores were eventually sold at 
much higher prices than their original import prices to the numerous small- and medium-sized steel mills, 
increasing the procurement costs for these end customers. The steel mills reportedly had to pay a high 
premium of 50-100 percent for those second-hand and third-hand ores amidst tight supply.219 As a 
result of these speculative market dynamics, spot market prices for imported ores were propped up. 
When the iron ore market was booming, speculative demand was also strong and rising. In anticipation of 
further growth in the (spot market) prices, a significant proportion of long-term contract ores were 
imported for speculative stockpiling and sales. Hence, China’s iron ore demand was amplified by the 
speculative demand, which would further accentuate the phenomenon of supply shortages and 
contribute to the high spot market prices. 
 
The rampant speculation in iron ore imports had undermined China’s bargaining position in the 
benchmark price talks and weakened her ability to check the rise in benchmark prices for long-term 
contract ore supplies. The speculative demand increased Chinese demand for imported iron ores, 
strengthened the mining companies’ case for strong Chinese ore demand and also provided the 
ammunition to the ore producers arguing for benchmark price rises.
220
 
 
                                                        
217
 Source: ‘Problem of Overcapacity Re-emerged in Steel Industry’ (June 26, 2009) 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090626/18406406637.shtml 
218
 Source: ‘Chinese Camp Put to Rout By the Three Giants As Small- and Medium-sized Steel Mills Excluded from 
Iron Ore Negotiations Benefits’ (June 24, 2009) 
http://www.china.com.cn/economic/txt/2009-06/24/content_18000332_2.htm 
219
 See various reports on the high premiums: http://news.sina.com.cn/c/sd/2010-03-15/112419866977.shtml; 
http://www.shbiz.com.cn/Item/107885.aspx; http://m.nbd.com.cn/articles/2009-07-01/223514.html; 
http://finance.qq.com/a/20090710/004060.htm 
220
 See: http://epaper.jinghua.cn/html/2006-09/13/content_66392.htm; 
http://china.cnr.cn/jryw/200908/t20090801_505417959.html; 
http://jjckb.xinhuanet.com/cjxw/2009-07/31/content_172324.htm 
241 
 
During the heyday of iron ore speculation, the lucrative prospects also induced some (if not many) 
Chinese steel mills to curry favour with the mining companies and beg them for long-term contract ores. 
In some cases, the sales representatives of the iron ore producers were bribed into selling long-term 
contract ores;
221
 some Chinese steel mills’ procurement staff had reportedly bribed the mining 
companies with sensitive information on the Chinese steel industry and commercial secrets that helped 
the companies determine the bottom line of their Chinese rivals at the negotiation table and the margin of 
price rise that would maximise their interests.
222
 
 
From the perspective of the CISA, the rise in spot market demand and the speculative trading were the 
major sources of China’s fatal vulnerability in the annual benchmark price negotiations.
223
 In the tense 
arguments dividing the Chinese negotiators and the iron ore producers in the successive price talks from 
2004 onwards, what it all boiled down to was China’s actual market demand for iron ores and the 
country’s strong and growing spot prices. From the producers’ perspective, the strong spot market prices 
revealed the true market value and demonstrated that China’s steelmakers had huge demand for iron ore 
imports, and had the ability to absorb further rises in raw material costs.
224
 
 
In order to curb the rampant speculative activities, The CISA implemented various measures to rectify 
import market order, including the introduction of a national iron ore import commission system and the 
establishment of the filing and monitoring system for the iron ore import business.
225
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The filing and monitoring system served a record-keeping function. Before executing a deal, Chinese iron 
ore importers were obliged to submit the information about their iron ore imports to the Ministry of 
Commerce, with regard to the quantity, origins, uses, quality and sales data, etc. The CISA and the 
CCCMC established a joint office under the supervision of the Commerce Ministry to collect information 
on the import contracts, which were submitted by the qualified iron ore importers on a regular basis.
226
 
The primary purpose of the filing system was to enable the industry watchdogs to monitor and keep track 
of the domestic destinations of the imported iron ores and to make sure they would go to the steel mills 
for steelmaking rather than being resold and traded for speculative purposes.
227
 
 
The filing rules were drawn up to complement the import commissioning system, which was the main 
thrust of the CISA’s efforts to curb spot market speculation and was intended to work in tandem with the 
iron ore import qualification framework. Under the iron ore import commissioning system, all qualified iron 
ore importers (i.e., iron ore import qualification holders) were prohibited from ‘selling’ their imported iron 
ores to other domestic Chinese buyers. The qualified importers were entrusted to import iron ores on 
behalf of those steel mills that had no iron ore import qualifications. They were allowed to earn import 
commission for their service as import agents; but any attempts to resell imported ores at a price were 
strictly banned. Only a maximum of 3-5 percent commission based on FOB (free-on-board) pricing could 
be charged for providing the service. Iron ore importers could only charge a maximum of 3 percent 
commission for members of the CISA or the CCCMC Iron Ore Sub-Chamber and a maximum of 5 
percent for non-members.
228
 
 
The import commissioning system also banned the qualified iron ore importers from procuring imported 
iron ores for non-steel producers; i.e., only the end users of iron ores (steel mills) were allowed to entrust 
the qualified iron ore importers to import iron ores, and all the intermediate minerals trading companies 
were completely denied access to imported iron ores from the qualified iron ore importers under the 
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commissioning system. Moreover, the commissioning parties were also banned from reselling the 
imported ores they obtained from the qualified iron ore importers to other domestic buyers: the imported 
ores should only be used for the steel mills’ own steelmaking activities, and any attempts to resell those 
ores to any third parties would constitute a breach of the rules.
229
 
 
The commissioning system and the total ban on reselling were supposedly designed to reduce the scope 
for speculative trading in the spot market. Under this system, China’s numerous small- to medium-sized 
steel mills that had no iron ore import qualifications could obtain the relatively cheaper long-term contract 
ores direct from the qualified ore importers (mainly the large steel mills) via the commissioning 
arrangement; as a result, they would cut out the numerous minerals import and export trading companies 
that had been acting as the middlemen between them and the qualified iron ore importers. If the rules 
were put in place, the imported long-term contract ores were prohibited from being resold to 
non-producing trading firms on the spot market. The regime would give speculators no room to profit by 
taking advantage of the price differentials between the long-term contract and spot market ores.
230
 The 
whole group of minerals import and export trading companies would be marginalised and eventually 
driven out of the iron ore import and trading business except for a handful of large qualification-holding 
resource trading companies.231 
 
In fact, the commissioning mechanism was arguably designed to suppress the spot market (trading) 
altogether. In an ideal situation (at least from the perspective of the CISA), if speculative trading could be 
curbed, spot market ore supplies would decline, demand for spot market ores would fall (and even 
disappear), and the spot market would shrink accordingly; and if spot market trading could be eliminated 
altogether, the long-term contract benchmark price would thus face less upward pressure.
232
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The CISA also worked with the CCCMC to cut the number of qualified iron ore importers by tightening the 
criteria used for assessing the qualified importers. The management of the iron ore import qualification 
regime was overseen by the Ministry of Commerce; but in practice the industry associations had a big 
say in the formulation of the specific assessment criteria and were delegated to undertake the specific 
tasks of preparing and executing the import qualification system.
233
 Over the years, the CISA worked in 
partnership with the CCCMC to raise the standards for iron ore import qualification with respect to the 
applicant’s annual iron ore imports volume, its annual steel output (if it was a steel mill) or registered 
capital (if it was an import and export trading company), among other threshold criteria.
234
 
 
There were 523 companies engaged in iron ore import before the qualification system was in place. This 
number was reduced to 118 (with 70 steel mills and 48 import and export trading companies) in 2005 
after the qualification mechanism was put in place (Li July 15, 2009). The number of qualified iron ore 
importers was further reduced to 116 in 2006 and 112 in 2007(Cao July 16, 2009). By 2010, the number 
was cut down to 105.
235
 By imposing more stringent barriers to market entry, the CISA was seeking to 
further limit the number of qualified iron ore importers, including the minerals import and export trading 
companies, which had been accused of aggravating the problem of speculation.
236
 
 
The Chinese also stepped up efforts to crack down on speculative stockpiling. Growing dock stockpiles 
at the ports helped reinforce the mining companies’ argument for a strong Chinese demand for ore, and 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.cnstock.com/paper_new/html/2007-10/30/content_59464088.htm; 
http://mnc.people.com.cn/GB/126636/10917437.html 
233
 Source: ‘Criteria and Application Procedure for Iron Ore Import Enterprise Qualification (Draft)’ (May 11, 2005) 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20050511/12021578391.shtml 
234
 See: http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20050511/12021578391.shtml; 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/wtojiben/t/200503/20050300019797.shtml; 
http://money.163.com/13/0615/07/91D4VLE8002526O5.html 
235
 Source: ‘Criteria and Application Procedure for Iron Ore Import Enterprise Qualification (Draft)’ (May 11, 2005) 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20050511/12021578391.shtml 
236
 See: http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20090731/06576553105.shtml; 
http://www.nbd.com.cn/articles/2009-07-14/226948/print; 
http://money.163.com/13/0615/07/91D4VLE8002526O5.html; 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2010-04/06/c_1218376.htm 
245 
 
seriously weakened the bargaining position of the Chinese negotiators.
237
 In 2006 and 2008, the 
Chinese government ordered the relevant parties to clear out their iron ore stockpiles at China’s iron ore 
ports.
238
 The joint order issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of 
Transport, the Ministry of Railways, and the Ministry of Commerce required iron ore importers and buyers 
to clear away their respective dock stockpiles; the directive also instructed port authorities, railways 
authorities, the CISA and CCCMC to speed up iron ore delivery and to take steps to prevent excessive 
stockpiles at ports.
 
The Chinese government also ordered the port authorities to raise the storage 
charges whilst banning all minerals trading companies from speculative stockpiling at the ports and 
selling iron ores to those steel mills contrary to the Steel Industry Development Policy (Zhang May 28, 
2008). These ad hoc policy measures were aimed to suppress speculative demand and curb excess ore 
imports. In the heyday of iron ore speculation, mountains of iron ores were stockpiled at the docks, as 
imported ores were deliberately held there anticipation of price rises.
239
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5.3 Limited Effectiveness of the Anti-speculation Measures 
The CISA’s efforts to curb speculative activities failed to remove the chaos from iron ore import market. In 
practice, the institutionalisation and enforcement of the iron ore import commissioning and filing regimes 
faced tremendous difficulties and resistance.
240
 The CISA, together with the CCCMC, had been trying to 
lay down specific rules for the commissioning and filing systems for years. A series of industry policy 
documents and self-regulatory conventions were promulgated successively since 2005. Basically 
carrying the same effect under different titles,
241
 those documents supposedly reflected the common 
position of the steel industry and the concerned minerals trading companies.
242
 In practice, they had 
never had their wholehearted support. The rules had been introduced and put in place, but were never 
completely followed nor seriously complied with.
243
 The fact that it had taken a gargantuan effort by the 
CISA and the CCCMC to reinstate and give legitimacy to these rules over the years demonstrated how 
difficult it had been for the iron ore import commissioning system (and to a lesser extent the filing system) 
to be fully implemented and enforced on the ground. 
 
The iron ore import commissioning regime failed to deliver the intended results. In particular, the 3-5 
percent commission rule was never truly complied with by the qualified importers.
244
 The large steel mills 
and the resource trading companies that had import qualifications would procure iron ore imports on 
behalf of the domestic buyers, but they would charge an additional 30-50 percent for reselling these 
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imported ores to other domestic buyers
245
 (Zhang July 1, 2009). Nor had the qualified iron ore importers 
abided by the rules by restricting their clients to the steel mills only: the imported iron ores would be sold 
to other minerals trading companies and could have changed hands several times before reaching their 
end users.
246
 When the imported iron ores were eventually resold to the end users (the steel mills) from 
those minerals trading companies, the ore prices could increase by more than 50 percent of the original 
import prices (Zhang July 1, 2009). Despite the introduction of the import filing system, the industry 
associations in practice were unable to keep track of where those ores would go or how many times the 
imported ores had changed hands in the market. 
 
The iron ore import qualification system was effective in limiting the ‘nominal’ number of legal iron ore 
importers because importers without the official qualifications were not able to clear the imported ores 
through customs. However, the arrangement failed to reduce the number of ‘shadow’ iron ore 
importers
247
 (Zhang July 1, 2009). The qualification system was set up to increase the barriers to entry; 
but in practice, many iron ore trading companies could find ways to bypass the restrictions and remain in 
business
248
 (Zhang July 1, 2009; Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 113, 177). Moreover, the number of qualified iron 
ore importers had been reduced from 523 before 2005 to 105 by 2010; but from 2010 onwards, there had 
been no further cuts to the number of qualified importers despite the CISA’s efforts to raise the bar on 
assessment criteria for iron ore import qualification application in more recent years. 
 
Given the poor implementation of the iron ore import regimes, there were no obvious improvements in 
import market order. On the contrary, the problem of speculation in imported iron ores had been to some 
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extent aggravated by the regimes.
249
 Without full compliance, the iron ore import commissioning system 
was actually self-defeating. It denied China’s steel mills that had no iron ore import qualifications direct 
access to iron ore imports, by forcing them to procure imported ore supplies only from those 
qualification-holding large steel mills and a handful of qualified large minerals trading companies. In this 
way, the commissioning arrangement actually made it easier for the qualified iron ore importers to profit 
through speculative trading. Rather than bringing order and checking speculation, the iron ore import 
qualification mechanism actually created a situation more conducive to speculation. The iron ore import 
qualifications had turned out to be a prerogative of those qualified large state-owned steel mills and 
resource trading companies that were able to enjoy all the benefits of the a de facto import monopoly by 
abusing their exclusive import privileges
250
 (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 115, 118). 
 
5.3.1 Too Tempting to Resist 
There were a number of factors that accounted for the failure to restore order in the chaotic iron ore 
import market. In the absence of powerful enforcement mechanisms, the profit-seeking speculators could 
hardly be expected to practise self-discipline and exercise self-regulation by abiding by the rules of the 
industry associations and cooperating with the relevant authorities in the campaign to wipe out iron ore 
speculation.
251
 On the contrary, there were strong incentives for speculators to take advantage of the 
institutional weaknesses and abuse the loopholes in the iron ore import regimes to continue with their 
speculative activities. Most importantly, speculative profits were so high that they were too tempting to 
give up.
252
 The qualified iron ore importers were unwilling to forego the chance to profit through 
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speculative trading (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 113). For many large steel mills, the lure of quick speculative 
profits was formidable because selling iron ore was more profitable than producing steel
253
 (Yin & Fan & 
Li, 2009: 113). Nor would the numerous small- and medium-sized minerals trading companies readily 
withdraw from the lucrative business as middlemen and concede the iron ore import market to the big 
qualified importers altogether.
254
 
 
At the same time, the speculators saw no strong incentives to give up speculation in the spot market. On 
the one hand, to put an end to speculative trading in the spot market would supposedly help the Chinese 
negotiators in the long-term contract price talks; if the long-term contract benchmark prices could be 
lowered, it would in turn benefit the large steel mills that relied heavily on long-term contract ore supplies. 
On the other hand, the large steel mills had no strong incentive to forsake the tangible huge speculative 
profits for the uncertain and intangible benefits expected to be derived from a reduction in speculative 
trading in the spot market. From the individual firm’s perspective, if it could not be assured that 
speculative trading would be halted completely across the entire industry, there would be no incentive for 
the individual steel producer to practise self-discipline; to do so would only put the firm at a disadvantage 
while others continued to make profit from speculative trading.
255
 
 
5.3.2 Inadequate Market Deterrence 
Speculative trading could be risky, but the risks were often considered too small to deter its practice. Most 
of the qualification-holding iron ore importers were large state-owned steel mills and resource trading 
companies with very deep pockets and a high risk tolerance; they were more willing and prepared to take 
risks by engaging in risky speculative stockpiling when iron ore prices were high and rising. 
 
Furthermore, during the 2003-2008 period, when the rise in raw material costs could be more or less 
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completely transferred to steel buyers and absorbed by downstream consumers and sectors
256
 (Yin & 
Fan & Li, 2009: 99, 119), the steel mills that used long-term contract ores did not in fact have to worry too 
much about the rising benchmark prices. Hence, the large steel mills had not in actuality been held back 
by the growing costs of long-term contract ore supplies, nor by the fact that rampant speculation would 
undermine efforts to bring down the benchmark prices. To some extent, the lucrative business of 
speculative trading had considerably reduced the large steel mills’ sensitivity to the surging prices of the 
long-term contract ores, since they could easily pass on the rising costs to the numerous small- and 
medium-sized steel mills by selling the long-term contract ors at a profit. When the costs of iron ores 
started to eat into the steel mills’ profits beginning in 2009, it even became an added incentive for the 
large steel mills to engage in speculative trading in order to make up for the extra loss due to the rising 
costs of the long-term contract ores.
257
 
 
5.3.3 Institutional Defects 
Furthermore, the proposed iron ore import commissioning regime did not seem to have taken into full 
consideration the practical risks faced by the individual importers and commissioning parties. From the 
perspective of risk compensation, the maximum 3-5 percent commission fee was too small to match and 
hedge against the potential market risks that would be faced in the process. If the qualified iron ore 
importers were to completely observe the rules of the import commissioning system, they would have to 
bear huge risks by importing iron ores on behalf of the commissioning parties, while subject to the 
uncertainty of the iron ore market and the instability in the downstream steel market. As a result, the 
qualified iron ore importers were by no means keen to take risks by obeying the 3-5 percent commission 
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rule.
258
 
 
Meanwhile, China’s small- to medium-sized steel producers had yet to place their trust in the import 
commissioning regime and the large steel mills with iron ore import qualifications. Because of their 
competitive relationship, the smaller steel mills (especially those which were private businesses) were by 
no means completely reassured to leave their overseas iron ore supplies in the trust of the large 
state-owned steel mills, which collectively dominated and effectively monopolised China’s iron ore 
imports.
259
 In theory, the import commissioning regime would give the small steel producers access to 
the long-term contract ores; in practice, the regime was used by the large state-owned steel producers to 
exploit their small private sector competitors.
260
 Hence, the import commissioning system could not even 
win the support of China’s small- and medium-sized steel mills, which were supposed to be the largest 
beneficiaries of the mechanism.
261
 
 
5.3.4 Institutional Weakness of the CISA 
The CISA was not powerful enough to exercise supervision over the iron ore import business. Despite its 
central role in initiating the industry efforts to eradicate speculative behaviour, the CISA’s institutional 
profile and regulatory capacity were far too limited to ensure thorough enforcement of the rules. The 
operation of the iron ore import commissioning and filing regimes faced tremendous practical difficulties 
on the ground. Notwithstanding the fact that the CISA was one of those most powerful industry 
associations in China with close association with the government, but it could not alone manage the 
whole process and handle resistance from the industry itself. Despite its semi-governmental role in the 
steel industry, it was not a statutory agency and had no statutory mandate to regulate the Chinese steel 
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industry. Its rules were neither administrative orders nor had statutory status, and the enforcement of its 
rules basically relied on self-discipline on the part of the individual firms.
262
 The CISA also lacked the 
administrative resources and the policy authority to perform an oversight and enforcement role, even with 
the backing of the Ministry of Commerce.  
 
The association had no real power to punish those companies that violated its rules. The CISA claimed 
that it had the authority to suspend and even cancel the iron ore import qualifications of those actors 
whose behaviour constituted a breach of CISA rules against speculative trading;
263
 however, that power 
was conditional upon the consent and support of the Ministry of Commerce, which was the ultimate 
statutory agency overseeing the iron ore import qualification regime.
264
 Moreover, the CISA could not 
constrain the behaviour of the large and powerful state-owned enterprises, particularly those national 
corporations, despite their CISA membership and nominal consent to the CISA’s leadership.
265
 The CISA 
had no real leverage or authority to regulate the behaviour of China’s hundreds of private steel mills that 
did not (and could not) join the CISA.
266
 Nor did it have the authority over China’s numerous minerals 
import and export companies that were in the custody of the CCCMC and other trade associations.
267
 In 
short, as an industry association, the CISA could hardly be expected to play the role of a government 
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regulator and to carry out a task which should have been undertaken by the relevant government 
agencies. 
 
5.3.5 CISA’s Hidden Agenda and Acquiescence to Speculative Trading 
The CISA’s real attitude towards speculative trading in imported iron ores was questionable in the first 
place. The industry association had arguably adopted a tolerant stance towards the speculative 
behaviour of the big state-owned steel mills that were profiting from speculative trading in the long-term 
contract ores. It had been intent on shutting its eyes to the widespread speculative buying and selling 
activities of those qualification-holding steel mills, which were made up the core membership of the CISA. 
Since the CISA represented only the interests of China’s state-owned steel mills, it had a vested interest 
in protecting the interests of its core members, even if the latter were profiting from speculation.
268
  
 
Indeed, until approximately 2009, the CISA’s real attitude towards speculating trading in long-term 
contract ores by its core members was tantamount to acquiescence.
269
 Arguably, the rising costs of 
long-term contract ores had yet to threaten to erode the profit margins and competitive advantage of 
China’s big state-owned steel producers in the pre-2009 period; the CISA in practice therefore took a 
fairly relaxed attitude towards the growing speculative behaviour of its core members profiting from trade 
in long-term contract ores, even if the intensified speculation had gradually come to be regarded as a 
source of China’s difficulty in the benchmark price talks. 
 
Discrimination against Private and Small Steel Mills 
Speculation in imported iron ores would eventually increase the costs of raw materials significantly for 
China’s small- and medium-sized steel mills. Because it solely acted on behalf of the state-owned steel 
producers, the CISA had no particular concern for the interests and survival of those hundreds of small- 
and medium-sized steel mills, most of which were private businesses
270
 (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 107, 
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159). 
 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, the booming steel market led to a rapid growth of the private sector in 
China’s steel industry
271
 (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 91, 108; Dou & Tang, 2009: 135, 172, 189). The plethora 
of private steel producers and the rapid expansion of their market share arguably posed a threat to the 
state-sector. China’s policymakers and state-owned steel mills by and large had a somewhat 
discriminatory attitude towards the private steel mills
272
 (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 26, 112). 
 
The hostility and bias against the private steel mills was enshrined in government policy. In official 
industrial planning and key industry policies, the country’s numerous small steelmakers from the private 
sector were seen as part of the structural problems faced by the steel industry
273
 (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 
110). Private steel mills were accused of adding excessive production capacity to the industry, bringing 
down the industry’s concentration ratio, producing more pollution and consuming more resources, and 
aggravating the problem of oversupply (of low-end steel products).
274
 From the perspective of the 
government policymakers and the big state-owned steel producers, the growing Chinese private 
steelmaking sector was not a genuine cause for celebration; rather, it was something that needed to be 
discouraged because they believed that the steel industry’s future should only lie in the development and 
strengthening of the state-sector.
275
 
 
On the specific issue of imported iron ores, the statist view was that the country’s numerous small private 
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steel mills generated excess demand for iron ores and created the world’s largest spot market, which had 
undermined the industry’s competiveness and collective bargaining power, undercut the Chinese efforts 
in the benchmark price negotiations, and contributed to China’s vulnerability in the national struggle 
against the foreign iron ore suppliers. Hence, the central government and the state-owned enterprises 
had no sympathy for the plight of the private steel mills
276
 (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 112, 117); instead, there 
was tacit collusion between the central government, the state-owned steel mills (especially the largest), 
and the CISA against the country’s private steel producers.  
 
Discrimination against private steelmaking businesses was present in the iron ore qualification system. 
The ostensible reason for the introduction of the import qualification system was to cut the number of 
China’s iron ore importers in order to enhance the Chinese buyers’ collective bargaining power vis-à-vis 
the mining companies because the plethora of importers had led to competitive bidding for the import 
contracts and pushed up ore prices.
277
 The import qualification regime was later viewed as a mechanism 
that would help to reduce speculation by driving further cuts in the qualified iron ore importers, particularly 
the resource import and export trading companies. However, the regime’s unstated agenda was to 
enhance the state-owned steel mills’ control of imported iron ore supplies so as to force the private 
steelmakers to buy the more expensive imported ores resold on the spot market by the qualified 
state-owned steel mills.
278
 By denying the small private steelmakers direct access to imported iron ores 
(whether long-term contract ore or first-hand spot market ores), the iron ore import qualification system 
effectively made it much tougher for the small steel mills to obtain imported iron ores and considerably 
increased their raw material costs
279
 (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 91). In fact, the unstated strategy was to 
deprive the small private steel mills control of the supply of their raw materials and increase their 
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difficulties in the steelmaking business.
280
 Indeed, the ultimate objective was to gradually drive the small 
private steelmakers out of the business
281
 (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 112). 
 
In the light of the implicit collective efforts against the private steelmaking businesses, the CISA had 
never wholeheartedly pushed ahead with its reform efforts to crack down on speculative trading in the 
long-term contract ores by the large steel mills during the pre-2009 period. As those speculative activities 
would eventually help eliminate the industry’s ‘backward production capacity’ in the private sector 
contrary to the requirements of the government’s industry policy, the CISA was thus not overly keen to 
expend serious efforts to eradicate iron ore speculation. In effect, the import qualification system (and the 
malfunctioning import commissioning regime) had encouraged speculative trading and exploitation of the 
small- and medium-sized private steelmakers
282
 (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 115, 118); this in turn had 
suppressed the development of the private steelmaking sector and enhanced the dominance of the 
state-owned enterprises in the steel industry. 
 
Only in the post-2009 years did the CISA begin to change its approach due to deteriorating economic 
circumstances. Moreover, from 2009 onwards, the CISA had assumed a role as the lead Chinese 
negotiator at the benchmark price talks, replacing Baosteel. Henceforth, the CISA was held directly 
accountable for bringing down benchmark prices in the price talks
283 (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 98). As the 
representative of the state sector of China’s steel industry, the CISA could no longer afford to close its 
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eyes to the rampant speculation in imported iron ores. Even speculative trading by its core members had 
to be curbed in order to protect the collective interests of China’s state-owned steel mills in the intensified 
battle over long-term contract ores against the Australian and Brazilian mining companies.
284
 
 
Bias against the Minerals Trading Community 
At the same time, the CISA’s tolerant attitude towards the steel mills stood in stark contrast to its 
unforgiving posture towards the mineral trading companies. The steel industry association had its eye on 
the mineral import and export companies, which were accused of being the primary culprits responsible 
for the chaos in the spot market. From to the CISA’s perspective, China’s large and small minerals 
trading companies should be held responsible for the growing speculative trading in the spot market and 
the resultant surge in spot market prices.
285
 However, the steel industry’s accusations met with firm 
rebuttals and resentment from the Chinese minerals trading community. The resource trading companies 
and their own industry association, the CCCMC, refused to accept responsibility for the import market 
disorder. On the contrary, they blamed the mess on the steelmakers and the CISA themselves. The 
minerals traders pointed to the declining proportion of the iron ores imported by the minerals import and 
export trading companies in China’s total iron ore imports over the recent years; and they also stressed 
the fact that it was mainly those large steel companies that were engaging in the speculative trading in 
long-term contract ores (since the ore producers signed long-term contracts mainly with top steel mills 
and generally did not deal with the import-export merchants directly).
286
 In fact, the CCCMC felt that the 
minerals trading community had been made a scapegoat for the large steelmakers’ greed and the CISA’s 
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incompetence.
287
 The growing grievances of the minerals merchants suggested that, despite its 
professed determination to take on speculators and restore import market order, in reality the CISA had 
been fiercely protective towards the large steel mills in the face of steelmakers’ speculative activities on 
the ground.
288
 
 
Conflicts between the CISA and the CCCMC: Divergent Interests 
It took the combined efforts of both the CISA and the CCCMC to restore market order in the iron ore 
import business. However, the CISA and the CCCMC were reluctant partners at best; although the 
CCCMC was an indispensible partner in this endeavour, the CISA had never seen eye to eye with the 
CCCMC. The two industry leaders had not been on good terms with each other since the beginning of 
their collaboration on iron ore import qualification and commissioning regimes.
289
 Having divergent views 
on who should apportion the largest share of responsibility for the chaos, their cooperation remained 
grudging and minimal. Indeed, the CISA and the CCCMC had never managed to come to a genuinely 
common position on how to deal with speculative trading.
290
 The persistence of iron ore speculation, 
surging iron ore prices and the deterioration of the steel industry’s operational environment, further 
increased tension between the two associations.  
 
The growing tension and mutual mistrust between the CISA and the CCCMC was most acutely 
demonstrated in a joint iron ore meeting in 2010. During the ‘CISA-CCCMC Joint Meeting on Restoring 
Iron Ore Market Order’, a bitter argument broke out between the CISA and the CCCMC about who had 
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the ultimate responsibility for the surging iron ore import prices.
291
 At the meeting, the CISA and the steel 
mills stepped up their attack on the minerals trading community and increased pressure on the trading 
companies to abide by the rules of the import commissioning system. Accused of violating the rules 
prohibiting importers from selling imported ores to non-producing customers, the trading companies were 
pressured not to engage in speculative multiple resale trading. The big qualified minerals trading 
companies were warned that further breaches of the iron ore import rules would lead to the revocation of 
their iron ore import qualifications. Given their irreconcilable differences the joint meeting broke down 
acrimoniously and led to a walkout by the CCCMC representatives in protest of the CISA’s unfair 
treatment.
292
  
 
The outburst of anger by the CCCMC captured the minerals traders’ resentment towards the CISA’s 
discriminatory stance and ‘selfish’ agenda.
293
 The trading community was in fact suspicious of the CISA’s 
real motives: by attributing the blame squarely to the import trading companies, the CISA and the 
steelmakers were actually seeking to drive the minerals merchants out of the iron ore import and trading 
business altogether, so that the large steel mills would be able to enjoy a complete collective monopoly 
on the import business. There had been months of speculation in 2009 about a possible cut in qualified 
iron ore importers by as much as 30, most of which were minerals import trading companies.
294
 Indeed, 
the iron ore import qualification system seemed to be inherently directed at the minerals trading 
companies. 
 
The responsibility to draw up the annual iron ore import qualification application criteria was a source of 
power. The CISA was not willing to share that power with the CCCMC because of the tremendous 
industry and organisational interests that were at stake; nor would the CCCMC readily give that up and 
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surrender its authority. Given their persistent mistrust and deepening acrimony, the two industry 
associations had to make compromises and perform balancing acts;
295
 this had significantly undermined 
Chinese efforts to tackle the market disorder and weakened Chinese bargaining position.
296
 For instance, 
the above-mentioned conflict between the CISA and CCCMC resulted in a serious delay in releasing a 
key regulatory document in 2010 because of the huge resistance to the new arrangement from the 
CCCMC and the minerals trading companies.
297
 
 
5.3.6 Ambiguity of Government Stance 
The CISA itself did not possess the authority to withdraw iron ore import qualifications from the minerals 
traders; it would have to rely on the Ministry of Commerce to back up its authority over the minerals 
trading companies.
298
 A radical overhaul of the spot market was impossible without the endorsement of 
the Ministry of Commerce.  
 
However, the Ministry of Commerce arguably had a vested interest in promoting trade and preserving the 
trading community’s interests.
299
 The Commerce Ministry was the natural government custodian of the 
international and domestic minerals trading companies, especially those state-owned merchant 
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companies that were the Ministry’s close political and economic associates. The CCCMC also came 
under the direct management of the Commerce Ministry.
300
 In this regard, the CISA could not completely 
fall back on the support of the Commerce Ministry. Arguably, the CISA had received only dubious 
endorsement from the Ministry of Commerce in its efforts to crack down on iron ore speculation.
301
 
Notably, Commerce Ministry could hardly be expected to wholeheartedly support the CISA by banning all 
trading companies from engaging in the iron ore trade.
302
 The slow progress in implementing and 
enforcing the iron ore commissioning regime was also arguably a result of a lack of enthusiasm on the 
part of the Ministry of Commerce for the project.
303
 
 
The steelmaking industry’s plight was not a direct concern for the Commerce Ministry. The rising raw 
materials costs and the deteriorating earnings performance of the steel industry were the pressing issues 
for other government stakeholders including the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the 
National Development and Reform Commission
304
 (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 74-76, 112). In fact, the CISA 
had been formerly associated with the NDRC.
305
 Nowadays, the work of the CISA came under the direct 
supervision of the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission.
306
 The senior 
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management of the CISA were staffed by officials appointed by and affiliated with the SASAC.
307
 By and 
large, the interests of these powerful government agencies were more aligned with those of the CISA on 
the iron ore issue; but they could not push forward with the CISA’s agenda by directly interfering with the 
work of the Commerce Ministry with respect to trade issues. After all, the Commerce Ministry was the 
designated lead government agency for the task of restoring market order for the iron ore import 
business.
308
 The subtle relationships between these four government agencies were important 
contextual variables shaping China’s response in the struggle over iron ore prices and determining the 
extent to which the CISA could push ahead with its reform programmes. 
 
However, regardless of which government regulatory agency was involved, none were eager to adopt an 
overtly active posture of direct intervention in the iron ore import market. Chinese policymakers were 
afraid of inviting foreign accusations of political interference with market prices
309
 (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 
76). On several occasions Chinese officials even went to some lengths to make a disctinction between 
the official government policy and the policy of the industry associations, ostensibly to keep the industry 
associations’ efforts at arm’s length.
310
 The Chinese authorities were after all sensitive to foreign 
allegations of protectionist policy and government interference in the free market.
311
 The government 
was even more concerned that high-profile government interventions in international (iron ore) trade and 
transnational business engagement might lead to inter-state trade conflicts with Australia and other 
nations. And in the face of China’s growing resource investment in Australia in particular, any direct and 
overt government interference with the sensitive iron ore business could easily spark wider business and 
political tensions that could very well spill over into the investment arena and further complicate China’s 
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resource investment push in Australia’s iron ore and other minerals mining sectors. 
 
Nonetheless, there had been instances of overt Chinese government attempt to influence the price 
negotiations
312
 (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009：74-76). For instance, the Ministry of Commerce and the NDRC 
issued a joint statement just prior to the fourth round of the 2006 price talks, stating that the Chinese 
government was highly concerned about the price negotiation that had been under way. The Commerce 
Ministry unequivocally asserted that if the Chinese government found the benchmark prices 
unacceptable, it reserved the right to take all necessary measures to deal with the situation because the 
Chinese steel industry could no longer bear further rises in the costs of (imported) iron ores (Yin & Fan & 
Li, 2009: 76). 
 
This assertive official statement immediately triggered reactions from both the Australian and Brazilian 
governments. The Australian Federal Resource Minister responded that the Australian government 
would be very concerned and alarmed by any attempts by the Chinese government to impose a price 
ceiling on Australian iron ore exports to China; and that the Australian government did not rule out further 
interventions if necessary. The Brazilian government urged the Chinese government to clarify its official 
position on whether it would consider direct intervention in the iron ore price talks (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 
76).  
 
The escalation of the inter-governmental conflict was however short-lived as all sides had successively 
declared and reaffirmed the principle of non-intervention. The Chinese Commerce Ministry also quietly 
revised its previous public statement and removed those insistent if not threatening remarks. The 
Chinese Premier and the NDRC Chairman also ruled out the possibility of direct Chinese government 
intervention in the price talks while being interviewed by foreign media. The Australian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) also expressed the same position afterwards (Yin & Fan & Li, 2009: 
76). 
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In April 2010, the CISA initiated a boycott of the long-term contract ores from the three big mining 
companies and imposed a ban on the import of low-grade iron ores in April 2010.
313
 Officials from the 
MIIT’s Industry Policy Department suggested that those decisions (to prohibit the import of low grade iron 
ore and to call a halt to the import of iron ores from the mining giants) taken by the steel industry 
associations were not 'government policy’.
314
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5.4 Structural Adjustments of the Steel Industry 
5.4.1 Accounting for the Diminishing Earnings Performance 
Surging iron ore costs had reduced the profit margins of the Chinese steelmakers. No less significant 
than the burden of increased raw material cost was diminishing Chinese steel demand due to the slowing 
down of the Chinese economy. Even before the outbreak of the global financial and economic crises, the 
Chinese economy had already begun to slow down, resulting in falling domestic demand for steel since 
the second half of 2008.
315
 In particular, the Chinese government’s effort to curb property speculation 
started taking effect by the beginning of 2008.
316
 The cooling of the Chinese housing market in turn 
impinged on demand in the steel market. With the rapid decline in investment and widespread 
suspension of new construction projects in the real estate sector, steel prices began to fall.
317
 Given the 
decline in domestic demand, the trading volume of steel products shrank and steel inventories went up 
towards the end of 2008. When the impact of the global financial crisis eventually set in, the market 
condition deteriorated even further as the Chinese economy was hard hit by the global financial and 
economic disturbances, and foreign demand for Chinese-made steel also plunged. China’s steel industry 
was therefore plagued by the plunge in both domestic and overseas steel demand during the crisis and in 
its immediate aftermath. 
 
Since the second quarter of 2009, China’s stimulus policy gave the Chinese steel market a strong boost 
and helped ameliorate the pressure on steelmakers.
318
 However, the stimulus package did not address 
the structural weaknesses in the Chinese economy. By 2010, the effect of the stimulus policy began to 
diminish.
319
 Beginning from 2010, domestic demand for steel products dropped once again as 
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investment in the property market and infrastructure projects (such as the national high speed railway 
network) stagnated and fell. A new round of government efforts (beginning from 2010) to cool the housing 
market dealt a heavy blow to the steel market.
320
 A significant proportion of the RMB¥4 trillion stimulus 
package aimed to deliver infrasture construction projects. These infrastructure investments focused 
heavily on the transportation infrastructures such as the construction of railways, highways and 
airports.
321
 However, this infrastructure investment spree driven by the stimulus policy also began to lose 
momentum and reduced demand for steel as the majority of the construction projects had neared 
completion by 2010 or 2011.
322
 From 2011 onwards, China’s economy experienced an almost 
continuous and steady decline in quarterly GDP growth.
323
 Slowing economic expansion, compounded 
by the government’s efforts to steer the economy away from heavy dependence on investment towards 
consumption-driven growth, forestalled a full recovery of the Chinese steel market. The slowing down of 
manufacturing activities across the steel-intensive sectors (such as the ship building industry, automobile 
industry, and appliance industry, etc.) further weakened the steel market. Having fallen from the 
post-crisis peak in late 2009 and early 2010, prices of steel products declined steadily with the 
deteriorating macroeconomic environment and market situation.
324
 In the face of rising raw material 
costs, falling steel prices (since mid-2010) and weak steel demand, China’s steelmakers experienced 
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rapidly diminishing profit margins and falling earnings. Given the sluggish steel demand, it had become 
much harder to pass on the rising raw materials costs to downstream buyers by raising steel prices. 
 
The bleak outlook for the steel industry was exacerbated by the sector’s structural problems, which had 
seriously undermined the competitiveness and profitability of China’s steel industry. Overcapacity, 
especially for low-end steel production (Dou & Tang, 2009: 50), was arguably the most serious and 
urgent structural problem among those ‘chronic illnesses’ facing the industry. Excessive investment and 
redundant capacity in the steel industry had become a serious policy issue long before the 2008-2009 
crisis (Dou & Tang, 2009: 1, 143-150); but like the problem of rising iron ore price, its damaging 
implications had not posed a serious threat to the industry’s profitability and earnings until the steel boom 
went bust. Once the growth of the Chinese economy and steel demand lost steam, the problems of 
excess steel capacity and over-supply were immediately accentuated (Dou & Tang, 2009: 1-3, 189). 
Over-investment led to excess steel capacity. Rapid expansion of steel production capacity in turn led to 
explosive growth in the steel output, which not only pushed up demand and prices for imported iron ores, 
but also significantly worsened the situation of over-supply of steel products and exerted downward 
pressure on steel prices, thereby encouraging vicious price competition. Hence, the problem of 
overcapacity exacerbated the problem of surging raw material costs and significantly worsened the 
market prospects for steelmakers. 
 
5.4.2 Chronic Overcapacity and Excessive Investment 
The Chinese government had been trying to carry out structural reforms to curb excess capacity and 
consolidate China’s steel industry. As seen from China’s ‘Iron and Steel Industry Development Policy’ 
(NDRC July 8, 2005), the ‘Iron and Steel Industry Adjustment and Revitalisation Plan’ (State Council 
March 20, 2009) and the latest ‘12
th 
Five-Year Development Plan for Iron and Steel Industry’ (MIIT 
October 24, 2011), there were a series of government directives aimed at tackling the structural problems 
facing the industry. Among other objectives, the government was seeking to curb excess investment and 
overcapacity in the sector, raise the concentration ratio and promote upward and downward vertical 
integration.
325
 A variety of policy instruments had been used to tackle the problems of overcapacity and 
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excess investment. However, despite repeated government efforts to push ahead with the various reform 
agendas, those structural problems persisted because of some rather formidable difficulties. 
 
Steel capacity was easy to build and expand but hard to cut down and dismantle. Excess capacity could 
not be brought down overnight in response to falling steel demand and prices. To make matters worse, 
the post-crisis years saw further increases in steel capacity, partly as a result of the stimulus policy.
326
 
Investment in steel capacity was also continuing into the post-crisis period despite government warnings 
of over-supply and efforts to curb excess capacity.
327
 Although the steel industry had the lowest average 
gross profit margin among all industrial sectors in China, the steel sector’s annual fixed asset investment 
in recent years had persistently reached the levels of around RMB¥400-500 billion.
328
 According to the 
CISA, China’s production capacity of crude steel reached 850 million tons approximately by the end of 
2011, whilst actual crude steel output in 2011 was only 683.88 million tons.
329
 
 
As the country underwent the phase of national-wide urbanisation and intensive industrialisation, China’s 
demand for steel products was in no small measure driven by the property market boom and the 
investment in infrastructure projects (Dou & Tang, 2009: 153, 165). They were the twin pillars of the 
booming Chinese economy and the main drivers of the soaring market demand for steel products, 
especially during and after the crisis.
330
 The construction sector was China’s biggest steel-consuming 
industry (Dou & Tang, 2009: 77; CCTV China Business Programme, 2009: 111). The Chinese economy’s 
heavy reliance on investment in infrastructure construction and the housing market had developed into a 
deeply entrenched growth model. The robust growth and expansion of those steel-intensive downstream 
sectors were propping up China’ growing demand for steel and iron ore over the 2000s. This was the 
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fundamental cause for the unprecedented booming steel market and overheated steel industry (Dou & 
Tang, 2009: 4, 164-165). 
 
Like China’s other overheated sectors, the steel industry witnessed huge investment growth and output 
expansion over the decade of the 2000s when the Chinese economy was moving into top gear (Dou & 
Tang, 2009:1-2, 4, 165). As rising steel prices and considerable profit margins attracted huge investment 
into the steel sector (Dou & Tang, 2009: 114, 165, 167, 187, 189), there had been two rounds of rapid 
and aggressive expansion of the steelmaking industry: first in the 2003-2006 period and later in the 
post-2008 period, after the post-crisis stimulus rekindled investment in the steel industry and its 
downstream sectors.
331
 Years of good earnings ensured that the steel mills’ finances were sound; and 
that the steel mills had sufficient funds to engage in further expansion (Dou & Tang, 2009: 117). The 
business of producing low-end steel products (especially the construction steel) had no significant entry 
barriers in terms of steelmaking technology and capital requirements; as a result, a large number of 
small- and medium-sized private steel mills were able to enter the lucrative market in the early years 
(Dou & Tang, 2009: 77, 172, 189). The state-owned steel mills also had an ‘intrinsic motivation’ and 
enormous capacity for expanding and embarking on ambitious investment programmes (Dou & Tang, 
2009: 114-115). Unlike their private counterparts, the state-owned steel mills enjoyed a number of 
advantages and privileges derived from their state-ownership: they were able to receive policy backing 
and funding support from the government, generally had easy access to bank loans and credit and land 
resources, and were also subject to soft budget constraint (Dou & Tang, 2009: 115, 128, 165-167, 187, 
204). Hence, they had a strong tendency to pursue large-scale expansion and enlarge production 
capacity.
332
 Under the dominance of the state-owned steel mills, the Chinese steel industry was thus 
prone to excessive investment (by the state-owned steel producers). And indeed, a significant proportion 
of investment in the sector came from the major large- and medium-sized state-owned enterprises (Dou 
& Tang, 2009: 114, 119-120). 
 
Local protectionism was another major factor that aggravated overcapacity. The property and 
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 Private steel mills tended to be more cautious and more concerned with profit maximisation (Dou & Tang, 2009: 
115, 128). 
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infrastructure construction sectors had become the pillar industries critical for GDP growth, governmental 
income (tax revenues and land rent) and employment. This was the case across the country. Local steel 
industries were of huge economic importance for the local economy and government in terms of creating 
jobs, propping up local GDP and providing a significant source of the government’s revenue
333
 (Dou & 
Tang, 2009: 190-191). Hence, local governments had every incentive to protect, support and promote the 
growth of their respective local steel industries. Local authorities could offer various preferential policies, 
tax concessions, subsidies and even government bailout;
334
 they could even help local companies to 
find ways of circumventing the national industry policy and regulations,
335
 or shutting their eyes 
altogether to problems or activities which contravened the national industry’s requirements.
336
 As a 
result, many small steel mills that had ‘backward capacity’ contrary to national requirements were 
allowed to remain in business, since they were of huge importance to the local economy. It was not 
unusual that local governments were found to be operating in collusion with the local steel mills or 
property developers to undercut the central government’s efforts to curb excess investment in steel 
capacity or to cool the overheated housing market (Dou & Tang, 2009: 171-172). 
 
Policymakers also faced the paradox whereby stringent rules about production capacity and technology 
requirements designed to eliminate excess and outdated capacity had in effect encouraged further 
expansion of steel capacity.
337
 Many small- and medium-sized steel mills had engaged in further 
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investment to expand and enhance their production capacity (for instance, by building bigger furnaces 
and more technologically advanced production equipments) lest they should be eliminated in the process 
under the new mandatory industry standards.
338
 The smaller steel mills were by no means willing to 
withdraw from the market; the option to withdraw could be costly not least because of the huge sunk 
costs in the steel industry (Dou & Tang, 2009: 190). In fact, neither private nor state-owned steel 
producers could easily decide to withdraw and afford to incur the huge losses. For state-owned 
enterprises, an exit strategy was usually not a politically viable option because of the political pressure for 
job creation and preservation of the value of state-owned assets (Dou & Tang, 2009: 190-191). For many 
steel mills, the preferred strategy was to hold out as long as they could and to wait for the next wave of 
rising steel demand.
339
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter argues that the internal fragmentation plaguing the Chinese market actors in China’s iron 
ore import sector and the structural problem of overcapacity facing the Chinese steel industry, constituted 
the two primary domestic factors that contributed to Chinese vulnerability in the resource politics vis-à-vis 
Australia.  
 
Because of its internal fragmentation, the Chinese steel industry tried in vain to crackdown on rampant 
speculative trading in the iron ore spot market. Pluralisation of interests within the Chinese steel industry 
made it extremely difficult for industry leaders to organise unified actions against the foreign mining 
companies. In fact, the previous chapter already highlighted how internal fragmentation undermined the 
CISA’s efforts to coordinate steel pricing and output policies amongst the major steel mills and the 
success of boycott actions during the benchmark price negotiation period. As illustrated in this chapter, 
the divergent agendas and inconsistent interest-orientations of the multiple market actors involved in iron 
ore importation, also undermined the industry leaders’ joint efforts to combat iron ore speculation in the 
spot market. The conflicts between the steelmakers and resource traders, and the competitive dynamics 
between the state-owned major steel mills and China’s numerous private small- and medium-sized 
steelmakers, combined to neutralise Chinese efforts to end speculative trading in the iron ore spot 
market. As a result, the growing speculative demand and surging spot market prices were allowed to 
seriously undermine Chinese negotiation efforts, aggravate Chinese vulnerability, and contribute to the 
rapid disintegration and eventual collapse of the traditional benchmark pricing regime (arguably to the 
detriment of the Chinese steel industry itself). 
 
The persistent issue of overcapacity was one of the most pressing structural problems faced by the 
Chinese steel industry. As the experience of the Chinese steel industry demonstrated, excess investment 
in steel capacity considerably increased Chinese demand for iron ore, thereby contributing to the high 
prices of imported iron ore. Moreover, overcapacity led to over-supply of steel, which was a major cause 
for the steel industry’s persistently bleak outlook over recent years, as the Chinese economy slowed 
down and demand for steel fell. Hence, the problem of overcapacity simultaneously aggravated Chinese 
vulnerability to iron ore price hikes and sensitivity to increased raw material costs. The problem of steel 
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overcapacity was reinforced by a series of structural factors pertaining to China’s economic growth model 
and development patterns; problems such as local protectionism and the Chinese economy’s heavy 
reliance on property market and (infrastructure) investment, all combined to make it extremely difficult to 
combat overcapacity and eradicate its root causes without paying a huge price. 
 
Complex interdependence theory also explains why the internal incoherence of the Chinese steel 
industry and iron ore import sector acted to reinforce Chinese vulnerability in the iron ore pricing struggle. 
From the perspective of complex interdependence theory, internal fragmentation in terms of pluralisation 
of interests and multiplicity of actors undermines the state’s ability to manipulate asymmetrical 
interdependence. According to Keohane and Nye, ‘states that are better placed to maintain their 
coherence… will be better able to manipulate uneven interdependence than fragmented states that at 
first glance seem to have more resources in an issue area’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 29). Because of the 
pluralistic patterns of the actors involved and the divergent interests at stake, the Chinese industry actors 
remained rather incapable of maintaining their coherence in the collective struggle against the Australian 
mining companies. Notably, the divergent interests amongst the various state-owned and private market 
actors of the Chinese steel industry, as well as infighting between the steel industry actors and the 
minerals trading community, clearly demonstrated how internal fragmentation jeopardised Chinese 
attempts to curb rampant speculative trading and undermined some of the collective bargaining 
strategies used against the Australian mining oligarchs in the price negotiations. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion: Navigating between 
Power and Vulnerability 
6.1 Introduction 
This concluding chapter summarises the empirical findings in the thesis in relation to complex 
interdependence theory. Its purpose is to answer the research question by addressing the more specific 
research objectives that were set out in the introductory chapter.  
 
This chapter argues that China does not enjoy a superior power position vis-à-vis Australia in bilateral 
resource politics under complex interdependence. Despite its perceived rising economic power, China 
has failed to gain the upper hand in the issue-specific power politics against Australia in the iron ore 
pricing war and in the controversy over Chinese resource investment. China sought to redress the 
unfavourable asymmetry in vulnerability interdependence, but so far its efforts have been seriously 
undermined by domestic constraints. Realist dynamics in the strategic dimension of the bilateral relations 
have also posed significant geopolitical constraints on the development of the resource ties. As China’s 
strategic relations with Australia continue to be strained by the revived realist dynamics in response to 
China’s rise, the development of China’s resource ties with Australia faces growing strategic risks. Thus, 
despite the fact that China’s overall power is growing rapidly, the country faces significant international 
political and domestic constraints; in order to protect her resource security interests, China has to 
navigate cautiously between exercising her rising power and paying heed to her vulnerability in relations 
with Australia.  
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6.2 China-Australia Relations Characterised by Complex 
Interdependence 
Chinese-Australian relations are characterised by extensive economic interdependence. It is apparent 
that the military security agenda does not dominate China’s relations with Australia, and 
inter-governmental links are by no means the only channels of contact between the two countries. Use of 
force is not a conceivable policy option for either Beijing or Canberra. Given these facts, 
Chinese-Australian relations can rightly be characterised as a situation of complex interdependence. 
 
China’s ties with Australia constitute multiple channels of contact. Transnational activities and institutions 
are growing between the two countries. Apart from the interstate relationship between the Chinese and 
Australian governments, a robust and growing transnational relationship has emerged that cuts across 
the business, societal and cultural domains. The exchange of tourists, students and other types of 
visitors constitute an important dimension of this transnational link; but the most important transnational 
actors come from the business and commercial sectors, who are engaged in a wide variety of economic 
activities. Thanks to the vibrant resource business environment, the transnational actors in 
resource-related businesses are the most powerful and prominent actors at the transnational level, be 
they Chinese or Australian. 
 
There are both non-state actors and state-related actors involved in transnational dealings, not least in 
the vital transnational resource trade and investment. Transnational market actors from the 
resource-related industries play a major role not only in promoting trade and investment, but also in 
shaping national interests and government agendas in the bilateral dealings. Transnational multinational 
corporations constitute the most prominent actors in the resource-related transnational interdependence 
politics between China and Australia. On the Chinese side, at the forefront of the transnational struggle 
against the Australian mining oligarchs over iron ore pricing, are those market actors from the Chinese 
steel industry such as: the state-owned and private Chinese steel mills; hundreds of minerals trading 
companies; and powerful government-linked business associations such as the China Iron and Steel 
Industry Association and the China Chamber of Commerce of Metals Minerals and Chemicals Importers 
and Exporters. However, their respective interests and institutional allegiances seem to be highly 
fragmented and divergent to say the least. Amongst the Chinese investors entering or operating in 
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Australia’s resource sector, are those government-related investment entities which constitute the 
majority of the Chinese investors and the main Chinese actors in the politics of bilateral investment 
relations. The internal fragmentation – which also occurs on the Australian side given the different 
interests of the Australian market actors from the mining sector and the divergent policy attitudes of 
political actors in the Australian polity on the questions of China and Chinese capital – demonstrates that 
states are not coherent units or the dominant actors in the resource politics and bilateral relations 
between China and Australia. 
 
Having said that, beneath the transnational resource politics, tension and arm-twisting between the 
Chinese and Australian governments is in evidence. This interaction has arisen for a number of reasons. 
First of all, the majority of the Chinese market actors are state-owned entities representing the interests 
of the Chinese state (in addition to their own interests). Second, the Chinese foreign policy establishment, 
security apparatus, economic departments, and even the state’s propaganda machine, have all become 
deeply entangled in China’s resource politics vis-à-vis Australia, and played a role in developing China’s 
policy response towards Australia. Certain powerful economic planning and regulatory agencies are the 
inherent stakeholders in the resource politics and are responsible for managing those so-called market 
actor-like interest groups; speaking out against the perceived Australian ‘bullying’ and ‘discrimination’ on 
behalf of the Chinese market actors from time to time; and devising China’s state-centric mercantilist 
geo-economic strategies behind the scenes, not least those pertaining to overseas resource acquisition 
and commodity pricing politics. Third, a vast number of political and government actors from the 
Australian polity, ranging from the federal government (including at cabinet level) to the local 
governments, have got themselves involved in the transnational resource politics through their respective 
statutory roles in economic regulation and policy-making, most notably in the controversy over Chinese 
investment and Australia’s foreign investment regime. In short, behind the transnational power struggle 
between the Chinese and Australian market actors (and government agents), are the sensitive and 
complicated political manoeuvres between the two governments. Nevertheless, that Chinese-Australian 
relations comprise multiple channels of contact with a prominent transnational link remains a valid point. 
 
The bilateral relationship is not dominated by a military security agenda. The development of China’s 
relationship with Australia has essentially been driven by trade and investment. China’s interests which 
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are at stake in the Australia ties are first and foremost derived from the country’s domestic economic 
imperatives and resource requirements: Australia has abundant resources that China desperately needs. 
China’s approach towards Australia is shaped first and foremost by the developmental imperative of 
resource security. A stable and reliable supply of resources has become and remains the most 
substantial policy imperative for the Chinese government and relevant industries. Australia’s China policy 
is mainly driven by economic interests derived from the resource business. The two countries are 
essentially tied together through a complementary resource partnership that underpins the extensive 
economic interdependence between the two nations.  
 
Although the bilateral (military) security relationship constitutes an integral dimension of the bilateral ties, 
China’s bilateral ties with Australia contain no substantial military dimension. Despite mutual visits by 
military personnel at various levels and occasional naval port calls, there is a lack of meaningful defence 
cooperation; nor are there any direct military security threats that each poses to the other. Neither the 
PLA nor the Australian Defence Force has the intention or the capability to mount hostile attacks against 
the other country. According to You Ji, ‘neither military has the desire to lift the bar of defence contacts 
beyond what can be qualificationted by their respective domestic politics or in light of the third party factor 
for some time to come’ (Ji, 2013); and ‘this is especially true in the case of Canberra, which may have 
prescribed Australia-China military ties only as a necessary supplement to a broader bilateral relationship 
that is beneficial to the Australian economy’ (Ji, 2013). 
 
Thus, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the military security agenda does not consistently dominate 
the policy agenda, especially since the beginning of this century. The overriding importance of the 
resource business has rendered the (traditional military) security dimension less prominent compared to 
past times. Given the prominence of the economic agenda, there is no longer a realist hierarchy of issues 
in the bilateral relations with the ‘high politics’ of military security dominating the ‘low politics’ of economic 
affairs. 
 
Further, military force is not a viable option under the current strategic circumstances. For both countries, 
the direct use of military force against the other, or the threat of force, remains inconceivable as a 
cost-effective policy instrument for achieving security and economic objectives, or as a politically 
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convenient means of wielding power in the bilateral relations. Although Australia’s defence posture 
manoeuvres, in terms of troop redeployment and allied defence collaboration with America in recent 
years, are aimed at hedging against rising strategic risks of Chinese expansion, these actions do not 
constitute the direct use of military force (or threat of force) against China. Neither government is 
considering the use of military force a necessary or appropriate policy option to resolve their political 
differences or to obtain economic objectives in the bilateral context, at least for the time being. According 
to Chinese military officers, Australia poses no direct threat to China’s national security and is outside the 
purview of the PLA research institutions, which mainly focus only on great power relations.
340
 
 
During the post-9/11 period, competitive realist dynamics had largely receded. Given the general stability 
in the regional strategic environment and the good overall relations between China and the United States, 
Australia held a rather benign view of China’s rise, and China-Australia relations experienced a period of 
entente. Since 2008, more adversarial dynamics re-emerged in China-Australia relations. In the face of 
the relative decline of the United States, China began to challenge U.S. strategic primacy and the 
regional security environment deteriorated rapidly as a result of China’s changing strategic posture. 
Australia consequently hardened her strategic perception of China’s rise and began to view China as a 
potential strategic enemy. The competitive dynamics between China and Australia were reinforced by a 
dramatic transformation of U.S.-Australia alliance, which was adapted in an attempt to contain Chinese 
expansionism. 
 
However, the revival of realist dynamics has not fundamentally altered the liberal underpinnings of 
China’s relations with Australia. Most of the above-mentioned characteristics of complex 
interdependence still remain despite the resurgence of realist signs in the strategic dimension of the 
bilateral ties. Indeed, high-level bilateral diplomacy between Chinese and Australia leaders since 2008 
demonstrated that both counties were unwilling to let their political differences and strategic tensions 
jeopardise economic ties, particularly the critical resource partnership. Li Keqiang and Xi Jingping visited 
Australia in 2009 and 2010 respectively, and their visits were symbolic of Chinese commitment to the 
bilateral ties. During Julia Gillard’s visit to China in 2011, both governments deliberately avoided sensitive 
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topics regarding China’s strategic behaviour and the regional security situation, and instead focused the 
discussion on trade and investment. The delicate political manoeuvring behind the agenda setting 
suggested the predominance of pragmatism, as well as a willingness to protect and further develop 
economic relationships between China and Australia (Gao, 2012, 2013). What do all these factors mean 
in terms of complex interdependence theory? This will be elaborated in the following sections. 
 
6.2.1 Position on Realist-Complex Interdependence Spectrum 
The preceding paragraphs sought to establish the compatibility between the actual situation of the 
Sino-Australian relations and the defining theoretical tenets of complex interdependence theory, before 
applying the theory to the analysis of bilateral resource politics between China and Australia. This is 
because before further discussion on how the condition of complex interdependence shapes the 
dynamics of power politics in the Sino-Australian resource relationship, it is necessary to first validate the 
applicability of the notion of complex interdependence in capturing the basic conditions of the extensive 
economic interdependence between China and Australia. Along these lines, Keohane and Nye stress 
that: 
 
It is important to determine the applicability of realism or of complex interdependence to each 
situation. Without this determination, further analysis is likely to be confused. Our purpose in 
developing an alternative to the realist description of world politics is to encourage a 
differentiated approach that distinguishes among dimensions and areas of world politics – not 
(as some modernist observers do) to replace one oversimplification with another. (Keohane & 
Nye, 2011: 24) 
 
In other words, it means that it is important to assess the degree to which the condition of complex 
interdependence is relevant to China-Australia relations. As Keohane and Nye have warned, ‘Before one 
decides what explanatory model to apply to a situation or problem, one will need to understand the 
degree to which realist or complex interdependence assumptions correspond to the situation’ (Keohane 
& Nye, 2011: 20). The preceding paragraphs have made a case for the general applicability of complex 
interdependence theory to this bilateral relationship by offering a broad sketch of the basic nature of 
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China-Australia economic interdependence. 
 
Complex interdependence theory postulates a spectrum of world politics, whereby the typical situations 
of complex interdependence and realism are ideal types, and most situations will fall somewhere 
between those two extremes; one needs to understand the degree to which realist or complex 
interdependence assumptions correspond to the situation, or where that particular situation of world 
politics sits on the spectrum, before deciding which explanatory model to apply to a situation. Since the 
condition of extensive economic interdependence in China-Australia relations is largely consistent with 
the defining characteristics of complex interdependence, the situation of China-Australia relations 
corresponds to a position that is arguably very close to the ‘complex interdependence’ end of the 
spectrum. The revival of adversarial realist dynamics post-2008 in the strategic dimension of the bilateral 
relations has moved the bilateral politics towards the realist end of the spectrum to some extent. However, 
the overall position of Sino-Australian relations remains closer to the liberal (or complex interdependence) 
end of the spectrum. 
 
6.2.2 Breakdown of Linkage Process and Relevance of Issue-Structure 
Model 
One immediate implications of this spectrum position for the resource power politics between China and 
Australia is the breakdown of linkage processes and the applicability of the issue-structure model for the 
analysis of Sino-Australian resource politics. According to Keohane and Nye, the relationship between 
the overall power balance between two countries and the pattern of outcomes of specific issue areas 
depends on whether the linkage processes are working. Under complex interdependence, linkage by 
strong states will be more difficult to achieve since military force will be ineffective and too costly, and the 
military security agenda no longer dominates (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 15); the stronger power is unable to 
translate its overall power advantage (in military terms) into issue-specific power advantage to gain a 
desirable outcome. As a result, the issue-specific power structure model becomes a more relevant 
explanatory tool for analysing power politics of interdependence in non-military economic issues as the 
distribution of power within each issue becomes more important in determining the outcome (Keohane & 
Nye, 2011: 42-44). 
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Developments in China-Australia resource politics take place against the general background of China’s 
rise in international significance. Whether China’s growing power or overall power advantage vis-à-vis 
Australia can help China enhance her power position vis-à-vis Australia in the specific issues of iron ore 
pricing and resource investment, would depend on the nature of the linkage mechanism. If the linkage 
mechanism functions, it would enable China to translate her overall power advantage into issue-specific 
power advantage in bilateral resource politics. Otherwise, China’s growing overall power would not help 
improve her power position (or bargaining position) vis-à-vis Australia in those specific issue areas. 
Given the ‘spectrum position’ of China-Australia relations, the issue structure model of power analysis is 
more applicable than the (overall power) structure model in the study of power politics of resource 
interdependence between the two countries. 
 
6.2.3 Issue-specific Power Derived from Asymmetrical Vulnerability 
Interdependence 
The issue-specific power relationship reflects the underlying patterns of sensitivity and vulnerability 
interdependence between the two sides in a specific issue. Given the negligible role of force and the 
military security agenda, states will rely more on other instruments in order to wield power. Since 
asymmetrical interdependence can be a source of power, states will manipulate asymmetrical 
interdependence as a policy instrument in the power politics of economic interdependence. From a 
strategic point of view, less vulnerable states will try to use asymmetrical interdependence in particular 
groups of issues as a source of power. Hence, manipulation of asymmetrical sensitivity and vulnerability 
interdependence specific to issue areas becomes an instrument of state policy (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 
13-15). 
 
This pattern is observed in the political struggles over the iron ore pricing and Chinese resource 
investment issues. Resource power politics between China and Australia took place at the sensitivity and 
vulnerability levels. Outcomes of power politics over the specific iron ore pricing and resource investment 
issues were determined by the distribution of power derived from asymmetrical sensitivity and 
vulnerability interdependence. In other words, the key to understanding the power dynamics behind the 
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iron ore pricing and resource investment issues, is the issue-specific power structure analysis that looks 
specifically at the patterns of sensitivity and vulnerability interdependence between China and Australia. 
 
6.2.4 Struggle for the Upper Hand: Chinese Vulnerability and Australian 
Dominance 
The Chinese steel industry was extremely vulnerable to iron ore price rises. The Australian mining giants 
were able to manipulate the asymmetrical vulnerability interdependence to maximise their gains from the 
iron ore trade without having to worry about Chinese retaliation. There was no alternative other than to 
accept the price increase imposed by the mining companies; in other words, the costs of making any 
effective adjustments to enable the use of a viable alternative would be too high under the existing 
market situation and policy framework. 
 
The Chinese steel industry attempted in vain to boycott Australian iron ores from Rio Tinto and BHP 
Billiton. As it turned out, the Chinese steel industry could not sustain any long period of boycott action 
because Chinese steel mills could not allow production and operation to be seriously disrupted. In this 
regard, the Chinese steel industry also lost the battle at the sensitivity level. More importantly, the 
Chinese action was a misguided attempt to manipulate asymmetrical sensitivity interdependence. The 
Chinese presumed the Australian mining companies would be sensitive to the impact of the Chinese 
boycott action; but they had failed to consider the underlying pattern of asymmetrical vulnerability, which 
was in the mining companies’ favour. As Keohane and Nye point out, vulnerability interdependence is the 
more important political aspect of mutual dependence than sensitivity interdependence as a form of 
power: ‘… coherent strategies must be based on the underlying patterns of vulnerability 
interdependence’; otherwise, ‘an attempt to manipulate asymmetrical sensitivity interdependence without 
regard for underlying patterns of vulnerability is likely to fail’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 14). 
 
Similarly, when the Chinese negotiators proposed the ‘Chinese model’ for the benchmark price 
negotiation, their proposal could only end in failure because the Chinese paid scant attention, or had 
seriously misjudged, the actual power relationship defined by the pattern of asymmetrical vulnerability 
between the Chinese steelmakers and the Australian (and Brazilian) mining giants. 
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Having realised their vulnerable position vis-à-vis the Australian mining companies in the pricing struggle, 
the Chinese actors began to take actions to reduce their vulnerability. The idea was to seek greater 
Chinese control of upstream resources and to reduce Chinese dependence on the three mining oligarchs. 
A major measure was to increase Chinese captive mines abroad by overseas investment and acquisition, 
which would presumably help increase Chinese market influence over resources, including the critical 
pricing power over major commodities such as iron ore.  
 
Australia’s resources sector had become a major destination for Chinese resource investment in this 
context. The Australian resource companies became weakened financially under the impact of the global 
financial and economic crises, and were therefore vulnerable to Chinese capital. As such, they could 
easily fall prey to Chinese government investors supported by the Chinese state with easy credit and 
political backing. The surge in Chinese government-related investment since 2008 constituted a 
scramble for Australia’s resource assets and, therefore, posed a serious threat to Australian control over 
her resources. In other words, the influx of Chinese government investment, if unchecked, would 
seriously undermine Australia’s dominant position in the resource politics. 
 
In this regard, the Australians were highly sensitive to China’s state-driven strategic manoeuvres to buy 
up Australia’s major resource assets. In the face of this unfavourable pattern of sensitivity asymmetry, the 
Australian government therefore responded by intervening and tightening the foreign investment regime 
against the Chinese government-related investment. This was essentially an attempt on the part of the 
Australian authorities to change the rules of the game for resource politics in the investment arena. If the 
Australian foreign investment regime chose not to discriminate against Chinese government investment, 
the Australian mining industry and resource businesses would become seriously disadvantaged in their 
contest with Chinese government-related investors. 
 
The initial power advantage enjoyed by the Chinese government investors was inherently unstable, since 
the Australian authorities, as the host government, were stronger in the vulnerability dimension. The 
Chinese investors were vulnerable to Australian government intervention and policy shifts designed to 
discriminate against the government background and the strategic pattern of Chinese resource 
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investment. This was partly because there were few private Chinese companies that were able to carry 
out substantial foreign direct investment in the capital-intensive resource acquisition projects abroad 
without state support. Moreover, the decision to discriminate against foreign government-related 
investment entities was a sovereign right of the host government, and the Chinese investors had no 
option but to adjust their investment behaviour and adapt their investment strategy to the new regime, 
however unwelcome the changes might have been. 
 
By transforming the rules of the game, the Australian government sought to preserve Australia’s resource 
interests. The exercise of Australia’s sovereign power to limit inflows of Chinese capital was aimed at 
forestalling strategic Chinese attempts to change the underlying pattern of vulnerability asymmetry in the 
bilateral resource politics. As a result, the Chinese government and state-owned investment entities 
appeared disadvantaged in terms of asymmetrical vulnerability interdependence in the power politics of 
foreign investment. In short, the Chinese attempt to take advantage of its superior position (derived from 
state support) on the sensitivity dimension ended in disaster because of a failure to recognise Chinese 
weakness at the vulnerability level. 
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6.3 Agenda Formation: Sensitivity, Economic Processes and 
Pluralisation of Interests and Actors 
Under complex independence, ‘high politics’ in terms of military security can no longer dominate 
state-level politics; and agenda politics is no longer primarily influenced by balance of power 
considerations and perceived military security threats. Rather, agendas can be heavily influenced by 
pluralisation of interests among different actors and domestic economic processes. This is evident in 
China’s resource power politics vis-à-vis Australia, whereby a variety of Chinese actors are involved in 
the process of agenda formation. 
 
In the case of iron ore pricing politics, the politicisation of iron ore prices in the Chinese policy discourse 
was a result of rising Chinese sensitivity to surging iron ore prices over the years. The issue was created 
by China’s economic growth and growing demand for resources, as well as the agitation for Chinese 
pricing power. The subsequent politicisation and even securitisation of the iron ore issue were closely 
related to the declining earnings performance of the entire Chinese steel industry since the end of the 
2000s, which had considerably increased the Chinese steel industry’s sensitivity to surging raw material 
costs. 
 
The formation of an agenda on iron ore pricing also reflected the will of the discontented Chinese steel 
mills, especially those large state-owned enterprises which had become upset enough to raise the issue 
and demand government intervention following consecutive defeats in the price struggles versus the 
Australian mining companies. Moreover, China’s rising market status in the global iron ore trade and the 
perceived shifts in the distribution of power (in terms of asymmetrical interdependence) on the issue also 
increased Chinese expectations and fuelled Chinese dissatisfaction, thereby facilitating the emergence 
of the iron ore pricing agenda. 
 
Both the Chinese steelmakers and Australian mining companies had growing complaints about what they 
all perceived as an increasingly ineffective iron ore pricing regime: the Chinese believed that the system 
was being abused by the dominant mining giants and no longer protected Chinese interests and 
demanded modification on their own terms; while the Australians preferred its wholesale replacement by 
a completely new pricing arrangement, as they believed that the existing pricing mechanism could no 
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longer maximise their interests in the iron ore trade. Hence, both the Chinese and Australians became 
impatient with the existing benchmark pricing regime as they believed that the mechanism could no 
longer deliver outcomes consistent with the underlying power structure, although the Chinese had most 
clearly misjudged the situation. 
 
Arguably, the iron ore pricing agenda was mainly promoted by the state-owned sector of the Chinese 
steel industry. State-owned industrial capital had a monopoly on access to imported long-term contract 
ores, which were considerably cheaper than spot market ores when demand for iron ore was high. To a 
large extent, the problem of rising benchmark prices had no immediate relevance to China’s numerous 
small- and medium- private steel mills, which always had to buy the more expensive ores from the spot 
market regardless of the benchmark prices of the long-term contract ores. Hence, the politicisation of the 
iron ore price issue mainly reflected the interests of the large state-owned steel mills that had privileged 
access to long-term contract ores. 
 
Some of these political dynamics were also found in the formation of the agenda related to the Chinese 
investment and acquisition of Australian resource assets. In the face of a sudden influx of Chinese 
government-related investment in the Australian resource sector, the Australian government became 
increasingly sensitive to the aggressive Chinese investment and acquisition spree and its market 
implications. The existing Australian mining oligarchs, who preferred the status quo in market conditions, 
viewed the infiltration of Chinese capital with hostility and actively lobbyied the government against 
Chinese investment. The politicisation of the Chinese investment issue in Australia was also a result of 
the fact that the previous Australian foreign investment regime had come to be seen as ineffective in 
protecting Australian economic and security interests in the face of the Chinese scramble for Australian 
resource assets. 
 
On the Chinese side, government investors had huge misgivings about Australian discrimination. Those 
state-owned industry and multinational corporations from the Chinese metallurgical industries and other 
resource-related sectors were powerful interest groups seeking to push investment access and 
discrimination issues onto interstate agenda. Developments in Australia showed that many of the 
Chinese transnational market actors pursued their own goals in terms of international expansion and 
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asset acquisition, often under the guise of Chinese national interests and state resource strategy. In no 
small measure, the interests of those Chinese corporations and industries played a dominant role in 
shaping China’s policy agenda towards Australia, even if the ultimate expression of those industry and 
business interests might impinge on China’s political ties with Australia. China’s rise and Australia’s 
growing economic dependence on China, also provided the Chinese with a sense of empowerment that 
had in one way or another encouraged the Chinese government to pursue its investment agenda 
forcefully by exerting huge pressure on the Australian policymakers. 
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6.4 Domestic Sources: Economic Constraints and Internal 
Fragmentation 
The sources of Chinese vulnerability in the power struggles over iron ore pricing and resource investment, 
also demonstrate how domestic constraints could complicate efforts to manipulate asymmetrical 
interdependence under complex interdependence conditions. Amongst other problems, internal 
fragmentation between the Chinese actors and the structural problem of overcapacity in the Chinese 
steel industry constituted two major domestic factors that contributed to Chinese vulnerability in the 
resource politics vis-à-vis Australia. 
 
The divergent interests and lack of internal coherence amongst the Chinese actors demonstrated typical 
problems under complex interdependence. According to Keohane and Nye, internal fragmentation, in 
terms of pluralisation of interests and actors, undermines the state’s ability to manipulate asymmetrical 
interdependence; ‘states that are better placed to maintain their coherence will be better able to 
manipulate uneven interdependence, than fragmented states that at first glance seem to have more 
resources in an issue area’ (Keohane & Nye, 2011: 29). This is most evidently demonstrated in China’s 
resource power politics with Australia, most notably in the intense struggle over iron ore pricing. The 
Chinese side appeared to have been seriously disadvantaged by these complications. Despite the 
perceived growing improvement in the Chinese power position following China’s enhanced market status 
and financial prowess in the two specific issues concerning resource investment and iron ore pricing, the 
Chinese actors remained near incapable of maintaining their coherence and manipulating the uneven 
interdependence to their own advantage. In this sense, internal fragmentation was a crucial source of 
Chinese vulnerability in the bilateral resource politics vis-à-vis Australia. 
 
Internal fragmentation within the Chinese iron ore import sector had seriously undermined collective 
efforts in the price negotiations, because it jeopardised Chinese attempts to end iron ore speculative 
trading, which was a major culprit in the crisis of surging iron ore prices. Iron ore speculation not only 
pushed up spot market ore prices, but also propped up benchmark prices and undermined Chinese 
negotiation efforts against the Australian mining companies. However, the divergent interests and 
infighting between China’s (state-owned) steel industry and the minerals import and export trading 
community, as well as the conflicts between the CISA and the CCCMC, largely crippled the CISA-led 
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efforts to crack down on iron ore speculation and further weakened the Chinese bargaining position. 
Moreover, the ‘selfish’ agenda of the large state-owned steel mills and the CISA also weakened the 
Chinese commitment to end speculation, which was in effect a good way of making huge profits at the 
expense of China’s numerous small- and medium-sized private steelmakers, to whom scant regard was 
given. 
 
During price negotiations, internal fragmentation within the Chinese steel sector also reinforced Chinese 
vulnerability at the negotiation table. Some leading steel mills were keen to pass on the expected rising 
raw material costs to downstream buyers, by raising steel prices before the settlement of benchmark 
prices. This occurred even though such pre-emptive acts of steel pricing would seriously jeopardise the 
ongoing negotiation efforts and were strongly opposed by the industry leader (the CISA). This problem 
was aggravated by the existence of numerous Chinese steel mills, which had allowed the mining 
companies to play the game of ‘divide and rule’ to defeat the Chinese steel industry. When the 
negotiations reached a deadlock and the CISA organised a collective boycott to exert pressure on the 
mining companies, many Chinese steel mills were willing to undercut the industry efforts and ‘defect’ to 
the mining companies’ side. The fact that many Chinese steel mills were willing to trade the industry’s 
commercial secrets for cheap long-term contract ores also illustrated the devastating impact of internal 
fragmentation. 
 
To some extent, internal fragmentation and incoherence also reinforced Chinese vulnerability in the 
investment issue. The Chinese transnational investors in Australia were mainly large state-owned 
enterprises from the mining and metallurgical industries. They played the dominant role in implementing 
the state-sponsored national geo-economic strategy of resource acquisition. Nonetheless, the 
investment strategies of those transnational actors were also driven by their own corporate agendas. 
Despite their government background, these state-related market actors were keen to pursue their own 
goals under the guise of national interest. In other words, they had a huge incentive to seek to enhance 
their own corporate profiles, expand their global business, and acquire the best resource assets with the 
help of state capital. In spite of the perception of a monolithic ‘China Inc.’, the lack of coordination and 
even internal competition amongst Chinese SOE investors as seen in Australia, undermined China’s 
resource acquisition strategy and compromised the chances of some major investment deals of strategic 
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significance. Some of the unhelpful candid remarks made by Chinese officials and industry leaders also 
fuelled Australian suspicion and fear about ‘China Inc.’ and Chinese intentions, thereby contributing to 
Chinese investors’ vulnerability. 
 
The other major source of domestic constraint was the persistent problem of overcapacity in the Chinese 
steel industry; indeed, it was the most pressing structural problem faced by the Chinese steel industry. 
Excess investment in steel capacity considerably aggravated the Chinese predicament in the iron ore 
struggle by propping up Chinese demand for imported iron ores, thereby contributing to their high price, 
and depressing steelmakers’ profit margins. Moreover, overcapacity led to over-supply of steel; this was 
a major cause for the steel industry’s persistently bleak outlook over recent years as the Chinese 
economy slowed down and demand for steel fell. Thus, the problem of overcapacity simultaneously 
aggravated Chinese vulnerability to iron ore price hikes and sensitivity to rising raw material costs. This 
problem was reinforced by a series of structural factors pertaining to China’s economic growth model and 
development patterns. Problems such as local protectionism and the Chinese economy’s heavy reliance 
on property market and infrastructure investment, all made it extremely difficult to combat overcapacity 
and eradicate its root causes without paying a huge price. 
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6.5 Political Constraints of Realist Dynamics on China’s 
Resource Ties with Australia 
Although the condition of complex interdependence was useful in terms of understanding the 
issue-specific power dynamics of resource politics, one has to go beyond the specific issues and look at 
the broader political context in which the bilateral resource politics have evolved. From the 
realist-complex interdependence spectrum perspective, the position of China-Australia relations was 
closer towards the liberal end than the realist end. In other words, China’s relations with Australia do not 
represent an ideal-type condition on the extreme end of complex interdependence; however, there is still 
an important realist dimension to consider when analysing resource politics between China and Australia. 
Moreover, the post-2008 strategic dynamics between the two countries resembles intensified realist 
dynamics; from a theoretical point of view, there has been a steady shift towards the realist end along the 
spectrum since 2008. Since the character of any particular situation of world politics depends on its 
position on the spectrum, this realist dimension and its implications must be taken into consideration, not 
to mention the fact that its relative salience in the bilateral politics has been increasing since 2008. 
 
The implications of the realist dynamics for the bilateral relationship are profound. China remains an 
authoritarian rising great power under Communist rule. Australia is a Western democratic ally of the 
United States located in the Western Pacific. China and Australia are not allies, but potential strategic 
adversaries with opposing political institutions and ideologies and divergent strategic outlooks. Thus, the 
strategic ties between China and Australia have always been extremely delicate and set the limit for the 
development of the overall political relationship. The adversarial realist dynamics were held in check 
during the post-9/11 era as the two countries experienced a period of entente; but the development of the 
bilateral political relationship during the post-9/11 period was still constrained by the fundamental political 
differences and strategic disagreements, as seen by Australia’s rejection of Chinese proposal for a 
Sino-Australian ‘strategic partnership’ in the mid-2000s. The revived realist dynamics since 2008 have 
arguably reinforced their political differences and exposed underlying adversarial dynamics in the 
strategic dimension of the bilateral ties, in response to the deteriorating regional security situation and 
intensified China-U.S. strategic rivalry. 
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6.5.1 Limits of the Bilateral Resource Ties 
Since the resource relationship has grown out of such a delicate political relationship, the realist strategic 
dynamics always have a constraining effect on the development of the resource partnership. The political 
controversies over Chinese investment and iron ore trade were suggestive of the extent to which the 
resource ties have grown and were able to develop under such a difficult political framework. Despite the 
substantial trade relationship, investment ties between China and Australia were significantly more 
limited. 
 
China’s resource-related investment in Australia was deliberately restricted and controlled by the 
Australian government. This was largely due to the disincentives to Chinese investment erected at the 
Australian end (Laurenceson, 2013). The Australian government required all foreign government-related 
investment proposals, irrespective of size, to go through a FIRB approvals process to determine whether 
they were in the national interest. In contrast, inward foreign investment by private firms only required 
FIRB approval if the amount was more than AU$248 million, and in the case of U.S. and New Zealand 
firms, the threshold was raised further to AU$1.08 billion. What these rules mean in practice is that nearly 
all Chinese inward investment must go through a lengthy and uncertain approval process, while only a 
fraction of investment from other countries must do the same (Laurenceson, 2013). 
 
Studies show that Chinese investment in Australia has indeed remained marginal. The stock of Chinese 
investment in Australia has stayed low, particularly compared with the stock of U.S. investment. In fact, 
Australia’s utilisation of China’s vast pool of domestic savings has been limited. At the end of 2012, 
accumulated stock of U.S. investment stood at AU$617.6 billion, whereas the stock of Chinese 
investment totalled only AU$22.9 billion, which was a mere 1.1 percent of the total stock of foreign 
investment in Australia (Laurenceson, 2013). From 2003 to 2012, there have been AU$330 billion net 
inflows of U.S. investment into Australia; by contrast, there has only been AU$20 billion net inflow of 
Chinese investment during the same period (Laurenceson, 2013). In 2012, net inflows of Chinese 
investment amounted to AU$3.9 billion, not much higher than the average annual value since 2006, and 
well down on the high of AU$7.8 billion in 2009; net inflows of U.S. investment in 2012, however, totalled 
AU$43.7 billion; even if only direct investment is considered, as opposed to including portfolio investment, 
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net inflows from the United States were still four times higher than those from China. This data suggests 
that China has hardly become a more important supplier of capital to Australia over the years 
(Laurenceson, 2013).  
 
The correlation between investment ties and strategic relationship was perhaps most convincingly put by 
the Australian Ambassador to the United States, Kim Beazley. In early 2014, he delivered a stark 
wake-up to Australian politicians and business people who believed that Australia enjoyed a ‘special’ 
relationship with China: ‘Some people in Australia think we are more engaged with China than the 
Americans. I am afraid to say that is ludicrous. We are not on the same chessboard’.
341
 According to 
Beazley, Australia had invested US$430 billion in the United States, which was about 20 times what it 
directed to China; and America had more than US$650 billion in Australia, which was 10 times what it 
had in China. Beazley warned about placing too much confidence in bilateral China-Australia trade as a 
diplomatic tool. Although trade was essential, it was ‘ephemeral’ because the relationship was at the 
mercy of supply and demand; investment in each country was more strategically important because ‘it 
has a greater level of permanency’.
342
 
 
The tightening of regulatory scrutiny on Chinese investment took place against the backdrop of rising 
anti-China feeling across the Australian polity and mainstream political spectrum. There was a pervasive 
perception that given its unlimited appetite for mineral resources China was seeking to buy up Australia’s 
resource assets and control the country’s mining industry. Australia’s public opinion has, in general, 
turned against China and Chinese investment in recent years. Australian anxiety over the resource 
investment relationship with China was vividly captured by Paul Kelly, whose warning was indicative of 
Australian unwillingness to forge a genuinely close and even symbiotic economic relationship through 
investment. Calling the Chinese investment issue a ‘manageable minefield’, the Editor-At-Large of The 
Australian, warned that: 
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China’s rise will mean for the first time in Australia's history that our dominant trade partner will 
not be a strategic ally of the West; for the first time the overseeing authority of our partner will be 
the Communist Party; for the first time the values of our partner will be radically different from 
Australia's…It is precisely the differences between Australia and China that generate the 
unpredictability. (Kelly December 16, 2009) 
 
The bilateral trade relationship has become much more developed thanks to the vital iron ore business. 
However, this robust trade relationship in no measure reflects a genuinely equitable and fair partnership. 
Australia’s mineral suppliers’ main interested has been in taking advantage of Chinese vulnerability for 
short-term profit maximisation. They have shown scant regard for Chinese misgivings about this 
exploitative trade relationship. Indeed, this pattern of trade has been reflective of the broader Australian 
approach to bilateral ties with China. In the words of the Australian ambassadors to China, the 
Australians tend to view the relationship with China primarily in ‘transactional’ terms (Raby, 2013). Whilst 
ruthlessly pursuing profit maximisation in iron ore trade, the Australian miners had no concerns about the 
legitimate interests of the downstream Chinese buyers in terms of survival and development needs. 
Australian society has remained by and large ignorant of the plight of the Chinese steel industry and its 
internal conflicts. With scant regard for Chinese interests and concerns, the Australian government has 
remained protective of the mining interests in the iron ore trade under the banner of ‘normal commercial 
relations’ (Leaver, 2010). In fact, the Labour government itself was keen to join the iron ore feast by 
proposing the resource super profits tax scheme, which would only further increase the Australian 
government’s revenue at the expense of downstream Chinese ore buyers and reduce the miners’ shares 
of the profits from the lucrative iron ore business. Although the proposed scheme was eventually 
defeated by Australia’s powerful mining interests and cost Kevin Rudd his Prime Ministership, the event 
was indicative of the Australia’s transactional, opportunistic if not bullying approach to its resource trade 
ties. 
 
Arguably, the Chinese abandoned their initial fantasy of forging an intimate strategic resource partnership 
with the Australians. A deep sense of mistrust, betrayal and frustration characterised the Chinese 
reaction to the failure of a number of high-profile Chinese investment bids, most notably by the collapse 
of the Chinalco-Rio deal. The Chinese felt betrayed and deeply hurt when Rio Tinto chose to break away 
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from the agreed strategic partnership with Chinalco, and instead formed an iron ore alliance with its 
competitor BHP Billiton to strengthen the producer coalition at the expense of the Chinese customers
343
 
(Cai July 10, 2009). China’s ensuing anger and frustration dealt a heavy blow to the already fragile 
investment relationship. Many Chinese consequently came to believe that Rio Tinto (and also the 
Australian government) was being dishonest and ungrateful: China wanted to embrace Rio Tinto as a 
long-term strategic partner and had helped Rio weather the storm through the most difficult time of the 
crisis; instead, Rio chose to break faith with the Chinese and showed itself to be nothing but a calculating 
and ruthless partner that had exploited the good faith of the Chinese.
344
 As a result, China was said to 
have lost faith in Rio, which was no longer regarded as a trustworthy partner with whom China could build 
a reliable strategic partnership. The Chinese believed that their failed partnership with Rio had taught 
them a lesson to not be too trusting: they would no longer look for ways of nurturing any special 
investment relationship with the Australians. Instead, the Chinese would pick up this Australian-style 
business expediency very quickly, which they thought in the long run would eventually cause Australia 
grief when the resource boom and the era of the seller’s market comes to an end.
345
 
 
Indeed, Chinese investors were prepared to invest elsewhere if political risks in Australia were to become 
unbearable. Some Australians had already taken note of the profound shift in the latest Chinese 
investment attitude towards Australia and warned that the situation on the ground was alarmingly 
discouraging, as Chinese investors had begun to vote with their wallets by investing elsewhere (and even 
leaving Australia), whilst big Chinese investments no longer went to Australia (Garnaut February 21, 
2009; May 31, 2011). During the official visit of Politburo Standing Committee member Jia Qinglin to 
Australia in April 2011, a senior Chinese official from the General Office of the CPC (Communist Party of 
China) Central Committee accompanying the visiting Chinese delegation left a private note to the effect 
that China would divest itself of its assets in Australia and even reconsider its approach to trade relations 
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with Australia, if Canberra continued to side with Washington against Beijing and ignore China’s interests; 
that Australians would be ill-advised to take the strong economic relationships with China for granted.
346
 
 
6.5.2 Reliable Resource Partnership with A Potential Strategic 
Adversary? 
China had great expectations for its resource ties with Australia during the post-9/11 era. When the 
bilateral relationship was in its best shape around the mid-2000s, Beijing wished to forge a long-term 
strategic resource partnership with Australia, and hoped the close resource partnership would help 
promote and develop the bilateral political relationship with Australia into an exemplary role model for 
Sino-Western relations.
347
 When the Labour Party came to power, the market opportunities created by 
the outbreak of the global financial crisis led to a rapid expansion of Chinese resource ambitions and a 
scramble for Australian resource assets through overseas investment. Australia’s strong reaction against 
Chinese investment came as a big surprise to the Chinese.
348
 China subsequently began to have 
growing doubts about the reliability of the resource partnership with Australia as the bilateral strategic 
relationship deteriorated. Reliability of resource supply had thus become a major policy concern for 
China. 
 
The rise of the resource security agenda added significance to the security relationship with Australia. 
The bilateral security relationship itself was not of major significance in China’s foreign policy thinking, 
given Australia’s relatively limited strategic weight as well as geographical distance from China. However, 
the importance of the resource agenda reinforced China’s strategic anxiety over Australia’s security 
orientation. In other words, resource security concerns reinforced China’s traditional security concerns 
about Australia’s strategic posture. This was why the resource ties helped Australia to punch above its 
weight vis-à-vis China and endow the country a level of influence well beyond its size in terms of 
population and geo-strategic importance
349
 (Yu & Xiong, 2012). 
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Much has been said about the strategic dilemma faced by Australia in its ties with China. For Australia, 
China had become a potential strategic adversary whilst at the same time becoming Australia’s major 
economic partner. However, China was also in an acute dilemma in which her critical resource supplier 
had become a potential strategic adversary. The stronger the realist dynamics in the bilateral relations 
became, the more acute the dilemma. Both countries needed each other for economic reasons, but both 
had begun to treat the growing resource ties with increasing caution and wariness. In an event of major 
conflicts between China and the United States, Australia would likely be drawn into a conflict against 
China. In such a scenario, China’s resource interests in Australia would be greatly endangered: Chinese 
resource assets might be seized by the Australian government; critical sea lanes of communication along 
the Indian Ocean might be taken by the allied forces; and the critical minerals and energy resources 
trade might come to an end if Australia imposed trade sanctions against China. These nightmare 
scenarios embody some of the potential strategic threats to China’s resource security, in the event that 
strategic tensions with the United States and other regional powers escalate into a great power war. In 
theoretical terms, Chinese-Australian relations could be characterised primarily by realist conditions 
under such circumstances, far closer to the realist end of the spectrum of world politics. 
 
In policy terms, there is a strong imperative to stabilise the security relationship with Australia and keep 
the realist dynamics in check. For this reason, China has a huge incentive to tap into the strategic 
dividend of the growing economic interdependence deriving from the resource ties. The rapid 
development of China’s resource ties with Australia in the post-9/11 period were not so much a result of 
the conscious implementation of Chinese economic statecraft as a consequence of China’s domestic 
economic development;
350
 but rather the strategic dividend derived from the economic ties had been 
apparent during that period as China’s economic rise helped to stabilise political relations with Australia. 
In the post-2008 era, China arguably faced a more difficult strategic environment for the practice of 
economic statecraft with regional countries such as Australia. If the strategic tension in 
Chinese-Australian relations and China-U.S. relations continued to grow, it could become more difficult 
for both China and Australia to adopt a ‘de-coupling’ strategy to separate their economic and strategic 
agendas in bilateral dealings. Yet, the need for effective economic statecraft to stabilise the security 
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relationship with Australia will become ever more imperative for the sake of ensuring a reliable resource 
supply from Australia. China might expect Australia to maintain its neutrality in an event of major regional 
strategic contingency issue involving China; but given the strategic reality, the best long-term option for 
China would be to avoid becoming over-dependent on Australia for its resource supply. 
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No.  Name Position Organisation  
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上海国际问题研究院亚太研究中心 
Center for Asia-Pacific Studies, Shanghai 
Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) 
2 Anonymous Associate Professor 上海社会科学院世界经济研究所全球化经
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Section of Globalised Economic, Institute 
of World Economy, Shanghai Academy of 
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3 Anonymous Professor 
 
上海社会科学院国际战略研究中心 
Center of International Strategic Studies; 
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Australian Studies Centre, East China 
Normal University 
5 Anonymous Associate Professor 复旦大学国际关系与公共事务学院国际政
治系 
Department of International Politics, 
School of International Relations and 
Public Affairs, Fudan University 
  
Trip 2:  China (Beijing and Shanghai), December 2009 – January 2010 
No.  Name Position Organisation  
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of Asia-Pacific Studies, CASS 
9 Anonymous Professor 北京大学国际关系学院 
School of International Studies, Peking 
University 
10 Anonymous Professor 北京大学国际政治经济研究中心 
Center for International Political Economy, 
Peking University  
11 Anonymous Professor 北京大学国际战略研究中心 
Center for International & Strategic 
Studies, Peking University 
12 Anonymous Associate Professor 北京大学国际战略研究中心 
Center for International & Strategic 
Studies, Peking University 
13 Anonymous Professor 北京大学国际战略研究中心 
Center for International & Strategic 
Studies, Peking University 
14 Anonymous Professor 北京大学国际关系学院 
School of International Studies, Peking 
University  
15 Anonymous Professor 北京大学国际关系学院 
School of International Studies, Peking 
University 
16 Anonymous Professor 外交学院战略与冲突管理研究中心 
Center for Strategic and Conflict 
Management, China Foreign Affairs 
University  
17 Anonymous Associate Professor 清华大学国际关系学系 
Department of International Relations, 
Tsinghua University 
18 Anonymous Researcher 中国人民解放军国防大学 
Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
National Defence University 
19 Anonymous Associate Professor 中国现代国际关系研究院亚非研究所 
Institute of Asian and African Studies, 
China Institutes of Contemporary 
International Relations (CICIR) 
20 Anonymous Associate Research 
Fellow 
中国青少年研究中心 
China Institute for Youth and Children 
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Research 
 
Trip 3: China (Beijing, Shanghai & Hangzhou), October-December 2010 
No.  Name Position Organisation  
21 Anonymous Professor China Research Centre, the University of 
Technology Sydney (based in Beijing) 
22 Anonymous Journalist Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
(ABC) 
23 Anonymous Journalist The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age  
24 Anonymous Senior diplomat Australian Embassy, China 
25 Anonymous Senior diplomat Australian Embassy, China 
26 Anonymous Senior diplomat Australian Embassy, China 
27 Anonymous Researcher 中国现代国际关系研究院南亚东南亚及大
洋洲研究所 
Institute of South & Southeast Asian & 
Oceanian Studies, CICIR 
28 Anonymous Researcher 中国现代国际关系研究院南亚东南亚及大
洋洲研究所 
Institute of South & Southeast Asian & 
Oceanian Studies, CICIR 
29 Anonymous Professor 南开大学周恩来政府管理学院国际关系系 
Department of International Relations, 
Zhou Enlai School of Government, Nankai 
University 
30 Anonymous  Assistant Professor 对外经济贸易大学国际贸易经济学院 
School of International Trade and 
Economics, the University of International 
Business and Economics 
31 Anonymous Professor 外交学院当代中国外交研究中心 
Foreign Affairs Department, China 
Foreign Affairs University  
32 Anonymous Researcher 商务部国际贸易经济合作研究院亚非部 
Department of Asia and Africa, Chinese 
Academy of International Trade and 
Economic Cooperation (CAITEC), 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
33 Anonymous Researcher 商务部国际贸易经济合作研究院 
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Department of China’s Trade & Economic 
Relations, CAITEC, Chinese Ministry of 
Commerce 
34 Anonymous Professor 中国人民大学国际关系学院 
School of International Studies, Remin 
University 
35 Anonymous Professor 中国人民大学全球治理研究中心 
Centre for the Study of Global 
Governance, Remin University 
36 Anonymous Researcher 中国人民解放军军事科学院世界军事研究
部 
Department of World Military Research, 
Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
Academy of Military Science 
37 Anonymous Associate Research 
Fellow 
中国国际问题研究所国际战略研究部 
Department of International and Strategic 
Studies, CIIS  
38 Anonymous Researcher 国家发展和改革委员会对外经济研究所 
Institute of International Economic 
Research, Academy of Macroeconomic 
Research, Chinese National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
39 Anonymous Researcher 国家发展和改革委员会产业经济与技术经
济研究所 
Institute of Industrial and Technological 
Economics, Academy of Macroeconoimc 
Research, NDRC 
40 Anonymous Professor 北京大学国际关系学院 
Department of International Political 
Economy, School of International Studies, 
Peking University  
41 Anonymous Former senior diplomat 中国国际交流促进会 
China International Exchange Association 
42 Anonymous Senior diplomat 中国外交部北美大洋洲司 
Department of North American and 
Oceanian Affairs, Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
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43 Anonymous Associate Professor 上海大学悉尼工商学院 
Sydney Institute of Language & 
Commerce, Shanghai University 
44 Anonymous Professor 华东师范大学澳大利亚研究中心 
Australian Studies Centre, East China 
Normal University 
45 Anonymous Lecturer 厦门大学经济学院 
School of Economics, Xiamen University 
46 Anonymous Assistant Professor 上海外国语大学国际关系与外交事务研究
中心中国海外利益研究中心 
Centre for China’s Overseas Interests 
Studies, School of International and 
Diplomatic Affairs, Shanghai International 
Studies University 
47 Anonymous Senior manager A Chinese minerals import and export 
company 
48 Anonymous Senior manager A Chinese minerals import and export 
company 
 
Trip 4: Australia (Canberra and Sydney), March-April 2011 
No.  Name Position Organisation  
49 Anonymous  Professor Department of International Relations, 
School of International, Political and 
Strategic Studies, the Australian National 
University (ANU) 
50 Anonymous Professor Department of International Relations, 
ANU 
51 Anonymous Professor Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
School of International, Political and 
Strategic Studies, ANU 
52 Anonymous Professor School of Politics and International 
Relations, ANU 
53 Anonymous Senior Lecturer Department of International Relations, 
ANU 
54 Anonymous Emeritus Professor Department of International Relations, 
ANU 
55 Anonymous Emeritus Professor East Asian Bureau of Economic 
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Research, Crawford School of Economics 
and Government, ANU College of Asia 
and the Pacific, ANU 
56 Anonymous Senior Fellow China Economy Programme, Crawford 
School of Economics and Government, 
ANU 
57 Anonymous PhD candidate Department of International Relations, 
ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, ANU 
58 Anonymous Visiting Fellow College of Law, ANU 
59 Anonymous Professor The ANU China Institute, ANU College of 
Asia and the Pacific, ANU 
60 Anonymous Senior columnist The Australian Financial Review 
61 Anonymous Senior Analyst Strategy and International Programme, 
the Australian Strategic Policy Institute 
(ASPI) 
62 Anonymous Senior Lecturer School of Humanities and Social 
Sciences, the University of New South 
Wales (UNSW) at the Australian Defence 
Force Academy (ADFA) in Canberra 
63 Anonymous Professor School of Humanities and Social 
Sciences, UNSW at ADFA in Canberra 
64 Anonymous Professor School of Humanities and Social 
Sciences, UNSW at ADFA in Canberra 
65 Anonymous Professor School of Humanities and Social 
Sciences, UNSW at ADFA at Canberra 
66 Anonymous Senior Research Fellow The Lowy Institute for International Policy 
67 Anonymous Senior analyst The Kokoda Foundation 
68 Anonymous Official Australian Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (DFAT) 
69 Anonymous Senior diplomat DFAT 
70 Anonymous Senior diplomat Chinese Embassy, Australia 
71 Anonymous Research Fellow China Research Centre, the University of 
Technology Sydney 
72 Anonymous Senior analyst The Lowy Institute for International Policy 
73 Anonymous Research Fellow The Lowy Institute for International Policy 
74 Anonymous Researcher Peking University 
75 Anonymous Professor Centre for International Security Studies, 
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the University of Sydney 
76 Anonymous Research Fellow The Centre for Independent Studies 
77 Anonymous Senior analyst The Lowy Institute for International Policy 
78 Anonymous Reader School of Social Sciences & International 
Studies, UNSW 
79 Anonymous Associate Professor Centre for International Security Studies, 
the University of Sydney 
80 Anonymous Anonymous China Studies Centre, the University of 
Sydney 
 
Additional interviews in London, October-December 2012 
No.  Name Position Organisation  
81 Anonymous Professor Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
School of International, Political and 
Strategic Studies, ANU 
82 Anonymous Official 中国外交部 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
83 Anonymous Official 中共中央对外联络部 
International Department of the Central 
Committee, Communist Party of China 
84 Anonymous Diplomat Australian High Commission, London 
 
